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
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MILITARY ENDS

AND

MORAL MEANS:

EXEMPLIFYING

THE HIGHER INFLUENCES AFFECTING MILITARY LIF
AND CHARACTER;

THE MOTIVES TO ENLISTMENT;

THE USE OF STRATAGEMS IN WAR;

THE NECESSITY OF STANDING ARMIES;

AND

THE DUTIES OF A MILITARY FORCE AIDING THE CIVIL POWE

BY

COLONEL JAMES J. GRAHAM,

AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF WAR."

LONDON:

SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL

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1864

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TO

FIELD-MARSHAL

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, K.G.,

ETC. ETC. ETC.

COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF,

This Work

IS DEDICATED (WITH SPECIAL PERMISSION)

BY

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS'S VERY OBEDIENT HUMBLE SERVANT,

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

In the present contest between scientific men, in which, on the one side, the most consummate skill is exerted to increase the powers of destruction, and, on the other side, equal skill is applied to improve the means of defence, the marvellous resources of an age highly advanced in scientific knowledge are forcibly presented to the world.

In this exciting struggle, Victory seems to incline to each side alternately, according as the ingenuity of each competitor reciprocally gains a temporary ascendency, and a degree of interest as to the ultimate issue has been created, which has a tendency to divert men's minds from the fact, that the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; that the impetus of projectiles, and the stoutness of armour plates, are not the only elements of victory.

Such elements undoubtedly form part of the whole machinery of war; but the movement of that vast and

complicated machinery differs from the action o ordinary piece of mechanism, in being subjected tc disturbing influence of the passions and emotions of its operations being well or ill performed in propo to the extent of the moral sympathy subsisting bet the authority which governs, and the intelligent pa the working power.

To approach this speculative feature in the nc presented to the mind by the term War is no t undertaking, being no less than an attempt to u those moral influences which feed the ranks of ar light the torch of war, control the power of conten hosts, and albeit unseen, yet with giant power, decid fate of nations.

Upon a right understanding of the first of t branches of the subject—the motives which induce to enlist—much more is dependent than public op is perhaps prepared to admit. Were its import justly appreciated, the vague and unphilosophical i propounded on the subject before the comm appointed by Parliament to inquire into the recru system, could hardly have remained so long unnotic

If the British soldier can bear the test of an in gation into the causes of his enlistment, if (as the a believes) the British soldier is a being of a hi standard in the scale of intelligence and moral v

than he has been represented in the evidence before the committee above named, an effort to remove all misapprehension on such a subject, and to obtain for the soldier that position in popular estimation to which he is entitled, cannot be regarded as uncalled for. Under any circumstances the merit of an honest desire to do an act of justice, is claimed for the attempt.

Drawn, as the young soldier is, from the poorer classes of the community, much of his moral training is probably of that description which is familiarly termed the "education of circumstances;" a great diversity is, therefore, naturally to be expected in the moral condition of the youths who join the Army; but it by no means follows from their humble origin that they have been educated in vice; on the contrary, it might not, perhaps, be difficult to prove that, in proportion to numbers, the lower ranks in this country are on a par with the rich in point of virtue and morality.

Such a mode of reasoning has hitherto scarcely been entertained, nor has the maxim, that innocence is to be presumed until guilt is proved, been much attended to in the case of a recruit for the Army. Few have been inclined to give him credit for enlisting from honourable motives. The feeling towards him upon his entering the service, it is to be feared, has been and still is in too many instances that of distrust; and up to a very

recent period, more reliance has been placed on a rigorous system of punishment than on the allurement of rewards. Happily, of late years, great modifications and improvements have been introduced, but all that is desirable has not yet been accomplished.

Succeeding generations will, perhaps, regard some part of our military code, even as it now exists, with the same astonishment with which we read that in the Roman armies their officers, even those of the rank of centurions, were liable to bodily chastisement. The Romans, no doubt, considered such a power essential to discipline; yet a milder system has proved perfectly successful in modern armies. There is, therefore nothing visionary in anticipating that some further modifications in our system will yet take place.

This, however, can only be effected with safety by establishing the soldier in that position which he ought to occupy in his own eyes and in the opinion of countrymen.

It is not to be expected that a passion such as the desire of posthumous glory can ever be made use of to a considerable extent as a stimulant to men in

One of the first objects to be aimed at is to extinguish such sentiments with regard to the service as those promulgated before the Committee on Recruiting, and to make the Army respected, as it ought to be, amongst the lower classes throughout the country.

Everything that can ennoble man is associated with the profession of arms. Devotion, patriotism, bravery, honour,—all are attached to the name of soldier. Without his aid, the existence of his country would be perilled.

Ille est qui nobis hæc otia fecit.

Why is it, then, that instead of competition for admission into the ranks, the art of persuasion is said to be required to tempt men to enter, and that a recruit is said to hold down his head and shun the sight of his friends after he has enlisted, instead of feeling proud that he has been deemed worthy to be enrolled ?

The little respect shown to soldiers in this country is not to be ascribed to any one cause in particular, but to several conjointly. A specimen of these causes may be pointed out in the fact recorded in these pages, that magistrates were at one time empowered in this country to remit the sentence of an offender, on condition of hi enlisting as a soldier. That baneful practice has lon since ceased, but its effects may still be traced in t

slights cast upon soldiers by the ignorant and narrow-minded.

Those who watch narrowly the current of public opinion may observe a partiality for the Army growing up, and gradually displacing the prejudices so long nourished.

To foster this feeling, and to confer a solid benefit on the British Army, perhaps no better measure could be adopted than that which has been mooted for the establishment of training schools for young soldiers, where in conjunction with a knowledge of the duties of a soldier's life, they may acquire industrious habits by learning a trade, and where sound moral principles will be instilled into them.

Impressed with a belief that such a measure would eventually repay any trifling outlay it may occasion in the first instance, the author concludes a sketch of the origin of Standing Armies, by raising his humble voice in favour of these training schools in connection with an organization securing to the well-conducted soldier at the end of his full term of service, eithe employment at his trade or in some way which w his pension will enable him to support himself i respectable manner.

Looking to the eventuality of some relaxation military code, and looking also to the fact that Engl

irrevocably committed to the position of a military power by necessity, the measures just referred to, although promising great results, do not comprehend everything which should be done.

In proportion as the soldier acquires more elevated sentiments, he becomes better qualified to appreciate similar qualities in his officer. A chapter has therefore been devoted to inculcating the value of that moral ascendency which officers should make it their study to acquire in relation to the men under their command.

The subject of Stratagems, which has been introduced in another portion of the volume, has more affinity with the moral influences than may at first sight appear. No private soldier can read the examples here recorded of surprises and stratagems without feeling raised in his own estimation, when he reflects on the enormous responsibility with which, at any moment, he may be invested in the discharge of his duty as a simple sentinel.

Weary and hungry when planted on his post, how much depends on the struggle of his spirit against physical weakness. Relying on his vigilance, the armed host sinks to repose—perils in every shape surrounding the camp; let but the weary sentinel's spirit grow faint, and, worse than death, the Army may be surprised, dishonoured.

To the officer on whom devolves the duty of diving into the secrets of the enemy, such examples from history as are here presented are valuable as guides, giving an insight into futurity, on the principle that what has been shall be. Nor are they less valuable as affording inspirations for action, inasmuch as what has succeeded with one may serve as a rule for another.

If it were possible to classify stratagems as the various operations of an Army are methodized in works on tactics, such an arrangement would be convenient and advantageous; but the same conception may sometimes serve to deceive the enemy at various stages of a campaign, at a battle or a siege, when retreating or advancing. Nothing further in the way of classification has therefore been attempted than to group together, in a general way, those examples which seem to bear an analogy to each other.

Devonshire Terrace, Hyde Park, March, 1864.

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ERRATA.

Page 99, lines 5 and 13, *for* "Lyseas" *read* "Lysias."
„ 109, line 6 from bottom, *for* "Feherbillen" *read* "Fehrbillen."
„ 110, „ 4, *for* "Cortes" *read* "Cortez."
„ 130, „ 7 from bottom, *for* "together" *read* "to gather."
„ 156, „ 10 „ „ „ the comma should be before the word "Græca," instead of after it.
„ 185, lines 4 and 17, *for* "Wurmsee" *read* "Wurmser."
„ 211, „ 4 and 9, *for* "Ganimede" *read* "Ganymed."
„ 222, line 5 from bottom, *for* "Oxemlin," *read* "Oxmelin."
„ 228, „ 9, *for* "Foresto," *read* "Foresti."
„ 251, „ 10, „ "Lautrech" *read* "Lautrec."
„ 257, „ 1, „ "Hurne" *read* "Heurne."
„ „ „ 3 from bottom, *for* "Bauner" *read* "Banner."
„ 258, „ 2, *for* "Cannes" *read* "Cannæ."
„ 280, Letter quoted in note should be signed "Wellington."
„ 283, line 12, *for* "or" *read* "for."
„ 305, „ 13 from bottom, *for* "Corigny" *read* "Coigny."
„ 419 „ 15, *for* "Clausenas' *read* "Clusinas."

course between the people of England and the inhabitants of the remotest regions of the globe.

The mere protection of such a commerce would require a fleet, even if no other circumstances contributed to favour the maintenance of a force of that description.

Popularity of navy increases, that of army declines.

Thus the naval service rose in importance, while, owing to the loss of our possessions in France, the union with Scotland, and a combination of other causes, the military service by which so much national glory had been acquired during past centuries declined in popular favour; and it became a ministerial policy to apply the skill of the country, as well as the public money, chiefly to perfecting the Navy, to aim at the sovereignty of the seas rather than at pre-eminence as a military power. In support of this view, the testimony of the late Lord Herbert may be quoted, as his lordship, after holding the office of Secretary to the Admiralty and Secretary at War in succession, stated, in evidence before a Parliamentary Committee, as the result of his experience in those offices, "that at a time when there was a very restricted military and naval expenditure, and when economical views prevailed over views for the purpose of securing efficiency, he could always obtain for the Navy (that being a popular service) anything in reason that the Department asked for; but when he was Secretary for War he did not feel that he could, with the same confidence, ask for those amounts which could be procured for the Navy."

Reaction in favour of army.

The preference which so notoriously existed at one time for the naval service, as compared with the Army, has been somewhat modified of late years, and a renewed interest has been excited in favour of the Army, which has brought about an amelioration in the condition of the soldier. His convenience and accommodation in barracks are more studied, and the means of intellectual culture, by schools and libraries, have been placed within his reach, and greater encouragement to good conduct is

now held out by the institution of a judicious system of rewards.

The standard of education for officers has, at the same time, been raised, and promotion made dependent on the officers' ability to pass specified examinations.

But enough has not yet been done to draw closer the bonds by which the officer and soldier should be knit together. The character of each individual soldier should be more studied by his officer, and the officer should be taught to cultivate assiduously those qualities which are calculated to gain for him the confidence of his men, and to secure to him such a degree of personal attachment that his orders shall always be met with a prompt and ready obedience, never with faltering compliance.

Convention rank insufficient to secure authority.

The conventional rank which is an essential part of all military institutions can only in itself secure to its possessor a limited amount of authority, if such rank is unaccompanied by that moral ascendency which is the result of superior character.

Among the rustics assembled round the village cross, in the courts of the palace, in the diplomatic circle, in the senate, in the halls of justice, among all classes, commercial as well as aristocratic, examples are daily presented to our notice of individuals invested with a moral sway which is wholly irrespective of their social position by birth.[1]

[1] "No two people can be half-an-hour together, but one shall acquire an evident superiority over the other."—JOHNSON.

"One chief may be a conqueror of many others. He may, by his actions, excite fear, admiration, enthusiasm. He may be regarded as a hero; and the empire over men's minds which he thus acquires may make them submit to him and obey his commands. In this case the government may be termed hero sway, and the sway may be acquired not merely by success in war, but by any of that superiority in overcoming great difficulties, and executing great designs, which subjugates the minds of men."

If it were not for this law of our nature, government would be impossible, for the physical force is always on the side of numbers, whilst the governing body must always be in the minority; and the authority of this minority, therefore, could have no solid foundation, if it were not for this attribute of superior intelligence and force of character.

With many who are born the unconscious possessors of this power, the power itself is latent through life, because no occasion occurs to call forth its exercise.[2]

By moral sway men become renowned.

Others who have to tread the way of life through more rugged and intricate paths, find scope for the exercise of this power, and thus become leaders in great national movements. Theirs is the mighty influence which alternately rouses and stems the whirlwind of popular feeling; they are, in fact, the actors on the world's stage, whose deeds, engraven with a pen of adamant on the world's history, give life to its pages.

This power is the result of a natural gift. There is a pathos, as well as a glowing vehemence, in the wild eloquence of the untutored savage, which rouses the emotions of his tribe to the highest pitch; at the same time increased skill in the exercise of this talent is to be acquired by studying the art of adapting it to the idiosyncrasies of those whose emotions we desire to rouse or control.

Importance of this moral influence in the army.

In the Army this gift is the connecting link between officers and their men, without which there is no security. The regular power, that is, conventional rank, may secure

[2] "Although men are accused for not knowing their own weakness; yet, perhaps, as few know their own strength. It is in man as in soils, where sometimes there is a vein of gold which the owner knows not of."—SWIFT.

obedience and respect in time of peace and inactivity, but in the emergencies of a campaign, when it is impossible to explain to a soldier why he is called upon to submit to the extremity of suffering, his reliance on his officer can alone reconcile him to his fate; and in the tumult of a battle, when everything becomes complicated, when a natural obstacle of the most trifling description may appear insurmountable, nothing else will suffice but the energy produced by mutual confidence subsisting between officers and men, combined with a bold and determined spirit.

The springs of human action are for ever the same, and, therefore, form a sure basis for calculations in war. Tactics and all the means of destruction and defence are subject to perpetual changes. Napoleon held the opinion that to keep ahead of our enemies we must adopt a new system of tactics every ten years. The talismanic influence communicated by the spirit of a general who has won the hearts of his men, is a never-failing resource. By it an army may be rescued from destruction, nay, more, may seize the victory when tactics alone would be wholly insufficient.

Hannibal on the summit of the Alps.

When Hannibal reached the summit of the Alps, all his moral influence was required to overcome the feelings of despondency which pervaded the ranks. All might have been lost but for the electric spark with which he revived the drooping spirits of his troops, when, as the historian relates, from a rocky pinnacle he addressed them in those memorable words, "You have now scaled the walls not only of Italy, but of Rome itself."

In the commencement, in the progress, in the con-

clusion of wars, in almost everything relating to wars, the influence of individuals may clearly be traced.

If any inevitable cause of war is sought for in the separation of the population of the earth into distinct communities or nations, in the configuration of those portions of the globe suited for the habitations of man, or in the distribution of land and water, none can be found. The destiny of man and the difference of language seem to explain the division of mankind into distinct communities; and neither in that nor in any of the other conditions in which men are placed, in their relation to each other, nationally or individually, can any cause be found which renders the hostile collision of nations an inevitable result.

Effects of this influence visible in all stages of a war.

In theory, it seems as practicable for nations to dwell together in harmony on the face of the earth as for families to inhabit the same town, or for rival towns to co-exist in the same country; and the check formerly given to private wars, by the measures adopted for their suppression, affords an example of the effect which may be produced by human efforts directed to the prevention of war.

The disturbers of peace in the tenth century were deprived of Christian privileges during life, and of the rites of burial after death.

In the same century a great council of ecclesiastics was held at Limoges. The bodies of the saints, according to the custom of those ages, were carried thither; and by these sacred relics men were exhorted to lay down their arms, extinguish their animosities, and abstain from hostilities. These endeavours failing, an expedient was afterwards fallen upon, which, for some time, had the

desired effect, and gave rise to that celebrated regulation called the Treuga Domini—Truce of God.[3] This truce from war was thus emphatically called the truce of the Lord, because a bishop of Aquitaine, A.D. 1032, pretended that an angel had brought him a writing from Heaven, commanding men to lay aside their animosities, on pain of incurring the wrath of the Almighty.

This supposed miracle had such an effect on men's minds that a general peace took place for seven years; and afterwards it was agreed upon, that Christians should never attack one another from the Thursday morning of one week to the Monday of the next, on account of the circumstance that the Passion and the Resurrection of the Lord had happened on the intervening days.

James I. restrains the warlike propensities of his people

An instance of the influence which one man may exercise in repressing the warlike disposition of his people is given in the following passage from Hume's history of the reign of King James the First:—"When James's son-in-law, Frederick the Elector Palatine, at the solicitation of the States of Bohemia, assumed the crown of that country, the feeling of anxiety to support him

[3] Philip Augustus, as some imagine, or St. Louis, as is more probable, published an ordinance, A.D. 1245, prohibiting any person to commence hostilities against the friends and vassals of his adversary, until forty days after the commission of the crime or offence which gave rise to the quarrel. This was called the *Royal Truce*, and afforded time for the violence of resentment to subside, as well as leisure for the good offices of such as were willing to compose the differences.

Bonds of assurance were, in some cases, taken from the parties at variance, to keep the peace for a certain time, or for ever. These regulations had so much effect in *repressing* the quarrels of the barons, that *they demanded their abrogation.*

Similar ordinances have at different times been enforced in England.

The well-known clause in the form of an English indictment, which, as an aggravation of the criminal's guilt, mentions his having assaulted a person who was in the *peace of God* and *of the King*, seems to be borrowed from the Treuga or Pax Dei, and the subsequent ordinance, Pax Regis.—ROBERTSON, *State of Europe.*

was very strong in this country. High were the complaints against the King's neutrality and inactive disposition. The happiness and tranquillity of their own country became distasteful to the English, when they reflected on the grievances and distresses of their Protestant brethren in Germany. They considered not that their interposition in the wars of the Continent, though agreeable to religious zeal, could not at that time be justified by any sound maxims of politics; that however exorbitant the Austrian greatness, the danger was still too distant to give any just alarm in England."

The maintenance of peace at that time depended chiefly on what the historian calls the unwarlike disposition of the Prince; to this may be added the strong feelings of James on the subject of the divine rights of kings, which apparently rendered him disinclined to support even his son-in-law's pretensions to the Crown of Bohemia.

Cromwell's stipulation respecting the Duke of York.

When peace was concluded between Cromwell and the French, and joint operations were concerted between the two Powers, Cromwell stipulated that the Duke of York, who was serving as Lieutenant-General in the French Army, should be despatched to join the French troops in Italy or Spain, not considering it desirable that H.R.H. should be employed with an army which was to be composed partly of English troops.

Vindictive spirit of the Queen of Naples.

The two years during which Sir John Moore commanded the forces in Sicily were spent in a constant struggle on his part to resist the plan of the invasion of Naples, which the Queen perseveringly urged. Mr. Drummond, the British Minister, who had at first strongly opposed the views of the Queen, was induced by her

flatteries to take her part; the Russian representative insisted on behalf of his Imperial master that an expedition should be undertaken against Naples. Lord Castlereagh sent similar instructions to General Fox, upon the supposition that the Sicilian and English armies together would form an invading force of 20,000 men. The British General, after providing for the garrisons of Sicily, could have sent about 5,000. The state of Ferdinand's Army was such as to make their co-operation an incumbrance instead of a support.

Embarrassing position of the English general.

The Queen's indiscretion revealed the real motive of the vehemence with which she pressed her proposal. It was pointed out to her by General Fox that, although it was possible to take Naples, it was perfectly impossible to hold it with the forces which were at his disposal: he urged that the effect of an attack would be to inflict incalculable evil upon the city, which her Majesty yet hoped to possess as her capital, only to abandon it after a short and not very creditable occupation. In one of those ungovernable fits of temper in which she lost all self-control, she exclaimed in reply,—"Give me Naples for twenty-four hours—it is all I ask; it will be long enough for vengeance on the rebels!" The argument astonished, but did not convince, the British General. Sir John Moore did not hesitate to record his opinion, that it was indispensable for the peace of Sicily that the Queen should be compelled to leave the island for Trieste.

Fortitude of Catherine of Russia.

A memorable instance of female fortitude, as well as of the influence which a woman may exercise in war, is afforded by the campaign between the Russians and Turks on the Pruth in 1711.

Peter finding himself, with an army of 37,000 men,

surrounded by a force of Turks and Tartars, under Baltazi Mehemet, amounting to 250,000, and disappointed of the supplies he expected at Yessi, determined on a night retreat. In attempting to effect this purpose, his rear-guard sustained a bloody conflict with the Ottoman host: 7,000 Turks were left dead on the field, and the Russian corps, consisting of only 8,000 men, covered themselves with glory; but, as Voltaire says, the situation of Peter was almost worse than that of Charles XII. at Pultawa; and undecided whether to renew the conflict in the morning, and expose his empire, the fruits of so many years of labour, to a fate which seemed almost inevitable, the Czar had retired to his tent in a state of deep dejection, giving orders that no one should be admitted. In this trying moment, Catherine, who had confronted death by his side in all the actions in which the Army had been engaged, now came forward to point the way for him to extricate himself from all his difficulties. While Peter's Generals could see no means of escaping the destruction which seemed to impend over the Army, Catherine conceived that in the intrepid and determined resistance which had been offered by the Russian Army, insignificant in numbers as compared with their opponents, there were grounds to hope for a peace which, without being too humiliating to the Russians, might still prove satisfactory to the Sultan, and she persuaded her husband to try negotiating, which proved eminently successful.

The Russian Generals despair. Catherine extricates the Czar from his danger.

"We might adduce scores of examples, bad and good, from Indian history of the effect of prestige and of leading, of good and of bad conduct by the same men, all induced by individual example, or by the moral effect of circumstances. No soldier is more open to the influence of all

Sir H. Lawrence's opinion of the influence of one man.

the above causes than the Sepoy. He has a wonderful opinion of the 'Ikbal' of the Company. He has also a keen perception of the merits and demerits of his officers."

Sir John Malcolm's anecdote of the old native officers always taking their sons to salaam to the portraits of Coote and Meadows in the Town-hall at Madras, but of their making a distinction in favour of the former, shows the advantage of long intimacy with Sepoys. Although Meadows was an officer who could not be otherwise than beloved by those under his command, Coote knew more of the habits of the Sepoy.

Marshal Macdonald passing the Splugen.

During the passage of the Splugen by Marshal Macdonald with the Army of the Grisons, the advanced guard under General Verrieres arrived at the foot of the Splugen on the 5 Brumaire, year 9 (1801), at Tusis. On the following morning they passed the first declivity, but a violent wind then covered up the road with snow, and made it impossible to advance a step on account of the surrounding precipices. In the meantime Macdonald, advancing by the valley of the Rhine, joined the advanced guard. The General himself now leads the way through the whirlwind of snow, testing the ice with a pole as he advances, not knowing whether the next step may not be into an unfathomable abyss; often a narrow plank across a gulf was the only hope of passing, and on that plank the whole Army must pass. The falling snow by the force of the wind cut the men's faces—the soldier could not see the man in front of him; and the road became covered up at every instant. It was more dangerous to stop than to advance: one man knocked up was sufficient to stop the column. The pioneers, exhausted,

refused to work. Macdonald seizes the spade, and clears himself a way; the generals and officers of his staff follow his example: courage and perseverance at last overcome all obstacles, and the column reaches Campo Dolcino.

Check on the conduct of an officer whose loyalty is doubted.

Cromwell had a high opinion of Monk's bravery and capacity as a General, but he distrusted him; and when it was necessary to entrust to some one the difficult and dangerous task of representing him in Scotland, in selecting Monk he gave him the most restless and fanatical troops in his army. Knowing Monk's aversion to such men, and that Monk was in a certain degree suspected by them, he calculated they would be a check on each other.

General Monk's character, as portrayed in a letter from M. de Bourdeaux (French Minister at St. James's) to Cardinal Mazarin is worthy of attention.

Ascendency gained by Monk.

"All parties now cast their eyes on General Monk, and each fancies that he is favourable to it, to which his answer to the City has not a little contributed: he approves and praises its conduct of late, and the declarations it has made in favour of a free Parliament. But he also professes to hold his commission from the Parliament, and to desire to support liberty of conscience and a free republic, deferring further explanations until his arrival in London. The perusal of this letter in the Common Council was not followed by any debate, because they had not been able to discover what his sentiments were; and there was no room for taking any decided measures without his assistance. At the same time, the Parliament received a copy not only of his letter to the City, but of the answer thereto, by the

Corporation of London cannot penetrate his intentions.

hands of a messenger whom General Monk despatched express. Thus, up to this time he has kept on good terms with both these bodies; and the Parliament does not manifest less impatience in expecting him than the City. It has even been determined that two of the members are to go and meet him, and invite him to hasten his march, and that an annuity of 1,000*l.* should be given to him in landed property, as a mark of gratitude for his services. Moreover, all possible complacency is shown to him by authorizing the changes he has made in the Army, and the establishments in Scotland, where Major-General Morgan commands the troops which he has left here, and a brigade of those from Ireland, which had at first deserted Lambert. Nevertheless, whatever caresses are lavished on him, it is certain that his credit excites jealousy, and that the Republicans will give him, if they can, coadjutors in the command of the Army, so as to weaken his authority."

Measures to conciliate him.

Measures to weaken his authority.

From the same, February 2, 1660—"General Monk not yet arrived, and his conduct continuing to keep up the hopes of all parties, Commissioners from Parliament set out at the commencement of last week to convey to him the compliments and rewards assigned to him. London followed this example, and deputed two citizens. The excluded Members of Parliament have also sent him one of their body. The nobility of the country, through which he passes, do not fail to do him all honours. The towns receive him with ringing of bells, and the people convey to him their complaints. He treats every one with great civility, discloses his feelings to none; and, whilst he is conferring appointments on persons suspected by the Parliament, he assures it of his fidelity.

Monk keeps up the hopes of all parties

"A number of Members of Parliament are said to be well disposed towards the King, and only awaiting Monk's arrival to declare themselves, as they think he will not fail to pay attention to the wishes of the whole nation, the great advantages which he will gain from it, &c.; but, although these and other considerations are weighty, we may doubt whether they will make much impression on a man of compact mind, who prides himself on his sincerity and firmness of purpose, who is, moreover, a Republican. It is not certain, also, whether his troops are entirely devoted to him; and if the Royalists have made any arrangements with him, they are very secret, as he passes for impregnable amongst most of them whom he has not made terms with. As the destiny of England partly depends on her resolution, and as he himself may not have come to any determination, no solid judgment can be formed upon affairs here until we have a clearer insight into his views."

His mystery and duplicity.

When matters arrived at that stage that it became difficult to deceive any longer, and yet the moment had not come to disabuse men's minds as to his views and plans, he could no longer make use of his favourite resource of silence, and falsehood became necessary. Guizot says he adopted this new course of action with all the indifference of a soldier who considers lying a mere stratagem of war.

"We must live and die for and with a commonwealth," he said to Ludlow.

When Monk arrived near London with his army, in February, 1660, the Common Council of the City, losing all patience at the delay in the new elections for Parliament, refused to levy a tax, until the nation was repre-

sented by a freely elected Parliament. The Parliament sent for Monk, and, on his arrival, he found they had given orders to compel the City to submission.

He is driven to decide on a course of action as regards the City of London.

He had to choose between three things: either to let the measure be executed by some one else, and nullify himself; or to oppose it, and compromise himself; or to undertake it, and remain master. He chose the latter; and the next morning, without any explanation, and before there existed in the City the slightest suspicion of what was contemplated, he entered at the head of his troops and took possession of the City. Even then such was his manner to the principal men of the City, that he contrived to conciliate them to a certain extent, "hardly giving the same account to two men," as Whitelock says.

A few days after we find him writing to the Parliament, calling upon them to give effect to the demands of the City, by fixing their own dissolution for the 6th May, to give place to a freely elected Parliament.

Promotes the cause of the King, without appearing to do so.

The movement in favour of the restoration of the Royal Family went on increasing; while the man who directed it did not seem to advance a single step, unless it were to recede the instant after.

One of the King's agents in London wrote on the 10th of March:—"On Wednesday, Monk declared to my friend that he would acquiesce in the judgment of the Parliament, both in relation to your Majesty and the House of Lords; and yet yesterday he told him, in a great passion, he would spend the last drop of his blood rather than the Stuarts should ever come into England."

So much was Eugene the idol of the troops, that when he returned to take command of the siege of Lisle,

in 1708, after his recovery from the wound he received at the commencement of the siege, Marlborough made him dine in public, to give spirit to the troops.

The Duke of Wellington, when asked whether Napoleon or Marlborough was the greatest general, replied: "It is difficult to answer that. I used always to say that the presence of Napoleon at a battle was equal to a reinforcement of 40,000 men. But I can conceive nothing greater than Marlborough at the head of an English army." Lord Mahon, when writing his *History of England*, applied to the Duke for permission to use this conversation. In reply to this request, the Duke sent his Lordship a memorandum, entering, at some length, into the grounds of his having, as he acknowledges, often expressed the above opinion. From this valuable memorandum it is evident that although the Duke did not wish a figure of speech thus used in the unrestrained play of familiar conversation to be handed down as a dogma in history, he had used that mode of expression as the most appropriate he could think of, to denote the idea which he entertained of the immense advantage which always accompanied the actual presence of Napoleon, whom he designates as "a *grand homme de guerre*, possibly the greatest that ever appeared at the head of a French army."

Nations differ in their characteristics, but all submit alike to the moral influence of a leader.

That some nations are characterized by a more warlike and predatory disposition than others, must be acknowledged; but there has always been some master-spirit to give direction to the fiercest onslaughts which barbarous nations have been stimulated to make by thirst for plunder or conquest; and there never has been wanting a patriot leader, when a spontaneous burst of indig-

nation has roused a people in vindication of the sacred rights of liberty.

The disposition of men in general is to act in reliance on the authority of others, rather than on their own independent convictions or opinions. Nothing is more repugnant to the feelings of human nature than a state of compulsory slavery; yet man, left to follow the dictates of his own disposition, is generally found in a state of dependence. The lower classes look to those above them; these, in their turn, are influenced either by those whose superiority of rank in life they respect, or by those in whose intellectual superiority and judgment they feel confidence.

In Cabinets, people are determined to see calculations only, never passions. They are not free from them, however; and those sudden irritations which in private life sometimes seize two men, and put weapons into their hands, are quite as often—more often, indeed, than a maturely weighed interest—the cause which urges two nations to attack each other.

When nations differ, there is no tribunal to which they can refer; the influence of individuals is, therefore, so much the greater.

In the relations between those independent societies of men called "States," certain laws are acknowledged both in peace and war, but when differences arise there is no common arbiter; and the mainspring which determines the great question of peace or war must generally be the moral ascendency of a few individuals on one side or the other, whose deep interest in the cause at issue must have a tendency to bias their judgment.

The cause of war in one age a matter of indifference in another.

At no period has this individual power in the world's affairs been in abeyance. Many other causes of war are only temporary in their influence; they spring up and are paramount for a season, then subside and give place

to others; but the influence of kings, statesmen, and generals in war has been felt since the creation of the world. Examples innumerable might be instanced of wars commenced and carried on through a succession of years, to gratify the personal ambition or family pride of haughty potentates.[5]

How awful the responsibility of those on whose fiat the great question of peace and war depends. Calmly and dispassionately, free from all feelings of a personal nature, they should survey the angry elements which are in motion. Their country's dignity, the honour and welfare of the State, are in their keeping, and must be maintained; but true patriotism requires that, if possible, this should be done without shedding the blood of its citizens.

So little does this maxim seem to have been attended to, that an eminent philosopher has recorded his reflections in these words:—"All civil history is nothing more

[5] An exemplification of these views is afforded by the pressure used to induce this country to interfere in American affairs, in reference to which the following able paragraph lately appeared in *The Times*:—

"No nation ever was or ever could be dragged into a war in the sense in which an Irishman may be dragged—that is, bodily—into a faction fight. What happens is that a multitude of passions and interests, veiling themselves under specious names, invariably possess the popular mind, and ally themselves with the instinct of pugnacity which no civilization has yet extirpated, obscuring and keeping out of sight the colossal evils which war ever brings upon the victors no less than upon the vanquished. It is at such times that GOVERNMENTS are often wiser than peoples, and when we can look back calmly on the part played by England during the American war, we shall see that *experience and statesmanship* are worth something, after all, in foreign policy. Had feelings alone, however natural and honourable, governed our conduct as a nation, we should long before this have been goaded by the insulting tone of Northern demagogues and journalists into some deviation from impartiality. Let us continue to practise the same forbearance and self-restraint when we are taunted by the South with undue subservience. Taunts are no more like arguments than threats, and arguments of the gravest and most solid kind are the only considerations which can properly be addressed to a great nation in matters of such moment."

than the record of the passions of a few leaders of mankind. Happy, therefore, the people whose history is the most wearisome to read."

The passion of individuals give interes to history.

According to the philosophy of M. Comte, the primitive tendency of man is to a military life, and his final destination an industrial existence; hence he asserts that progress is accompanied by a decline of the military spirit, and the gradual ascendency of the industrial.[6] In a former portion of this chapter, the fact has been noticed that some years ago the Army of this country, so renowned in the days of chivalry, declined in public estimation; and that, as a service, the Army has since that period in some degree recovered its popularity. These changes are to be viewed rather as the result of political causes, than as indications of any fluctuation in the military spirit of the country.

Philosophy of Comte.

Military spirit in England has not declined.

The advancement of science, the progress of civilization, and education of the masses, have not dimmed the lustre of the national spirit, although they have undoubtedly produced such a change in the habits and feelings of soldiers and officers, that the harsh system of discipline practised half a century ago is certainly no longer suitable; and, as a consequence, there is an increased necessity for the exercise of moral power.

The great object with an officer should be to ensure the most prompt and implicit *obedience* from his men. When an officer has secured his authority, then, as long as due attention is paid to the physical wants of the men, he knows exactly what he can do with the force under

The object at which an officer shoul aim.

[6] The same idea is to be found in Bacon's works:—

"In the youth of a State, arms do flourish; in the middle age of a State, learning, and then both of them together for a time; in the declining age of a State, mechanical arts and merchandise."

his command; and it remains for him to show his judgment in observing the exact boundary which separates the reasonable and possible from the desperate and impracticable, and to be careful not to abuse the ascendency he has gained over his men, by exacting from them anything which is calculated to shake their confidence in his discretion and judgment.

Presence of mind.

Perfect presence of mind at once suggests itself as a quality of very high value in an officer.

Its nature.

To give an exact definition of all that constitutes this virtue is not easy. There must be a fearlessness of spirit, but not arising from insensibility to danger; a clear discernment in all things being an essential element in true presence of mind. Danger, when it arises, must be seen, but from habit despised; perfect serenity of temper and control over the thoughts are also requisites.[7] Nothing must be suffered to ruffle or discompose the mind, and no idea permitted to intrude itself against the will, while, at the same time, there must exist the power of fixing the mind intently on that which commands its attention, to the exclusion of everything else. There must be a combination of fortitude with prudence —the one to endure the evils of adversity as long as they are insurmountable, the other to dictate the moment when endurance shall cease, and valour shall be let loose to overthrow and destroy the evil.

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[7] "If you will work on any man, you must either know his nature and fashions, and so lead him; or his ends, and so persuade him; or his weaknesses and disadvantages, and so awe him; or those that have interest in him, and so govern him."—BACON.

At Auerstadt, a soldier, whom his comrades had nicknamed the Emperor, on account of a certain resemblance to Napoleon, perceiving some wavering in his company, ran forward, drew himself up erect, and cried, "My lads, follow your Emperor!" All followed him, keeping close to each other, amidst a shower of grape-shot.

Buonaparte at Lonato (1796).

At the time Buonaparte was engaged at Lonato (1796) in making his dispositions for the battle, which he anticipated would take place on the following day, a flag was announced to him, whose instructions were to require him to surrender. He learnt, at the same time, that the advanced posts of the enemy were approaching the town, and that all communication by the Brescia road was intercepted, and that he was surrounded on all sides. Buonaparte had only with him a corps of 1,000 or 1,200 men. His situation was critical; but, quickly recovering from his surprise, his presence of mind enabled him to extricate himself from his difficulties by a bold stroke. With a mixture of dignity and anger, he demanded of the officer with the flag how he dared to summon a victorious General in the midst of his Staff and the head-quarters of his Army. "Tell the General who sent you," he said, "that if he wishes to insult the French Army, I am here to avenge the insult, that he himself is my prisoner as well his soldiers. I know that his corps is only one of the columns cut off by the divisions of my army which occupy the Salo and the road from Brescia to Trent. Tell him that, if in eight minutes he does not lay down his arms, and if a single priming is burnt, I will shoot him and his men." He then desired the bandage to be removed, and, continuing, he said, "You now see General Buonaparte and his Staff. Tell your General that it is open to him to make a good prize." The officer returned, and Buonaparte immediately ordered Berthier to cause the Grenadiers of the Guard to advance, and the few other troops that were in Lonato, with some pieces of artillery. The officer in command of the enemy's column, very much

surprised at learning that Buonaparte and his Staff were at Lonato, then offered to capitulate. "No," said Buonaparte, "I will not make a capitulation with men who are my prisoners." The Austrian urged the point. Buonaparte then ordered a demonstration of attack to be made. The Austrian corps, consisting of 3,000 men and some artillery, then laid down their arms.

Soldiers admire presence of mind.

Soldiers readily see and appreciate presence of mind in an officer. There is no quality they admire more; although many of them would, perhaps, be at a loss to designate that which they admire by what appears to be its appropriate definition.

As the consideration of those qualities which give an officer a moral ascendency over his men does not embrace a review of all those acquirements and natural endowments which constitute the great military genius, these observations will be concluded by pointing attention to the advantages of a conciliatory manner, blended with genuine kindheartedness.

An officer's duty not ended when parade is dismissed.

An officer should not look upon his men as mere machines, who are to obey the word of command on parade; to be punished if they do not; and of whom, when off the parade, he is to take no thought.

What would the officer be without his men?—a mere point in space, a nonentity. With them, he is a warrior, armed with the noblest weapon which can be put into the hand of man; it is for him to keep it bright and to use it skilfully.

An officer should know the character of his men and their pursuits.

To this end, the necessity of sympathizing with the soldier cannot be too emphatically urged upon the officer. This does not by any means imply that an officer should live entirely with his men; but it implies that an officer

commanding a company, who makes a point of acquainting himself with the character and disposition of each man under his command, and takes some pains to provide occupation for his men when off parade in which they can take an interest, will find a community of feeling spring up, greatly contributing to that moral ascendency which it should be his endeavour to obtain and consolidate.

The following observations extracted from Sir H. Lawrence's *Essays* should be suspended in every officer's barrack-room :— Sir H. Lawrence.

"The moral character of a regiment, be it good or bad, fairly reflects the amount of interest taken by the officers in the well-being of their men. The soldier wanders out of garrison or cantonments, and commits excesses abroad, because he has no inducement to remain within the precincts of the barrack-square. He goes abroad in search of amusement, and he finds not amusement but excitement, leading him on to ruin. This would not happen if regimental officers did their duty to their men. It is not merely the duty of an officer to attend parade, to manœuvre a company or regiment, to mount guard, to sanction promotions, to see the pay issued, to sign monthly returns, and to wear a coat with a standing collar. The officer has higher duties to perform; a duty to his Sovereign, a duty to his neighbours, a duty to his God, not to be discharged by the simple observance of these military formalities. He stands in *loco parentis*—he is the father of his men. His treatment of them should be such as to call for their reverence and affection, and incite in them a strong feeling of shame on being detected by him in the commission of

unworthy actions. It is his duty to study their characters, to interest himself in their pursuits, to enhance their comforts, to assist and encourage with counsel and praise every good effort, to extend his sympathy to them in distress, to console them in affliction, to show by every means in his power that though exiles from home, and aliens from their kindred, they have yet a friend upon earth who will not desert them. These are the duties of an officer; and duties, too, which cannot be performed without an abundant recompense.

"There are many idle, good-hearted, do-nothing officers who find the day too long, complain of the country and climate, and perhaps, in time, sink into hypochondriasis, but who would, if they were to follow the advice thus tendered, not arrogantly but affectionately, find that they had discovered a new pleasure, that a glory had sprung up in a shady place. Some may smile—some may sneer—some may acknowledge the truth dimly, and forget it: to all we have one answer to give, couched in two very short words—*try it.*

"We need scarcely enter into minute details to show the manner in which this is to be done. Every officer knows, if he will know, how it is to be done. The youth of a month's standing, endowed with ordinary powers of observation, must perceive that there are fifty ways open to his seniors by which they may advance the well-being and happiness of the inmates of the barracks. Let them see, think, and act as men endowed with faculties and understandings.

"But we must do something more than alleviate the sufferings of the present. We must render him hopeful for the future; we must brighten up his prospects,

animate him with a new-born courage, fill him with heart and hope, that he may still bear up and steer right on until better days shall dawn upon him.

"The commissioned ranks of the Army should not be closed against the deserving soldier in any branch of her Majesty's service."

CHAPTER II.

THEORY OF ENLISTMENT.

"Tous les hommes désirent être heureux: cela est sans exception. Quelques différens moyens qu'ils y emploient, ils tendent tous à ce but. Ce qui fait que l'un va à la guerre, et que l'autre n'y va pas; c'est ce même désir qui est dans tous les deux, accompagné de différentes vues, la volonté ne fait jamais la moindre démarche que vers cet objet. C'est le motif de toutes les actions de tous les hommes jusqu'à ceux qui se tuent et qui se pendent.—*Pensées de Pascal*, 2 part, art. 1, p. 198.

. . . . "Dans une armée, si le mécanisme importe beaucoup, le moral n'importe pas moins, et, sans le moral l'armée la mieux organizée est une habile machine depourvue de moteur."—*Thiers*, vol. x., p. 247.

CHAP. II.

Efficiency of an army dependent on moral condition of its members.

As the vigour and beauty of the tree in the natural world depend on the soundness of the roots, so the efficiency and *morale* of an Army correspond with the intrinsic moral and physical standard of the individual members composing its ranks.

The moral in this case does not yield to the physical in importance; and no system of discipline, however satisfactory it may appear in practice, has any secure basis unless it has been framed with a just knowledge and appreciation of the source and principle of human actions, and the force of the passions.

In the training of youth, if the disposition is first rightly discerned, and the system of training then adapted accordingly, the desired results may be anticipated; and in the same way an insight into the various emotions which fluctuate in the breast of each recruit prior to his

enlistment, and a knowledge of the motives which at last determine his will, might be of assistance in deciding upon the nature of the discipline to which the individual is to be subjected.

Such an analysis it is, of course, impossible to make, but it does seem possible to remove some erroneous notions which are current on the philosophy of recruiting, and by correcting misapprehension on that subject, to arrive at a more just estimate of the moral condition of the British Army than that which is at present entertained.

Natural impulse of man to defend his country.

When a nation is in arms to repel invasion or vindicate its independence, the impulse which prompts each individual citizen to enrol himself in the ranks of a battalion or squadron requires no analysis. The act has only to be named, and the feeling which prompted it is instantly and distinctly reflected in the bosom of every free man.

But the case is different when in time of peace a youth voluntarily adopts as his vocation in life the business of a soldier.

Such an act of man's volition has not yet received any satisfactory explanation or solution; and yet it is the process by which the ranks of the British Army are daily replenished.

Voluntary enlistment seems to indicate a martial spirit.

The act of enlistment in itself seems, *primâ facie*, to indicate a spirit of military enthusiasm in the individual; and giving this view a more extended application, the prevalence of a martial spirit amongst the inhabitants of these islands is a just inference from the fact that the large army required for the country and its colonies is kept up to its authorized strength by voluntary enlist-

ment; but such an inference is decidedly opposed to the recorded opinions of several officers of rank and long standing in the service, as well as of non-commissioned officers and others who have had great practical experience in recruiting, all of whom agree in ascribing the success which has hitherto attended our system (perhaps it would be more correct to say *want of system*) of recruiting, to distress and inability to obtain employment amongst the industrial classes.

Contrary opinions.

Sir John Macdonald, who held the important office of Adjutant-General for twenty years, and whose experience in the service extended over a period of half a century, stated before a Parliamentary Committee in 1850 his belief "that very few recruits think beyond the present moment when they enlist; that a few of his own countrymen (Scotch) might, perhaps, take into consideration the advantage of the pension which the service offers as a provision for old age, but the mass think only of the present."

Recruits do not think beyond the present.

In the report of the Committee more recently engaged in investigating the subject of recruiting for the Army, the evidence of Sir John Macdonald is corroborated by that of his successor in the office of Adjutant-General, Sir George Wetherall, who says:—

"He thinks that very few men enlist for the love of being soldiers—it is a very rare exception. These fellows never look to the future, they do not care for to-morrow."

Colonel Russell, I.F.O., in producing before the Committee a letter from Captain Clerke, says, he is induced to do so because he considers it depicts very accurately the feelings of men enlisting. This letter states:—

"Those men who enlist in the low public-houses frequented by recruiting parties do not do so for any love they have to the profession, but, as the returns unfortunately show, to get a temporary shelter, and to desert the moment opportunity offers. Of course all do not desert, but you may rest assured many more would do so if they had the chance."

Men enlist for temporary shelter.

Colonel Russell himself states, "Few men enlist in the Army unless driven to it—it is a last resource." And again:—"They are coming away from something or other they want to get rid of; they are reckless, and they do not care where they go."

Captain M'Kay says:—"It is only the idle, perhaps the profligate, who enter: they are dissatisfied with their position in civil life, and they enter the Army, and are still dissatisfied."

Only the idle and profligate enlist.

Paymaster Bartlett thinks "that nine-tenths are *obliged* to enlist."

General Patton thinks "the number of those who enlist from pure love of soldiering very small."

Mr. Nurse, the proprietor of a great rendezvous for recruiting-parties in Charles Street, states:[1]—"I am certain it is much more a question of support than of fondness for the service, with a large number of the men who enlist."

Question of support.

To the above may be added the following quotation from an article by M. Esquiros on the subject in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*:—"In reply to the question from what rank in the population is the English Army recruited," (that writer says,) "we must look to the

M. Esquiros.

[1] "Impossible to generalize in this manner on such a subject."—See MILL, vol. ii. p. 339.

motives for enlistment. These are three—patriotism, inclination, and necessity. Very few enter from the first two motives; a great many from indigent circumstances. If there were no poor, Great Britain would hardly have any soldiers. Recruits are to a certain extent the conscripts of hunger. It is not merely the bounty which attracts them, but the prospect of a roof over their heads, and food, and clothing. From this we may gather the nature of the waters in which the State fishes to supply the Army with recruits."

Recruits, the conscripts of hunger.

Springs of human action cannot be thus limited.

The complex problem with which the various persons quoted have entangled themselves cannot be solved in this summary manner by a theory which limits the springs of action amongst a numerous class of our fellow-creatures to the mere satisfaction of bodily wants, ignoring in the minds of these people the exercise, if not the existence, of those faculties which are the distinguishing characteristics of the race. The human character certainly exhibits itself in a variety of phases, and men occasionally appear to act, like the lower animals, from mere instinct.[2] A few cases such as these witnesses have portrayed may have come under their observation, and a forcible impression has evidently thus been left on their minds, but in generalizing on the few cases so presented to their notice, they seem to be ignorant of the searching analysis which would be necessary to establish the soundness of their theory.[3]

Insufficient grounds for the theory sought to be established.

[2] "Desires operating merely as tendencies to action, and not unfolded by the exercise of thought, so as to become tendencies to mental objects, are like 'instincts.' The instincts of animals are a kind of image of the desires of man."—WHEWELL, vol. i. p. 21.

[3] A great number of cases might be brought forward, in which the practice of vegetarianism has been attended with the greatest benefit; yet such instances would be of no value as evidence concerning the proper food of man.

Commencing with the evidence of Mr. Nurse,—at the time he appeared before the Committee, nearly 20,000 recruits had passed through his hands; he was quite conversant with the business, and was as expert as any sergeant in stripping and examining the candidates. During the time they were waiting approval they were subsisted in his house; therefore, few persons can have had better opportunities for observation.

He does not attribute the formation of his opinions to the revelations made to him by the men, neither can he have any intuitive perception on such a matter. It is, therefore, to be assumed that "drawing inferences" forms part of the business of life with Mr. Nurse, as it does with other persons, and that before the Committee he spoke from inference.

Let us now turn to the facts from which it is probable Mr. Nurse's inferences were drawn, keeping in view at the same time his special business of publican, and the extent to which that business may have biassed his judgment, contracted his views, and given his mind a tendency to overrate the importance of such objects as happen to come within the range of his faculties of observation.[4]

[4] Mr. Nurse, in answer to question 5280, says:—

"Speaking conscientiously, witness would say, the interests of the service could not be studied to their fullest extent, unless the recruiting was carried on in the houses of licensed victuallers; for this very reason, that men came there frequently to get a little refreshment. It often happens that four or five men will come to such a place with their minds partially made up; they want to inquire of those men who are employed on the recruiting service what would be the best regiment for them to join, and what are the advantages to be derived after they have joined. Men who are mechanics, if they are out of employment, want to know what inducements there will be for them to enlist, and, after they have enlisted, what will be the chance of promotion, if they are men of *intellectual mind*. If they are more careless, of course the questions are less particular than I am describing: but we have a great differ-

CHAP. II.

Probable method of observation pursued by Mr. Nurse.

The special business of Mr. Nurse being to provide "support" for recruits, he, no doubt, has observed that they generally enter his house with a good appetite, and that they do justice to the fare provided; and as they have no visible means of living, while at the same time he has heard them express aversion to the discipline of the Army, it is not surprising that, in the limited scope of his mind, he should have come to the conclusion that the young men in general upon whom he has (using his own expression) *the pleasure of waiting*, are on the horns of a dilemma at the time of their introduction to him, and that with reluctant hearts they choose the disagreeable alternative of enlistment.

If such are the premises from which Mr. Nurse has reasoned himself into the opinion that recruits are guided by an instinct which has its seat in the stomach, his argument has little better foundation than that of the musician who believed that God created the world in six days and rested on the seventh, because there are seven notes in music.

The avidity with which he sees his good cheer vanish under the assaults of these healthy, robust young men,

ence in the characters of the men who apply at one place to be enlisted." Question 5281. Answer—"Does not think the questions could be put *as well* in any building appropriated for the sergeants as in a *public-house*."

"In the case of a man dying after eating of a particular dish," Mr. Mill observes, "it is said he died of eating of that dish. There need not, however, be any invariable connection between eating of that dish and death, but there certainly is among the circumstances which took place some combination or other upon which death is invariably consequent; as, for instance, the eating of the dish combined with a particular bodily constitution, a particular state of health, and perhaps even a certain state of the atmosphere, the *conditions* of the phenomenon. The real cause is the whole of these antecedents, and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them exclusive of the others."—Vol. i. p. 399.

"The fact which was dignified by the name of cause, was the one condition which came last into existence."

See also example of a stone thrown into water, pp. 401, 402.

The reaso adduced (not attacl more to t particular theory th to many others.

who come to his house with their minds, as he says, "partially made up," indicates a wholesome state of physical activity fitting them for the service; but it affords no proof that they are driven to enlist from necessity. What proof does it afford that they could not have found the means of subsistence elsewhere had their *minds been as intent* on some other object as they are on that project of enlisting, which has brought them into contact with Mr. Nurse? The circumstance of the appetite may be reconcileable with Mr. Nurse's theory, but it is quite as reconcileable with many others; there is nothing to attach it to his particular theory alone.

If, instead of looking to the cause of young men enlisting in the Army, we look to the general effect of the necessity imposed upon the mass of the population of labouring for their support, the argument may be thus stated:—All men want support—bricklayers, carpenters, shoemakers, receive wages; soldiers are fed and clothed and paid; therefore, some men become bricklayers, some carpenters, some soldiers, &c. Is the choice of each man determined solely by what Mr. Nurse calls the "question of support," or is it a fact that a variety of circumstances combine to create in the mind of one man a preference for that which is regarded with repugnance by another? and that thus, by the inscrutable plans of the great first cause, provision is made for the distribution of men into those various classes which form the elements of civilized life.[5]

Labour th lot of mar

[5] "Nous sommes corps autant qu'esprit; et de la vient que l'instrument par lequel la persuasion se fait n'est pas la seule démonstration. Combien y a-t-il peu de choses démontrées! Les preuves ne convainquent que l'esprit. La coutume fait nos preuves les plus fortes; elle in-

If the ranks of the army of bricklayers and those of King Crispin's host are filled by volunteers, upon what grounds is it contended that the soldier has not a preference for the calling which he adopts?

The only reply to this question in Mr. Nurse's evidence is, as he expresses himself, "because the general opinion people have of the service is that they are very much under control."

So far from this expression of apprehension betokening an aversion to the service, the feeling is one which is quite compatible with the strongest sense of military enthusiasm.

Dread of discipline not incompatible with a thirst for military glory.

Let the case be supposed of a man admitted to be inspired with the most ardent desire of military fame. Such a man would enter the Army, not with the desire of subjecting himself to its stern discipline, but with a view to acquiring glory and distinction; at the same time there would be nothing strange in his balancing in his mind whether, as the price of that hope of distinction and renown, he shall submit himself to the severity of military rules. If such a train of thought in this supposed case would be natural, it is not surprising that similar reflections should suggest themselves in the mind of every one meditating enlistment, whatever may be the state of his mind as regards ambition, whether

cline les sens, qui entrainent l'esprit sans qu'il y pense. Qui a demontré qu'il sera demain jour, et que nous mourrons? et qu'y a-t-il de plus universellement cru? C'est donc la coutume qui nous en persuade; c'est elle qui fait tant de turcs et de paiens; c'est elle qui fait les métiers, les soldats, &c. —*Pensées de Pascal*, p. 222.

"There is, perhaps, no action of a man's life in which he is neither under the immediate nor under the remote influence of any impulse but the mere desire of wealth."—MILL, *Logic*, vol. ii. p. 578.

There are thousands of young men who would readily hazard their lives in attacking an intrenchment, who dread the miseries, privations, ennui, and idleness of a camp life.

it is down to zero, or indulging in the loftiest flights of military genius.

Another witness, Captain McKay, is of opinion, "that it is only the idle, perhaps the profligate, who enlist." In some cases observed by this witness there may have been a casual conjunction of these qualities, but no generalization can be admissible on such data.

The idle, taken in the sense of unemployed, are not necessarily profligate.

Idleness and profligacy are not necessarily connected; and the greatest caution should be used in connecting them in just such cases as the one now in question. A young man who offers to enlist belongs generally to that class who have neither capital nor income, their subsistence being earned from day to day. When he presents himself as a recruit, he is idle, because he has voluntarily left his ordinary employment, or because he has been dismissed from it, his services being no longer required; but in neither of these cases does it follow that his idleness is a reproach to him. In the one case, he may have left his work to adopt a calling he prefers; in the other, although an exemplary character, it may have been his fate to be thrown out of work, owing to his employer being obliged to reduce the number of his workmen. Looking at this point without prejudice, it would be more consistent with the spirit of equity to say that a young man enlists because he has an aversion to idleness, than to charge him with being an idle character because he enlists; but this is a subject to which, in the course of the inquiry, some further reference will be made.

Enlistment is rather a proof that a man dislikes idleness.

With regard to the charge of profligacy prior to enlistment, if such a charge against recruits generally can be sustained, it is at all events satisfactory to be able to adduce the evidence of Mr. Godley, the Under-

Secretary at War, in proof of their amendment of character after they enter the service. "The present system," says Mr. Godley, "makes the Army a reformatory for scamps. The men who are obtained, after a certain amount of training, make good soldiers; and that is the strong point of the system."

Want of food and shelter are facts of little value in the argument.

The want of shelter which one witness assigns as a cause of enlistment, is, like the want of food, a state or condition which, as a fact in itself, is of little value towards establishing the point that a recruit is driven to enlist by necessity. The want of shelter and enlistment are circumstances casually conjoined, but in no other way dependent on each other. He wants shelter, perhaps, because he is bent on becoming a soldier, and therefore he could not confine his mind and attention to his former employment.

Men want to change their mode of life when they enlist.

Another witness describes recruits "as coming away from something they wish to get rid of."

This seems highly probable; and yet it is no proof that they are driven to enlist from necessity, or that they are deficient in military spirit.

Memoirs of a working man.

In one of Knight's publications, entitled *Memoirs of a Working Man*, the following picture is given of a youth's life in civil employment:—

"My duties were neither few nor pleasant, for I was expected to be ready at the call of not fewer than twenty persons—my master and mistress, four children, two maid-servants, a shopman, two apprentices, a foreman, and eight journeymen (tailors). I need hardly say that I found it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to please this large number of people. I honestly endeavoured to please all; but in my well-meant endeavours to do this,

I often, like the old man in the fable, failed to satisfy any one, and consequently was in rather general disgrace, to my great discomfort and discouragement."

A want of subsistence is not complained of by this youth, and he had sufficient self-control and patience to struggle through his difficulties; but surely there would have been no cause for surprise if he had shown less fortitude and endurance, and *tried to come away from such a mode of life, to get rid of it;* and if upon consideration he had adopted the life of a soldier, he could not, upon such grounds, have been included in the category of those driven to enlist against their will by the *question of support.*

Inconsistency of the recklessness and extreme prudence attributed to recruits.

While one witness describes the mental state of a recruit as one of recklessness, another depicts him a prey to apprehension and anxiety at the prospect of the discipline of the service. Such opposite feelings can hardly coexist in the mind of one person, it is therefore to be supposed the witnesses speak from observation of different classes of recruits; and viewed in that light their evidence, in a limited sense, is just what might be expected, considering that there are countless causes in operation in bringing recruits into the Army; but fully to comprehend the conflict of emotions in each case would require a much more attentive study than these witnesses have bestowed on the subject.

Witnesses confused in their own minds.

All these erroneous conclusions which have been glanced at may be regarded as errors of inference, into which the various witnesses have probably been drawn by a state of confusion in the mind of each, consequent on his ascribing the enlistment of a recruit directly to something he perceived, instead of trying to distinguish

some legitimate connection between that which he objectively saw, and the subjective effect of those various emotions or feelings which are just as active in the minds of recruits as in those of other persons.

Another very apparent obstacle to the theory in dispute, of a less complicated character than the foregoing objections, seems to have been entirely overlooked by the witnesses who appeared before the Committee, although by no means an insignificant element in the attempt to arrive at accurate conclusions on the subject under examination.

Operation of the Poor Law quite overlooked by these witnesses.

From the general tenor of the opinions submitted to the Committee on Recruiting, it might be imagined that in this boasted land of civilization the labouring man is without any resource but enlistment when, through any temporary dislocation of the social machinery, his usual employer declines his services for a time. Any such impression created by the curious speculations on the philosophy of recruiting propounded before the Committee on Recruiting, may be removed by a visit to the office of the Poor Law Commission, a department of State designed to prevent any man in the country, who is willing and able to work, from being reduced to the extremity in which the young men from the country have been represented as seeking shelter in the establishment of Mr. Nurse.

It is well known that previous to the Amendment Act of 1834 great abuses prevailed in the administration of the Poor Laws, but those abuses were not in favour of that theory on recruiting the truth of which is now disputed, as the able-bodied poor obtained parish assistance more readily under the old system than they can at

present. The evidence, however, before the Committee on Recruiting having been taken at a period long subsequent to the introduction of the new Poor Law, the observations which follow on the bearing of that law on recruiting for the Army are to be understood as having reference to the law as it now exists.

Principles of the Poor Law.

The principles propounded by the Commissioners employed with a view to the amendment of the Act in their first report are as follow :—"That in all extensive communities circumstances will occur in which an individual, by the failure of his means of subsistence, will be exposed to perishing.

"That to refuse relief, and to punish mendicity when it cannot be proved that the offender could have obtained subsistence by labour, is repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind; that it is repugnant even to them to punish depredations apparently committed as the only resource against want."

These sentiments were infused into the amended Poor Law, and in the same spirit the law has continued to be administered up to the present time. True it is that the claims of the able-bodied are tested by their readiness to work, and employment, as a general rule, is found for them to entitle them to relief. This of course can be no impediment to the relief of men who are fit for recruits during a time of distress, as they must be capable of labour to be fit for recruits.

If the Poor Laws are fairly administered men do not enlist as a last resort

It therefore devolves on those who assert that recruiting is dependent on the destitution of the people to show, in the first place, that the Poor Laws are not properly administered, and that such is the social state of this country that men have no choice between enlistment and

starvation; until that point is established, they can make no progress in the demonstration of their theory.

There being, then, as just pointed out, a resource provided by law for the industrious classes of this country when reduced to a temporary state of indigence, it is clear that the young men who enlist are not reduced to that step as a *last resource.*

The only object at present being to refute the theory propounded before the Committee, it is not necessary to enter upon the consideration of the reasons why young men in indigent circumstances enlist in preference to availing themselves of the benefit of the Poor Laws. In every instance in which the fact of such a preference can be shown, that fact will, it is presumed, be acknowledged as a feature in the case favourable to the moral standing of the recruit.

The age at which young men enter the Army furnishes more than one argument against the theory of their being driven by necessity to enlist; one of which is that at seventeen or eighteen years of age few young men of good character are destitute of friends or relatives who feel an interest in them, and are willing to assist them to struggle through a season of adversity. It is more generally at a later period of life that a man who has been unfortunate finds himself without any resource but parish relief.

The age of recruits an argument against their being driven to enlist by necessity.

So far an endeavour has been made to show that the enlistment of a soldier is not to be attributed to the low ground of instinct or animal appetite; and that even in cases where such passions are predominant, the Poor Law affords an alternative to enlistment always available.

The objections which have been enumerated do not

by any means exhaust the arguments which may be urged against the position attacked; but in the belief that enough has been adduced to disturb the effect which the evidence laid before the Committee was calculated to produce, a cursory view will now be taken of some of those events or causes which, linking themselves together in an endless variety of combinations, minister to the requirements of the recruiting service.

Consideration of causes which fill the Army with recruits.

In this examination, it is necessary to bear in mind that the emotional sensibilities are not permanent in their condition, neither are they invariably excited by the same objects to the same degree. Our own experience is sufficient to satisfy us that the emotions in any number of individuals, in a natural or normal state, correspond to the mental and physical organization of each individual. The variety of phases in which they afterwards exhibit themselves is still greater, as they become expanded, or brought under restraint and modified by extraneous influences, such as the special events or circumstances in life by which each person may be surrounded. This excitement of some passions and blunting of others, caused by the action of the current of events, produces, in fact, a change in the character, and each person is thereafter more or less affected by the occurrences of life, according to the new disposition or temper of mind which has thus been produced.[6]

Emotional sensibilities.

[6] "As different objects occupy the attention of men of different passions, so different passions become habitual to them; and if we bring home to ourselves their situation in this particular respect, we must be sensible that every occurrence should naturally affect them more or less, according as the emotion coincides or disagrees with the forced habit and temper of their minds."—SMITH'S *Moral Sentiments.*

Again: "Our vital spirits, according as they stand disposed, force a particular kind of ideas upon the mind; and the latter, in every exertion of her power, causes an alteration in the courses of

Certain objects have also certain sensibilities attached to them; and yet, in many instances, the special sensibility proper to an object is not awakened at the sight of that object.

Fear may be said to be the emotion attaching to danger; and if the mind only contemplated the danger, fear is the feeling which would predominate: but the danger with which we are menaced may arise from an object which rouses our indignation, or inflames the love of glory; and when these latter feelings are awakened, the emotion of fear vanishes. In such a conflict and composition of moral forces, one emotion displaces another from the feelings, because one object displaces another from the thoughts.

Conflicting emotions; their operation.

Our desires often manifest themselves in a sudden and unaccountable manner; some cause makes us wish ardently for a thing of the existence of which a moment before we had not the least conception: and we then continue to wish for it. If we put an enemy of this kind to flight, another presently succeeds in his place: if they cannot conquer us by force, they will by importunity; if they find we are invulnerable in front, they will detach a regiment of secret motives to take us in rear, so that we may be brought to the ground without knowing from what quarter the blow came.

Succession of motives, termed by some expulsive power.

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the former, sometimes designedly, but oftener as a consequence of something else she intends. He that runs, means only to arrive the sooner at the place whither he would go; but, besides that, he quickens his pulse, heats his flesh, and puts himself out of breath—effects which he did not think of, nor, perhaps, should have ensued had it been at his option to have helped them. The like happens on other exercises of our activity which propagate a motion to the parts of our body corresponding respectively with the organs employed in those exercises and those parts so frequently receiving such motions." — TUCKER, *Light of Nature.*

The desires are the forces which, operating through the will, incite man to action; but it is seldom that, by the mere bodily desires or appetites, man's actions are determined; and, therefore, although, as already observed, in some cases the mere desire of food and shelter may determine a man to enlist, in the plurality of cases reason is at work as well as appetite, and enlistment is the result of a process of thought, combined, it may be, with bodily desires.

Reason as well as appetite at work when a man enlists.

Tucker says present satisfaction being our constant pursuit, nothing remote could ever move us if it did not afford an immediate enjoyment in the expectation, or there were not uneasiness in the thought of missing it.

Tucker's philosophy agrees with Sir John Macdonald's evidence so far that the recruit feels a present satisfaction in enlisting. The cause of that satisfaction is thus traced by Tucker:—

"The aptness of our mental organs to run into this or that particular course of exercise depends upon some accident[7] or lucky hit, or the company we converse with. Waller supposes—

> "Great Julius in the mountains bred,
> Perhaps some flock or herd had led;
> The world's sole ruler then had been
> But the best wrestler on the green.

"A book falling into a boy's hands, an adventure related, a performance he sees which takes his fancy, the conversation of a companion or a servant, may lead his

Accidental events of life have a great influence over the mind.

[7] "No man can reflect without wonder on the vicissitudes of human life arising from causes in the highest degree accidental and trifling. If you trace the necessary concatenation of human events a very little way back, you may perhaps discover that a person's very going in or out of a door has been the means of colouring with misery or happiness the remaining current of his life."—GREVILLE.

imagination into particular trains of thought, thenceforward becoming so habitual to his mind that he cannot divert it to others of a different kind without trouble and uneasiness."

The admiration excited by a Lord Mayor's or a Chancellor's State coach may have stimulated many a schoolboy or apprentice to that application through which he becomes eminent at the bar, or in commerce; and if we reflect for a moment upon "all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war," we cease to wonder at a youth's being allured to don the martial robe by the brilliant appearance of an array of well-disciplined troops.

It is refreshing to find that the sentiments which have been culled from the evidence before the Recruiting Committee are not universally entertained.

In the evidence given by the Prince who is now at the head of the Army the stimulating effect of the pomp and pageantry of war is clearly acknowledged.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge.

His Royal Highness, before the Committee, expressed himself as follows:—

"The difficulty of getting recruits is principally in the infantry. In the cavalry and artillery it is done with comparative ease.

"I have a very strong opinion upon that subject. I think that the dress of the Army is a most material thing, much more material than people imagine. A soldier comes for the appearance as much as anything else. He goes to the cavalry with pleasure, because the cavalry are smartly dressed; he goes to the artillery with pleasure, because the artillery are smartly dressed; the infantry are much less smartly dressed, and he has not the same inclination to go there as to go to the

others. Therefore, I think that the dress is a very important element in recruiting, particularly in voluntary enlistment."

The testimony of Mr. Godley, the Under Secretary at War, if not precisely to the same point, bears a close analogy:—

Effect of the love of adventure and foreign travel.

No. 1849.—"Thinks that with the present rate of pay, the strictness of the discipline, and the work of a soldier, which is unpleasant to young men, we should get fewer men than we do. In fact, we could not get on at all if it were not for the gratification of the love of adventure by war and travel, the incidents of our military service. The idea of visiting foreign countries is a great allurement to young men."

No. 1945.—"I am sure that foreign service is attractive. The Indian regiments get recruits fastest, and the Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian regiments are notoriously popular. As regards West Indies, I think there may be a distinction; but, on the whole, I believe the regiments on foreign service are quite as attractive and popular as those on home service, and that men generally prefer the foreign to the home service."

Propagation of motives.

There is a propagation of motives in perpetual progress in our minds—one motive begets another, which last, like the viper brood, supplants, and perhaps destroys, its parent one. Many of these descendant motives gain the credit of being coëval with ourselves, and, even among the studious and considerate, are reputed to have been, like Melchisedek, without father or mother, because we find no mention in our record of any they had. But, upon a strict and impartial scrutiny, it may be possible to trace their origin, and make it appear

that all the motives actuating us in our riper years, excepting sensations of pleasure or pain, or our natural or acquired appetites, are of the translated kind. Through this channel, we derive most of our tastes, inclinations, and sentiments, moral senses, checks of conscience, obligations, impulses of fancy, attachment to *professions*, fondness for diversions, regard for reputation, views of prudence, virtues, and vices, and, in general, all those pursuits, whether of distant or present aims, that render the occupations of men different from the amusements of children.[8]

Diversity of men's tastes.

The channels of our tastes are infinitely various and variable—the same thing appearing charming to one person, indifferent to another, and disgusting to a third; admired or neglected in the several stages of our existence, courted or nauseated at different seasons, according to the disposition of body or humour of mind we happen to be in. If this be true, it is evident that the beauty of an object does not depend on its intrinsic qualities, and that our being pleased with it is not the result of any admiration specially for that object which was born with us, but from a sense which has grown by time, and which may be moulded into almost any shape by custom, conversation, or accident.

Influence of fashion on our emotions.

The flexibility of our emotions is strikingly exemplified by the influence of fashion in giving a temporary beauty to various forms. What *we are* in fashion is ever beautiful; but nothing is in fashion so ridiculous as the beauty which *has been;* as, in journeying with the sunshine before us, what is immediately under our eye is splendour; but, if we look back, we see a long shadow

[8] TUCKER.

behind us, though all which is shadow now was once brilliant as the track of brightness along which we move.[9]

The youth of recruits, which has been adduced as an argument against the theory propounded before the Committee, may also be brought forward in support of the assumption, that enlistment has more connection with the emotions of the mind than with the bodily appetites. Aristotle says, "Youth live by hope, for hope is of the future, but memory is of the past; and to youth the future is everything, the past but little. They hope all things, but remember nothing; and it is easy to deceive them for the reasons which have been given; for they are willing to hope, and are full of courage, being passionate and hasty, of which tempers it is the nature of one to fear, and of the other to inspire confidence; and they are easily put to shame, for they have no resources to set aside the precepts which they have learned; and they have lofty souls, for they never have been disgraced or brought low; and they are unacquainted with necessity. They prefer honour to advantage, virtue to expediency; for they live by affection, rather than by reason, and reason is concerned with expediency, but affection with honour. They judge of nothing by utility. They chiefly err by doing things overmuch, for they keep no medium. They regard all men as good and more virtuous than they are, for they measure others by their own innocence."

In youth men act from the impulse of the emotions.

Youthful emotions.

Noble sons do not always spring from noble fathers; but it is beyond dispute that the virtues and the vices of the parents have an influence in general upon the

Hereditary influences.

[9] BROWN: *Philosophy of Human Mind.*

children. Looking, then, to the origin of the British races, the warlike and predatory nature of their ancestry, we cannot but expect that a thirst for military life should prevail amongst our peasantry. The spirit thus exhibited by the peasantry is chivalrous in its nature, for chivalry has no exclusive connection with conventional nobility or rank. It belongs to the nobility of nature,[10] in whatever condition of life that may be found. It belongs to those qualities which carry with them their own dignity, to what our Saxon ancestors called Knighthood, which meant only the kingly state of youth. It is a spirit which more generally prevails in youth than in the later periods of man's life. As the earliest age in the history of nations is the heroic; so youth, the first period of human life, may be considered as the heroic or chivalrous age of each separate man; and, in the most obscure ranks, it is quite possible to find "le plus vaillant écuyer qui oncques en son temps chaussa éperons blancs." [11]

Warlike character of the British races.

Youth the heroic or chivalrous age.

Amongst the different classes of emotions, those termed by Brown prospective emotions seem to be intimately connected with enlistment. Man is formed, not for rest, but for action: and if there were no weariness in a repetition of the past, the most general of all motives

Man formed for action, and not to remain at rest.

[10] K. DIGBY.

[11] Napier says, with regard to the British soldier,—"The whole world cannot produce a *nobler* specimen of military bearing, nor is the *mind* unworthy of the outward man. . . . . It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle is the result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory; but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy. No honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to his applauding countrymen; his life of danger and hardship was unchequered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore? Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, overthrow with incredible energy every opponent, and at all times prove that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, *the fount of honour was also full and fresh within him.*"

to action would be instantly suspended. We act, that is to say, we perform, what is new because we are desirous of some result which is new: and we are desirous of the new because the old, which was itself once new, presents no longer the same delight. If the old appeared to us as it once did, we should rest in it with most indolent content.

> Hope, eager hope, the assassin of our joy,
> All present blessings treading under foot,
> Is scarce a milder tyrant than Despair.
> Possession, why more tasteless than pursuit?
> Why is a wish far dearer than a crown?

It is not because hope treads our present blessings under foot that they seem to us to have lost their brightness, but, in a great measure, because they already seem to us to have faded, that we yield to the illusions of that hope which promises us continually some blessing more bright and less perishable,[12] from the enjoyment of which it is afterwards to seduce us with a similar deceit.

Mental faculties without nourishment would become deadened.

The diminished pleasure, however, fading into positive uneasiness, which thus arises from uniformity of the past, answers, as we have seen, the most benevolent of purposes. It is to our mind what the corresponding pain of hunger is to our bodily health. It gives an additional excitement even to the active, and to far the greater number of mankind it is perhaps the only kind of excitement which could rouse them from the sloth of ease to those exertions by which their intellectual and moral powers are, in some degree at least, more invigorated, or by which, notwithstanding all their indifference

[12] Satisfaction, being momentary, cannot be provided for completely without supplying fresh fuel every moment to keep it alive; happiness depends upon having something constantly at hand whereon we can employ ourselves with relish.

to the welfare of others, they are forced to become the unintentional benefactors of that society to which otherwise they might not have given the labour of a single bodily exertion, or even of a single thought.

One characteristic ascribed to recruits, namely idleness, has been already shown to have no better foundation than a confusion of ideas.

Man seeks to escape from idleness.

As a general rule, idleness is a state which man seeks by all means to escape from; his mind abhors it as much as nature abhors a vacuum; if reason has not planned out a course wherein it may expatiate, it will run after any whim or folly that shall present it with allurement.

In the journal of a working man already referred to, he thus describes his state when out of work: "I was rarely idle; for when tired of reading I fell to tailoring, having long before that time learned that absence of occupation is not rest."

Another spring of human action is termed by Dr. Whewell, the need of *mutual understanding*, which he defines as follows:—

"It is rather a necessity of man's condition than an object of his conscious desire. This necessity is seen even in animals, especially in those which are gregarious. In their associated condition they derive help from one another; and many of them, especially those that live, travel, or hunt in companies, are seen to reckon upon each other's actions with great precision and confidence. In societies of men, this mutual aid and mutual reliance are no less necessary than among beavers or bees. But in man, this aid and reliance are not the *work of mere*

Operations of the principle

instinct. There must be a *mutual understanding* by which

men learn to anticipate and to depend upon the actions of each other. This mutual understanding presupposes that man has the power of determining his future actions: and that he has the power of making other men aware of his determination. It presupposes Purpose as its matter, and Language as its instrument. The verb to understand has especial reference to the use of language. of mutual understanding.

When we have determined a future action by intention or settled purpose, we communicate the intention to another person who is concerned in the result by a promise. The person to whom any promise is made (the promissee) understands my purpose, and is led to reckon in his actions on my purposed actions, and I understand him to regulate his actions by this reckoning.

A large part of the actions which take place among men are regulated by their mutual understanding, established by promises or in some other way. In most forms of society, each person depends for food, for clothing, for shelter, for safety, for comfort, for enjoyment, or for a greater part of these, upon a mutual understanding with other men. There is a mutual dependence, the result of a mutual understanding.

One of the ways in which this result is carried into effect is by the establishment of different employments, occupations, businesses, and offices among different classes of men. One man employs himself solely in preparing food for men; others in preparing clothing; and again, one in preparing clothing for the feet, another for the body. Again, one man's business *is to protect the other from foreign foes—he is a soldier;* another occupation is to decide disputes which occur within the society —he is a judge. Persons are placed in such situations Cause of the establishment of different employments.

by general understanding, express or implied; and each man in his actions reckons upon the others discharging their offices according to their respective trades or professions. This mutual understanding is a universal bond, which could not be removed without the community falling to pieces: it is force of cohesion permeating the structure of society; so that if this force were to cease to act, the whole mass would crumble into dust. We therefore place this need of a mutual understanding among the principal springs of human action.

Unconscious concurrence of men in one general development.

Is it possible to conceive anything more wonderful than that regular and continuous convergence of an immensity of individuals, each endowed with an existence distinct, and, to a certain degree, independent; and, nevertheless, all ceaselessly disposed, notwithstanding the differences of their talents and characters, to concur, by a multitude of various means, in one general development, without having in the least concerted together, and most frequently in active unconsciousness, all fancying they are only following their personal impulses.

The prospects which the Army holds out have one striking peculiarity when placed in contrast with the future, which presents itself to the most lively imagination in entering upon the business of a tradesman or ordinary mechanic.

A young man may emulate the integrity and industry of his parents in ordinary trade, but no visions of fame or glory can come within the range of his contemplation. Without pretending to say that such lofty conceptions allure many men into the Army, a brilliant career and an imperishable name not being entirely beyond the reach of even a private soldier, it is possible that there are some

who feel a desire of world-wide renown, and there are undoubtedly many quite sensible to the feeling of self-approval, as well as to a feeling of satisfaction, derived from the idea of affording pleasure to their domestic circle, both of which are motives producing desire of fame. Desire of fame.

What else but a martial spirit is to be inferred from the facts that men who pay the smart to be set free before attestation very frequently enlist again; and that instances are by no means uncommon of a man re-enlisting after his friends have, perhaps with difficulty, purchased his discharge at a cost of 20*l.* ?

Even when there are no great prizes, the mere love of excitement is sometimes enough to cause an adventurous employment to be overstocked. This is apparent in the readiness with which persons in humble life enlist as soldiers, or go to sea. The dangers and hair-breadth escapes of a life of adventures, instead of disheartening young people, seem frequently to recommend a trade to them. A tender mother among the inferior ranks of the people is often afraid to send her son to school at a seaport town lest the sight of the ships and the conversation and adventures of the sailors should entice them to go to sea. The distant prospect of hazards from which we can hope to extricate ourselves by courage and address is not disagreeable to us, and does not raise the wages in any employment. It is otherwise with those in which courage and address can be of no avail. In trades which are known to be very unwholesome, the wages of labour are always remarkably high. Unwholesomeness is a species of disagreeableness, and its effects upon the wages of labour are to be ranked under that general head. (MILL, *Pol. Ec.*, vol. i., p. 474.) Love of excitement leads men into adventurous employment.

CHAP. I.

It may be urged that this is more applicable to the Navy than the Army, there being a supposed greater enthusiasm in this country for the Naval Service; but on turning to the report of the Committee on Military Organization, it will be found that there is no deficiency of military spirit in the country. It is stated in that report, "That in the manufacturing districts recruiting has sometimes been most successful when wages have been highest; that men are more easily obtained when war is going on, not on account of the increase in the bounty, but from the military ardour of the people; that the news of any great loss or disaster has been found to bring men to the standard quite as much as the news of a victory; so that it is difficult to say whether the success or the failure of our arms gives the greatest impetus to the recruiting.[13]

Little influence of high or low wages.

Men enlist more readily when the Army is actively engaged.

Having thus endeavoured to show that the theory attempted to be established by some of the witnesses before the Recruiting Commission with regard to the voluntary enlistment of soldiers is quite opposed to the doctrine generally established as to the mysterious union and sympathy between those feelings of instinct which man enjoys, in common with inferior animals, and those emotions of a higher order which are the special attributes of the human race, the question which seems very naturally to follow is, "Can it be possible that emotions, desires, apprehensions, feelings of shame or of emulation,

A man who enlists still retains the attributes of the human race.

[13] "Some regiments in the British service, raised in particular localities, limit their recruiting to those districts in which they were originally raised; as, for instance, the Highland Regiments, the Royal Irish and Welsh. When men are discharged from those regiments and return home, their stories of military adventure, and particularly the exploits they relate of the favourite regiments of the district, have a great influence in inducing young men to enlist."—JNO. MILTON, *Dictionnaire Générale de la Politique.*

of self-respect or of ambition, have severally, according to circumstances, some influence in determining the will of each individual man when he makes choice of a vocation, excepting when he elects to become a soldier, in which solitary instance the determining influence is a mere desire of satisfying the cravings of hunger or procuring clothes and shelter for his body?"

By studying the operations of the material senses in connection with the emotions of the mind, those who have any hesitation in answering the above question may convince themselves that, in nine cases out of ten, enlistment is the deliberate act of a rational being, preceded by the ordinary process of reflection characterized by all those mental conflicts which distinguish intelligent beings, and brought about in conformity with all the laws which are believed to govern the will of man.

Reflection and emotion precede the act of enlistment.

No such sweeping assertions to the prejudice of a whole class as the supposed moral degradation of the recruit prior to enlistment can be founded in justice.

On what grounds, it may be asked, does any man thus arrogate to himself the right to classify his fellow-creatures?

Is it not by some accident of birth or fortune that he who thus impeaches others finds himself in the position, whatever it may be, which he now holds. If born in that rank from which officers are generally selected, was not his birth the result of a thousand chance circumstances? In himself what better right can he show to the position in society conferred upon him by the accident of birth than one of those recruits who have been described as little better than animals of an inferior order? The rank and fortune acquired by ancestors are held because the

In what consists the superiority of those who look down upon recruits.

laws of this country happen to secure to the children the enjoyment of the possessions of their forefathers. Had the law of the land been different, and that the father's property, after he had enjoyed it for his life, reverted to the public, what cause on the *ground of personal merit* would the children have to complain? If a man's position has been acquired by his own genius and industry, are there not thousands of equal merit who have not had the same good fortune?

The powers and passions are the same in the peasant as the king.

The occupant of high position must feel that he has, as it were, a double existence. If he must outwardly appear and comport himself in conformity with his rank, he must inwardly feel that he is not a superior being to those men who enlist as recruits.

Much of the mischief which flows from the haughty, overbearing manner of the rich towards the poor would be avoided, if the former would only bear in mind their natural equality with the rest of their fellow-creatures.[14] "The king is but a man as I am; the violet smells to him as it doth to me; all his senses have but human conditions; his ceremonies laid by, in his nakedness he appears but a man; and though his affections are higher mounted than ours, yet, when they stoop, they stoop with the like wing."[15]

Profession of a soldier a

The profession of a soldier is a noble one, and, as a

[14] "Man is formed with a nature that may suit him to every situation; the monarch with those passions and powers which are necessary for the humblest of his subjects—the humblest peasant with the passions and powers of those who are born of kings. The sovereign, occupying himself with those voluntary labours which he denominates amusements, may feel in those very amusements the common nature which he shares with those who are toiling around him in labours which they indeed term labours, and think, perhaps, that they would be happy if only they had that ease which he finds so painful."—BROWN, 445.

[15] SHAKSPEARE.

rule, it is desirable that every man should get credit for entering it from noble and worthy motives, and his discipline should be regulated accordingly, until a change of system is called for by his own misconduct.

noble one, and he should get credit for entering it from noble motives.

If through the errors which have been discussed an approximation to truth has been evolved, and the British soldier appears before his officer as a being of more elevated feelings and desires than he has been represented elsewhere, this desirable result has been brought about by the witnesses who appeared before the Committee and raised the question of the moral and intellectual standing of the recruit.

Had it not been for the unworthy light in which he is depicted in the proceedings of that Committee, the necessity might not have suggested itself for an attempt to show the real stamp and character of those men of lion hearts whose stalwart arms have upheld the honour of England on many a glorious field.

Conclusion.

CHAPTER III.

STANDING ARMIES.

"Among the questions which it was necessary the House (of Commons) should speedily decide, after the peace of 1697, one stood forth pre-eminent in interest and importance—What was to be done with that army which had been formed in Ireland and Belgium, which had learned in many hard campaigns to obey and to conquer, and which now consisted of 87,000 excellent soldiers? Was any part of this great force to be retained in the service of the State? And if any part, what part?

"An alarmist who should now talk such language as was common five generations ago, who should call for the entire disbanding of the land force of this realm, and who should gravely predict that the warriors of Inkerman and Delhi would depose the Queen, dissolve the Parliament, and plunder the Bank, would be regarded as fit only for a cell in Saint Luke's."—MACAULAY.

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THE stirring incidents which wars and tumults furnish for history are much more congenial to the tastes and predilections of man than the events of a peaceful life.

For this reason an impenetrable mist veils the rise and progress of many things which it would be interesting to us to know—such, for instance, as the history of language—while we know that man at a very early period had recourse to the formation of armies.

Preliminaries to the levy of an army in the early ages.

It seems reasonable to suppose that in a free State, until the practice of keeping up standing armies was introduced, the preliminary step to the levy of an army was to convince those who were to be enrolled for the defence of the State that their homes and families were in danger; and in this open discussion of the question of war is to be perceived a certain degree of restraint

imposed upon the warlike propensities of the leaders of the people where such propensities existed; but by the maintenance of a standing Army, the few in power are always armed with an instrument ready for use without an appeal to the patriotism or military ardour of the many.

In this view the maintenance of a standing army may be considered as tending to give additional strength or force to the moral ascendency of individuals. When a warlike sovereign is the head of a despotic State, and at the same time commander of a powerful army, such a combination of circumstances, being calculated to promote war, must produce a feeling of insecurity in neighbouring States; but a standing army is a dangerous instrument to place even in the hands of the Government of a free State, fenced round, as such a Government is supposed to be, with limitations and responsibilities.

Standing armies and a warlike sovereign.

The first object in ancient Greece was to make the citizens good soldiers. To this end their system of education and their laws were directed: the manners and habits of the people were all in accordance with the same object; but until the time of Philip, their forces were of the nature of militia rather than of standing armies. By the Roman laws all citizens were liable to serve between the ages of seventeen and forty-five: their legions were distinctly regular troops.

Militia of Greece.

Roman legions.

For several centuries after the downfall of the Roman empire, armies had no other base than the feudal system. The temporary levies, raised as required, had no uniformity of dress or equipment, even agricultural implements being used in the ranks. They were hur-

Feudal system.

riedly assembled and as rapidly dispersed, either through the caprice of the barons, or from a want of the means of keeping them up; so that any operation depending on calculation was impossible.

Effect of the invention of coined money.

Sovereigns felt the weakness and imperfection of such a system; but, although they had nominally the right over their vassals, they were not in a condition to enforce their power until the introduction of coined money enabled them to keep permanent levies in their pay.[1] While money was thus favourable to the formation of standing armies, standing armies became, in their turn, one of the causes and means of civilization; regular revenues being required to keep up troops, and the collection of regular revenues demanding a certain degree of order and administrative organization.

Money not the sinews of war.

Machiavel states that nothing is more false than that common opinion that affirms moneys to be the sinews of war. The origin of the saying he imputes to Quintus Curtius, who relates in his history of the war between Antipater the Macedonian and the King of Sparta, that for want of money the King of Sparta was forced to fight, and was broken, whereas, if he had deferred the battle a few days, news had come into Greece of Alexander's death, when he had remained conqueror without combat. But his treasure failing, and he, doubting his army would leave him for want thereof, was constrained to hazard the battle; whereupon Quintus Curtius says that moneys are the

[1] In the reign of Philip III., at the time of his expedition against the Count de Foix, 1274, barons were assessed for their default of attendance at a hundred sous a day for the expenses which they had saved, and fifty sous as a fine to the king; bannerets at twenty sous for expenses, and ten sous as a fine; knights and squires in the same proportion. But barons and bannerets were bound to pay an additional assessment for every knight and squire of their vassal whom they ought to have brought with them into the field.

sinews of war, which sentence is alleged every day, and followed, too, by some princes not quite so wise as they should be; for, making this their ground, they believe that this is able to defend them if they have treasure enough; and never consider that if treasure were of force to overcome, Darius would have conquered Alexander, and the Greeks mastered the Romans, but these were overcome by those who esteemed not "money" but "good soldiers" the sinews of war.

Fallacy of the saying shown in the case of Darius.

Wherefore, according to Machiavel, gold, as the common opinion cries it up, is not the sinews of war, but a good army of stout soldiers; for gold is not sufficient to find good soldiers, but good soldiers are able well to find gold. The Romans, making war with the sword, never found scarcity of gold; for they had it in abundance brought into their camps by those that stood in fear of them.

Money a powerful agent.

Notwithstanding all this there can be no doubt that money is a potent and manageable instrument, by which States have been able to keep on foot forces which they could not have commanded from mere natural resources.

The doctrine laid down by Machiavel, in another place, that a well-disciplined infantry is capable of resisting almost any body of troops, is a maxim which no doubt had some influence in promoting the introduction of standing armies.

The organization of standing armies was preceded by the practice of making treaties of subsidy, of which instances are to be found at a very early period in the history of Europe. One singular article in these treaties is the exception generally made in favour of the lord paramount, or those who might possess superior rights

CHAP. III.

Treaties of subsidy.

over the parties. In 1101, there was a regular treaty of this description between Henry I. and the Earl of Flanders, by which, in consideration of 400 merks a year, the Earl was bound to assist the King with 500 soldiers against all enemies who may attack him in England, except his *liege lord the King of France.*[2]

When Edward III. and Philip of Valois were preparing for their great contest in France, they each of them sought allies to themselves by every possible means, and 100,000 merks purchased a powerful auxiliary to the former in the person of Adolphus of Nassau. King Charles the Wise is also represented as eager to gain foreign princes on all occasions to his interests by caresses and pensions, for which they were to furnish him with a certain number of men; and the Tresor des Chartres is full of *deeds* by which he obtained the services of soldiers of all ranks, from sovereigns down to simple knights, drawn from the frontiers of Flanders and Brabant, from the Rhine and interior of Germany.

The constant state of warfare which existed in Europe in those times was productive of much misery and suffering; and the prospects which the profession of a soldier held out were so unbounded that men were readily found to offer their services wherever they were wanted, as the best means of obtaining a living. This could not fail to foster and promote the military and chivalrous spirit of the age; and Europe saw everywhere vast bodies of men in arms, who, if they had no quarrel of their own upon

[2] Hallam says there were exceptions to this during the height of the feudal system in France; that the vassals of Henry II. and Richard I. never hesitated to adhere to them against the sovereign, nor do they appear to have incurred any blame on that account.

their hands, were ready at the call of those who had. A soldier of fortune in those days might aspire to anything, and the chief element in his combinations was always self-interest. The idea of duty to a sovereign, or patriotism were secondary considerations, or left out of consideration altogether, by many. The acquisition of riches was the aim of both soldiers and captains; their pretensions were even raised to sovereignty. The Visconti, the Sforza, the Scali Ecelini, and many others, had no other origin; and before them several of the Italian States had been the prey of Norman adventurers.

Soldiering a matter of business.

The soldiers of fortune employed under this general practice of subsidizing have been known under different names at different times.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries they were known as Rowters; in the fourteenth century they were designated the Companies.

Designations given to these subsidized soldiers.

In Italy they were known by the appellation of "Condottieri," or leaders of bands, who made a trade of war, trained up soldiers in their own pay, and let them and themselves out for hire to every State and every cause that stood in need of them.

Those leaders who had acquired the greatest reputation in war were of course the most eagerly sought after by sovereigns when it was necessary to settle their differences by the sword.

As, for example, Ferdinand II. sent for Wallenstein when he wanted an army. The terms were discussed and agreed upon; Wallenstein then collected those commanders in whom he placed confidence, and stipulated that they should have the command of regiments; these again selected their captains and lieutenants upon the

Ferdinand II. contracts with Wallenstein.

Wallenstein and his subcontractors.

same principle observed by the Romans in the choice of their officers. This sort of organization gave a kind of property in a regiment, and was the origin of the names still preserved to designate regiments in Austria.

In the fourteenth century, Sicily was overrun by mercenary troops of various nations, who refused to lay down their arms when their employers had made peace, and, consulting only their own interest, continued hostilities, and committed depredations which were no longer lawful.

Frederick, King of Sicily, at a loss how to get rid of them, despatched 18,000 of them, under Roger de Flor, to Andronicus, Emperor of Constantinople, to contend against the Turks. These troops performed signal service for the Emperor, and gained for him the Great Duchy of Romania. They then changed masters several times, killed the Duke of Athens, and formed his territory into a State for themselves, under the title of the "Great Company," and twenty-four years afterwards again placed themselves under their old commander, Frederick.

The Great Company.

Similar to the history of the "Great Company" is that of other bands of mercenaries in the middle of the same century, known also by the name of the Companies.

Contest between Edward III. and Philip VI. A.D. 1338.

The quarrel for the crown of France between Edward III. and Philip of Valois had thrown the whole world into arms, and the great length of time during which that quarrel lasted brought immense bodies of soldiers from all nations into the kingdom which was the object of contention. The military spirit thus expanded itself to an unnatural degree, and the profession of a soldier seemed literally to have annihilated all

others.[3] When, therefore, the treaty of Bretigny, 1360, produced a general peace, there remained all over the seat of war a vast multitude of armed bands whose ravages had hitherto been authorized by the sanction of Sovereigns, but who could no longer continue their mode of life without exposing themselves to the vengeance of the law. It was difficult for such men to understand how the same conduct could be morally different because they were in different situations. According as they were disbanded, they formed themselves into companies, and, electing some of the boldest of their body as their chiefs, they fell upon everything that came in their way; their occupations remained unchanged, but the name of soldier was degraded into that of robber. Not only private dwellings, but cities—not only the highways, but whole provinces—were ravaged by these merciless men.

The name of soldier degraded into that of robber.

Their numbers and actions made them respected as well as feared: they frequently undertook enterprises in which they proved themselves superior to the force of many regular States, and in the end they acquired nearly as much consequence as their adversaries, by forcing

Consequence acquired by these bands.

[3] "The history of the middle ages makes it evident that war was the whole profession of gentlemen, and almost the only object attended to in their education. The youthful exercises and occupation of Francis I. were altogether martial and athletic.

"Even the distinction between the functions and character of ecclesiastics and laymen was little regarded in those times. The higher order of ecclesiastics, many of them of noble birth, retained the idea of what belonged to them as gentlemen, and, in spite of the decrees of the pope and canons of councils, they bore arms, led their vassals to the field, and fought at their head in battle."—ROBERTSON.

The practice of knighting judges on their appointment to the Bench is ingeniously traced by Robertson to those ages in which military distinction was looked upon as the highest; and, therefore, knighthood was conferred on men eminent in the law, to place them on a level with those who had become conspicuous for military talent.

Sovereigns to treat with, and in some measure, therefore, to acknowledge, them.

At first the King of France looked upon them, and with justice, as freebooters and rebels. They were not authorized by any sovereign power; they made war under no commission but that of their swords; and hence they have been called by an old historian, "Filii Belial Guerratores de variis nationibus non *habentes titulum*."

Their successes, however, obliged the King of France to meet them in regular battle, and in an encounter between one of their armies and the King's forces commanded by James de Bourbon, a Prince of the blood, attended by the flower of the French chivalry, at Brignars, near the banks of the Rhone, the Prince was slain, and his army defeated. They afterwards pillaged the whole of the Lyonnais and other provinces, and marching straight to Avignon, resolved to plunder the whole Consistory, including the Pope himself. From this intention they were only diverted by the Marquis Montserrat, who took them into his pay, and sent them to the wars in Italy.

France ravaged by them for five years.

Five years passed on, during which period France continued a prey to their ravages, in her fairest provinces, without a possibility of restraining them; while the complexion of the times, and the toleration accorded by custom to these roving bands, tended palpably to increase, instead of diminishing, the evil. The mode which had been adopted of granting subsidies to particular chiefs of renown for the purpose of holding in readiness a constant supply of armed men, was favourable to the Companies in the highest degree; and so far from being repressed, they were encouraged, and actually

joined by men of celebrity, who, had they lived in other times, would not have countenanced this perversion of a profession of all others, perhaps, the most truly noble. Thus it is that in the history of these times such men as Calverly, Gournay, Albret, Auxerne Andrechain (a Marshal of France), and even Du Guesclin himself, appear at the head of these roving bands.

In the present age, although there is no type of the Companies, many living representatives of the Soldier of Fortune might, no doubt, be found amongst the officers serving in the civil war in America. A vivid sketch of one is introduced by Colonel Freemantle, in his *Diary of a Visit to the Southern Army.* Colonel St. Leger Grenfell, whose adventures are therein related, was previously well known as having led a life full of extraordinary adventure, serving at one time as a dragoon in the French Army, while at another time, being a good Arabic scholar, he lent his services to Abd-el-Kader, and fought against the French. Buenos Ayres and the South American republics have also in turn been the scene of this roving colonel's adventures. During the Crimean war he served with the cavalry of the Turkish Contingent. For some years, on board his own yacht, he harassed the Reff Pirates, and during the Indian Mutiny he entered into a contract to mount the cavalry in India. In the present war in America he holds the post of Inspector-General of Cavalry to the Army of General Bragg, admired by all ranks for his reckless daring and gallantry, and the terror of all absentees, stragglers, and deserters and commanding officers who cannot produce for his inspection the number of horses for which they draw forage.

Furnishing troops for hire did not necessarily involve the State furnishing them in the war.

The act of furnishing troops by subsidy did not necessarily lead to the State furnishing them being involved as a party in the war. History affords many instances of British troops being engaged in Continental wars while this country remained at peace with both of the belligerent powers; as, for instance, in the case of the corps of 6,000 Scotch, under the Marquis of Hamilton, which took part in the Thirty Years' War.

The best troops of Switzerland, since the time of Louis XI. up to a recent period, have been almost constantly in the service of some one or more of the States of Europe,[4] without any instance of a quarrel thereby ensuing between their country and the State against which they have acted.

Charles the Seventh of France is generally considered to have been the first to raise what may be called a standing army, for the regular payment of which a tax was levied, instead of the men being allowed to live by plunder—the only means by which a feudal army could possibly subsist.

Voluntary enlistment in France. Service compulsory in England.

During the sixteenth century, the French recruited their army by voluntary enlistment, while about the same time it was no uncommon practice to press men into the English service.

[4] In the Republic of Venice, the military force was composed entirely of mercenaries. The command of these was never entrusted to noble Venetians, lest they should acquire such influence over the army as might endanger the public liberty, or become accustomed to the exercise of such power as might make them unwilling to return to the condition of private citizens.

But though a soldier of fortune was placed at the head of the armies of the Republic, the same suspicious policy which induced the Venetians to employ these adventurers, prevented their placing entire confidence in them. Two noblemen, appointed by the Senate, accompanied their army when it took the field, with the appellation of *Proveditori*, and exercised an irksome control over the general, like the field deputies of the Dutch, who gave Prince Eugene such annoyance in later times.

Until the Revolution of 1688, the only force recognized by law in this country was the militia.

A small force levied by Charles the Second after his restoration, upon his own authority, and paid for out of his own means, may be regarded as the germ of the British army as it now exists.

But it was not until long after that date that men's minds became reconciled to the idea of a standing army.

Fletcher of Saltoun's writings furnish a very good specimen of the feeling very prevalent on the subject.[5] Fletcher of Saltoun.

"That, as to the hiring of mercenary soldiers, it was a thing of great danger to put the liberty of Scotland into the hands of men who are of no fortunes nor have any hopes but in the public calamity; who for money would attempt anything; whose excessive avarice[6] opportunity would inflame to a desire of all manner of innovations; and whose faith would follow the wheel of fortune. Such men make a trade of war, and enter into that employment in hopes of its continuance during life. If mercenary forces be established, they will inevitably produce those fatal consequences that have always attended such forces in the other kingdoms of Europe—violation of property, decay of trade, oppression of the country by heavy taxes and quarters, the utmost misery and slavery of the poorer sort, the ruin of the nobility by these expenses in court and army, deceit and treachery in all ranks of men, occasioned by want and necessity."

Through the increase of commerce, many new chan-

[5] See *Marshal's Miscellany* for an excellent sketch of the different expedients adopted to raise troops in this country at various times.

[6] He must have had the old Companies in view when he wrote.

nels are now opened to the population, by which subsistence may be obtained, and the progress of civilization and good order have produced a feeling of security in the enjoyment of property, so that the profession of arms no longer holds out the same prospect to an adventurer as in former times; neither are men so much driven to adopt it from necessity.

Prospects of soldier of fortune diminish.

The mode of raising armies by conscription has, therefore, been very generally adopted except in England. The great bodies of men now kept up on the Continent could not be raised in any other way.[7] It remains to be seen whether the system of voluntary enlistment will prove sufficient in this country in the event of any extraordinary pressure for men.

Force at the close of the Revolutionary War with France.

The whole force under arms in this country at the close of the Revolutionary War is stated to have amounted to 700,000 men. Since that time, the population has nearly doubled itself. A rough estimate may thus be formed of the resources of England for military purposes, if the country should be called upon to put forth its strength.

The effective strength of the Regular Army at the present time (inclusive of the Army of India) may be put down as 227,000—230,000.[8] On a moderate calculation, the number of recruits required to meet casualties in such a force would be 23,000 annually.

Lord Herbert's evidence.

Lord Herbert, when Secretary of State for War, in

[7] In France, agents for insuring young men against the conscription have frequently made large fortunes. One way in which they deceived the Government officer was by keeping a number of young men in pay, who had slight blemishes disqualifying them to serve as soldiers. When a young man who had insured was drawn as a conscript, he was personated at the usual inspection by one of these blemished young men, and thus obtained exemption.

[8] See note, p. 72.

his evidence before the Committee on Military Organization, expressed his conviction that the requisite number might be readily obtained, and that, in the event of a war with any great power, we could in such case double the number we now raise, and more if necessary. This result he anticipated, not from the effect of an increase in the bounty, but because the spirit of the population would be animated by a war. A war with a great power his lordship thought would be popular, and *many persons would be thrown out of employment.*

The opinion of a Cabinet Minister possessing the experience and great administrative ability of the late Lord Herbert is entitled to much weight; but this is a question in which the vital interests of this country are involved—interests of such magnitude that they should be secured on the firmest basis attainable; and if any means can be adopted by which a steady and certain supply of reinforcements for the Army can be assured, we have arrived at that period in our history when it seems desirable that we should avail ourselves of such means.

The utmost number of recruits raised in any one year during the Revolutionary War has been put down at 14,000. That was a period of extraordinary peril and incredible exertion; and "as in nature so in government," nothing that is violent is permanent. Besides, it is not desirable to check the industry of the country by withdrawing artisans from their regular vocations. England struggled through the great war at the period alluded to, not because her artisans were driven to enlist by *being thrown out of employment;* the war was a profitable one to her trade, and she was thus enabled to keep up a powerful Navy and to subsidize foreign troops in

Injury to trade from artisans being forced to become soldiers.

support of the small force kept up by her on the Continent: and in any future war it should be the aim of this country, if possible, to keep the enemy at a distance, so that the looms and forges in the manufacturing districts may continue in activity, and supply the rest of the world under the ægis of England's Navy.

Ordinary recruiting only sufficient for peace establishment.

As 14,000 men only could be raised by incredible exertion in one year, and in other years 12,000, it is not to be expected that the nation will easily raise annually more than double that number? but that would be little more than sufficient to keep up the peace establishment; for the vast increase of the British force in India, consequent on the mutiny in that country, is not a temporary increase. There is no prospect of a reduction in the strength of the force employed in the East, or, indeed, in any part of the world. Some scheme, therefore, is required to provide for the additional levies which would be called for in the event of a war, and the consequent augmentation of the Army.[9] The increase of the bounty to the Navy is said to have brought into the service a very indifferent description of men, and, altogether, a temptation of that description is not a measure upon which much dependence can be placed.

In making any calculations on this subject, it must also be remembered that, if the population has increased since the Revolutionary War, the outlets for the population are also much more numerous. Large colonies invite the people from these islands, and the inducements they hold out are sufficient to tempt numbers from their native shores, even in time of peace. Entwined as

[9] Since these pages were written, the volunteer movement has added greatly to the defensive power of the country.

England now is with her colonies by family ties, parents and children, brothers and sisters, in many instances, are almost at a loss to say on which side of the broad ocean they are at home. The agency of these ties, in promoting emigration, is likely to be more felt each succeeding year, and it is not favourable to recruiting for the Army.

Emigration antagonistic to recruiting.

Colonel Dalrymple, writing in 1760, describes the Army "as composed of men who enter the service through levity, are inveigled or drove into it through necessity, and, lastly, forced into it to supply the deficiencies of the other classes." And he further adds, that "the very act which remits all debts under ten pounds is an encouragement to bad men to enlist and defraud their creditors."

Col. Dalrymple, 1766.

At the time that Colonel Dalrymple wrote all able-bodied and idle disorderly persons, who could not, upon examination, prove themselves to exercise, and industriously follow, some lawful trade or employment, or to have some substance sufficient for their support and maintenance, were liable, according to law, to be pressed into the service.

Since that date an improvement has so far taken place that the raising men by impressment, and the quashing of debts by enlistment, have been done away with, as well as the power of magistrates to remit penalties on condition of men enlisting; but in other respects the recruiting is very much on the same principle it was a century ago. Various experiments have been made at different times, such as raising men by holding out bribes to officers to exert themselves in obtaining recruits. Commissions have sometimes been sold to officers, and the proceeds applied to the payment of bounty. Officers

Rewards held out to officers to obtain men.

have been rewarded by promotion, on producing a certain number of men. In the year 1778, cities and towns raised subscriptions to defray the expense of levying men. The legality of this *private* mode of raising men was the subject of lengthy debates in Parliament. The measure was supported on the ground of precedent, drawn from the time of the rebellion in 1745, when the nobility and gentry raised regiments at their own expense, and subscriptions were not only openly received, but persons went from house to house to collect money for the common defence, and individuals refusing to subscribe, were looked upon in a suspicious light, as wanting in loyalty.

Cities and towns raise regiments.

Regiments raised by nobility and gentry.

The opinion delivered by a great law lord at that time was, "that the Declaration of Rights was only applicable to a time of peace, not to a state of war, like the present."

This measure had the effect of entirely annihilating the recruiting for the old regiments in the usual manner, and the extraordinary premiums given had the effect of causing an extraordinary desertion from the established corps.

Premium for particular regiments checks enlistment for others: occasions desertion.

Civilians have at times been regularly employed on the recruiting service, giving security for the public money entrusted to them, and receiving, instead of daily pay, a sum of five guineas for every recruit raised. Recruiting corps, such as Macdonald's, Ogle's, and others, were at one time formed; letters of service being granted to those officers, authorizing them to form a staff of officers and non-commissioned officers, and raise 1,000, or 500, or such number of men as might be agreed upon for general service.

Commanding officers of regiments at one time were

allowed to send out as many officers and parties as they pleased, to recruit, and when the regiment was complete, an order was immediately given for all parties to join head-quarters, occasioning a great expense. The number of officers called in, in this way, upon one occasion, amounted to 800. It frequently happened that by this system several officers met together in the same place, employed on the same duty, which led to disorder and quarrels at the different stations. The present system, without almost any alteration, has been in force since 1812. Throughout the succession of expedients which from time to time have been adopted to raise men, we see nothing but temporary measures; no traces are to be found of any attempt at the adoption of a systematic plan, calculated to afford a regular and certain annual supply of recruits proportionate to the force which it is essential for the country to maintain.

No attempt visible to introduce a regular system of replenishing the ranks.

The necessity of a standing army in this country was apparent even in the time of Blackstone, for he observes, "As the fashion of keeping standing armies has of late years universally prevailed over Europe, it has also for many years past been annually judged necessary by our legislature, for the safety of the kingdom, the defence of the possessions of the Crown of Great Britain, and the preservation of the balance of power in Europe, to maintain, even in time of peace, a standing body of troops under the command of the Crown, who are, however, *ipso facto*, disbanded at the expiration of every year, unless continued by Parliament."

Necessity for the Army greater now than ever.

Now although this necessity for an army is much stronger at the present day, and the risk of any abuse by the Crown is so far diminished as almost to amount

to nothing, it might really be supposed, from the circumstance of there being no organization to keep the Army complete, that the institution is still regarded as a temporary one, and that the dissolution of the Army some morning by Act of Parliament, or in default of an Act of Parliament, is still looked upon as probable.

Recruiting in 1761.

In Colonel Dalrymple's book, already referred to, numbers of good men are stated to be enrolled as volunteers (1761), but that the Army is greatly obliged to lively accident and the dexterity of the recruiting officers for them.

In the evidence before the Committee on Recruiting, Colonel Russell states:—"We have always recruited from those who are most commonly to be found in low beer-houses, and such places; and hardly any respectable person would allow a recruiting party to come near his place."

Mr. Godley considers the system of recruiting objectionable, both upon economical and moral grounds. "I do not think" (he says) "you get a good class of recruits. I do not think you get so many recruits, or recruits so easily as you ought. I think that you get them in an unsatisfactory and a discreditable manner."

Sir F. Stovin thinks the system of recruiting disgraceful.

Lieutenant Lowrie "thinks that the whole of the present system of bringing money and rewards tends to degrade the Army in the eyes of the people. It is quite notorious that the recruiting service is at present conducted by crimps, called 'bruizers,' who are men generally of the very worst character, touting about in the lowest haunts of the town."

The fallacious ideas propounded before the Committee on the Recruiting for the Army have been already noticed. It is more gratifying to be able to select, from the evidence before the same Committee, some passages which seem to contain the germ of an improved system of recruiting:— Col. Russell, 867.

Colonel Russell "thinks that boys ought to be taken out of the industrial schools yearly, and trained up for the Army."

Captain de Teissier "would form battalions at once of lads from fourteen to seventeen. Their service not to count until eighteen. Train some for one branch of the service and some for another, and let them join any regiment they please at eighteen." Capt. de Teissier, 2623.

Major Buckley. — "Reference might be made to registries for the ages of recruits with good effect. Recruits on joining should be placed in charge of such soldiers as are known to be of a kindly disposition. Thinks it would be beneficial to allow men to enlist at sixteen. Give them a portion of their drill, and keep them at school until they are eighteen. At the age of eighteen they would be able to carry their knapsacks, having been well fed, clothed, and looked after, and not hard-worked." Major Buckley, 5513.

Major Buckley advocates a return to the system of boy companies. They did not get quite the same pay as men.

The system was given up on account of expense. 40*l.* or 50*l.* in that way may be said to have been paid for each recruit. Thinks the expense would be quite counterbalanced by the advantage.

Major Morvin "thinks it would be a good plan Major Morvin, 407.

to give old soldiers employment in the customs, arsenals, &c.

Training depôts; teaching trades and securing employment to pensioners.

The two ideas contained in the foregoing passages—first, that of training up boys for the Army; and, secondly, that of providing employment for old soldiers—if properly combined and developed, hold out a prospect of an improved state of things. If a youth on joining a depôt or training school should be taught a trade as well as his drill, some portion of his leisure, while in the service, might be devoted to keeping up his trade; and on leaving the service, if his conduct merited it, he might be ensured employment. The manufacture of a number of things required for the service might be extensively carried on by the troops themselves in this manner.

The present system of giving a man a pension and a character on discharge is not sufficient; the pension in scarcely any instance is sufficient as a subsistence for the man.[10] If his character is good, he may perhaps get employment; but if good conduct while in the service would ensure employment on discharge, a most valuable

[10] There are always some short-sighted people, who look upon troops in time of peace as a useless burden, and desire to reduce them. In this way, instead of creating in the peasant a desire for military life, you inspire the soldier with a wish to become a peasant again; for since he has no distinction to hope for in military life, it will be less fatiguing and more to his advantage to adopt once more the life of a rustic.

Polybius says, the citizen crowns the warrior who has saved his life, and if he refuses to do so, the Tribune compels him. In a word, he who has been delivered from some danger, honours his liberator during his life, in the same way as a son his father. In that way, not only those who have embraced the profession of arms, but those who remain in the villages, became accustomed to despise dangers; because those who obtain such a reward, besides the glory and reputation which they acquire in the eyes of military men, also enjoy, when they retire, the right of attending fêtes and public games, decorated with certain ornaments, which those only are permitted to wear who have received them from the hands of the general as the reward of valour. Certainly, troops should not be left in idleness in times of peace; but there is no difficulty in finding them occupation.

incentive to good conduct in the service would be afforded; the standing of the pensioner in the social scale would be elevated; and that circumstance could not fail to react on the recruiting, by raising the Army in public estimation, and thus facilitating the enrolment of recruits.

CHAPTER IV.

MILITARY ELOQUENCE.

"There is no persuasion without moving the passions. You say, '*It is for my interest:*' now you bespeak my self-love. You say, '*It is for the public good:*' you rouse my patriotism. You say, '*It will relieve the miserable:*' you touch my pity."

"Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind than eloquence, by which objects are represented in the strongest and most lively colours. The bare opinion of another, especially when enforced with passion, will cause an idea to have an influence upon us, though that idea might otherwise have been entirely neglected."—HUME.

CHAP. IV.

THE soldier who goes into action with an idea that he must conquer, that his enemy is always beaten, that in the cause at issue justice is on his side, that the skill of his General cannot be surpassed, confronts danger with a degree of courage calculated to make him conquer another who is not possessed of the same feelings. In this may be seen the foundation of the military oration, which, like a prologue, was formerly addressed to the troops on the eve of a battle.

Military oration in ancient times.

The great Generals of antiquity applied themselves to the reason, fancy, and passions of their soldiers, the middle principle partaking equally of the two extremes; and they thus wound up the feelings within them to the liveliest and happiest energies of exertion.

Hannibal on the summit of the Alps.

When the Carthaginians reached the summit of the Alps, a dreary prospect presented itself—the snow lay

thick around; from their lofty eminence, they could see the mountains below, as far as the eye could range, all covered with snow, made discernible through the grey and hazy light of morning, and casting a dismal kind of dead reflection upon the half-illumined sky: much conspired to throw them into despondency of soul. Hesitation appeared evident in their steps, and despair was strongly marked in their countenances.

Under these circumstances, it was not an additional ration with which the Carthaginian General sought to stimulate his men: he had recourse to an *Oration*. He pointed out the plains of Italy to excite their hopes and raise their drooping spirits; and he reminded them that the country through which they were about to pass to reach those plains was inhabited by friendly tribes, thus calming their apprehensions, and giving them confidence.

Topics to which he adverts.

With Cæsar the speech was such an invariable prelude to the battle that, when he wishes to show that he was either surprised or suddenly compelled to fight, his usual mode of describing the suddenness of the event is by saying that he had not so much as time to "harangue his men."

Scipio Africanus is represented by Polybius as having been eminent for his talent in addressing troops.

Oration no longer possible; power of rhetoric still confessed.

The tactical organization of armies in our day, and other circumstances, render the delivery of an oration, in the style of the Generals of former times, quite impracticable; but in the practice of addressing troops by general orders and proclamations, there is a clear admission that the power of rhetoric is still acknowledged to be a means of developing the military spirit and elevating its tone.

It is also still possible for a commanding officer of a

regiment, or small corps, to address a few words to his men before they are launched against their enemy; and the effect of a speech, well delivered, and couched in brief, stirring terms, is much greater than any effect that can be produced by written orders: the voice, the action, gesture, and energy of the speaker all combining to send the words home with a living power which no written order can convey.

The comparative neglect in modern times of rhetoric, an art on which so much careful study was bestowed by the ancients, has been explained in various ways.

The democratic form of Government in the early ages was obviously favourable to the rise of orators who possessed the power of fascinating the multitude by their eloquence, and who were educated men, capable of gaining an influence over those classes who required to be addressed in a train of sound argument. The oration was also the only method of addressing a people or State until the art of printing became general, and the means of circulating printed publications increased. Thus, the art of rhetoric was closely connected with the science of legislation or politics, and no one hesitated to avow that he had studied an art in which political wisdom was supposed to be included.

Art of printing affords a substitute for oratory.

With changes in the form of Government, and the unlimited discussion of any political subject, promoted by means of the printing press, the power of oratory has declined; and, in the present age, people entertain a decided aversion to anything bordering on artifice in public speaking, and are quite ashamed to own that they have studied the art.

A rhetorical display, in which the care and attention

bestowed on the preparation are not skilfully concealed, is not more likely to take effect on soldiers than on civilians; but an officer should not, on that account, be discouraged from applying himself to the attainment of a facility in addressing a few spirit-stirring words to his men on suitable occasions; and, although it is not laid down as a part of his duty, it is an act of wisdom on his part to cultivate this art.

Opinion of the Emperor Leo.

The Emperor Leo, in conversation with his General Nicephorius, says, With a natural talent for speaking, which has been cultivated, you may at all times revive the drooping spirits of your men, excite them to fresh deeds of valour, and console them under misfortunes. A speech addressed with prudence can effect much.

The effects of the speech promoted by the justice of the cause.

It was a maxim with the ancients—"Above all things seek to fight in a just cause, on which you can implore the blessing of the God of battles."

In accordance with this maxim, any address to soldiers, as well as citizens, is more likely to take effect when it proceeds from the lips of earnestness and sincerity, from the lips of one who has thoroughly convinced himself of the justice of the cause in which he has engaged.[1] A brief consideration of the lawfulness of war in some of its aspects may, therefore, be deemed not irrelevant as an introduction to the subject of military oratory.

Duty of a citizen.

Amongst the duties of a man as a citizen, that of defending the social system under which he lives is, by common consent, acknowledged to be one of primary importance. The duty thus imposed on man by the

[1] "Why fear a numerous army?" said Henry of England, surrounded by the French; "God will protect the just."

unanimous voice of his fellow-creatures, is an implied sanction to defensive war. On the other hand, aggressive war is pronounced unlawful by the general sense of mankind; but, in practice, no distinction, approaching to accuracy, can be made between defensive war and war for other purposes; when nations are mutually exasperated, and armies are levied and battles fought, with whatever motives of defence one party may have begun the contest, both in turn become aggressors. If the army of defence obtains success, it soon becomes an army of aggression. Having repelled the invader, it begins to punish him. If a war has once begun, it is vain to think of distinctions of aggression and defence. Moralists may talk of distinctions, but *soldiers* will make none, and none can be made. It is without the limits of possibility.

Distinction between defensive and offensive soon lost in war.

Dr. Johnson says, "There is reason to expect that, as the world is more enlightened, policy and morality will at last be reconciled." That such a day will come, every one must admit, who believes that there will be an era of purity and holiness, "when violence shall no more be heard in our land, wasting nor destruction within our borders." But, at the same time, the lawfulness of defensive warfare in the present age is quite compatible with the same scriptures, which promise that blessed and glorious futurity.

Grotius on the sanction to war by the natural law.

Grotius says:—"The doctrine that war is not contrary to natural law, is proved from the sacred history. Abraham made war upon the four kings who had plundered Sodom, and was thereupon blessed by Melchisedec. This he did without the special mandate of God, as appears by the history; he must therefore have been

justified by the law of nature: for he was a most holy and wise man, as even heathen authors declare. We may also refer to the war in which the Jews under Moses and Joshua resisted the attack of the Amalekites; and, further, God prescribed to his people general and perpetual laws concerning the mode of carrying on war (Deut. xx. 10–15); showing plainly by this that a war may be just, without a special mandate; for the case of the nations of Canaan is here expressly distinguished from the case of other nations. And inasmuch as nothing is there said as to what are just causes of war, this shows that they are assumed to be known by the light of nature. Light of nature. Thus we have Jephthah's war against the Ammonites, concerning the occupation of the land (Judges xi. 13); David's war against the same people for the insult done to his ambassadors (2 Sam. x. 4). So the Apostle, in writing to the Hebrews (xi. 32), speaks of Gideon, and Barak, and Samson, and Jephthah, and David, and Samuel, and others, who through faith subdued kingdoms, waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of the aliens, when, as the context shows, faith includes the belief that what is done is pleasing to God."

The same writer also contends it would be absurd to suppose that the Hebrew people were allowed to secure their government, and the public and private safety, by capital punishments, and to bear arms for their own defence; but that other nations and kings at the same time were not allowed to do so, and yet were never admonished by the prophets for using capital punishments and making war, as they were often reproved for their other sins.

The right of making war is vested in the State; by The right of making war

vested in the State.

which term, State, is understood the recognized agents of all the individuals composing a society or nation. The State is an authority superior to all authorities, and from which they are all derived. The supreme and original authority thus residing in the State is its *sovereignty*. A State which is in all its internal relations independent of all other States, is a sovereign State. In the monarchies of modern Europe, the supreme power has been conceived as vested in the monarch, and he has been looked upon as the origin of all other power. In such cases, the monarch is termed the Sovereign; but in Republics, such as the United States of North America, no person is sovereign. The term *sovereign* has also been applied to the people; but a people deprived of that organization which makes them a State, are not sovereign. They cannot exercise or impart authority. We can with no propriety speak of the sovereign people of England, except we mean the State of England, and thus include King, Lords, and Commons, in the term people; if people denote individuals without governors and magistrates, we can with no more propriety speak of the sovereign people of England than of the sovereign people of Yorkshire. If the people of Yorkshire be not sovereign, because they are under the authority of England, the people of England are not sovereign, because they are under the authority of King, Lords, and Commons.

Sovereign State.

Necessity of those conditions of society termed a State.

It is impossible for man to exist out of such a society as is called a State, and the rights of a State are necessary to the existence of the State as a distinct and independent agent which is sovereign over all its subjects within it, and protects from all harm without. If its subjects be injured, or its independence assailed by a

foreign State, it has no resource but remonstrance, which may inevitably lead to war, in which case its authority over the armies of the State being supreme, the duty of all loyal soldiers is to yield a willing obedience to its commands.

No scruples as to the justice or injustice, in appearance, of a war determined on by the State, whether defensive or offensive, are becoming the soldier. The lawfulness of defensive war has been shown, and a war which appears aggressive in character may be equally lawful as a matter of policy. An aggressive war may be resorted to by a State for defensive purposes; the soldier can have but very imperfect means of judging of the motives of policy which dictate strategic movements in war, but every soldier should know that the maintenance of the State he serves is essential to the existence and welfare of the society which it represents, and of which he is a member, and that the authority of the executive depends on the State being able to command obedience from its armies. Patriotism, and every loyal and honourable feeling, prohibit the soldier from canvassing the orders of his superiors. It is for him to trust to the wisdom and justice of the State under which he acts, and to exert his best energies in the execution of its commands.

Soldiers must not argue, but obey.

The particular passions to which soldiers are most sensible may be divided into two classes—those which are superinduced by, and appertain to, military life amongst all nations; and those which may be traced to particular national characteristics. Amongst the former may be instanced the inclination of the soldier to run into excess, arising from the severity of military discipline,

The ruling passions of soldiers.

and from his being in a great measure excluded from the enjoyments of a domestic life; the familiarity with the idea of death, and the contempt for it produced by the nature of his duty; his indifference to the future, and disposition to seek all his enjoyment in the present.

Distinction between the regular Army and Militia.

In these respects, there is a distinction to be drawn between soldiers enlisted in the regular standing Army and in the Militia, or temporary levies; these latter more nearly resembling the soldiers of former times, who left the ordinary occupations of agriculture and labour, their homes, and families, when danger threatened the State, and returned to their homes when the danger had passed. Militia and Volunteers retain more of the character of citizens than the soldiers of the regular army, and are consequently more alive to the emotions excited by the thought of home and kindred.

The particular emotions arising from national characteristics which the British officer has to study, may be classed under three principal heads—those of the three nationalities composing the British Army—the English, Scotch, and Irish. The native levies in India certainly present a fourth; but for the present purpose it will be sufficient to offer a few remarks on the first three.

English recruits.

Amongst the English recruits, two classes are comprised—those from the agricultural, and those from the manufacturing, districts, each presenting shades of difference. The peasant from the rural district is probably, in most cases, of purer English blood than the manufacturer; for the influx of adventurers and emigrants from other countries continually streaming into England has a greater tendency to accumulate round the manufacturing centres than to spread over the country.

The peasant and the artisan.

The peasant has generally the advantage of the artisan in stature and strength. The latter is supposed by some officers to be more intelligent and more easily trained to military exercises; but it is doubtful whether, in reality, any difference in this respect is to be found in favour of the artisan; and if any such difference, in point of intelligence, does exist, the peasant and the artisan are likely to be brought more on an equality by the introduction and daily increasing use of machinery in agriculture. Fifty years ago, the only agricultural-implement maker was the village ploughwright. It is impossible to think of the display in the agricultural department in the International Exhibition, and at the agricultural meetings in all parts of the country, without feeling a persuasion that this extensive use of machinery must have an effect in elevating the labourer. An increased produce from the land is one result already known. The labourer's toil will be lightened; and, as he will have the guidance and direction of these machines, his mind will be set to thinking; and, being stimulated into activity, will grow in power. Political feelings in the manufacturing districts not being favourable to military discipline, the labourer is generally found more ready and willing than the artisan to yield the requisite obedience to his superiors.

The English soldier is generally of a blunt, independent character. He is proud of his own country, and inclined to despise others. He is not so much disposed as either the Scotch or Irish soldier to attach himself to his officer, from a pure feeling of personal respect and regard. He observes that wealth constitutes the standard of respectability in his country, and he is inclined to follow

the example of his countrymen, and yield the tribute of respect, according to the standard which they have established. His physical condition is good as far as muscular strength and the proportions of his figure, but he does not endure hardships and privations with the equanimity of the Scot or the Irishman, neither is he always a good marcher.

The English soldier is not of an enthusiastic, impetuous temperament; but, judging by the enthusiasm shown in the British Navy, there can be little doubt that the same spirit exists in the Army, although latent, and requiring to be drawn forth. The courage of the English soldier is cool and deliberate; he may be depended on to hold his ground with indomitable tenacity; and, when obliged to yield, if properly handled, his retreat will be conducted with order and regularity.[2]

Natives of the borders.

The people on the borders of England and Scotland bear a close resemblance to each other, and probably have a common origin in character. They seem to have more affinity with Scotland than with England.

Scottish soldier.

The military service, from various causes, into which it is unnecessary to enter, has always been looked upon with more favour amongst the Scotch than the English. Although not superior in bodily strength to their Southern neighbours, the Scotch show more endurance under privations. To the Highlander in particular,

[2] The science of the ring is generally supposed to have some influence on the national character in those ranks from which the soldier is drawn; and the following extract from *Bell's Life* shows the interest which is still felt as to the championship of England :—"The Championship.—Jem Mace hopes that King will not make a match with any foreigner, but will give him the first chance of retrieving his laurels. Mace is much surprised that a man of such immense power and youth should so easily forego the highest and most valuable trophy any pugilist can attain, namely, the champion's belt."

familiar from his infancy with inclemency of the weather and coarse fare, the hardships of a compaign are no novelty.

To the remains of a spirit of clanship, as well as, perhaps, to the religious education of the Scotch, may be ascribed the staunch fidelity of the soldiers of that country. Their courage is more impetuous than that of the English soldier.[3] They have, like the Englishmen, great national pride.

With a strong love of adventure, great natural sagacity and penetration, the Scotchman is admirably adapted for a military life, while his ardent enthusiastic temperament renders him particularly open to that impression which it is in the power of a zealous officer to produce upon the men under his command.

The Irish have many excellent qualities as soldiers. Like the Scotch, they have generally been inured to hardships from their youth, and are, therefore, less likely to suffer from exposure on a campaign. In character, there is a difference between the natives of the south and west of the country and those of the north. The former seem to be more of an aboriginal race than the latter, who partake more of the qualities of the Scotch and English. Irish.

To the great qualities of the British soldier, one of

[3] Dundee arrived at Blair Castle, 27th July, 1689. A council of war was held. The Saxon officers were, generally, against hazarding a battle; the Celtic chiefs were of a different opinion. Glengarry and Lochiel were now both of one mind. "Fight, my lord," said Lochiel, with his usual energy; "fight immediately; fight, if you have only one to three. Our men are in heart. Their only fear is that the enemy should escape. Give them their way, and be assured that they will either perish or gain a complete victory. But if you restrain them, if you force them to remain on the defensive, I answer for nothing. If we do not fight, we had better break up, and return to our mountains."

the most eloquent men[4] of the day in France has paid the following tribute:—

Montalembert on the British soldier.

"The first efforts of the English in Continental wars have almost always been unsuccessful. Except at sea, the history of her long struggle against the Revolution and the French empire, offers nothing but a long series of reverses, until the genius of Wellington at length succeeded in crowning her indomitable firmness. The final triumph of England over the greatest captain of the age, is due to her not having given way to despondency in consequence of the miserable campaigns of the Duke of York in 1794 and 1799, or the disastrous retreat of Sir John Moore in 1808. Amongst a free people, the elasticity, the vigour, and firmness, which are the sure guarantees of victory, are by no means impaired by free political discussion and criticism, and the daily intervention of the press, the use, and even abuse, of all its rights. Where is the people that could maintain an army of almost 100,000 men, voluntarily enlisted, at a distance of 3,000 miles, as England did in the Crimea for two years? Friends and enemies alike have an interest in not deceiving themselves as to the real value of that army which has been so severely criticized. It will never have the *élan*, the boldness, the intrepid and reckless gaiety of the French, but will yield to none in unconquerable energy in the midst of the greatest dangers, in its contempt of death, in its high discipline. Who can forget the example of discipline given in the shipwreck of the *Birkenhead*? When the means of reaching the shore were only sufficient to save the women, and children, and sick, officers and soldiers

Army in the Crimea.

Discipline on board the *Birkenhead*.

[4] MONTALEMBERT.

take their arms and fall in on the poop, whilst the embarkation takes place of those chosen to be saved, whilst the vessel at the same time is gradually sinking. Not one of these powerful armed young men tries to take the place of the weak, and without a murmur they descend into the sea, martyrs to duty and charity. In my opinion, the word *Birkenhead* should be inscribed on the colours of that regiment as one of its most brilliant victories."

An address to the feelings and active principles of our nature is generally associated with the idea of dishonest artifice, and stigmatized as an appeal to the passions instead of the reason, as if reason alone could ever influence the will, and operate as a motive; which it no more can than the eyes which show a man the road can enable him to move from place to place; or than a ship provided with a compass, can sail without a wind.

The abuse of any natural power no argument against its legitimate use.

It may, indeed, be urged with truth, that an orator does often influence the will by improper appeals to the passions; but it is no less true that he often imposes on his hearers by sophisticated arguments; yet this does not justify us in condemning the employment of arguments. The prejudice against an appeal to the passions seems to arise from the common belief, that whenever the feelings are excited, they are, of course, *over-excited.* Now, so far is this from the fact—so far is it from being true that men are universally, or even generally, in danger of being misled in conduct by an excess of feeling, that the reverse is at least as often the case. The more generous feelings, such as compassion, gratitude, devotion,—nay, even rational and *rightly directed* self-love, hope, and fear, are oftener defective than excessive; and that even in the estimation of the parties themselves, if

they are well-principled, judicious, reflective, and candid men.

We often wonder at, and are ashamed of, the coldness and languor of our feelings, when we contrast them with what we think they should be in proportion to the causes of excitement existing or passing at the time; and if we try on such occasions to rouse such a degree of emotion as reason would seem to approve, we discover that the feelings, propensities, and sentiments, of our nature are not like the intellectual faculties, under the direct control of volition.[5] By a deliberate act of the will a man may set himself to calculate, to reason, to recall historical facts, &c., just as he does to move any of his limbs; on the other hand, a volition to hope or fear, to love or hate, to feel devotion or piety, and the like, is as ineffectual as to will that the pulsations of the heart, or the secretions of the liver, should be altered.

Control of intellect easier than that of feelings.

But although we cannot by a direct effort of volition excite or allay any sentiment or emotion, we may by a voluntary act fill the understanding with such thoughts

[5] "At night, as the pickets of the two armies were stationed within a hundred yards of each other, the Confederates could hear the earnest and impassioned speeches of Federal orators, rousing the spirit of their troops, and making spirited appeals to the sanctity of the 'old flag.' 'The "old flag" is played out,' shouted the Confederates, in reply. 'Somehow,' remarked one of the Confederates to me, 'there must be a want of grit among the Yankees, otherwise they wouldn't want all this talking to.' It is impossible not to contrast the spirit of the two armies—the Confederates, so calm, so resolute, so satisfied with their generals, so suffering, yet rejoicing to suffer as long as hardship is the price of liberty; the Federals, lashed into the field by the thong of golden bounties, and in the field lashed against the enemy by the invective and appeals of able spokesmen, so distrustful of their generals and of each other, so pampered and yet so dissatisfied. The Aurora borealis, which overspread the heavens and darted blood-red tongues of flame swiftly from the meridian down to the horizon, was accepted by the Confederates as the cross outlined on the sky was accepted by Constantine, an earnest of assured victory."—*Times'* Correspondent from the South, before the battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862.

as shall operate on the feelings. Thus, by attentively studying and meditating on the history of some extraordinary personage—by contemplating and dwelling upon his actions and sufferings, his virtues and his wisdom, and by calling on the imagination to present a vivid picture of all that is related and referred to in this manner — we may at length succeed in kindling such feelings, suppose, of reverence, admiration, gratitude, love, &c., as we admit to be suitable to the case.

Excitement of emotions.

So, again, if a man of sense, and a Christian, desires to allay within himself any emotion—that of resentment, for instance—though it is not under the direct control of his will, he reflects on the softening circumstances and the lessons afforded by the Scriptures on the forgiveness of sins.

Men act as orators to themselves.

Now, in any such process as this, which is one that every man with a well-regulated mind continually finds it necessary to resort to, he is precisely acting the part of a skilful orator to himself.[6]

Longinus on the destiny of man in this life.

Nature, says Longinus, has not intended man for a low or ignoble being, but has brought us into life, in the midst of this great universe, as before a multitude assembled at some heroic solemnity, that we might be spectators of all her magnificence, and candidates for the prize of glory which she holds forth to our emulation. It is in this boundless theatre, with mankind for our witnesses, and God for our judge and rewarder, that we have to struggle with our fortune in that great combat which is either glory or disgrace, and according to the result of which life is or is not a blessing.

The desire of glory, far from being unworthy of a

[6] WHATELY'S *Rhetoric.*

good man, is as truly worthy of him as any of those other secondary desires which minister to that primary desire which is the only one that cannot be too vivid—the desire of rendering ourselves acceptable by our virtues to Him who made us. Our domestic and social affections, as well as our love of glory, may be perverted, both may lead to vice; but, as general principles of our constitution, both are auxiliary to virtue. It is not to love glory much that is unworthy of us as beings that can look to a higher judgment than that of man, and that are formed for a still higher reward than man can bestow; but to love glory for unworthy objects, or to love it even for worthy objects more than we prize that approbation, which is far nobler.

Love of glory.

In analysing the pleasure or delight of glory, we find, first, that there is involved in it the pleasure of simple esteem, which is an object of desire even, although it may be felt for us by only one individual. Next, the pleasure of the approbation of others, as it confirms our own doubtful sentiments. We feel that conscience may sometimes flatter us; and, therefore, it is a satisfaction to find our feelings of self-esteem confirmed by the praise of others; but the most important element of all is the pleasure of the distinction of superiority attained over others in that of which all are, or are supposed to be, ambitious. Life is a competition. We are continually measuring ourselves with others.

The feeling of emulation.

The next pleasure in the complex delight of glory is the pleasure of the feeling of a sort of extension which glory gives to our being. In fame we live, as it were, along the whole nations of the globe with a feeling of diffusive consciousness almost like omnipresence; we

The feeling of extension.

imagine ourselves to be where we are praised, and to hear what is said of us. And it is not surprising that such an expansion of our being should seem to us delightful when the emotions through which it is expanded are those of admiration and love. Nor is this extension of our being limited in our imagination to the present, or the period of time in which we are living, we hear in anticipation the applause of future generations.

The clear perception which Napoleon had of the springs by which the soldier's feelings may be excited is obvious in the decree which appointed La Tour d'Auvergne first grenadier of France. After the death of this brave man at the battle of Neuburg, his name remained inscribed on the rolls of his regiment. The sergeant who called the roll, after the names of the non-commissioned officers, always called La Tour d'Auvergne. The corporal who carried his heart answered, "Mort au champ d'honneur." The same honours were accorded to his heart as to the colours of his regiment.

Posthumous fame.

Brown[7] ascribes this desire of posthumous glory to the same mental process by which the dread of death is produced. We cannot separate the notion of consciousness from the notion of ourselves; and, therefore, to think of ourselves in the grave, is not to think of a mere mass of matter. We know ourselves only capable of feeling, and anything divested of that feeling is not recognized as ourself. And so we delight in the contemplation of posthumous glory, because we consider the glory as one glory: it is impossible to separate ourselves from it, not to imagine ourselves present with it, and, therefore,

[7] *Philosophy of Human Mind.*

impossible not to feel in some degree, during the brief illusion, as if the praise itself were actually heard and enjoyed by us.

Patriotism.

It is not necessary that we should think of what we have to lose personally before we consider the invader of our country our enemy. It is not necessary that we should even imagine to ourselves the desolation which he is to spread, the miseries of blood and rapine by which his conquest would be perpetrated, and the deeper miseries of oppression which would follow it. It is enough for us to think of him as the invader of our land; and in thus thinking of him we have already felt the duty of opposition. We may indeed afterwards trace, in our imagination, the sad series of consequences to those whom we directly love, and to those whom we love with a sort of indirect and borrowed affection, when we know nothing more of them than that they are our countrymen. We may think more abstractedly of the excellencies of our frame of laws which would be broken down, and feel an indignation at the outrage, as if this very frame of beautiful mechanism which we admire were itself a living thing. But though our indignation may thus be more fully developed, as we develop new causes of indignation, the strong emotion itself existed before. If the foot of an enemy, with an enemy's purpose, be pressing our soil, we feel, in the very moment in which we learn it, if our hearts be not thoroughly corrupt, that he who has presumed thus to advance must either retreat or perish.

Peculiarity of military eloquence.

Such are some of the feelings on which the art of addressing soldiers has its foundation. Participating of the nature of ordinary eloquence, it is at the same time

marked by several peculiarities. A thousand little trivial incidents serve to give effect to an address at the moment it is spoken; and when stripped of these accessories and repeated, it may be difficult to comprehend how it could have produced any effect. Lyseas, says Plutarch, wrote a defence for a man who was to be tried before one of the Athenian tribunals. Long before the defendant had learned the speech by heart, he became so much dissatisfied with it that he went in great distress to the author:—"I was delighted with your speech the first time I read it; but I liked it less the second time, and still less the third time, and now it seems to me no defence at all." "My good friend," said Lyseas, "you quite forget that the judge is to hear it only once."

The influence of mutual sympathy.

It is difficult to estimate, in any precise form, the entire influence of mutual sympathy in human life.

Each one of us being brought under the constant influence of other minds, first in the close relationship of the domestic circle, and next in the wide echo of general society, we contract habitual modes of feeling, entirely independent of our innate impulses.

Effect of fanaticism on Romans and Greeks.

The Romans and Greeks were often worked up to the highest pitch of excitement by fanaticism; but there is this difference between the process in their case and in that of the followers of Mahomet, that, in the former, the heathen gods made known their wishes by oracles, and took an active part in the affairs of mortals, while a blind faith and obedience were required from the followers of Mahomet.

Piety of Gustavus Adolphus.

The piety of Gustavus Adolphus cannot be classed with fanaticism. He made the religious feeling service-

able in promoting all the military virtues, composing prayers himself. His maxim was that a good Christian could not be a bad soldier. He said to an officer, who seemed surprised to find him reading the Bible, "I am seeking strength against temptation by meditating on the sacred volume. Persons of my rank are only answerable to God for their actions, and that independence gives the enemy of our souls opportunity to lay snares, against which we cannot be too much on our guard."

Addresses of Gustavus Adolphus.

His addresses to his men were very effective, and all partook of the religious element.

Addresses must be adapted to the hearers.

An address, however eloquent and argumentative, may be perfectly useless, unless adapted to the comprehension, as well as suited to touch the peculiar sensibilities of those whom it is designed to affect.

The first point to be gained is to awaken an interest in the men as to the subject upon which they are addressed, and not to suffer their attention to flag for an instant, when once excited.

The future and the past.

In regard to proximity of time, if we compare the influence of the past and the future—*cæteris paribus*—the influence of the latter will be predominant, because the future, which seems placed before us, is approaching, while the past is, as it were, receding.

Connection of place.

With how much indifference do we read the accounts of deplorable accidents in remote countries. How much, on the contrary, are we alarmed and agitated on being informed that any such accident has happened in our immediate vicinity, although, perhaps, totally unacquainted with the persons concerned.

Effect in proportion as we are nearer or

In like manner, the more nearly we are related to persons the more interest we feel in their cause, and the

interest is greatest in our own cause. Every effort, therefore, should be directed to make the case come home with power to each individual as *his own.* farther related to an object.

The play upon the passions must vary according to the nature of the war; but there are critical and decisive moments when an effort should be made to call all the passions into movement. Their moral power, as already said, may be compared to a second army, secret and invisible; but, as in the tactics of the visible army, with its battalions and reserves, so in the management of the other it is sometimes necessary to display the whole force.

There is a well-known maxim in politics, "Divide and govern," which the moralist may turn to good advantage in the management of his province. The little state of man is far from being an absolute monarchy, or having any well-settled or regulated polity. The prerogative lies within a very narrow compass, but the power lodges in the rabble of appetites and passions; and any importunate fancy that, like some popular orator, the favourite of the day, can raise a mob of them to clamour after it, bears down all opposition. Reason can do nothing to stem the torrent unless she can raise up a party among the populace to side with her. She can only prevail by the aid of some passion to second her; and, as she will always find one or the other of them opposing her measures, she must continually play them one against the other — pleasure against indolence, selfishness against pleasure, vanity against selfishness, fear against rashness, shame against indulgence, resentment against cowardice, reputation against injustice, and particular desires against their several competitors. Fickleness of man.

Difference in nature of passions.

Some passions deject the mind, and indispose it for enterprise; others elevate the soul, and stimulate to action. To the latter class belong hope, patriotism, ambition, emulation, anger. These, with the greatest facility, are made to concur in direction with arguments exciting to resolution and activity; and are consequently the fittest for producing what, for want of a better term in our language, may be denominated the *vehement*.[8]

Fanaticism has still a powerful effect with some troops, the Turks and Russians in particular.

Proclamations of Alexander of Russia.

The proclamations of Alexander, during the French invasion of Russia, were directed to induce desertion on the part of the French, and to excite the religious feelings of his own people, by leading them to suppose that it was the intention of the French to convert them to an idolatrous worship.

[8] Of this nature is a new style which has grown up in the present contest in America, and which has been quaintly called the "coloured style."

In the manifesto of the coloured citizens of New York, it is asserted that "this war, so fiercely raging over the broad fertile acres of this, the best heritage ever enjoyed by man, is not a fratricidal conflict, but one of the most justifiable wars that were ever inaugurated beneath the smiling, radiant dome of all the broad heavens." The poetry of the man of colour is appealed to in the prophecy that, in case of a defeat in this war, "in the reign of tyranny thence ensuing the human heart must of necessity become chilled and frozen; art, science, and religion must go out as oilless lamps; darkness must eclipse the light; the garden of the mind run to waste and weeds; human genius be vagabond, stifled, and dumb, as of old; and the spirit of misrule sweep the fair green earth with the besom of destruction." The religious imagination of the negro is stirred by the appeal:—"Let the cohorts of freedom now yield an inch, and the blood of Jesus will almost have been shed in vain, the sacrifice of Calvary prove a failure, the spontaneity of the human soul be chilled and frozen, human genius be stifled, talent be warped, and eloquence be dumb, as in the dead years of the far-off past." Negro chivalry is told that "every drop of blood shed from Northern veins is a sacrifice on the holy altar of human freedom, and for ever consecrate to the ever blessed Redeemer of mankind. What!" proceeds the African orator, "the banner whose blazonry is the stars of heaven to fall tattered to the dust before the sulphureous hail of treason's cannonry—a treason more foul and despicable than aught ever before witnessed by His starry eyes, looking down from the deep blue sky!"

In a despatch from Oliver Cromwell, when in command of the army in Scotland, an attempt to overthrow his forces by surprise is thus described:—

"The enemy, taking advantage of our weariness, about four o'clock of the morning of the 30th July, fifteen hundred of their best horse, commanded by M. General Montgomery, being many of them drunk, came up to Musselburgh, and made a desperate charge upon our quarters. This they did very resolutely; and our guard of horse, being somewhat negligent, they routed them, and came to our very town-gate, till our 'musquettiers' and a piece of ordnance had discharged and done execution upon them. They were put to a stand, and received by two troops of Lelburne's horse. Falling upon us thus suddenly, before we could well receive the alarm, they mightily disordered our horse and wounded many of our men. At length, our men rallied and charged them home, and pursued them to the very works."

In a letter from Musselburgh, of July 30, from a colonel of the Army, allusion to this occurrence is made in these words:—

"The Lord has been pleased to manifest His presence and owning of us, and witnessed that we are not a people forsaken; but He doth declare that our cause is that wherein His name and His glory is concerned; and that the Lord doth own us is matter to us of the greatest rejoicing. Four ministers came out with them, but being not known, received the lot of war, three of them being killed, and one taken. This was the party they most relied upon, as being especially consecrated by the Kirk to the service. Their ministers told the people before

Four ministers lead an attack on Cromwell's army.

our Army came, that they should not need to strike one stroke, but stand still, and they should see the sectaries destroyed."

Buonaparte, acting on the principle of suiting his eloquence to the character and feelings of his hearers, went so far as to feign communication with the Prophet in Egypt, and by his proclamations reopened the mosques, and protected the worship of the country.

The 3rd February, 1801, he wrote the Minister of War:—"Desire General Murat to attend some of the great religious ceremonies to convince the people that we are not enemies to religion." And on another occasion, he orders "General Soult and his Staff to attend mass on fête days with the bands, and to cultivate friendly terms with the priests."

On the evening of the battle of Moscow, Kutusow rode in front of the line, and having caused the priests to bring to the front a very sacred picture which had been saved from the hands of the French at Smolensk, he thus addressed the army:—

Superstition of the Russians.

"Behold in these sacred emblems of your worship an appeal addressed to Heaven for assistance against the tyrant of the universe. Not satisfied with destroying the image of God in millions of His creatures, that universal oppressor, despiser of all laws, human and divine, enters the sanctuary by force, defiles it with blood, and overthrows the altars, treads under foot the holy sacraments, and exposes even the ark of the Lord, which is thus consecrated in our Church, to be polluted by chance or the effects of the elements. Fear not that God, whose altars are thus insulted, will be on our side. Fear not but He will place His shield before our ranks,

and combat His own enemy with the sword of the Archangel St. Michael.

"It is in this confidence that I go forth to fight and to conquer. It is in this confidence that I shall fight and die, sure that my expiring eyes shall see victory declared on our side.

"Soldiers! do your duty; think of your cities in flames; think of your wives and children; think of your Emperor and your nobles, who look upon you as the element of their strength;—and to-morrow, before sunset, let the proof of your faith and patriotism be stamped on your native soil with the blood of the aggressor and his followers!"

Battle of Moscow.—Napoleon.

What a contrast is presented in the following address of the French Emperor on the same occasion; yet each was suited to the different circumstances in which the armies were placed.

Riding along the front of the line, the Emperor pointed to the sun rising without a cloud. "Soldiers!" he exclaimed, "it is the 'sun of Austerlitz.' Behold the battle which you have longed for! The victory now depends on yourselves. It is necessary to you; it will give you abundance of what you want—good winter quarters, and speedy return to your own country. Acquit yourselves as you did at Friedland, Vitepek, Smolensk; and let the latest posterity recount with pride your actions on this day, and say, 'He was at that great battle under the walls of Moscow.'"

The prospect of plenty in a country devastated, the hope held out of a speedy return from such a distance, the happy connection between Austerlitz and the more recent battles, and the conclusion, con-

tongue and hoary head will bless our memory; with rapture hail the day when we drew the sharpened steel against the tyrant George, and with transports all their own pass down the stream of time till time shall be no more! How angelic the design to communicate felicity to all those millions who may rise after us and inhabit these United States! The blessings of future ages, which the conscious imagination anticipates, crowd together in the patriot's breast, and are the solid pleasures which delight his mind!

"The history of mankind bleeds with the destruction which tyranny has made in all countries and nations; and while we weep over the tragic pages stained with the blood of patriot citizens, they speak like a voice of thunder in the ears of Americans to guard against the execrable monster! Despotic kings, from the days of Nimrod to this hour, have deluged the world with blood, and have been the curses of mankind; but in the whole catalogue of royal villains, has there been one of a more infernal character than *George the Third?* Do not our heroic ancestors, who fled from the tyranny of Britons and subdued American wildernesses in spite of savage barbarity, speak to us from their celestial abodes to defend the dear inheritance of liberty which they left us: while posterity mingle their cries, reason and religion unite their voice in the pressing call! Imploring the assistance of Him who gave us the rights of humanity, let us, with a sacred ardour and unalterable firmness, watch over and defend the rights of America, 'nor pause to waste a coward thought on life.' Every good mind must feel a glow of gratitude to Heaven for the animating prospect of seeing America the asylum of liberty, the land of

virtuous freedom, the seat of learning, of industry, manufactures, commerce, and husbandry; the nurse of heroes, the parent of science, the bosom of virtue, and the guardian of mankind. The whole series of divine dispensations, from the infant days of our fathers in America, are big with importance in her favour, and point to something great and good. If we look round the world and view the nations, with their various connections, interests, and dependencies, we shall see innumerable causes at work in favour of this growing country. Nature and art seem to labour, as it were, travail in birth to bring forth some glorious events that will astonish mankind, and form a bright era in the annals of time."

Eugene Beauharnois.

After the defection of Murat in 1814, Eugene Beauharnois addressed a proclamation to his army, pointing out the perfidy of the Italians, but that at the same time there were Frenchmen in their ranks many of whom were friendly to the cause of the French, and ready, at the first shot, to abandon their adopted colours and come over to their countrymen.

Frederick before invading Silesia.

Frederick the Great, on the point of invading Silesia, addressed his army:—"I commence a war in which I have no other allies but your courage and enthusiasm. My cause is just, and I rely on a successful issue. Remember the glory acquired by your ancestors in the fields of Warsaw, Fehrbellin, and other glorious campaigns. Your fate is in your own hands. Honour and rewards await your heroic deeds. But I need not excite you to glory; you have nothing else before your eyes; it is the only object worthy of your exertions. We go to meet troops whose first renown was acquired under

Prince Eugene: although he no longer lives, there will not be the less honour in victory, as the soldiers we are to contend with are all brave men."

Cortes. "Behold, my friends!" said Cortes, on invading Mexico, "what we have to look for,—great riches, and great perils and privations; the one establishes the fortune, the other a reputation."

Buonaparte, on embarking for Egypt, made known the object of the expedition for the first time by a proclamation.

Fix attention on the enemy's weak point. In addressing troops, any disadvantages which the enemy labours under, in point of position, quality of troops, or in any other respects, should be pointed out.[9] If he has assembled all his forces, the men should be reminded that he has no reserves; that his all is staked on this throw of the die; and that, therefore, if he is vanquished, the fatigues and hardships of the campaign will be at an end. This mode of encouragement is introduced by Tasso in the speech of Godfrey.

Napoleon before Austerlitz:—"The Russian Army is before you to avenge the defeat of the Austrians at Ulm. These are the same battalions you conquered at Hollabrunn, and whom you have pursued until now. The position we occupy is a formidable one; and in

[9] Alexander, before Arbela, recalled to his troops the passage of the Granicus, and their successes in the mountains of Cilicia, in Syria, and Egypt; "and to-day," he said, "you have only before you the relics of an enemy twice beaten; who now resolve to fight because they can fly no farther; who, having stood three days armed, are almost dead for fear before the fight. Consider their want of discipline and wretched weapons; some have only darts, many only slings. So on their side will be indeed more spectators; on ours, more to engage in battle."

T. Q. Flaminius, about to attack the Macedonians in a position not very strong, reminded his men they were the same foes they had driven from a position almost inaccessible in the mountains of Epirus.

their march to turn my right their flank will be exposed."

Washington, in an address to his Army in September, 1777, points out several attempts made by the enemy to reach Philadelphia, and that they are now engaged in a last effort on which they have staked their all. "They will put the contest," he says, "on the event of a single battle. If they are overthrown, they are utterly undone—the war is at an end. Now, then, is the time for our strenuous exertions; one bold stroke will free the land from rapine, devastation, and burnings, and female innocence from brutal lust and violence. Washington, 1777.

"Two years we have maintained the war, and struggled with difficulties innumerable; but the prospect has since brightened, and our affairs put on a better face. Now is the time to reap the fruit of all our toils and dangers. Ours is the main army: to us our countrymen look for protection. The eyes of all America and Europe are turned upon us, as on those by whom the event of war is to be determined. Here glory wants to crown the brave. Peace, freedom, and happiness, will be the reward of victory."

Scipio Africanus, before Zama, pointed out to his men that the Carthaginians could no longer contend against the power of Rome, since they had been brought to propose peace.

The Consul, M. A. Glabrion, desired his men to observe that Antiochus and his Army never thought themselves safe, unless they were entrenched on the most advantageous ground.

"Although the troops before you," said Darius to

his Army before Arbela, "are the Macedonian army, there are but few Macedonians amongst them, because the most of the veteran troops of Alexander have been killed in preceding actions."

In like manner, if the General who commands is not the same who commanded on former occasions, it should be noticed.

Defensive and offensive wars will naturally suggest different themes for the General to touch upon. In the former case, families, property, all are at stake; if the invading enemy is not driven back, the country will be desolated, contributions will be levied; while, on the other hand, in aggressive war, the hopes and desires of the Army pursuing a career of conquest will be excited by describing the fertility of the country which lies before them, and the richness of its towns. Hannibal, before Ticino, promised his men the plunder of Rome. Napoleon, before entering Italy, drew a glowing picture of the fertility of its plains.

Again, the different phases of a campaign call for appropriate topics suited to the situation in which the Army is placed. An Army which has sustained a reverse must be reminded of the fickleness of fortune, of the nobleness of fortitude under disasters, of the baseness of sinking under despair; that hope is not yet cut off, and all may yet be retrieved.

An address before a battle, or congratulating an Army on success, may be a little diffuse, but anything said in the heat of action to be effective must be laconic.

At the attack on Creuznach, 1795, Bernadotte, seeing a demi-brigade giving way, called to his Staff, "Bring up the 71st Regiment; they will soon retrieve the disgrace

incurred by these fellows." Such was the effect of these words, that the wavering troops rallied and carried everything before them.

Napoleon, in one of the "Maxims" which have been attributed to him, denies the effect of a speech at the commencement of an action; the only use of a speech, he says, is during a campaign, to destroy the effect of false reports, and furnish conversation for the camp; but he has furnished an answer to this by his other maxim, that there is nothing *arbitrary* in war; and he did not always adhere to his own maxims, as is pointed out in Chapter IX. of this work.

Proclamations and addresses he approves of, and his own are good specimens of military eloquence, when we keep in view the peculiar characteristics of the troops composing the armies he commanded.

To the army embarked for Egypt, his address, revealing the object of the expedition, commences:—

"Soldiers! you are one of the wings of the Army of England! You have made war in mountains and in plains, and besieged fortresses. You are now to commence a maritime war. The Roman legions, whose example you have followed, but not yet equalled, contended with Carthage alternately by sea and on the plains of Zama."

In opening the campaign of 1805:—

"Soldiers! the war of the third coalition has commenced! The Austrians have passed the Inn; violated their treaties; attacked our ally, and driven him from the capital. You yourselves have been obliged to hasten by forced marches to the defence of the frontier. But now that we have passed the Rhine, we shall not stop

until we have secured the independence of the German Confederation, ensured the safety of our ally, and humbled the pride of faithless aggressors."

Almost all Napoleon's addresses of this description are modelled on the same form, commencing with the word "Soldiers!" by which he seems to have wished to remind them of their honourable profession, and to mark the identification of himself with their body.

French style not suited to English soldiers.

The great effect produced on the French Army by Napoleon through proclamations and addresses is well known, and compositions of the same stamp will, no doubt, produce the same results in that Army, so long as the national character remains unchanged. Upon an English Army the effect of similar addresses would be very trifling.[19]

In the war now waging in America, addresses in the Napoleon style have been tried on the Anglo-Saxon race, perhaps, with more success than they would have had in England.

Let us compare the following address of General M'Clellan to his Army with those of the Emperor Napoleon before the battles of Moscow and Austerlitz.

The Emperor Napoleon and General M'Clellan.

EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

Before Moscow.

"Soldiers!" (exclaimed the Emperor, pointing to the sun without a cloud,) "it is the sun of Austerlitz. Behold the battle which you have longed for. The victory now depends on yourselves. It is necessary to you. It will give you

GENERAL M'CLELLAN.

"*Head-quarters of the Army of the Potomac, Camp near Newbridge, Virginia, June 2.*

"Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac,—I have fulfilled, at least, a part of my promise to you. You are now face to face with the rebels, who are

[19] The complete inapplicability of the Napoleon style of oratory to an English Army demonstrates very forcibly the impossibility of laying down any fixed rules for military eloquence.

abundance of what you want—good winter-quarters, and speedy return to your own country. Acquit yourselves as you did at Friedland, Vitepek, Smolensk; and let the latest posterity recount with pride your actions on this day, and say, 'He was at that great battle under the walls of Moscow."

Before Austerlitz.

"Soldiers! I shall direct the disposition of every battalion myself in person. If with your accustomed valour you bear down all opposition, I shall not expose myself; but if the victory is for a moment doubtful, I shall place myself in the front.

"This victory will finish our campaign, and we shall return to winter-quarters; and then the peace which I shall conclude will be worthy of France, of you, and of me."

held at bay in front of the Capitol. The final and decisive battle is at hand. Unless you belie your past history, the result cannot for a moment be doubtful. If the troops who laboured so faithfully and fought so gallantly at Yorktown, and who so bravely won the hard fights at Williamsburg, Westpoint, Hanover Court-house, and Fair Oaks, now prove worthy of their antecedents, the victory is surely ours.

"The events of every day prove your superiority. Wherever you have met the enemy you have beaten him. Wherever you have used the bayonet, he has given way in panic and disorder.

"I ask of you now one last crowning effort. The enemy has staked his all on the issue of the coming battle. Let us meet him, and crush him here, in the very centre of the rebellion.

"Soldiers, I will be with you in this battle, and share its dangers with you. Our confidence in each other is now founded on the past. Let us strike the blow which is to restore peace and union to this distracted land. Upon your valour, discipline, and mutual confidence, the result depends.

"GEO. B. M'CLELLAN,
"*Major-Gen. Commanding.*"

Contrast between the addresses of Napoleon and the orders of Wellington.

It is interesting to observe the different course pursued by Wellington and his great antagonist. Amongst Wellington's orders and proclamations we may search in vain for any order of the day designed to exalt the courage of the men and urge them on to glorious deeds, by reminding them of the reputation they have gained and must uphold, or by any of those artifices resorted to by Napoleon. Stern orders for the maintenance of discipline are to be found, not the least remarkable of which is the well-known circular letter after the retreat from Burgos, also proclamations commanding the strictest

respect to the property of the inhabitants of the country; but his battles were only preceded by simple orders to his generals as to the disposition of their brigades and divisions; and after his crowning victory at Waterloo, we have only the following simple general order, dated Nivelle, 20th June, 1815:—

General order after Waterloo.

"The Field-Marshal takes this opportunity of returning to the Army his best thanks for their conduct in the glorious action fought on the 18th instant. He will not fail to report his sense of their conduct in the terms which it deserves to their several sovereigns."

Algerian warfare.

In an account of Algerian warfare, by G. W. Cooke, he thus describes the effect of a few words addressed to the men, after a painful march through the desert, on which they suffered much from the intense heat and want of water:—

"It is now announced that the Emir is in the neighbourhood, and that his camp, 'his *deira*,' must be captured. The troops are informed that they are going to have an opportunity of covering themselves with glory. The general makes the usual appeal to the courage of his soldiers, talks of honour and chivalrous feelings, and after that he can reckon on anything he can desire on their part."

Previous to placing the Army of the Potomac face to face with the Confederates, General Meade issued the following order:—

Federal General Meade.

"*Head-quarters, Army of the Potomac, June* 30.

"The Commanding General requests that, previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers address their troops,

explaining to them the immense issues involved in the struggle. The enemy is now on our soil. The whole country looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe. Our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of the army. Homes, firesides, and domestic altars are involved. The Army has fought well heretofore. It is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever, if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails to do his duty at this hour.

"By command of Major-General MEADE,

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*"

French critic on English military eloquence.

A French writer on "military eloquence" says that the English are secure from all criticism on this subject, as they have never produced anything to which the term "military eloquence" can be applied; and in another part of the work, in reference to this assertion, there occurs the following paragraph :—

"Nous regrettons d'avoir à revenir sur *cette assertion,* pour citer une harangue d'un de leurs généraux.

"En 1702, les Anglais attaquaient Cadiz. Voici le discours que le général des assaillans addressa à ses soldats :—

"'*Anglais,*' *leur dit-il,* '*qui mangez tous les jours du bon bœuf et de la bonne soupe, souvenez-vous bien que ce serait le comble de l'infamie que de vous laisser battre par cette canaille d'Espagnols qui ne vivent que d'oranges et des citrons.*'

"Nous ne ferons point de reflexion sur l'eloquence qui mésure l'honneur et la gloire par la différence du *beefsteack au citron.*"

Had this French critic been acquainted with a little English work—*The Reminiscences of a Military Life*, by an officer of the Guards—he would probably have extracted from it an anecdote of the late Sir George Elder.

Sir George, in the Peninsular War (as Lieutenant-Colonel Elder) commanded a Portuguese regiment, the 3rd, or Villa Real Cacadores, attached to the light division.

Craufurd, who commanded that division, like some Greek hero or Roman leader, was much given to eloquence, and, on all important occasions, addressed *a speech* to his division.

Ciudad Rodrigo.

When preparing for the assault on Ciudad Rodrigo, the General, not speaking Portuguese, called upon Lieutenant-Colonel Elder to address some expressions of encouragement to his Cacadores.

Elder, though in command of a Portuguese regiment, unfortunately was as innocent of the vernacular of their language as the general himself; and his powers of speech, even in his own tongue, never approached to anything oratorical. More prompt in deed than word, he conveyed his communications to his corps in a kind of Anglo-Portuguese, or rather Portuguese English, a species of *lingua franca* peculiar to himself, but which they understood. His men admired his courage, and would have followed him anywhere; and it is but justice to him to say that his battalion was in the very best state of discipline.

Sir George Elder and Portuguese Cacadores.

Just as the firing commenced on the right with the third division, Craufurd again impatiently called out, "D—n it, sir, why do you not obey my orders, and speak energetically to your men?" Elder was puzzled, and at last roared out, "Vamos, Villa Real," which was about one of the greatest efforts at eloquence he had ever attempted. But, from the sequel of the story, it appears to have been very effective.

CHAPTER V.

INFLUENCE OF MUSIC.

"When our country's cause provokes to arms,
How martial music every bosom warms."—POPE.

CHAP. V.

AN effect analogous to that resulting from skilful and well-timed oratory, may be produced on the soldier by certain kinds of music.

Acknowledged effect of music on the human system.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon a fact so well authenticated and generally acknowledged as the wonderful effect of music on the human race of all ages and sexes, and in all stages of civilization.

If, as some suppose, song and speech are coëval, and the birds taught man to sing, while instrumental music was first introduced by Jubal, the seventh in descent from Adam, the priority, in point of antiquity, must, of course, be conceded to the war-song over the trumpet, as a means of exciting man to battle. For the present purpose, it is not material to ascertain which was first used; the great antiquity of the use of both is evident from history, sacred as well as profane.

Songs and instruments produce a similar effect, but in different ways.

Whether it be a martial song that is sung, or a musical instrument that is used, such as the Highland pipe, or a full military band, the end proposed is the same—that of animating the warrior to deeds of individual valour, and exciting the courage of the men, when

men are acting together in a military body; but there seems to be some difference in the process by which men are acted upon by songs and martial music respectively.

The song embodies a sentiment which has a direct and substantive influence upon the passions, while music acts by its own expression, and also as a sign which recalls sensations formerly experienced.

Of a kindred nature to the martial song was the ancient war-cry.

These cries were not confused sounds; they were clearly articulated words, and were all conceived in terms of invocation to some divinity, and the spirit of the troops was judged of by the animation with which the cry was received.

The general cry was shouted by the whole army at the same instant before they charged the enemy, or rather at the moment of doing so, or when they were close to each other.

Every gentleman and nobleman had not a right to a war-cry. It was the privilege of chiefs or conductors of troops, or of those who bore banners in the Army.

Of the immense influence of song, in preserving a national spirit, and keeping up the love of freedom amongst a people, perhaps no stronger instance can be quoted than that which is furnished by the melancholy history of the Welsh bards, who paid the penalty of their lives, under Edward the First, for the power which their songs were supposed to exercise over their countrymen. Songs of the bards.

Not only kings, but every petty chieftain in Ireland and Scotland, in those days, had a bard in his retinue, whose business it was to animate the clan to battle.

Amongst the verses sung by these minstrels before a

battle, none were more popular than those which commemorated the praises of great men.[1] Compositions of this description, such, for instance, as the *Chansons de Roland*, were used up to the time of the French monarchs.

The songs of Dibden are supposed to have had some influence in keeping up the national enthusiasm for the Navy; but the battle-song is no longer in fashion in Europe. We must now transport ourselves to another quarter of the globe to find it still in use; and, in the following vivid picture of campaigning at the Cape of Good Hope, we have, perhaps, a very fair representation of the barbarous customs of our forefathers:—

"*Camp of the Fingoe Allies, Cape of Good Hope, described by Captain King, 72nd Regiment.*

War music of the Fingoes, South Africa.

"The part of the camp allotted to these most zealous allies presented a variety of novel and striking scenes. On all sides, the eye encountered black fellows of stalwart frame, arraying themselves in the insignia and ornaments of despoiled 'Inkosi' and Amapakati, singing to themselves in a deep guttural chant, and dancing in a slow jerking step to some monotonous measure. In a wide, clear space, a ring of some three score of these athletic forms, blankets and karosses thrown aside, began a war-dance to the strange chorus of their deep voices,

[1] "At the conclusion of the feast given by Attila to the Roman ambassadors, two Scythians advanced towards the King of the Huns, and recited a poem, in which they celebrated his victories and military virtues. All the Huns fixed their eyes with attention on the bards. Some seemed to be delighted with the verses; others, remembering their own battles and exploits, exulted with joy; while such as were become feeble through age burst into tears, bewailing the decay of their vigour, and the state of inactivity in which they were now obliged to remain."—ROBERTSON'S *Notes, Byzant. Histor. Script.*

accompanied by regular tapping on a shield of ox-hide. The performers shook their gleaming 'assegais' in the air, and jerked their supple frames to and fro, lifting their feet alternately, or jumping with both, as they sung, in perfect harmony, a wild air, swelling from a low organ-like hum, to the full power of their lungs, hissing like serpents, and creeping with bent bodies round and round, and in and out, as if on the spoor of the enemy: then, breaking out into cries and yells, stabbing furiously at the imaginary victim in the centre, and shaking their bodies backward and forward from the knees upward, until the perspiration steamed from every pore. Each verse of the war-song, which was an improvised commemoration of their late achievements, was given by a single voice in a loud recitative, and then caught up by the whole in an astounding chorus—

"Come on, come on, you Kaffirs;
We will kill you! we will kill you!"

Amongst the ancients, the Spartans seem to have been the only people who despised music, holding it and all other arts to be useless, which neither tend to fortify the body nor the mind. At the same time, as will hereafter appear, they were not insensible to its power.

Cultivation of music by the Greeks.

By the other people of Greece, music was most assiduously cultivated. It formed part of the education of youth; and the comparative merits of musical instruments was considered of such importance as to form the subject of State deliberations.

For military music there can be no doubt that all instruments are not equally well adapted.

One of the most ancient instruments, as well as one of the best fitted by its tones for martial music, is the

trumpet. By Moses it was used for calling the assembly, and regulating the movements of the camp; and in the Book of Daniel it is mentioned as in use among the Chaldeans.

Bruce the traveller describes the Abyssinian trumpet as an instrument with only one note, which is loud, and hoarse, and terrible in tone. When on a march, or before an enemy appears in sight, the instrument is played slow, but afterwards the note is repeated very quick and with great violence, and has the effect upon the Abyssinian soldiers of transporting them absolutely to frenzy and madness, and of making them so regardless of life as to throw themselves into the midst of the enemy, which they do with great gallantry.

The tender tones produced by the greater number of reed instruments are not military; and an addition of triangles, cymbals, fifes, and drums is essential to give the effect of military music.

The airs should also be carefully selected and adapted to the peculiar character and feelings of those for whose ears they are intended.

In the pibroch we have at first a grave movement, resembling a march, which gradually quickens into the onset, and runs off with a noisy confusion and turbulent rapidity, to imitate the conflict and pursuit, swelling afterwards into a few flourishes of triumphant joy, and closing with the wild wailings of a funeral procession.

The immense power which music may be brought to exercise in rousing even the timid and gentle, is a subject which well deserves the attention of military men.

Instances of the effect of music.

Such is the extreme sensibility of our system to musical notes that an instance is on record of death

having ensued from the notes produced at the performance of a Handel commemoration in Westminster Abbey.

"When the evil spirit was upon Saul, David took down his harp and played; and Saul was refreshed, and was well, and the evil spirit departed from him."

The power exercised by the musician at the court of Henry II. of Denmark, over that gentle and peaceful monarch, by a movement or touch calculated to excite choler, is said to have been so great that the Prince became inflamed to such a degree as to fall upon and put to death three or four of his domestics, and would have carried the havoc and devastation further had he not been restrained by violence.

Alexander the Great is said to have been acted upon in nearly a similar manner by Timotheus, one of his musicians, who had the power of alternately exciting and subduing him.

With a nervous temperament so finely constituted, it is not surprising that music should be found a powerful stimulant when man is engaged in such an exciting pursuit as war.

Tyrthæus, the Athenian general, was himself an astonishing performer, and his success in war is ascribed in a great measure to the energy and heroic character of his music. Even the Spartans, generally insensible to music, are said to have been worked upon by the music of Tyrthæus.

Effect of music in war.

Terpander is said to have appeased a violent sedition among the Lacedemonians by the assistance of music.

Napier, in describing the battle of St. Pierre on the Nive, 1813, thus refers to the coolness and self-posses-

sion of the gallant Colonel of the 92nd Highlanders, in using the national music to animate his men in the heat of the combat :—

"The cannonade now rolled like a prolonged peal of thunder; and the second French column, regardless of Ross's guns, though they tore the ranks in a horrible manner, advanced so steadily up the high-road, that the 92nd, yielding to the tempest, slowly regained its position behind St. Pierre. However, the right wing of the 50th and Ashworth's 'Cacadores,' both spread as skirmishers, never lost the small wood in front—upholding the fight there, and towards the high-road, with such unflinching courage, that the 92nd Regiment had time to re-form behind the hamlet of St. Pierre. Then its gallant Colonel Cameron once more led it down the road, with colours flying and *music playing*, resolved to give the shock to whatever stood in the way. Gloriously that regiment came forth again to charge, with their colours flying and their national music playing, as if going to a review. This was to understand war. The man who in that moment, and immediately after a repulse, thought of such military pomp, was by nature a soldier."

The beneficial effects of music on an Army are thus commented on by one of the public correspondents from the camp of the Southern Confederacy :—

Confederate Army.

"The apparent imminence of a battle has had its effect in heightening the spirits of the soldiers, and disposing the camp to such gaiety as life in a pine-wood, and a total absence of women, may be supposed to admit of. The usual frolics at General J. E. B. Stuart's head-quarters are of nightly recurrence, except on the occasions

when the General is absent upon one of his long scouting rides, which keep him out all night, and afford a respite to 'General Stuart's head-quarters' band,' which consists of one excellent 'banjo-player' and one 'bones.' But all other entertainments of the camp have, for the moment, been thrown into the shade by the performances enacted two nights ago by General Hood's Texans, and which, by particular desire, will be repeated to-night. General Hood, who is much beloved by his men, knows that listlessness and want of interest and occupation in camp are fatal obstacles, when the day for action comes, to efficiency in the field. He has been at the pains, therefore, to encourage the organization, among his men, of a band of Ethiopian minstrels, ten or twelve in number, who, on Saturday night, discoursed very eloquent music, and elicited rapturous applause. The long preparation which such performances exact, the interest of the discussions which they subsequently awaken, are great incidents in the monotony of camp life, and very healthy stimulants to men so disposed to listless apathy as the Southern soldier. It cannot be questioned that the banjo, the national musical instrument of the Southern Confederacy, is a great addition to the amusements of soldiers on a campaign, and that music has no slight influence in elevating the spirits of the dejected, tatterdemalion, lack-lustre, half-starved scarecrows who are nobly conducting this brilliant struggle for independence."

CHAPTER VI.

CAUSES, FORMS, AND POLICY OF WAR.

"Cabinets have many secret motives to wars of which the people know little. They talk in public of invasions of right or breaches of treaty, of the support of honour, of the necessity of retaliation, when these motives have no influence on their determinations. Some untold purpose of expediency, or the private quarrel of a Prince, or the pique or anger of a Minister, are often the real motives to a contest, while its promoters are loudly talking of the honour or the safety of the country."—J. DYMOND.

CHAP. VI.

THE policy of a war is not a subject upon which the soldier, simply as a tactician, is required to meditate; nor is it even one which comes within the scope of his legitimate speculation, in his limited capacity of tactician. Military discipline requires that he should draw the sword, and use it *with* policy, without asking why he fights. But it is otherwise with the General, as strategist and Commander-in-chief.

General commanding should be consulted on policy of war.

The *military* policy of a war, the political institutions, and foreign and domestic policy of a State about to engage in it, are all so intimately blended together, that no statesman, unless he is himself a General, can with prudence adopt an appeal to arms without having first consulted those who are competent, by military experience, to assist him in arriving at a right decision on that most momentous question—"Peace or war:" an award more solemn in its nature than any which can be submitted to man's judgment.

The career of honour and advancement in the military profession being open to all: he who is to-day precluded by his position from criticizing the causes and object of a war in which he may be engaged, is, perhaps, the person who, to-morrow, will be consulted in the Cabinet of his Sovereign, and on whose opinion will then depend the fate of nations.

Thus war, in its political aspects, is a subject which those who are devoted to the career of arms should train their minds to comprehend,[1] if they entertain hopes of preferment; if through the hardships of the field, or the monotonous duties of peace, they are still sustained by visions of future glory.

The use of the familiar image of war as a demon is not confined to poets, philosophers, or peaceful citizens; some of the most renowned Generals have left upon record their solemn opinion that war is in itself so hateful that every means should be adopted to avoid it; and although it must be confessed that these heroes, in

War is to be avoided, if possible.

[1] "*The* DUKE *of* WELLINGTON *to* GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.

"*St. Jean de Luz,*
"22 *Mai,* 1813.

"La Catalogne m'a donné bien des mauvais momens pendant l'automne, et j'ai bien souvent pensé a y aller.

"Peut-être que si je regardais seulement l'Espagne, ou même si je *voyais les affaires sous un aspect militaire seulement,* j'aurais dû y aller parcequ'il n'y a pas de doute que Buonaparte tient en Catalogne, et tiendra les facilités pour rentrer en Espagne. Je dis peut-être, parceque dans ce diable de pays, où j'ai fait la guerre pendant cinq ans, j'ai toujours trouvé, comme votre Henri Quatre, qu'avec des petites armées on ne faisait rien, et qu'avec des grandes armées on mourait de faim.

"Si je ne suis pas trompé, il est bien plus important aux alliés et à l'Espagne même, que je me porte en avant en France, au lieu de faire une guerre de forteresse en Catalogne. Même *en vue militaire pure,* je dirai que s'il est vrai que Buonaparte soit pressé du côté du Rhin, comme il le parait, et que je le presse aussi du côté des Pyrénées occidentales, il n'a pas les moyens de se renforcer en Catalogne, et les forteresses tomberont d'elles-mêmes par suite des opérations ici et ailleurs, et des blocus qu'y sont établis.

"Ainsi tout considéré, je me suis determiné à porter la guerre en France de ce côté-ci."

their lives, appear to have sometimes lost sight of the maxim, there is no reason to doubt that, in inditing it, they expressed a serious conviction.

The Great Frederick says:—"Princes, who ought only to live to reign for the benefit of mankind, should reflect well before exposing them, for frivolous and vain causes, to the most dreadful sufferings of which human nature is capable. Sovereigns who regard their subjects as slaves may risk their existence without pity, and see them perish without regret; but princes who consider their fellow-men as their equals, and the people as the body of which they are the soul, should be sparing of the blood of their subjects."

While the old warrior here advocates caution and humanity, he does not neglect elsewhere to point out that such a policy is not suitable on all occasions, and that the interests of a people may sometimes be best promoted by a vigorous aggressive.

There are, he says, wars of precaution which princes act wisely in undertaking. These are certainly offensive wars, but they are not the less just on that account. Where the excessive aggrandisement of one power threatens to overwhelm all others, it is the part of wisdom to oppose barriers to its encroachments whilst there is yet time to stay the torrent. The clouds are seen together, the lightning announces a coming storm, and the Sovereign who is unable to contend against the tempest will, if he is wise, unite himself with all those who are menaced by the same common danger. Had the Kings of Egypt, Syria, and Macedon confederated together against the Roman power, they would not have fallen under its oppressive

yoke;[2] an alliance prudently concluded, and a war carried on with energy, would have saved the ancient world from universal despotism.

It is the part of prudence to prefer lesser evils to greater, and to choose a certain, rather than an uncertain, course of policy. A prince will, therefore, act more wisely to engage in an offensive war while he has yet the option between the olive branch and the laurel, than to await an open declaration of war, which may leave him without the means of effectual resistance. It is a sure maxim that it is better to anticipate others than to be ourselves anticipated, of which great men have constantly availed themselves, by exerting their strength whilst it is yet entire, thus anticipating the designs of their enemy before they have been carried into execution.

Better to anticipate others than to be anticipated.

Many princes have been involved in war by treaties of alliance obliging them to furnish a certain proportion of auxiliary forces. As no Sovereign in Europe is sufficiently powerful to dispense with the aid of others, these treaties are formed for the purpose of mutual support in case of need. The event decides which of the two allies derives the greatest advantage from the compact. A fortunate conjuncture favours one of the contracting

[2] Hiero II., of Syracuse, though professedly the ally of Rome, lent assistance to the Carthaginians during the servily war, because, according to Polybius, in order to retain his dominions in Sicily, and to preserve the Roman friendship, he esteemed it requisite that Carthage should be safe, lest by its fall the remaining Power should be able, without control or opposition, to execute any purpose and undertaking. This is one of the earliest instances of the principle of preserving a balance of power, and the sagacity of Hiero is to be admired; but the universal sovereignty of the Romans was written in the immutable decrees of the Almighty; and they did arise and reduce all other kingdoms under their dominion, and form one vast republic, which was different from all other governments that had preceded it.

parties at one time, a different state of circumstances is advantageous to the other party at another.

Probity and worldly wisdom both equally require that princes should religiously observe the faith of treaties, that they should scrupulously fulfil them, the more so as they thereby secure a more efficacious protection to their subjects.

Vast range of subjects embraced in the consideration of the military policy of a war.

The military policy, which is part of the whole question of the policy of a war, must be based on a profound study of the passions of the people with whom it is proposed to engage in war, their military system, their means of war actually available, and their further resources, their financial condition, the attachment of the people to their rulers and institutions, the personal character of the chief of the State, the military talent of its generals, the influence which the Cabinet, or councils of war, do, or will, exercise on the operations of the Army in the field, the strategic and tactical system which is in favour with the Staff of the Army, the relative proportion of the different arms which make up the whole constituent force of the Army, the geography and military statistics of the country which is to be the theatre of war, and generally all the available resources of the enemy, and all the obstacles of every kind to be encountered.

Causes of war.

A State is brought into war to vindicate or defend its rights; to support the public interests as regards commerce, national industry, and such other questions as concern the prosperity of nations; to fulfil treaties, offensive and defensive; to aid and assist other States, whose existence is necessary for our own safety, or to preserve the balance of power; to overthrow or defend political doctrines; to extend the influence or power of

the State by acquisitions necessary to its security; to preserve the independence of a State;[3] to avenge insults to national honour; by the spirit of conquest or invasion.[4]

Different classes of war.

Wars may be either offensive or defensive. The aggressive may be reduced to the defensive, and the party assailed may, in his turn, take the initiative if he is prepared for it.[5]

Causes of war enumerated by Bentham.

Bentham enumerates, among the causes of war, the following:—1st. Uncertainty of the right of succession with regard to vacant thrones claimed by two parties. 2nd. Intestine troubles in neighbouring States, occasioned by the same cause, or by disputes concerning constitutional law, either between the Sovereign and his subjects, or between different members of the sovereign

[3] The war with the American colonies arose from a very trifling cause. The colonies, although acknowledging the King of England as their sovereign, had never been subjected to the legislation of Parliament, having had their own local administration; and when the English Parliament demanded from them the stamp duty, on the ground that the war of 1756 had been undertaken for the benefit of the colonies, the imposition of the duty was resisted. Parliament then repealed that special duty, but others were substituted, and that on tea led to the outbreak of the armed resistance.

[4] Guicciardini says, the Venetians, Pope Alexander VI., Louis Sforza, and the Emperor, all jealous of each other, armed under pretence of assisting the King of Naples against the French, but in reality each of them to get possession of his dominions.

[5] The French are considered to have acted with great political sagacity and prudence in treating with the American colonies and continually siding with them. As long as it was dangerous to declare themselves, their operations were carried on secretly; but as soon as the position of the colonies left no doubt of their success, and of their being allies to be depended upon, they threw off the mask. They entered the arena when their armies, and, above all, their fleets were ready—when everything promised victory.

The French themselves have acknowledged that they entered into negotiations with the Americans, after the capitulation of Burgoyne made the independence of America unavoidable.

In justification of the war which broke out in 1778 between France and England, the French have put forward the vexation and annoyance which, as a maritime people, they experienced from the rights arrogated by England on the high seas. The object aimed at by the war was no less than that of humbling England by wresting from her one of her colonies; thus retaliating, in part, for the sacrifices which France had been obliged to submit to at the peace of 1763.

body. 3rd. Uncertainty as to boundaries.[6] 4th. Uncertainty as to the right to new discoveries made by one party or the other. 5th. Jealousies caused by forced cessions more or less recent. 6th. Disputes or war, from whatever cause they may arise, among circumjacent States. 7th. Religious hatred.

There are, also, other complications which arise from the respective positions of the parties engaged.

The war may be confined to hostilities between two States; or one State may make war against several combined.

A State may be the principal, or only an auxiliary.[7] In the latter case, the auxiliary may take part from the commencement, or in the middle of the contest.

The theatre of war.

The theatre of war may be transferred into the enemy's country, or it may be in our own, or in the territory of an ally. If the war is one of invasion, it may be only necessary to cross an imaginary frontier line, or a distant expedition may be necessary.

A war may be a national one, either against ourselves or the enemy. There are also civil and religious wars.

Plan of campaign.

The plan of a campaign must vary to suit the circumstances or grounds which excite or cause the war, and the desired end to be attained.

Usual preliminaries to war.

A declaration of war is generally preceded by a demand made by one State upon another, with which the latter has declined compliance; but it by no means follows that the demand on one side, and the refusal

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[6] On this it has been observed that a blundering land surveyor may occasion a war by his ignorance.

[7] In the war of 1813, England was both a principal and an auxiliary: a principal, as engaged with France in America; and an auxiliary, with her allies on the Continent, against France.

on the other, are made public; the ingenuity of the diplomatist is often taxed to the uttermost to give both an appearance totally different from that which they present when viewed in their true light.

Various kinds of war.

A *perfect* war is where one whole nation is at war with another nation, and all the members of both nations are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other in every case, and under every circumstance, permitted by the laws of war.

An *imperfect* war is limited as to places, persons, and things.

A *civil war* between the different members of the same society is called by Grotius a MIXED war; it is, according to him, public on the side of the established Government, and PRIVATE on the part of the people resisting its authority.

Declarations of war.

In the wars of the Jews, although there does not appear to have been any uniform mode of declaring war at that time, Moses ordained that certain conditions of peace should be offered before the Israelites proceeded to attack any place (Deut. xx. 10).

When Jephthah was appointed judge of the people beyond the Jordan, he sent messengers (or ambassadors) to the King of the Ammonites, saying, "What hast thou to do with me, that thou art come against me to fight in my land?" (Judges xi. 12.) On the Ammonites complaining that the Israelites had forcibly seized their lands, Jephthah, after justifying his people from the charge, concluded by saying, that "the Lord the Judge be judge this day between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon" (27); after which, he attacked, and totally discomfited them.

After the destruction of the Philistines' corn by Samson, "the Philistines went up and pitched in Judah; and the men of Judah said, Why are ye come up against us? and they answered, To bind Samson are we come up, to do to him as he hath done to us" (Judges xv. 9, 10).

The Israelites did not commence war with the Benjamites, in consequence of the horrible murder of the Levite's concubine, until their demand for the surrender of the guilty parties had been refused (Judges xx. 12).

In later times, the army of David, under Joab, and that of Ishbosheth, under Abner, are described as in a position of mutual defiance opposite to each other, "the one on the one side of the pool of Gibeon, and the other on the other side of the pool. And Abner said to Joab, *Let the young men now arise, and play before us.* And Joab said, *Let them arise;*" and immediately the conflict began between twelve men of each army (2 Sam. ii. 14).

Amaziah, King of Judah, proud of some advantages which he had obtained over the Edomites, sent a challenge to Jehoash, King of Israel, saying, "*Come, let us look one another in the face.*" Jehoash, in a beautiful parable, dissuaded him from going to war, to which Amaziah refused to listen. The two kings did look one another in the face at Bethshemesh, where the King of Judah was totally defeated (2 Kings xiv. 8).

Israelites and others.

Ben Hadad, King of Syria, declared war against Ahab in a yet more insolent manner. Having laid siege to Samaria, he sent messengers, saying, "*Thy silver and thy gold is mine; thy wives also, and thy children are mine.*" Ahab, who felt his weakness, replied, "*My lord, O King, according to thy saying, I am thine, and all that I have.*"

Then Ben Hadad, more insolent than before, rejoined, "Although I have sent unto thee, saying, Thou shalt deliver me thy silver, and thy gold, and thy wives, and thy children; yet I will send my servants unto thee to-morrow about this time, and they shall search thine house, and the houses of thy servants; and whatsoever is pleasant in thine eyes, they shall put it in their hand, and take it away." These exorbitant demands being rejected by Ahab and his council, who resolved to defend themselves and sustain the siege, Ben Hadad was obliged to abandon it, after having lost the greater part of his army.

When Pharaoh Necho, King of Egypt, on his way to Charchemish, against the Assyrians, was desirous of crossing the dominions of the King of Judah, Josiah, who was the ally or tributary of the Assyrian monarch, opposed his passage with an army. Then Necho sent ambassadors to him, saying, "What have I to do with thee, thou King of Judah? I come not against thee this day, but against the house wherewith I have war: for God commanded me to make haste: *forbear thee* from meddling with God, *who is with me*, that He destroy thee not." Josiah persisted, and in the battle which followed he was mortally wounded (2 Chron. xxxv. 20 *et seq.*).

Forms of declaration of war, and when disused.

A declaration of war was a form invariably observed by the Romans, and by the States of modern Europe until about the middle of the seventeenth century. The latest example of the observance of all the formalities usual on such occasions took place immediately before the war between France and Spain, in 1635, when the declaration was pronounced at Brussels, by heralds-at-arms, with all the ceremonies of the middle ages.

In the form of declaration used before the war between France and England, 1744, the English King is accused of being the personal enemy of France, and of doing all he could to provoke that country by the tenor of instructions to foreign ministers, and outrages at sea. In the counter declaration of the King of England, the truth of these insinuations is denied, and France is accused of violating neutrality (when, strictly speaking, she was bound to aid England in the war against Spain), and giving secret orders to the commanders of her vessels to assist the Spaniards against the English.

According to some jurists, the law and usage of civilized nations still require that war should not be undertaken without a previous declaration; but the more general practice appears to be to publish a manifesto within the territory of the State declaring war, announcing the existence of hostilities, and the motives for commencing them.

In connection with such declarations it is to be remembered that the ostensible cause of war is often a mere pretext to conceal the real cause.

Wars in which England has been engaged.

For some centuries after the Conquest the energies of England were consumed in vain attempts to gain dominion over France,[8] and in fruitless wars with the Scots. To these succeeded the civil war between the rival houses of York and Lancaster, which lasted forty years, and in which both the Scots and French occasionally took part.

The accession of Henry VII. put an end to intestine war, and, under his vigorous administration, law and

[8] Between the years 1141 and 1815, an interval of 670 years, England has been at war with France *alone* 266 years.

order became more respected; still, during his reign and that of his successor, renewed invasions of France by the English, and of England by the Scots, furnish incident for history.

In the reign of Elizabeth, the spirit of commercial enterprise began to develop itself in this country. Previous to that time, the state of our manufactures was so low that foreign wares had a preference in our markets. Our fleet was composed of ships built at Genoa, Venice, Hamburg, or Dantzic; and no ship was considered properly equipped for sea, unless provided with a cable for the "*great anchor*" manufactured at Seville, and generally known by the name of the "Hope."

The improvement in our trade which commenced at the time now referred to, is to be attributed in some measure to the religious persecutions in France and the Low Countries having driven a great number of skilful artisans to seek protection on our shores.

The protection thus afforded by Elizabeth to the revolted subjects of Philip II. produced a spirit of revenge in the breast of that monarch, to which may be attributed the hostility which he openly evinced to this country.

The result of the fierce strife engendered by the Reformation, was a change in the relations of subjects towards their princes, and a change, also, in the political relation of States towards each other; the Northern Powers, such as Sweden and Denmark, by their adhesion to the Protestant League, being brought within the political system of Europe, to which they had previously been strangers.

Parties into which

The great Catholic and Protestant Powers mutually

Europe was divided by the Reformation.

protected the adherents of their own faith in the bosom of rival States. Hence proceeded a repeated interference of Austria and Spain in the affairs of France, Germany, and England; and of the Protestant Powers in favour of their fellow-communionists in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, which tinges the political transactions of that period with a peculiar character. Not the least remarkable of the many singular results thus produced was the support given by France, during the ministry of Richelieu, to the heretics in Germany, against the House of Austria; while in the heart of France unrelenting persecution was carried on against the members of the reformed faith.

In a war extending over such an area, and of such duration in point of time, as the war of the Reformation, it would be strange if some of those princes who engaged in it were not tempted by the hope of gain in the general confiscation of ecclesiastical property; but there is no evidence of any great misapplication of the property of the Church during the period of that great conflagration; and religion, the avowed and ostensible cause, may be regarded as its real cause.

It seems highly improbable that Europe will again be desolated, to the same extent, by any religious strife; religious antipathy may, therefore, be regarded as a cause of war which is almost extinct in Europe. Neither does there appear any probability of a recurrence of those broils which so frequently arose between the sovereign and the great nobles, under the feudal system.

As one cause of war disappears another arises.

But if those causes are withdrawn from the list of provocations to war, others have taken their place. Previous to the discovery of America, Europe had no

colonies. The foundation of our American colonies gave a powerful stimulus to our commerce and manufactures, and for the protection of a growing trade so important it was necessary to increase our naval and military establishments, and our relations with the rest of the world became daily more complicated. To carry on our trade a demand for merchant shipping arose. The increase in this branch of trade had a powerful reacting influence on the navy. The empire of the seas became the ambition of Britain; and as trade flourished, and the naval superiority of the country began to develop itself, the jealousy and rivalry of other States was excited; and there are few elements of strife charged with more active power than commercial rivalry.[9]

[9] The present war in America has called forth the following picture of the naval arrogance of this country in times past:—

"We wonder what Lord Stowell would have said if any one had told him that the Great Britain of the next generation would be the champion of neutral rights at sea and on land. In those days, when England was at war, she swept the seas not only of her enemies' war ships, but very nearly, also, of the merchant ships of neutrals. Sometimes, also, she declared the existence of a higher law, and took very strong measures to prevent imminent dangers. By constantly straining her favourite doctrines in extension of the rights of belligerents, she banded all the sea-going nations against her, and was at last put to her election, either to defy the world, or to moderate her pretensions. Yet in the very height of her pride, and while she thought that it never could be to her interest that the seas should be equally open to all, and while she believed, or acted as though she believed, that no war could take place among maritime nations without her being a party to it, even then she never set up such pretensions or hazarded such doctrines as those which are now being put forth by the Northern Americans. Never during any one of our wars have we pretended to dictate to friendly Governments what their conduct should be towards their own subjects; and never have we called upon them to interfere in our interest, and to restrict those subjects as to what they shall make or sell, or for whom they shall make, or to whom they shall sell. It has been reserved for the Americans —who grew up into a nation upon neutral advantages, and championing all the time the extreme measure of neutral rights—it has been reserved for the Americans to make, as belligerents, the preposterous claim of a right to hold censorship over our shipyards, to place restrictions upon our gun trade, to forbid our workshops to manufacture sword-blades, and to dictate to our merchants the class of customers to whom

Balance of power.

The principle of interference to preserve the balance of power is to be discerned, as has been already observed, in the history of very remote ages; but the idea of a systematic arrangement to secure to different States, within the same sphere of political action, the undisturbed possession of their independence and existing territories, is of modern date.[10]

Demosthenes, in order to meet the danger which he apprehended from the rise of the Macedonian power, would have formed a confederacy to check the ambition of Philip; but his countrymen disregarded his advice, and the liberties of Greece were destroyed on the plains of Cheronea.

The Persian monarchs followed the advice given to Tissaphernes by Alcibiades, to support the weaker party in the intestine wars of Greece. The existence of their empire was prolonged for nearly a century by an adherence to this maxim; and when, for a moment, they neglected it, on the first appearance of the aspiring genius of Philip, the destruction of the empire was the result.

The successors of Alexander wished to pursue the same policy originally observed by the Persian monarchs,

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they shall not sell the unnumbered articles which are classed in the long catalogue of 'contraband of war.'

"Smarting under the insult and the injury inflicted by that single Confederate cruiser the *Alabama*, it is not surprising that the Americans should turn round in search of some one upon whom they may vent their vexation. England is always at hand; and it is quite a matter of course for us to hear that to England is attributed all the responsibility of the acts of Captain Semmes. It is our Government which is responsible for the captures and burnings; because our Government allowed English tradesmen to sell a ship, stores and sails, and guns to Confederates."—*Times, January* 5, 1863.

[10] Polybius is of opinion that such a force ought never to be thrown into one hand, as to incapacitate the neighbouring States from defending their rights against it.

but they failed to see the true way to carry out that policy; and although the contest between Rome and Carthage was palpably waged for universal dominion, they never attempted to interfere.

Philip II., of Macedon, when he saw Hannibal victorious, formed a most impolitic alliance with him, stipulating for the assistance of the Carthaginian general to subdue the Grecian republics.

Ruinous policy of the Grecian States.

When the conclusion of the second Punic war left the Romans free to turn their attention elsewhere, the Grecian States opened to their view a new career of conquest; and some of these States, pursuing the ruinous policy of seeking in an alliance with Rome the means of gratifying their animosity to neighbouring States, the whole soon sank into the condition of subject provinces.

Preventive policy of Modern Europe.

Any political disturbance in any one of the States supposed to form the political system of modern Europe, immediately rouses the vigilance of all the other States composing that system; such is the apprehension entertained of the undue aggrandisement of any one State at the expense of others. Many bloody and destructive wars have proceeded from this preventive policy, some of them founded on very reasonable apprehensions of peril to the independence of weaker States; but many of them not justifiable by any fixed or recognized principle of international law.

One of the first of these wars was that undertaken by the confederacy formed to check the notorious ambition of the House of Austria under Charles V. and his successors. In the war which resulted from this confederacy France took a prominent part; but most of the States of Europe supported France against Austria. The peace

of Westphalia followed; but the ambition of Louis XIV. soon threatened to disturb the balance of power adjusted by that treaty; and in the war which ensued the greater part of Europe were arrayed on the side of Austria to curb the encroachment of France.

Political combinations to restrain the power of Louis XIV.

The political combinations of that period having arrayed the German Empire, the United Provinces, and Great Britain as allies against France, the exiled House of Stuart found a protector in Louis XIV., while the allies favoured the English Revolution. After forty-five years of war, the peace of Utrecht set bounds to the ambition of France for a time by splitting the Spanish monarchy, which had passed into the hands of the Bourbons, and establishing an intermediate power between France and the States General.

Next in order amongst the memorable military transactions in Europe follow the wars of Frederick the Great, in which he gave a dangerous example of conquests made for convenience.

Partition of Poland.

In 1772 the political division of Europe was rearranged by the partition of Poland, which is thus described:—

"The Austrian troops crossed the southern boundary of Poland in 1770, under pretext of setting up monuments to mark the boundaries of Hungary. They occupied the rich salt mines, the principal source of the revenues of the Polish Kings. Frederick II. availed himself of the pretext of a contagious disease, which desolated the country, to enter Great Poland with a sanitary cordon. Kaunitz, the Austrian Minister, wishing to avoid the odium of being considered the author of the partition project, endeavoured to get Russia to make the first proposition. The way in which he went about this

was by telling the Russian Minister, Prince Gallitzin, that the Austrian Court would not consent to mediate for peace, which the Russians were anxious to conclude with the Porte, unless Russia would give a positive assurance that she had *no* intention to *dismember* Poland."

The true meaning of this was perfectly understood by the Russian, and matters were soon arranged.

Prussia and Russia appear as Great Powers.

Hitherto, Prussia had only occupied the position of an inferior Power, and Russia had been almost a stranger in European politics. These two Powers now came forward to take a more prominent part in the general affairs of the Continent of Europe.

The example given by the partition of Poland encouraged the successive governments which obtained power in France in 1793 to disregard the independence of nations, and all questions of a balance of power. To check the progress of the revolutionary principles propagated in France, and the extension of her military power, the Allied Powers applied the principle of armed intervention in the internal affairs of Europe; and thus commenced the first Revolutionary War. That this was the motive of the Powers allied in the continental war of 1792 is very evident, from the history of the times.

From former periods of history numerous instances may be quoted of the intervention of one or more European States in the affairs of others, in consequence of the special interests and security of the intervening States being at stake; as in the intervention already noticed of the Catholic and Protestant States mutually in behalf of their adherents at the time of the Reformation, and the confederacies successively formed to keep in check, first, the House of Austria, and, subsequently, the Bourbons;

Distinctive features in the wars which sprang from the French Revolution.

but the wars which sprung out of the French Revolution arose because the social condition of Europe was declared to be in imminent danger from the doctrines propagated in France, and the balance of power was threatened with destruction through the ambition of France, and her march to universal dominion.

Holy Alliance.

France having been reduced within the limits of her original boundaries, an alliance, intended to be perpetual, was formed between the four Great Powers—Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain. France herself eventually joined the coalition at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1818. These Powers constituted themselves into a kind of superintending authority over the affairs of Europe, the extent and object of which were never accurately defined.

As interpreted by some, this union was intended to form a perpetual system of intervention among the European States, adapted to prevent any such change in the internal forms of their respective governments as might endanger the existence of the institutions which had been re-established.

The measures adopted by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, at the Congress of Troppau and Laybach, in respect to the Neapolitan Revolution of 1820, were founded upon principles adapted to give the Great Powers of the European Continent a perpetual pretext for interference in the internal concerns of its different States. The British Government expressly dissented from these principles, not only upon the ground of their being, if reciprocally acted upon, contrary to the fundamental laws of Great Britain, but such as could not safely be admitted as part of a system of international law; and while upholding

the right of a State to interfere where their own immediate security or essential interests are seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another State, it regarded the assumption of such a right as only justifiable in extreme cases, and not capable of application indiscriminately in all revolutionary movements.

The British Government also refused to be a party to the Congress at Verona, 1822, which led to an armed interference by France, under the sanction of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, in the internal affairs of Spain, and the overthrow of the Spanish Constitution of the Cortes.

Reasons given by Austria for postponing to declare against France.

In a State paper, written during the negotiations relative to the treaty of Pressburg (1805), the Russian diplomatist, commenting on a despatch which he had received from the Court of Vienna, observes that he presumes it to be the opinion of the Austrian Court that the attitude of France, from her geographical position, is so formidable that the maintenance of peace is desirable until a more favourable conjuncture.[11]

"This," observes the Russian, "would be sound and good reasoning if there was a probability of a more favourable conjuncture; if the Court of Vienna, by waiting, could augment and consolidate her forces; and if, in the meantime, no other changes were to be apprehended. But," he continues, "while we are temporizing, Buonaparte will be, from day to day, strengthening his government, and increasing his power, by the organ-

[11] "The Popes in the conduct of their temporal affairs followed that mysterious policy by which their spiritual dominion had been extended, and in all their measures were more ready to employ the refinements of intrigue than the force of arms. Hence it was in the Papal Court that address and subtlety in negotiation became a science; and, during the sixteenth century, Rome was considered as the school in which that art might be best acquired."—ROBERTSON.

ization of Lombardy and Parma, and the geographical position will not be improved for Austria."

In making arrangements, at the same time, for the march of the Russian troops, it was proposed that the Austrians should provide rations of bread and meat and forage for the first Russian corps, after it passed the frontier; but that in crossing the frontier and for a day or two after they passed, they should bring provisions with them, as no arrangement could be made to provide them without exciting suspicions of the intended movement.

In 1810, Napoleon directed Murat to invade Sicily with 40,000 men; but he gave secret orders to General Regnier, commanding the auxiliaries, not to cross the Straits unless there was a rising in Sicily. He had another object in the display, to prevent any assistance being sent from Sicily to Lord Wellington in Spain.

Demonstration by Murat to stop reinforcements for Wellington.

The army of Murat was bivouacked on the coast of Calabria. Under the protection of the batteries, 208 gunboats lay close to the once formidable rock of Scylla, and 700 boats of other descriptions waited the embarkation of the troops. On the opposite shore, 15,000 British were spread along ten miles of the coast from Messina to Faro Point, and four line-of-battle ships, with several frigates and smaller vessels, were lying at anchor, ready to assail the flotilla.

On the 18th September, about 3,500 of Murat's men effected a passage and landed at Faro Foint; but, being unsupported, they were repulsed, with a loss of 800 prisoners in the hands of the Sicilians.

Difficult position of British Commander in his relations to the Court of Palermo.

The conduct of the Court of Naples, at the time Murat threatened to invade Sicily, convinced Sir John Stuart of the impossibility of *maintaining his position while*

invested with no political authority to control the machinations of the Queen. In October he wrote to Lord Liverpool, resigning his command; while in the same letter he made the strongest representation of the dangers he apprehended from the suspicious movements of the Court of Palermo.

These representations determined the British Cabinet on recalling the civil representative, and uniting in one person the functions of diplomacy and of supreme military command; and the appointment was conferred on Lord William Bentinck,—it is believed, in a great measure, to conciliate the powerful family to which he belonged. At the same time, he proved himself a very able man.

The fifth article of the treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine is the secret of the attachment of Saxony to the cause of Napoleon.

Secret reason of attachment of Saxony to the cause of Napoleon.

The Protestant States of the empire exercised full ecclesiastical power by virtue of their territorial supremacy; the Catholic States, only a limited ecclesiastical power. The Elector of Saxony, Frederick Augustus, in 1697, changed his religion, and became Catholic, to promote his election to the Crown of Poland, and thus curtailed his prerogative in ecclesiastical matters in his own country. By the fifth article of the treaty above referred to, he obtained full supremacy in matters spiritual.

By the peace of Tilsit, Prussia lost half its possessions, and very much of its political consideration as the centre of civilization and enlightenment in Germany. The barrier to the ambitious views of Buonaparte, which its geographical position had hitherto opposed, was thrown

down, and Russia was brought into immediate contact with the Emperor of the French, whose ambitious views at that time seemed to be directed to the subjugation of all Europe.

Emperor of Russia complains of the attack on Copenhagen.

In 1808, the Emperor of Russia complained of the silence and secrecy which had been observed by the British Government with regard to the attack on Copenhagen, adducing their not having previously communicated with him on the subject as a proof that they well knew he would not countenance the proceeding. Lord Gower, in the name of England, replied that the Emperor had no grounds of complaint, since he had pursued the same course himself with regard to the secret articles of the treaty with Buonaparte at Tilsit, and that England had learnt that a general confederation against England was proposed at the conferences which took place at Tilsit, in which the Navies of Portugal and Denmark were destined to take part.

In a declaration published by his Imperial Majesty at this time, the conduct of England is thus described:—

Manifesto of the Emperor of Russia.

"The more the Emperor desires the friendship of his Britannic Majesty, the more regret he feels at that monarch having estranged himself from him.

"Twice the Emperor has taken up arms in a cause in which England was most directly interested, but he has solicited her assistance in vain. He desired that she should make a diversion in a cause in which she was so vitally interested, when, to his astonishment, he heard of her sending troops to Buenos Ayres. Part of her army, which seemed destined to create a diversion in Italy, left Sicily, it was supposed, to land near Naples, instead of which the expedition set out to appropriate Egypt; but

what annoyed his Majesty the most was to find the commerce of his subjects interfered with and impeded by the English Navy, at a time, too, when (it seems hardly credible!) the blood of the Emperor's subjects was flowing in glorious battle-fields against the French Emperor, the declared enemy of England, and with whom she was at that time at war.

"Notwithstanding these grounds of complaint against England, when the two Emperors made peace, the Czar stipulated, in drawing up the treaty, that he should be allowed to mediate with the King of England. The English Ministers, however, refused his good offices.

"Peace between Russia and France ought to have led to a general peace. Then England suddenly threw off the lethargy into which she appeared to have sunk, and cast fresh brands upon the north of Europe, to nourish the war which she did not wish to see extinguished. Her fleets and armies appeared on the coasts of Denmark, to perpetrate an act of violence unexampled in history.

"A moderate and peaceable State, which, by a long, unfaltering course of prudent conduct, had gained a dignified moral standing amongst monarchs, has been seized and treated as if she had been guilty of secretly conspiring, as if she meditated the ruin of England; all this to justify her complete and immediate spoliation.

"This act of violence, committed in the Baltic, which is not an open sea, and the tranquillity of which has been long guaranteed by the States bordering on it, with the concurrence of England, has wounded the Emperor both personally and also in relation to the interests of his people and his allies in the North. He avows this

feeling, as well as his intention to show his sensibility of the outrage."

In conclusion, the Emperor reproaches England with having wished to make him share in the disgrace attaching to the attack on Denmark, and with attempting to make him a supporter of the English policy.

Reply of the English Government.

The English Government, in their defence, published a declaration, setting forth that it was not for those who had been parties to the Treaty of Tilsit to call upon the King of England to account for what had been done at Copenhagen; that the secret articles in the Treaty of Tilsit fully justified the steps that had been taken; that if anything had been wanting, it was furnished by the Emperor's declaration. The King expressed his regret that the Emperor should have been led away by the French to abandon his ancient ally. With reference to the reproaches on the subject of Russia having engaged in war for the benefit of England, the Emperor was reminded that he had just as much interest in the cause of Prussia as England had.

His Majesty proclaims again those principles of maritime law against which the armed neutrality of the Empress Catherine was directed, and which are denounced at the present moment by Russia. These principles have been recognized by all the Powers of Europe, even by Russia. It is the King's duty to maintain these principles, and he intends to do so against any confederation. They have contributed to uphold the maritime power of England; but they are particularly essential at a time when Great Britain is the only bulwark against the war-increasing usurpations of France—the only refuge for other nations.

In 1761, by the "Family Compact," the Duke de Choiseul may be said to have reduced Spain to the form of a province. A separate and secret convention was executed on the same day (15th August), by which it was agreed that if England did not make peace with France by the 1st May, 1762, Spain should then declare war against the former Power. His most faithful Majesty the King of Portugal was to be desired to accede to the convention, "it not being just," in the opinion of those royal jurists, that he should remain a tranquil spectator of the disputes of the two Courts with England, and continue to enrich the enemies of the two Sovereigns, by keeping his ports open to them.

Arrogant conduct of France and Spain towards Portugal in a secret treaty.

The King of Portugal refused to purchase a temporary exemption from attack by a surrender of his independence. The French and Spanish Ministers declared that the Portuguese alliance with England, although called *defensive*, became, in reality, *offensive*, from the situation of the Portuguese dominions, and from the nature of the English power. A war ensued, being, probably, the first ever waged against a country on the avowed ground of its geographical position. This war was terminated by the Treaty of Paris, 1763, without, however, any proposition on the part of France and Spain that Portugal should be cut away from the Continent, and towed into the neighbourhood of Madeira.[12] This barefaced ground of war illustrates the situation of Portugal since Spain became a dependent ally of France.

First war waged against a country, on account of her geographical position.

In the American war it does not appear that any attempt was made on *principles of geography* to compel Portugal to make war on England. The example of the

[12] SIR J. MACINTOSH.

family compact was not, however, long barren. As soon as the French Republic had re-established the ascendant of France at Madrid, they determined to show that they inherited the principles, as well as the sceptre, of their monarchs. Portugal, now overpowered, was compelled to cede Olivenza to Spain, and to shut her ports on English ships. Thus terminated the second war made against her to oblige her to renounce the only ally capable of assisting her, and constantly interested in her preservation. But these compulsory treaties were of little importance, being immediately followed by the peace of Amiens. They only furnished a new proof that the insecurity of Portugal essentially arose from the dependence of Spain on France.

Extreme enforcement of the geographical principle. Portuguese monarchy confiscated.

When the war, or rather wars, against universal monarchy broke out, the Regent of Portugal declared the neutrality of his dominions. For four years he was indulged in the exercise of this right of an independent, in spite of the geographical position of his kingdom. At the end of that period, the geographical principle was enforced against him more fully and vigorously than in the former instance of its application which has been quoted. The Portuguese monarchy was confiscated, a French army under Junot marched against the country, and the royal family were obliged to embark for Brazil.

CHAPTER VII.

STRATAGEMS.

It is the height of art to conceal art.

"Above all things" (comrades) "you must be sure to be evermore intent upon your enemy, and have your judgment centinel to spy what he can do against you; and play two parts, saing to yourself, If I was the assailant, what would I do? on which side should I make my attaque? for you ought to believe that your opinion and that of the enemy do very much jump."—MONTLUC.

Section I.

Primitive signification of the word "stratagem."

THE word stratagem, in the original στρατήγημα, signifies the action of a general, a military manœuvre or operation; and the Greek noun is derived from στρατηγέω, to command an army.

The Greeks were perhaps unrivalled in the art of deceiving skilfully; and in their estimation, he who conquered by skill, that is, by stratagems, ranked much higher than a general whose success depended on superior numbers. It seems, therefore, very natural that στρατήγημα, or the art of circumventing an army, should have been used by them to denote the art of a general.

The Romans, in the early period of their power, looked down upon the use of stratagems as unworthy of brave and honourable soldiers. At a subsequent period these scruples were entirely laid aside; and the Roman generals resorted to stratagems without hesitation when-

ever an opportunity occurred favourable to the use of such means. Francis I., with a contempt for stratagems worthy of the Romans in their early days, wrote to the Marquis Pescara, the imperial general, before the battle of Pavia: "You will find me before Pavia, and you ought to be here in six days; I will give you twenty. Let not the superiority of my forces serve for an excuse: I will fight you with equal numbers." General Puysegur, whose treatise on the art of war was written in the first half of the eighteenth century, appears to have held the opinion that "stratagem," in modern acceptation, bears a very limited meaning, as compared with the signification attached to the word even in the Latin language.[1]

The introduction of the word into the Latin language is thus noticed by Valerius Maximus, *De Strategematis*:—"Illa vero pars calliditatis egregia, et ab omni reprehensione procul remota, cujus opera, quia appellatione nostra vix apte exprimi possunt Græca, pronuntiatione strategemata dicuntur."

The Duke of Wellington said of Soult, "He is a great man in the administration of war; but less in *battle*—less in what are called '*les stratagèmes de la guerre.*'"

In a modern English dictionary (the *Imperial*), the following notice of the introduction of the word into our language is inserted as a quotation from the *World of Wonder*, 1688:—"See there as fine and cunning a

[1] *Stratagems.*—Ce mot avait toute autre signification en Latin qu'il ne l'a ordinairement en Français; expédiens ruses de guerre, ne le rend pas encore.—PUYSEGUR, vol. i. p. 29.

As an instance of change of signification of words, the learned Dean of Westminster has pointed out that "*impatientia*" has borne, at different times, the opposite meanings of impatience (non-enduring) and apathy (non-feeling).

stratageme as can be devised; for I hope I may be bold *to use* this word, seeing of *late* it hath found such good entertainment amongst us." But from the frequent use of the word by Shakspeare, whose death took place in 1616, it must have been a familiar word before the seventeenth century. Shakspeare.

In Warde's *Animadversions of Warre*, published in 1639, there is a discourse of "Politique Stratagems," which he prefaces by saying, that "politicke stratagems have been the immediate means, next under the providence of God, to gain victories, enervating and weakening an enemy; and in his aphorisms he says, "Policie against force deserveth much, and prevaileth often; but by stratagem to prevail against policie is most excellent." Warde's *Animadversions on War.*

The actions of Generals are as much as ever stratagems, and the art of war is still the art of circumventing the enemy. Some of the preparations for war, some of the operations which take place in war, cannot be concealed from the enemy: but banish the use of stratagems, and the chances of any war taking place are greatly diminished; for what State would enter upon war with another vastly superior to it in population and wealth, and power of every description, if superior skill in the art of war did not hold out a hope of success? And even when wars take place between Powers who are on an equality in point of strength, is it not that one or the other, or perhaps each, thinks itself superior in skill? We do not go to war to be killed—we go to conquer the enemy; and if we run the chance of being killed, it is on condition that the hypothetical sacrifice of life will be of use. If an intelligent mass sees before it Warfare still carried on by stratagems.

no chance of victory, no chance of glory, it hesitates to throw away life, seeking naturally to preserve it until the moment arrives when the sacrifice can be made to some purpose.

Stratagems commence before the war breaks out.

The negotiations which precede war are frequently chiefly designed to put off actual hostilities until one or other can enter the field superior in strength. The marches, the assembling of troops, cannot always be concealed; but who would allow the enemy to know that he is on the march, or what his numbers are, if it could be avoided, until the moment when he is ready, like the eagle, to dart down on his prey?

The distinction which Warde makes in his *Animadversions* between policy and stratagem is worthy of note. Good stratagems are generally good policy; but, on the other hand, good policy does not always come under the head of a stratagem.

There was a time when, in war, the break of day, or rather the approach to that hour, was considered a favourable time for an attack, as troops were supposed to be less on the alert at that time; and while any want of vigilance prevailed at that hour it was good policy to fix upon that time for an attack. In consequence of that particular time being so frequently selected for an attack, troops became more than usually vigilant just at that hour; and, therefore, it is no longer regarded as the most favourable time in general for an attack: special cases may, of course, still occur in which it may be advisable to choose that hour for an attack.[2]

Policy and stratagem.

[2] Epaminondas was in the habit of marching on the enemy at sunrise. He altered that hour in the Peloponnesus against the Lacedemonians, and defeated them as they were not on their guard, relying on what they had observed of his habits.

Vendôme and Prince Eugene were

Now, any march to *surprise* an Army comes under the head of a stratagem; but there is, in reality, more of policy than stratagem in deciding whether the enemy should be attacked at daylight, or at any other time, in anticipation that he will then be found off his guard. But if we shift from the camp of the assailant to that of the party who is to be assaulted, and suppose that the latter, for the purpose of inducing his opponent to make an attack under disadvantageous circumstances, has taken steps to create a belief that a slackness of discipline prevails at any particular hour, in order to draw on an attack at that hour, while, in reality, he is always more than usually vigilant just at that particular time, then we have a complete stratagem, combining also good policy, or what Warde might call a "politick stratageme."

It is good policy in war to prepare for the worst, and to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves. To gain intelligence of the enemy, and a true estimate of his forces, and form plans accordingly, is good policy; but events, as they develop themselves, may leave nothing for policy to act upon; and when policy proves insufficient to disperse the gathering storm, the genius of the General must seek to change the aspect of affairs by calling to his aid the science of stratagems. This science recommends itself to the consideration of the soldier on two grounds; first, that he may know how to make use of a stratagem when a fit occasion offers; and, secondly, that he may be able to foil the devices of his enemy.

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so well known to each other for their habits of doing extraordinary things that they were sometimes obliged to spread their toils with the greatest ingenuity in order to carry their schemes into execution.

The higher order of stratagems almost identical with strategy.

Stratagems and surprises are not limited, as might at first appear to be the case, to the domain of tactics, their importance will always be measured by the effect which they produce on strategic combinations; and the higher orders of stratagems are so closely allied to strategy that it is difficult to distinguish them from strategic combinations; and it is of the utmost importance, at the very earliest stage of a misunderstanding, as well as of a campaign, to read the ulterior views of an opponent through the veil with which he is almost sure to mask his real opinions and designs.

The lawfulness or admissibility of stratagems in military operations has caused it to be said that, in war, man's estimation of human virtues becomes, to a certain extent, inverted; which is true, inasmuch as, amidst the strife of nations, those moral qualities which are highly esteemed in peaceful life become more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

In the infancy of States, or while they are uncivilized, their intercourse with other people is not regulated by well-understood principles; but as they improve in internal condition, they seek to put the external relations on a settled basis; and the licence which is allowed to the patriot or warrior in the defence of his country, or in the pursuit of glory, is not unlimited, or free from any control but the will of the individual. Stratagems, therefore, as all other operations in war, must be subject to those laws which nations, by general consent, have adopted to restrain the licence of war.

Licence of war not unlimited.

As a general rule, if the cause and end of the war be justifiable, all the means that appear *necessary* to the end are justifiable also. Here the only limitation is that

which is expressed by the word *necessary*. Cruelty to prisoners, barbarous treatment of women,[3] profanation of temples, destruction of public buildings, repositories of collections of the fine arts, and, in general, any act of violence or demolition, which cannot tend to bring the war to a conclusion, are unjustifiable as being unnecessary.

To the limitation thus defined must be added another, which may be termed the limitation of expediency. The restrictions which are imposed by expediency apply to things which may or may not bring the war to a conclusion, but which nations, by mutual consent, have declared to be contrary to the laws of war. It may be said that, if it is lawful to kill an enemy at all, it is lawful to do so by poison or assassination,[4] as well as by other means;

[3] Duguesclin always said to his soldiers, "Remember that, whenever you make war, the ecclesiastics, the poor, and women and children, are not your enemies,—that you carry arms only for their defence and protection.

[4] The stratagem made use of to terminate the career of the celebrated partisan officer Schill comes under the class to be reprobated. The plan was laid by Seruzier, and executed by an officer under his orders named Beckman. The garrison of Stralsund having been considerably weakened by detachments, Schill was known to have formed the design of gaining possession of the place with his followers. The officer Beckman was despatched, disguised in the dress of a peasant, with a spy, who was acquainted with the person of Schill.

A strong force was assembled by Seruzier in the vicinity of the town, to co-operate in the design by destroying all the followers of Schill who might attempt to escape. The signal appointed for these troops to act was the firing of two shots. Beckman, with his conductor, having entered the town, Schill was pointed out to the French officer by the spy; and, on the signal being given by Schill, for the plunder of the town, Beckman went into a café, took up a firelock belonging to one of Schill's party, and deliberately shot the Prussian partisan. The rest of Schill's party were massacred by the troops posted for that purpose.

The principles laid down to regulate the war now raging in America, so far as the inhabitants are concerned, in the districts occupied by the Federal troops, are comprised in a letter addressed to M. General Rosencrantz by General Halleck:—

"GENERAL,—The suggestions of General Reynolds and General Thomas, with regard to a more rigid treatment of disloyal persons within the lines of your army, are approved. No additional instructions from these headquarters are deemed necessary.

"You have already been urged to procure your subsistence, forage, and

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and if the ... of ... by ... this may be true; but the first ... will be followed by instant retribution: ... which such

... ble, in the country occupied. This ... had a right to do without any in- ... actions. As the commanding General ... the field you have the right to enforce ... the laws and usages of war, however ... rd and severe these may be, unless ... re be some act of Congress forbid- ... g them. As a general rule, you ... st always be the judge when it is best ... st rigidly. Apply these laws, and a ... lenient course where such would ... o our advantage.

Distinctions, however, should al- ... be made in regard to the cha- ... r of the people in the district- ... country which is militarily occupied ... ssed over. The people of the coun- ... which you are likely to operate ... be divided into two classes.

... First, the truly loyal, who neither ... ssist the rebels, except under ... ssion, but who favour and assist ... Union troops :—Where it can pos- ... be avoided, this class of persons ... ld not be subjected to military re- ... ions, but should receive the pro- ... n of our arms. It may, however, ... ecessary sometimes to take their ... ces either for our own use, or to ... n falling into the hands of the ... . They will be paid at the fair ... ue of such property ; or, if that ... nvertible, they will hereafter be ... ndemnified. Everyone should be ... ed all property so taken without ... aid for ...

... ond, those who took up ... ms, but belonging to the ... n military ... ...

the horrors of war, yet procure no superiority to either party engaged in it. Civilized nations have, therefore, joined in reprobating such practices, and, by general usage and consent, nations are precluded from resorting to them as measures the effect of which would be to introduce amongst mankind new evils without necessity or advantage.

The limitations of the licence of war do not affect stratagems.

Thus far, then, the licence of war acknowledges two limitations. On the one hand, it disavows any act of violence wanton in its nature, and not tending to further the end of the war; and it recognizes and respects those laws rendered sacred by the custom of nations, and which tend to mitigate the horrors of war, without giving either party an advantage, as long as they are mutually observed by the contending parties.

Under these limitations, it is considered quite lawful to deceive an enemy by stratagems, feigned attacks, spies, false intelligence; and such means as these are measures tending to bring the war to a termination without involving any breach of confidence, the opposing parties standing in a relation to each other which precludes any grounds for either party putting any confidence

through it, our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the innocent and defenceless, and the wanton destruction of private property, that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country. Such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetrators and all connected with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of the Army, and destructive of the ends of our present movement. It must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered, without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemy, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favour and support our efforts must all prove in vain. The commanding General, therefore, earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain, with the most scrupulous care, from unnecessary or wanton injury to private property. And he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and bring to summary punishment all who shall, in any way, offend against the orders on this subject.—R. E. LEE, *General*."

in the act or word of the other. At the same time, tampering with flags of truce and treaties, signals of capitulation or surrender, are decidedly repugnant to the laws of war; these being things pertaining to the termination of the war, and consequently of such a nature that, if the strictest fidelity was not observed with respect to them, then there could be no confidence between contending parties, the horrors of war would be increased, as no war could be brought to an end, but by the extermination of one party or the other.

The means of carrying on war, which are admissible, are thus divided, in a general way, from those agencies which might be employed, but the use of which is universally reprobated; and, in this classification, stratagems come under the category recognized as lawful means.

Lawfulness of stratagems.

The signification, however, attaching to the word stratagem in the English language is of such a questionable nature as to suggest a brief examination into the lawfulness of actions coming under that denomination when judged of by the standard of morality, by the laws of honour, and the dictates of divine authority.

According to the opinion of the great philosopher of the north, Dugald Stewart, the law of honour operates in the case of veracity in some measure as the law of the magistrate operates in the case of justice. In the latter case, a man may be unjust in the sight of God and of his own conscience, without transgressing the letter of any statute; and in the former, without forfeiting his character as a gentleman, he may often incur all the guilt of a liar and an impostor.

In the days of Addison, party spirit in politics was carried so far that truth seems to have been utterly

disregarded by the opposing parties; and a paper in the *Spectator* is devoted to denouncing the practice of lying in political matters, the writer observing what a marvellous thing it is that *men of honour* in other respects should so far forget themselves as to tell any lies from party spirit.

That which is honourable in one age of society is repudiated in another, as, for instance, the practice of duelling. The writer of the following letter, no doubt, conceived that he had a true *sense of honour;* and in his estimate of himself he was probably supported by the opinion of others; yet the matter of which he makes a serious question can only be looked upon at the present day in the light of an absurdity. The writer is a subaltern officer in the Army, addressing his commanding officer, and the letter is to be found in Lord Cornwallis's memoirs:—

Specimen of a gentlemanly mind.

"SIR,—I believe I am a member of the —— mess; if so, I will take the liberty to submit the following argument, viz.,—Every gentleman under the immediate propensity of liquor has different propensities; to prove which I have only to mention the present instance with respect to myself and Lieutenant ——. My propensity, *noise and riot;* his, *sleep.* I ever conceived that, in a public mess-room, three things were certain. First, that it was open to every officer who chose to pay the subscription; second, that he might indulge himself with liquor as much as he pleased; and, third, that if a gentleman, and a member of the mess, chose to get intoxicated in the mess-room, no other officer (however high his rank in the regiment) has a right, or dare order, to restrain (not being president) his momentary

propensity in the mess-room. As such, and this being the case, I must inform you that you have acted in a most unprecedented and unknown (not to say ungentlemanlike) way, in presuming to enter the mess-room as a commanding officer, and to bring a *sentry* at your back (which you asserted you had), to turn out the amusement (a hand organ) of the company (a stranger being present), and thereby prevent the harmony which (it is ever supposed) ought to subsist in a mess-room.

"I appeal to you as a gentleman. If you will answer this letter as *such*, you, at all times, know how to direct to

"———

"Lieutenant —— Foot."

Ancient duels.

In the combat *à l'outrance*, or *à toute outrance*, so prevalent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the opponents entered the field appointed for the duel to conquer or die. These deadly combats were particularly common in Italy and Denmark. Brantome mentions that he was for a month on a visit in one of the large cities in Italy (Milan or Florence), and that during that time there were twenty or thirty duels every day, always many dead bodies lying about the streets. The conqueror in these duels, by the laws of honour, or whatever they may be called, had the right of disposing of the body of his opponent; he might make him prisoner, slay him on the spot, or cause him to be burnt, beheaded, or hung. Brantome records an instance of a celebrated knight who determined beforehand to drag his opponent through the field, as Achilles is described by Homer dragging the body of Hector at his chariot wheels three times round the camp in triumph; a purpose which

remained unfulfilled, only because he had the misfortune to be worsted in the encounter. Instances have also occurred of one of the combatants refusing to commence the fight until the fire was lit, or the scaffold erected, on which to burn or gibbet the vanquished.

Various opinions as to stratagems.

The Romans, as already noticed, at one period of their history condemned the use of stratagems as base, and prided themselves on never resorting to such means. At another period their jurists call it *good deceit* (*bonus dolus*), which a man practises against an enemy, and say it makes no difference whether any one elude the enemy by force or fraud.

Lycurgus encouraged theft, provided it was done without discovery, because he considered it one means of practising the youth to conceal and dissemble their designs in war. The Swiss fell into the other extreme. Upon one occasion they refused to use a simple *chevaux de frise* in their own defence, as not being a fair open mode of fighting.

Moral rules founded on utility and sentiment.

The *moral rules found to prevail in most, if not in all, communities are grounded, partly on utility, partly on sentiment.* If we put aside the question as to the legitimate and defensible basis of morals, and ask simply what has given birth to the codes now or formerly existing, we are compelled to admit that utility is not the sole explanation, though coming in for a very important share. If, however, we add sentiment and tradition, which is the continuing influence of some former utility or sentiment, we can render a comprehensive account of the existing practice. The rules manifestly founded on utility are all those that protect the persons, property, good name, &c. of the members of each society from violation, that en-

force justice and the fulfilment of bargains and engagements; that uphold veracity and integrity; that maintain obedience to constituted authority; that extend protection to the helpless; and so forth.

The cases of sentiment converted into law and morality differ widely, according to place and time. Some have their origin in sentimental likings, carried the length of public consecration—as the veneration of the Hindoos for the cow; out of which has arisen a compulsory homage, with severe penalties for disrespect. The Buddhist reverence for animal life is of the same nature. The enunciation of disgust is a favourite exercise, creating for itself objects to be vented on, precisely as the temperament overflowing with tender emotion finds many things to love. The objects thus sought out need not offend the senses in any way; if they can only furnish a slight pretext for being called nasty or unclean, it is enough for letting off the charged battery of the powerful organ of disgust.

Among strong antipathies made into moral rules, we need only refer to such instances as the dislike of the pig. The Hindoo ritual is full of the means of purification from actions deemed unclean. The hatred to classes of men has often acquired the force of moral enactments. The system of castes implies an outcast population.

Foreigners have often come under this sentiment, as in the feeling of the Jews to idolators, and white men towards negroes. The sentiment of detestation felt by a a good Catholic of the fifteenth century to a heretic was intense. These antipathies were not only strong to the hurt of the objects of them, but some of them were enacted as obligatory upon all members of the com-

munity; so that any one harbouring the proscribed class was made liable to the severest penalties.

There have been usually certain modes of indulgence, not at all affecting the welfare of society, that have excited feelings of dislike so strong and so influential, as to place them under the ban of authoritative morality. Wine and animal food have been the subjects of total prohibition.

Source of moral rules.

In reference to the *process of enactment of moral rules*, one well-known source of moral rules is the dictatorship of a religious prophet like Mahomet. Ask a Mahometan what is the standard to settle any difference that may arise among individual consciences, and he refers you to the Koran; in other words, to the dictatorship of Mahomet. So in China, Confucius is known to have given the moral tone and specific precepts to a section of the Chinese. The proper answer, therefore, to the question, "What is the moral standard?" would be, *the enactments of the existing society, as derived from some one clothed, in his day, with a moral legislative authority.*[5]

The conscience of the Quaker is regulated by the moral code received from George Fox, and continued in the society from his time. That part of our moral code relating to marriage and the relations of the sexes can be historically traced, for the most part, and the responsibility of maintaining it in its present shape can be brought home to the proper parties. It is mere trifling to fill our imagination with an unseen, unproducible standard of morality. We need only look about us, and read history, to get at the real authority that now maintains, and the one that originally prescribed, almost any moral precept now recognized as binding. Instead

[5] BAIN: *Emotions and Will.*

of treating morality as a whole, one and indivisible, let us take the enactments in detail, and we shall have no difficulty in ascending to the fountain head in each case.

Changes in men's sentiments.

The change that has come over men's sentiments on the subject of slavery[6] would prove an interesting example of the growth of new moral feelings. Until less than two centuries ago the abhorrence of the usage of holding human beings as slaves did not exist, and now, except in the Slave States in America, the repugnance to the practice has almost reached the height of a moral sentiment. The process whereby this new and more liberal theory of the rights of humanity first shaped itself in the minds of scattered individuals, and came, by degrees, to leaven the mass, might probably be (and has been partially) traced out by the historian.

Thus, then, the notions of honourable and moral conduct prevailing at different times, even in the same country, and amongst the same people, being of a fluctuating and transitory character, some other and surer standard than the code of honour must be taken, in order to form a just opinion of the morality of employing stratagems in war.

Truth.

If recourse be taken to truth as a standard, still the question is not freed from obscurity and difficulty; for it is said to be impossible to define the meaning of the word truth. According to Dugald Stewart, it is a word which expresses a simple idea or notion, of which no analysis is possible; it is a natural and instinctive prin-

[6] "Slavery was not abolished in England until the reign of Queen Elizabeth. In 1574, a commission was issued for the purpose of fixing the compensation to be paid by bond men and bond women in the counties of Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, and Gloucester, for their manumission and freedom." — Lord KAMES.

ciple in the human mind; it is the spontaneous expression of our sentiments; while, on the other hand, falsehood does violence to our feelings.

Without entering on an examination of this doctrine, let it, for the sake of illustration, be supposed to be granted. Thus it would appear stratagems can only offend against this natural love of truth in so far as they involve falsehood. The extent to which stratagems are characterized by falsehood will then be the next point for examination.

Elements of falsehood.

To constitute falsehood, it is an established maxim that the parties concerned in the transaction must stand in such relationship to each other, that the one has *the right* to know the truth from the other. Such being the case, it will often be found in war that falsehood in appearance does not exist in reality.

The movements of an army in a campaign are not generally made with an avowed or open purpose; the great end or object of the campaign may be well known; but the means by which it is hoped to attain that object are generally concealed, if absolute deceit be not practised to mislead the enemy as to those means.

Let it be supposed that, in the recent campaign in Italy between the Austrians and French, the French Emperor, by a skilful movement on his right, led the Austrians to believe that the storm was about to burst on their left, while, under cover of this demonstration, by an able move, he placed the bulk of his forces parallel with the Ticino, and ready to effect the passage at a very different point from that at which it was expected he would cross. In such a case no one would say that the Emperor was guilty of telling a falsehood to Giulay. The term

falsehood is used because it is equally criminal, in a moral point of view, to mislead by actions which convey a false idea of our intentions, as it is to mislead by a verbal lie.

The reason why such feigned movements do not offend against any moral law is, that those who direct them stand in such relationship to each other that the one has no claim or right to know the truth from the other.

The Emperor of the French and Giulay were so placed, in the case above supposed, as to beget the very reverse of confidence; and, therefore, if the one commander drew conclusions as to the intentions of the other, and suffered, in consequence, by his error, he was himself alone responsible for any such evil consequences, and he by whom he was misled violated no confidence, none having been reposed in him.

This mode of reasoning applies to many stratagems which have been used, and which are quite lawful. The Scriptures afford an instance in the flight which Joshua advised his men to make in order to take Ai. The flight itself meant nothing by institution; by the enemy it was interpreted as a sign of fear. The others were not bound to undeceive them, using their liberty, as Grotius says, "to go one way or another quickly or slowly, with gestures and movements such and such."

Flight of Joshua's men from Ai.

The faculty of speech having been given to us to communicate our thoughts to aid our other faculties, intellectual and bodily, in carrying on the business of life, it seems reasonable to infer that the organ of speech and the intellectual faculties were intended for use in war, as much as the other faculties with which man is endowed.

Employment of speech in deceiving enemy.

The Scriptures furnish many instances of the employment of spies and of stratagems in war under Divine

sanction; and therefore it is to be inferred that the agency of such means is permissible, at least to a certain extent.

In order not to transgress the limits within which stratagems in war have received Divine sanction, it is desirable to discover the nature and character of those devices which are *not lawful.*

In considering this point it occurs at once that there is so little direct intercourse between parties engaged in war that the opportunities which one party has of deceiving the other by direct lies or falsehood must be of rare occurrence.

False despatches.

Despatches, containing nothing but falsehood, have been fabricated, and purposely thrown in the way of an enemy, with a view to mislead him; but such stratagems are no more unlawful than a feigned movement of a corps of an army.

Almost the only cases in which there can be a question as to whether deception may be resorted to, are those in which spies are employed, or when recourse is taken to a treacherous correspondence.

The employment of spies in obtaining information may be carried on very extensively without their having recourse to lying; and it would be quite impossible to define exactly how far, in their exceptional position, the communications they may hold with the enemy can be fairly tested by such rules as may be considered applicable to truth under ordinary circumstances. The probability is that when they resort to untruth it is in self-defence, when their lives are in jeopardy.

Not lawful to prompt another to do what it is not

The most important point to be borne in mind is that what it is not lawful to another to do, it is not

lawful for us to impel or solicit him to do. We may take such examples as these, as Grotius says:—"It is not lawful for a subject to kill his king, nor to give up towns without public authority, nor to despoil his fellow-citizens. Therefore it is not lawful to move a citizen, continuing in that character, to do such things; for in all these cases, he who gives another cause to sin does himself sin. Nor is it enough to reply that to him who impels such a man to such a deed, say to kill an enemy, the deed is lawful. It is lawful, but not in that manner. Augustine says well, '*It makes no difference whether you yourself commit a wickedness, or make another man commit it for you.*'" lawful for him to do.

The case is different if any one use the help of a person who does wrong of his own accord, and not at his impulse. We *receive a deserter by the laws of war;* that is, it is not against the laws of war to receive him who leaves the enemy and comes over to us. Deserters.

The extent to which we may hold correspondence with the subjects of a State with which we are at war, must be judged of according to all the concomitant circumstances.

The rule that what it is unlawful for another to do, it is not lawful for us to impel or solicit him to do, seems to restrict us very much in holding any correspondence with the enemy's people; but if the position of this country in relation to France during the revolutionary war be taken for the sake of illustration, it cannot be argued that the English were then under any restraint whatever in the employment of any Frenchman as a spy or informer. The power which had subsisted through a long course of years had been violently overthrown, and others substi- Condition of France during great Revolution, 1793.

tuted in succession, according as different factions gained the ascendency. None of these were regarded by us as legitimate Governments, or as more than temporary usurpations.

In a State paper addressed by the English Minister at Copenhagen to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in that kingdom, relative to the restriction on commerce with France, the Minister says:—"There exists no recognized Government in France at the present moment (1793) by belligerents or neuters. The Court of Denmark has no Minister at Paris, nor has it received any from France since the death of the King. It scrupulously abstains from recognizing the existence of any legitimate authority in France as a fact which has no existence; and although particular reasons have prevented her going to war, she cannot look upon France at the present time as a country with which she can maintain the usual rules of friendship and neutrality."

Throughout all these changes a numerous party remained faithful to the ancient line of monarchs which had been overthrown at the commencement of the Revolution; the act of negotiating with a Frenchman of this class to gain intelligence for war purposes, was evidently only combining with him for the overthrow of that which he justly regarded as an usurpation.

The political state of France is different at the present time, and however despotic the powers of the Government may be, still the existing form of government is the choice of the people. Its foundation may be on the ruins of the Government which preceded it, but it is not the less to be regarded as a legitimate authority; therefore any negotiation of a treasonable

character with a subject of the France of to-day would bear a different stamp to a negotiation of the same nature at the former period of history to which reference has been made.

Distinction between inciting to treachery, and using the services of a traitor.

Grotius makes a difference between impelling or soliciting a person to do wrong, and using the help of a person who does wrong of his own accord. The latter he shows, by the example of God himself, to be lawful; and this is an important distinction.

War could not be carried on without employing the services of wicked men as well as good; and if information or assistance be offered by one who is a traitor to his country, it is fair and lawful to take advantage of it: always provided it involves no act which, under the acknowledged limitations of war, would be unlawful; that is to say, no act not contributing to bring the war to a termination, and no act which is contrary to the recognized laws of nations in war.

It is an ancient proverb, that "he that cannot use the skin of the lion must put on that of the fox;" but even heathen writers held the opinion that stratagems in war, to be of lasting benefit, must have reason and justice on their side.

Cambyses, the father of Cyrus, in his instructions to his son, compares stratagems in war to new music. "Do not be contented," he says, "with those you have learnt; you must invent new ones for yourself, like a composer in music. And as new music is most prized, so in war you will find new stratagems the best, as they are least likely to be foreseen or provided for."

The soundness of this advice will not be questioned; but the similarity which may be discerned in the strata-

The range of man's ingenuity limited.

gems practised in the different ages of the world, leads to the conclusion that the range of man's ingenuity in this, as in other matters, is only limited, and that it is impossible to give practical effect to the suggestions of Cambyses. The wisest course is, therefore, to seek to profit by a knowledge of what has been done before, and the maxims deduced from the experience of preceding generations.

Similarity to be observed in the stratagems in all ages.

In proceeding with the examination of the subject of stratagems, it will be found that frequently before any hostilities have actually taken place, that is, whilst war may be said to be in the womb of time, policy and stratagem are engaged in preparing to usher the demon into the world; they attend at his birth, as well as accompany him throughout his wild career.

Section II.

Activity and watchfulness when war is in view.

The moment a State is menaced with war, its rulers should carefully guard against being lulled into a state of supineness, or false security, by an outward show of a peaceable disposition, on the part of the Power with which a difference exists; more especially if the demands of that Power are of such a nature that it is palpably impossible to satisfy them.[7]

[7] At a meeting of the Confederate Congress, Mr. Conrad offered the following peace preamble and resolution:—

"Whereas the present Administration of the United States, by its reckless disregard of all constitutional restraints, by its persistent efforts to subvert the institutions of these States, and the ferocious war which it is waging for that purpose, has more than realized the worst apprehensions of our people, and fully justified their wisdom and foresight in averting, by timely separation from the Union, the calamities which a longer continuance in it would have rendered inevitable; and whereas a portion of the people of the United States have recently manifested their disapproval of the war, of the objects for which, and the manner in which,

"The words of his mouth were smoother than butter, but war was in his heart; his words were softer than oil, yet were they drawn swords."—Ps. lv. 21.

While every effort is exerted to avoid war, by working on the fears, interests, and other passions, the possibility that these efforts will prove fruitless must be kept steadily in view, and we must seek to be prepared to enter upon war with as many advantages as possible on our side.

Generally speaking, war is considered as commenced under favourable circumstances, if nothing more can be lost by the issue of the great struggle, than we are called upon to sacrifice for the maintenance of peace.

The beginning of things should be well timed.

When war is inevitable, we must endeavour to seize a propitious moment to declare. Thus, it is a matter for consideration, whether the opening of the war should be postponed by further negotiations, or commenced immediately; for, as Bacon says,—

"There is surely no greater wisdom than well to time the beginning and onset of things. The ripeness or

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it is conducted, and their desire for its speedy termination; and several foreign Powers, notably the Government of France, have expressed a similar desire: Now, therefore, the Congress of the Confederate States, deeply impressed with the conviction that it is their duty to leave no means untried to put an end to a contest injurious to the civilized world, and disastrous to the parties engaged; believing that its prolongation can only tend to embitter and perpetuate feelings of hostility between States which, however politically disunited, must ever be connected by identity of language and of religion, and by the immutable laws of geographical *unity*, and of mutual demand and supply; deem the present time, when there is a momentary pause in conflict, a suitable one to utter the words of peace. The Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate States do, therefore, resolve that they will cordially co-operate with the Executive in any measures it may adopt, consistent with the honour, the dignity, and independence of these States, tending to a speedy restoration of peace with all, or with any of the States of the Federal Union."

The resolution was referred without debate to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

unripeness of the occasion must ever be well weighed; and generally it is good to commit the beginning of all great actions to Argus, with his hundred eyes, and the ends to Briareus, with his hundred hands—first to watch and then to speed.

The moment the Saguntines, who were allies of the Romans, showed a hostile disposition, Hannibal suspended his plans against them, for fear of prematurely alarming the Romans.

When Austria, anxious to avail herself of the aid of Russia and France to reconquer Silesia, provoked Frederick to a war, that great King and General did not scruple to draw on himself the appearance of being the aggressor, because he foresaw that he could not escape ruin, except by anticipating the designs of his enemies. He professedly acted in self-defence, according to the principle of his declaration to the British Minister, "that he who gave the first blow was not to be considered the aggressor, but he that made that blow necessary and unavoidable."

The Prussians precipitated the war with France in 1806 to their own disadvantage.

The Prussians precipitated the war with France in 1806. It is said they ought to have put it off by negotiations, until arrangements were concluded with the Russians to obtain their assistance.

When the late mutiny in India broke out, it was supposed that the hot season would prove very fatal to our troops in the field; and when a war with America seemed imminent, on a recent occasion, it was supposed that, owing to the winter having commenced, Canada would be defenceless. In the first case, our troops in India did not suffer to the extent anticipated; and, in the second, we managed to throw reinforcements into

Canada, which would probably have sufficed to defend the colony through the winter, had hostilities taken place. Still, in these cases, the circumstances referred to made the time in each case unpropitious for us to enter upon war, as far as it is possible to judge beforehand in these matters.

Secrecy.

Stratagem is a branch of the art of war, in which secrecy is especially important. "If a hair of my head knew my intentions, I would pluck it out and cast it into the fire," was the reply of the Sultan Mahomet II. when questioned by his chief officers as to the object of his operations. None of those feelings, which render men in general communicative, such as familiarity, affection, the prospect of success, should ever induce any one entrusted with operations in war to impart his designs to any but those who are charged with the execution of them; neither should anything more be divulged at one time than is absolutely necessary. Even silence is not always sufficient. Dissimulation becomes necessary to throw a veil over our designs; and we must guard against their being betrayed even by our looks.[8]

Monk never advanced openly when he could proceed as effectually in secret. Some attempted to ascertain his views secretly, some openly. In the midst of them all, the General, calm, taciturn, and too good-tempered to be displeased at what he was determined not to understand, quieted and combated each, in particular, by some concession to the views of his interrogator, or by some half confidence, intended as much to conceal what he did

[8] "Secrecy has been well termed the soul of all great designs. Perhaps, more has been effected by concealing one's own intentions than by discovering those of the enemy. But great men succeed in both."—COTTON.

not say as to insinuate what he wished to have believed. Each in turn might consider himself the nominal confidant, "that is," to use the language of Price, "him who had the post of first dupe to the General."

Spinola deceives by telling the truth.

The famous Spinola, supping with Henry IV., was asked by the monarch about his plans for the approaching campaign. He detailed them in full. Henry, who was interested for the Dutch, communicated to the Prince of Orange all that he had heard, warning him, at the same time, that he must suppose the whole to be exactly the reverse of what the Spanish General intended to do, as it was not consistent with his character to have explained his real design to one he distrusted so much. It happened, however, that Spinola acted exactly as he said. This caused Henry to say that most people deceive by telling a lie, but that Spinola had deceived him by telling the truth.

Marlborough advocating the contrary to what he intended.

When Marlborough commanded in Germany, he called a council of war on a particular occasion to determine whether he should attack the enemy on the following day. His Generals were unanimous in recommending the measure, but the Duke expressed his objections to it in the strongest terms, and the council submitted to his superior judgment. Prince Eugene followed him to his hut, when he retired, and lamented the disgrace in which such a resolution would involve them. "My resolution," said the Duke, "is to give battle to-morrow; and I shall instantly issue the requisite orders; but I opposed it in council because I have received information that our enemies have the means of becoming acquainted with the result of our deliberations."

Eugene, in preparing for the campaign of 1708, circulated a report that a journey he made to confer with some of the minor German potentates, was in consequence of the waters of Schlangenbad having been prescribed for his health. Villars was not duped with this story; and he wrote to a prisoner whom he sent back to Eugene's Army, "If you belong to the Army which Prince Eugene is going to command, assure him of my respects. I understand that he is going to the baths on the 20th June; but if I recollect right, he was not formerly so attentive to his health. We shall soon see what sort of baths he intends to take."

Eugene circulates a report that he is going to the baths.

A General, says Saxe, may be seemingly communicative, to encourage such conduct in others, while, in reality, he maintains the strictest reserve on all that concerns his own Army.

The object both in secrecy and in demonstrations, or feints, is to mislead the enemy as to our real designs, in order to deliver a blow which he is unprepared to receive.

Anything foreseen may be provided against.

The military art furnishes some means of opposing almost every attack which can be foreseen, even when the assailant is superior in numbers, and has other advantages on his side; but time for preparation is indispensable. When this time is not given, the party attacked cannot avail himself of his military skill, while the assailant comes forward with all the advantage of a preconceived plan on his side.

In addition to the secrecy which is so necessary when it is intended to surprise an enemy, such enterprises should also be executed with the utmost rapidity, for the premises on which they are based are liable to perpetual

Rapidity of execution in surprises.

and sudden change: and any delay may be followed by an alteration in the position and projects of the enemy.[3]

When a stratagem is designed, it is a rule not to awaken the suspicions of the enemy by any demonstration or enterprise the execution of which is evidently impossible.

Punctuality as to time.

Whatever hour or time may be fixed upon for a surprise, it is of the utmost importance that precision should be strictly observed. Many a well-conceived enterprise has miscarried because some detachment has failed to be at the post assigned at the exact moment, or because the requisite supplies of ammunition have not arrived at the moment they were required.

Knowledge of locality.

Instructions.

The assailants should possess a thorough knowledge of the locality in which they are about to engage; the direction given to the columns should be in accordance with the rules of tactics; and the instructions given should be such as to admit of no misconception. The surprise intended by the Russians at Inkerman partly failed, owing to the commander of one of the columns, General Somoinoff, being slain at an early hour in the morning, and the column taking a wrong direction after his death.

In war, the neglect or oversight of one thing may prove fatal.

It is a good maxim that, in war, it is vain to think of many things, if one does not think of all: the forgotten point is just the one by which the enemy surprises you.

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[3] "That we would do,
We should do when we would; for this world changes
And hath abatements and delays as many
As there are tongues, are hands, are accidents;
And then this *should* is like a spendthrift sigh,
That hurts by easing."—SHAKSPEARE.

It was a gross fault in the Prussians to neglect the defile of Kosen, and to relinquish the Landgrafenberg to Napoleon before the battle of Jena.—THIERS.

After the defeat of Wurmsee, at Bassano, Napoleon framed the most perfect plan to surround the Austrian Marshal, and to compel him to an unconditional surrender in the field; and he never forgave one of his officers, Sahuguet, to whose negligence the miscarriage of his projects may chiefly be ascribed. To Massena was assigned the duty of blockading the road from Porto Legnano to Mantua, by taking post at Sanguinetto; while General Sahuguet, amongst other orders, was directed to destroy all the bridges on the Molinella and Tione.

From Ronco, the place from which Massena set out to Sanguinetto, there are two roads; and the direct one should have been taken, to enable Massena to be in time to cut off Wurmsee at Cerea; but, for some reason, the guide selected the other road, and the whole of Massena's division did not, in consequence, reach Cerea in time to hold the bridge against the Imperialists. Still, if Napoleon's orders to Sahuguet, with regard to the destruction of the bridges, had been carried out, the French would, in all probability, have overtaken the Imperialists before they reached Mantua; but Sahuguet had neglected to destroy the bridge at Villa Impenta, and the Imperialist General, by sending a corps opposite to Castellaro, to deceive Sahuguet, was enabled to file the whole of his division unmolested over the bridge at Villa Impenta, and thus reached Mantua.

Campaign of Marengo illustrates the higher orders of stratagems.

The campaign of Marengo is an instance of the development of the higher order of combinations in war; for although the battle was decided by the attack of the

brave Dessaix, at the head of a few battalions, aided by the charge of 600 dragoons, under Kellerman, in an opportune moment, after all seemed to have been lost, the battle itself was not the result of accident; it was an event prepared long beforehand by the skilful plan of the campaign. Six months previous to June, 1800, everything was in train; the movements of the smallest detachments, the preparations of the arsenals, the organization of corps, the most profound calculations, and the most minute details, each in turn received attention from the indefatigable mind of Napoleon.

In addition to the cares of providing for an expedition of this magnitude, increased as they were by the difficulties which the proposed passage of the Great St. Bernard presented in prospect, extraordinary measures were necessary to ensure secrecy as to the real object of such great activity in the Military Department. The expedient which Buonaparte adopted for this purpose was to give publicity to his project in the most exaggerated terms.

Plans kept secret by being made public.

His messages to the Senate and the Legislative body, as well as the public journals, resounded with the preparations of the Army of Reserve, and the intention of the First Consul to take command in person. In the meantime, there was no appearance of any assemblage of a force at Dijon. A Staff appeared there without troops, except a few conscripts. The artillery, the provisions, the veteran troops, were all directed to the adjoining departments, and isolated in such a manner as not to excite attention. The divisions were thus formed on the different great roads by previously-concerted movements, without a man appearing at Dijon.

Articles written on purpose were circulated in derision of the Army which was supposed to have no existence. The spies of foreign countries were completely duped by these manœuvres; and a belief was created that Buonaparte only announced this Army with so much ostentation in order to arrest the march of Melas.

Even after Buonaparte had set out to join the Army the same deception was kept up. He took steps to establish himself at Genoa, giving out that it had been selected as a central point from which to direct the movements of Thurreau and Suchet, and arranged for hiring a house in the vicinity. From thence he proceeded to Lausanne, ostensibly to review a division intended as a reserve to the corps of Valais, but in reality to superintend the formation of the advanced guard under Lannes.

Napoleon conceals his expedition to Egypt.

Another example of concealing the destination of an expedition is furnished by Napoleon's measures previous to his invasion of Egypt.

A misunderstanding with the Beys had attracted the attention of the Directory to the state of Egypt in 1795, and the French Consul at Magallon at that time pointed out to his Government the defenceless condition of the country. This report was afterwards confirmed by a French officer of engineers, employed on a special mission to Egypt, for the purpose of obtaining information as to the internal state of the country.

The conquest of Egypt was an enterprise well suited to the ardent imagination of Buonaparte, and he urged the fitting out of an expedition for that purpose on hearing of these reports; but the moment was not then favourable for such an undertaking.

After the peace of Campo Formio the Directory set no bounds to their ambition, and the subject of the conquest of Egypt being again brought forward, an expedition was determined upon, and Buonaparte selected for the command.

The project for an invasion of England aids in keeping secret the expedition to Egypt.

An impenetrable veil shrouded the first preparations. The formation of an army for the invasion of England deceived the Cabinet of St. James's. Buonaparte, by virtue of his office of General-in-chief of the Army of Invasion, demanded of the Dutch Government the co-operation of fifteen men-of-war; a similar demand was also made upon Spain. The activity in all the ports and arsenals announced that the forced loan had been successful. The insurrection which burst out in Ireland aided to mislead the English Ministers; and ships were recalled to be ready to resist any attempt at landing in Ireland, and no more vessels were left before Brest and Cadiz than such as were absolutely necessary to keep up the blockade. The Mediterranean, almost denuded of cruisers by Admiralty arrangements, made the route of the Toulon fleet comparatively easy.

The French expeditionary force consisted of the choicest troops of the Army of Italy, reinforced by some of the best regiments of the Army of the Rhine, amounting in all to 36,000 men. The fleet was manned by 10,000 men, a more formidable armament than any that had appeared in the Mediterranean since the Crusades. Soldiers and sailors emulated each other in their ardour; and although still ignorant of their destination, their excited imaginations were filled with the brightest visions of glory and conquest. The real object of the expedi-

tion was not known until the fleet actually sailed from Toulon.

Wellington's talent for keeping his enemy in the dark.

The Duke of Wellington's talent for keeping his enemy in the dark was frequently displayed in the course of the Peninsular campaign. Napier thus adverts to the secrecy with regard to the Torres Vedras lines:—

"Massena, ill-acquainted with the military features of Portugal, was absolutely ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras (September, 1810). So circumspectly had these works been carried on, that only vague rumours of their existence reached the bulk of the English Army; neither the Portuguese Government nor the British Army, although aware that great defensive works were constructing, knew their nature; they imagined the entrenchments round Lisbon were the lines. Many British officers laughed at the idea of remaining in Portugal; the major part supposed the campaign on the frontier to be only a decent cloak to cover the shame of embarkation. In England, the Opposition asserted that they would embark; the Portuguese dreaded it; the French Army universally believed it; and the English Ministers entertained the same opinion: for at this time an officer of engineers arrived at Lisbon, whose instructions, received personally from Lord Liverpool, were unknown to Wellington, and commenced thus:—'As it is probable the Army will embark in September.'"

In 1707, Eugene, the Duke of Savoy, on projecting the siege of Toulon, assembled three Armies, in order to conceal his design, and oblige the French to divide their forces. One of these corps he encamped in the environs of Pignerol, the other near Ivree, and the third under Coni. Thus, it was evident France was to be invaded,

but whether by Provence, Languedoc, or Dauphiny did not appear. The French were, therefore, obliged to guard these three lines of march.

Plentiful supplies should be laid in before engaging in war.

When war has broken out, everything required to carry it on generally rises in price, and freight and transport are generally higher from the increased risk. It is, therefore, good policy to have the command of well-filled magazines and stores before engaging in war, and also to abstract as largely as possible from the country with which we are about to be brought into collision, those productions which are useful in war.

Louis XIV., preparing for war with Germany, filled his magazines in Lorraine and Alsatia with corn from Swabia and Franconia.

Sowing discord amongst our enemies.

That "war is the fruit gathered from discords sown" is an old proverb; but when we are once engaged in war, we do not run the risk of being the worse off by sowing some discords amongst our opponents and their friends. Such a measure resembles those remedies for the natural body, which are injurious if taken in health, but which prove salutary in sickness. The advantage to be anticipated from such a course is, that we shall weaken the power of our adversary, by detaching from him those who are likely to throw their weight into the scale on his side against us.

In Isaiah, chap. xix. v. 2, "And I will set the Egyptians against the Egyptians, and they shall fight every one against his brother, and every one against his neighbour; city against city, and kingdom against kingdom."

When the French assisted the party of the Duke d'Alençon against the Spanish Government in Holland, the Spaniards fomented a revolt in France, which

obliged the French to withdraw their assistance from the Dutch.

Hannibal profited by the dissension between Fabius Maximus and Marcus Minutius.

In the time of Nero, the Roman officers advised Vespasian their General to take advantage of the unnatural discord which prevailed amongst the Jews, and to lay siege to Jerusalem. Vespasian said, "Let the civil war be well lighted first, and let them destroy each other." This they did. The respective parties fortified themselves in different quarters of the town, made sorties upon each other, and destroyed the fortifications and magazine. Vespasian then formed the siege.

Great effect produced by rumours, whether true or false.

"Rumour," says Bacon, "is of that force, as there is scarcely any great action wherein it hath not a great part, especially in war. Mucianus undid Vitellius by a rumour that he scattered, that Vitellius had a purpose to remove the legions of Syria into Germany, and the legions of Germany into Syria, whereupon the legions of Syria were infinitely inflamed. Julius Cæsar took Pompey unprovided, and laid asleep his industry and preparations by a rumour that he cunningly gave out, how Cæsar's own soldiers loved him not; and, being wearied with the wars, and laden with the spoils of Gaul, would forsake him as soon as he came into Italy. Themistocles made Xerxes post apace out of Greece, by giving out that the Grecians had a purpose to break his bridge of ships, which he had made athwart the Hellespont. There be a thousand such examples. Therefore, let all wise governors have as great a watch and care over rumours as they have of the actions and designs themselves."

CHAP. VII.

The importance which Napoleon attached to false reports.

Napoleon, in writing to his brother Joseph, at a time the British Army was in a critical position, on the 23rd Dec., 1808, after describing his own movements, and what he supposed to be the direction taken by the English, ends with the following instructions:—"Cause to be inserted in the Madrid papers, that the English are surrounded and ruined. Let the letter herewith forwarded be also inserted, which will show the Spaniards how they have been treated by their dear allies, with the observations on those who have brought the English into Spain, which is thus devastated by both its allies and its enemies."

And, again, writing to Joseph on the 27th of the same month, he says, "If the English have not already retreated, they are lost; and, if they retire, they will be pursued to the point of embarkation, in such a way that one-half of them will certainly never embark. Cause an article to be inserted in the papers and circulated everywhere, that 36,000 English are surrounded; that I am at Benevente in their rear, and Marshal Soult in front of them; and, if the enemy should make any serious movement on Aranjuez, let this success be celebrated with ceremony: fire a salute, and receive compliments. This news will very soon reach you. Send a thousand copies of the proclamation which I have issued, and a thousand of the public journals which have appeared at Madrid since your entry there."

Further instance of the same.

A trifling encounter magnified into a great battle.

In the same war, the dispersion of a corps of 12,000 Spaniards, badly clothed and equipped, under the Marquis de Belvidere, near Burgos, by the advanced corps of the French Army, was represented by Napoleon as a great and important battle, decisive of the fate of

Spain. In order to give it *éclat*, he sent the standards which had been taken, as well as some others, to the Legislative Assembly. That body sent three of its members to present their thanks and congratulations, and a deputation waited on the Empress, offering their homage and testifying their admiration of her Imperial spouse. This exaggeration was designed by Napoleon to keep in check the hostile feeling which he well knew existed against him at that time in Austria. Thus it has happened that this trifling affair has been magnified into a battle by some historians, and acquired a celebrity to which it is not entitled.

Sowing dissensions by creating jealousy.

One method of sowing dissensions amongst allies which has been frequently used, is that of treating, or appearing to treat, with each separately. Guicciardini, in his history of the wars in Italy in 1502, after adverting to the activity of the Duke of Valentinois in recruiting his army, adds, further on:—"Nor was Valentinois less busy in attempting, by various tricks of flattery and fair promises, to mollify or lull into security, sometimes one, sometimes another among the Confederates, as well with a view to render them more negligent in their preparations as in hopes by these separate negotiations to create jealousies and disunion among them."

The Emperor Frederick, informed that the Austrians, Bohemians, and Hungarians had confederated against him: "I will," said he, "throw an apple among them, such as was thrown between the three goddesses in the fable, and set them by the ears."

The same artful method was successfully employed by the famous Castruccio, Lord of Lucca, to oppress the Marquises of Malaspina, who were united against him.

The Spaniards set the Dutch and French at variance.

After Prince Thomas of Savoy had been beaten, the Spaniards, not having a sufficient force in the field to contend against both the Dutch and the French, succeeded so well in creating a misunderstanding between the two, that the Dutch, disgusted with the way in which they thought the French had treated them, withheld from their army those supplies which were necessary to enable them to keep the field, and the French were, in consequence, obliged to raise the siege of Louvain.

Hannibal.

Hannibal spared the lands of Fabius in order to make his countrymen distrust him. Upon the same principle, the Roman ambassadors, sent to King Antiochus while he had Hannibal with him, well knowing the value of the Carthaginian general, sought frequent interviews with him, in order to excite suspicions in the mind of the King as to his fidelity.

M. d'Aubigny, governor of Gaeta in 1513, was ordered by Louis XII., in case he should be obliged to surrender the place to the League of Venice, to give it up rather to King Ferdinand than the Emperor, in order to make the Germans suspect the Spaniards.

The Duke de Guise sent a horse as a present to the Duke d'Andrea, and also one to Don Fabricius Speneli, to make them suspected by Don John of Austria. They returned the horses, saying they knew there was as much malice as generosity in his gifts.

Alexander sent a rich present of silver to Phocion, the Athenian captain, who asked why it was sent; and on being told that it was because Alexander thought him superior to all the Athenians, he returned the present, saying, "If Alexander thinks so well of me, do not

let him do anything to make others think differently of me."

Such was the effect of the arts used to prejudice the Spaniards against their deliverers, the English, in 1813, that the inhabitants of St. Sebastian actually fired on the Allies at the storming of the town. The Duke of Wellington, in allusion to some complaints made at that time against some of his officers, drily observes, "It is not astonishing that the inhabitants *from whom* the town was taken for the nation, should complain of those who took it from them."

Intrigues to traduce the character of Wellington.

The letters from the Duke to Sir H. Wellesley give a vivid picture of the intrigues in operation to make his character odious in the eyes of the Spaniards.

In the year 1813, a movement of cavalry into Andalusia, ordered by the Duke of Wellington, was represented by the party hostile to him in Spain as a movement made from a spirit of intrigue, and designed to favour the Government which had just been deprived of office; whereas the movement was simply made to give the cavalry the advantage of green forage a little earlier. The Duke points out the utter absurdity of the charge, from the circumstance that this very movement of cavalry was one on which he had had a dispute with the Government just gone out of office.

The Spaniards publicly called upon to take vengeance on the Anglo-Portuguese Army.

After the fall of St. Sebastian, a most inflammatory article appeared in the *Duenda*, calling upon the people of Spain to take vengeance on the officers of the Anglo-Portuguese army for the supposed sack of that place.

The proprietor of the newspaper being a servant of Government, the Duke remonstrated against this libellous article; and in writing to Sir H. Wellesley, he says, "If

a paragraph such as the one complained of had been published by an officer of the Government before we entered Spain in 1812, and the author had not been punished, or formally disavowed by the Government, I should never have entered Spain, the siege of Cadiz would never have been raised, nor would any of the other events have occurred which have delivered Spain from the enemy." In conclusion, he thus expresses himself:—

Course adopted by Wellington under the calumnies heaped upon him.

"As we are now stationed, I wait till I know the conduct and decision of the Spanish Government upon my despatches to you of the 9th and 23rd, before I take any further steps, being determined that, if they do not conduct themselves as I think they ought, and completely vindicate us, I shall make known my opinion to the King's Government that they ought not to risk their Army here under the circumstances of an officer of the Government having published such an atrocious libel, and then having called upon the people of Spain to take revenge of the acts falsely charged upon our officers; and the law giving no redress; and the Government keeping their officer in his office, and taking no notice, or inadequate notice, of his conduct."

The civil war now raging in America, like preceding wars, has, no doubt, in its course developed many political intrigues to sow dissensions and create alliances, wherever and whenever there seemed a prospect of advantage from such measures. While the war lasts, it is not to be expected that much will be known as to the contingent influences which have been thus set in motion to attract and divert supporters to and from the rival standards; the knowledge of some of the schemes which have been set on foot for these purposes will not survive

the present generation; that of others will in the course of time be brought to light, when some future Polybius or Napier takes in hand to write the history of the war. In the meantime, however, one contribution to this branch of the art of war, possessing some interest, has been furnished by some intercepted despatches from the Confederate Government, dated October, 1862.

The subject to which these despatches relate is the expulsion of the French Consuls from Galveston and Richmond, a measure adopted on the suspicion that these officials had been concerned in an intrigue to induce the State of Texas to withdraw from the Confederacy.

In one of these despatches, addressed by the Secretary of State at Richmond to the representative of the Confederate States at Paris, the Secretary expresses his belief that the French Government, being desirous of obtaining an independent source of cotton supply as an offset to that of Great Britain from India, had, in order to effect that purpose, secretly set on foot this intrigue in Texas; intending, if the State seceded, to acknowledge it as an independent republic, and then to take it under the protection of France, and thus gain a preponderating influence in its affairs.

Mr. Benjamin authorizes Mr. Slidell to use this discovery as a means of exciting the jealousy of Great Britain, with the ulterior view of thus hastening the recognition of Southern independence.

The establishment of the South as a Power to keep the United States in check, on the one side, and France on the other, must, he thinks, be advantageous to England; and it is only requisite, he thinks, that England should know that there has been a *secret*

attempt on the part of France to obtain separate advantages of such magnitude, and a change in the views of the British Cabinet would be induced.

Bribery used to break up alliances.

Amongst the various means used to break up alliances during the continuance of war or previous to its commencement, bribery, we can easily imagine, has been tried in the shape of subsidies, promises of territory, and in a variety of ways.

One very early example we find recorded in 1 Kings, chap. xv., verses 16–19:—"And there was war between Asa and Baasha king of Israel all their days.—And Baasha king of Israel went up against Judah, and built Ramah, that he might not suffer any to go out or come in to Asa king of Judah.—Then Asa took all the silver and the gold that were left in the treasures of the house of the Lord, and the treasures of the king's house, and delivered them into the hand of his servants: and king Asa sent them to Ben-hadad, the son of Tabrimon, the son of Hezion, king of Syria, that dwelt at Damascus, saying,—There is a league between me and thee, and between my father and thy father: behold, I have sent unto thee a present of silver and gold; come and *break* thy league with Baasha king of Israel, that he may depart from me."

Seek to contract alliances while making efforts to destroy those of the enemy.

While we seek to strip the enemy of the assistance of allies, we must not neglect the creation of alliances which may be for our own advantage; and however small the State, its assistance should not be despised. The Elector Maurice of Saxony, declaring against Charles V., in the zenith of his career, transported the war into the Tyrol, and arrested the progress of that powerful monarch in 1552.

In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, changed the face of affairs in Italy by taking part against Louis XIV., and compelled the French Army to leave the banks of the Adige, and seek refuge within the walls of Turin, where they experienced that great catastrophe which immortalized Prince Eugene.

Pyrrhus, beaten by the Romans, sent to demand succour from Antigonus, which was refused; he caused, however, a report to be spread that Antigonus was on the march to assist him, and that had the effect of causing the Tarentines and Sicilians to remain, instead of abandoning him, which they were on the point of doing.

William the Conqueror, in conferring grants of land on his followers, secured their allegiance, while he made it more difficult for those who had been dispossessed to form a strong party against him.

In like manner, Henry VIII., in confiscating the Church property, gained over those on whom he conferred the estates of the clergy, while he weakened the power of the Church of Rome by impoverishing it.

Conduct to neutrals.

With regard to neutrals, the most just and honest course undoubtedly is to hold sacred their neutrality, so long as they commit no act which is inconsistent with the position they have assumed. Should circumstances justify a different course, the most favourable moment to give a neutral the alternative of declaring himself either for or against us, is when the enemy is not in a position to give him prompt assistance.

The Emperor Ferdinand II. deferred his declaration of war against the Elector of Saxony, until it was too late for Gustavus Adolphus to aid in preventing the

Imperial troops from overrunning Saxony, and seizing its fortresses.

It may be politic not to notice the treachery of a neutral

Sometimes there are commercial or other advantages to be gained by preserving peaceable relations with a treacherous neutral, which more than compensate for any injury sustained by the assistance he is secretly affording to the enemy: in such cases, it may be for our interest not to notice, or appear to perceive, his breach of the laws of neutrality.

Cortez, on discovering a secret conspiracy among the Indians of Cholula to cut off himself and all his retinue, affected not to believe the participation of Montezuma in the plot, although the conspirators declared they had acted at the instigation of the King. And, further to convince Montezuma that he was not suspected, Cortez caused the ringleaders to be executed as false accusers.

In dealing with neutrals, great caution should be used not to provoke the hostility of any State which is likely to join the league against us.

It is natural to expect that a people will contribute to support a defensive war, which is undertaken to protect their own homes and all that they hold dear upon earth, more readily than they will submit to be taxed for an offensive war: in the one case the necessity for the war is apparent, and each individual feels himself personally interested; in the other, the end or object of the war must be placed before them in such a light as to rouse their patriotism, and make them feel interested in the issue of the contest, either directly or indirectly.

Financial resources to be secured.

This may seem to be a question more within the province of the statesman than the general, but the assurance

of adequate financial resources is not a point to be overlooked by a General.

Sir William Napier, in his observations on the operations in Spain in August and September, 1813, says:—"Clausel's beautiful movements merit every praise, but it may be questioned if the English General's marches were in the true direction, or made in good time." The historian then proceeds to explain how Clausel might have been enclosed by Clinton and the Spaniards in his rear, and by Wellington, reinforced by divisions brought by the Somosierra route from Madrid, on his front and flank, and thus compelled to fight under every disadvantage; and he concludes with these observations:—"In fine, the object was to crush Clausel, and this should have been effected, though Madrid had been entirely abandoned to secure success. It is, however, probable that *want of money* and means of transport decided the line of operations, for the route by the Somosierra was savage and barren, and the feeding of the troops even by Valladolid was from hand to mouth, or painfully supported by convoys from Portugal."

People incited to war for the recovery of territory.

Ahab, the King of Israel, to make the war with Syria popular among his people, reminded them that Ramoth in Gilead had once been theirs:—"Know ye that Ramoth in Gilead is ours, and we be still, and take it not out of the hand of the King of Syria?"

When Louis XII. and Ferdinand the Catholic allied themselves for the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, they gave out that it was to facilitate a projected invasion of Turkey, and that there was just cause of war, because Frederick of Arragon, then King of Naples, meditated an alliance with the Porte.

Frederick, at the commencement of the Seven Years' War (1758), published documents, stated to have been found in the Electoral Archives at Dresden, to prove that the Courts of Vienna, Dresden, and St. Petersburg, had secretly concerted a plan for the partition of Prussia.

Persuasion to war, on the ground of protecting the kingdom from invasion.

The discovery of any such documents is now questioned, and Frederick's own confidential Minister has admitted that the plan for an invasion of Prussia was only eventual, and presupposed aggression on the part of the King.

Carrying the war into the enemy's country to keep it out of our own.

Servius Sulpicius Galba overcame the scruples of the Romans against carrying the war into Macedonia, on the ground that it was the only way of keeping the war out of Italy.

The prospect of plunder a fertile source of war.

The prospect of booty or plunder has been a fertile source of wars. How often is the Promised Land in Scripture described as a land "flowing with milk and honey!"

National insults.

We may also find many wars founded on national insults, both real and imaginary. The Levite whose concubine had been abused, divided her corpse into pieces, and sent a portion to each tribe, and thus excited the eleven tribes to that sanguinary contest with the tribe of Benjamin.

Imaginary insult.

Tullius, the Volscian, desirous of declaring war against the Romans, but fearful that he would not be supported by his people, adopted the expedient of persuading the Consuls at Rome, on the occasion of the public games, that, to prevent any disturbance, it would be advisable not to allow any Volscians to be present. The Consuls were thus induced to give an order that all Volscians

should leave the place of exhibition. This was deemed such a mortal affront, that Tullius readily obtained the consent of his people to a declaration of war.

Cæsar said he always acted towards his enemy, if possible, as a surgeon to his patient. He conquered rather by hunger than the sword. If a country has no natural defences to stop an enemy, and that his course cannot be arrested, the next thing is to destroy everything. The inhabitants of the open places must be ordered on a certain day to repair to fixed points with their families, their grain and provisions, their oxen, horses, waggons and carriages, straw, hay, arms and munitions; all that cannot be used must be destroyed —bridges, mills, dykes; the wells to be filled with dead dogs and horses, but by no means *poison*, that being contrary to the laws of nations.—*Vide* GROT.

If these orders are faithfully executed, it will be impossible for an enemy to subsist long in the country. The execution of such orders must be entrusted to confidential officers—men above bribery, and who will not be moved by the tears of the inhabitants. Assurances should, as far as possible, be given to the inhabitants that they will be reimbursed for their losses, and subsisted until they are restored to their homes.

If the enemy must pass through the territory of a neutral to reach you, it is necessary to take strong measures if the neutral offers him a free passage. His country may be devastated on the same principle that you may cut away anything which is not your own, but which connects your house with one which is on fire.

Desolating a country to deprive the enemy of supplies.

The desolating a country at the commencement or at any period of a war, whether it be your own country, your

allies', or the enemy's, is one of those fearful measures frequently propounded as the only alternative on which to found a hope of prolonged resistance, or ultimate success.[10]

In *Eugene's Memoirs* (by the Prince de Ligne), the following narrative of operations is supposed to be given by the Prince:—

"At the end of April, 1734, I set off for Heilbron, and took up my excellent camp at Brucshal; but, as the enemy was much stronger, I had nothing to do but to cover all the places and the country on this side the Rhine.

"In order to render the possession of Philipsburg useless to him, I turned the course of three rivers, which,

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[10] The operations on the Mississippi in the present war in America have been thus publicly commented upon:—

"Admiral Farragut's position, between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, is such as to cause anxiety among his friends, for his liberty, though perhaps not for his life. The people of New Orleans speak of him as being in a 'souricière,' or mouse-trap; and the people of New York will not be surprised, although they may be grieved, to learn that so gallant a mouse has been captured. The whole conduct of the war for the reduction of Vicksburg and Port Hudson is more suggestive of foolhardiness than of courage, and the utter failure of all the magnificently absurd schemes for turning the course of the Mississippi, and approaching Vicksburg by the rear, through the swamps and jungles of the Yazoo, would be ridiculous, had it not been attended with such enormous and wanton destruction of property. To inundate regions as extensive as many an European kingdom; to submerge villages, towns, and cities; to render once fertile fields incapable of cultivation for years; to run the risk of drowning an inoffensive population, removed by scores of miles from the immediate scene of hostilities; —are extreme measures which injure a country for a length of time, and can only be recognized as justifiable when adopted by the people of a country for their own defence against an invader. It was a sublime act in the Dutch, in 1671, to lay the best part of Holland under water to repel the powerful Army of France, when no other means could have succeeded. It would have been base and cowardly on the part of the foreign foe to have resorted to such means to conquer or coerce the Dutch. Even now, ere the history of the events on both banks of the Mississippi is fully known, the blush of shame mantles to the cheek of many a true-hearted American, when he reflects that such deeds have been done in the name of liberty, and for the sake of compulsory brotherhood; and, what is worse, that all has been done in vain, and that the Vandalism has not even had the poor reward of success."

instead of discharging themselves into the Rhine, produced me a superb inundation from that fortress to Ettlingen, the lines of which thus covered were unassailable."

At the siege of Pavia, after struggling long against the resistance offered by the veteran Governor, who repaired the breaches almost as fast as they were made, and harassed the besiegers with frequent and furious sallies, Francis, recollecting, it is said, the scheme of Cyrus at the siege of Babylon, determined on turning the course of the Ticino. Even the officers assisted in the labour, which was immense, pile-driving being necessary in order to bank up the proper course of the river, while the trench was excavated, which was to carry the waters of the river in the new direction.

After undergoing great fatigue and suffering, much also from the severity of the weather, just at the moment when they were in expectation of reaping the fruit of their labours, the embankment suddenly gave way, ruining instantly the whole of the work which had cost so much time and labour.

The adoption of measures by Wellington in Portugal, for desolating the country, is thus described by Napier, in connection with the Duke's occupation of the Lines of Torres Vedras:—

"He (the Duke) insisted that his authority, as Marshal-General of Portugal, should be independent of the local government, and absolute over all the arrangements concerning the forces, whether regulars, militia, or ordnances; for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by extraordinary means.

Wellington's measures in Portugal.

"Armed with the power and the influence derived from the money supplied by England, he first forced the

dangerous position of the army in case the Spaniards made a sortie from their lines.[11] The Viscount said he would be more cautious if he had Condé near him instead of the Spanish Generals, but that, from his knowledge of the excessive caution of the latter, he knew that Don Ferdinand de Solis would not dare to undertake anything of himself; that he would send to Count de Fuensaldagna, the Spanish Generalissimo, for orders; and that the Count would go himself to speak to the Archduke; and that the Archduke would not fail to ask Condé to come and discuss the matter in council; and that before all these consultations amongst so many people were finished, he would have abundance of time to make his reconnaissance and retire. All turned out as he predicted, and the Spaniards did not make up their minds to an attack until it was too late.

Turenne's picture of an alarm in the Spanish camp.

Before the battle of the Downs, the Duke of York and Condé, who had observed the movements of the Royal army, intimated to Don John that they were about to be attacked by the whole weight of Turenne's army. The Don would not credit it, saying it was only an attempt on the outposts. Condé, turning to the Duke of Gloucester, who was present, asked if he had ever been present at a battle. The Duke replied, "No." "Then, in half an hour," said Condé, "you will see how one is lost."

[11] "Captains, my friends and companions, you must rather hazard yourselves to be taken, and discover the truth, than rely upon the report of inferior fellows; for the fire makes so strange an impression on them, that they take bushes for squadrons, and will swear it. You may trust to them if you will. 'Tis just the same as when they see a hundred heads, they think them to be a thousand. Send always some bold soldier, some fellow that has not his heart in his breeches, and let him venture his carcase to bring you a true account; but, if you will do better, go yourselves. I have always done so, and found an advantage in it."—MONTLUC.

Duke of Wellington's opinion of Clausel and Massena.

The Duke of Wellington entertained a very high opinion of Clausel as a General, and a good idea may be formed of the high estimation with which the Duke and Massena mutually regarded each other from Rogers' anecdotes, of his having been told by the Duke that when Massena was opposed to him he never slept well! —and that when the Duke and Massena met at a dinner-party in Paris, Massena said to his great adversary, "Vous m'avez rendu les cheveux gris."

Another anecdote related by Rogers shows how one General may divine the secrets of another; it exemplifies, at the same time, in a curious way, the value of a spy-glass on service.

Use of a spy-glass.

The Duke was making a reconnaissance near Pampeluna, when a noted spy told him he would show him Soult. The Duke saw Soult so plainly on that occasion through the glass, that he afterwards recognized him when they met at Paris. Soult was writing on his hat, and, when he had finished, he gave what he had written to an aide-de-camp, and sent him off in a particular direction, indicating the direction by pointing. The Duke guessed where the attack was to be made, from thus seeing the point to which the A. D. C. was despatched, and his surmise proved correct.

Estimation of Germanicus by the Germans.

Augustus Germanicus, when about to set out for the suppression of an insurrection in the German provinces, concealed his intention of leading the expedition in person, knowing that the dread entertained of his personal character would prompt the barbarians to greater preparations if they expected to have to contend against the legions under his command.

Montecuculi's opinion of Turenne.

The opinion which Montecuculi entertained of Tu-

renne may be judged of by the following anecdote:—A deserter brought the news of Turenne's death to Montecuculi. That General told him if the news was true he should be rewarded, but if not, he should be hanged. The man persisted in the truth of his statement, and Montecuculi gave orders to attack the French.

A General's instructions should, if possible, be discovered.

Endeavour to discover the instructions which a General may have received from his superiors. You may then take measures accordingly to frustrate, and, if necessary, deceive him, by feigning ignorance of his plans.

Germanicus was so well informed by his spies of all that took place in the enemy's councils, that he was always ready to make their plans recoil on their own heads.

In order, however, to be prepared for the contingencies which are for ever springing up in war, a General, after forming a plan on the best information he has been able to obtain, should carefully form a second in reserve, in case that the assumption on which the first is based should be found a failure at the last moment.

The enemy should be encouraged to employ an ignorant General.

If the commander to whom you are opposed, through timidity, ignorance, or incapacity, is in the habit of committing blunders, do all in your power to uphold his credit in the eyes of his superiors, and on no account breathe a word respecting his incapacity. Let him get some small advantage, to give him confidence and gain for him a reputation. Complain that he is so subtle, it is impossible to penetrate into his designs. In fact, do all you can to keep him in his place, until he affords you an opportunity of striking a blow which may serve as a recompense for so much duplicity, and which you would,

perhaps, never have had the opportunity of delivering, had he been removed from the command.

Cæsar, besieged in Alexandria by the Egyptians under Aquilas and Ganimede, set King Ptolemy at liberty, because he knew him to be weak and inexperienced; and he therefore concluded that, when the King resumed command of the Army on being released, he should have less to apprehend than he had from Aquilas and Ganimede. This scheme succeeded; Ptolemy took command, and Cæsar made him raise the siege, and obliged him to give battle in the open field, where he was slain.

A General who appears unskilful may be only feigning incapacity.

The apparent unskilfulness of the enemy's General must not be presumed upon too much. There may be dissimulation in his conduct; or he may, through accident or by good advice, act very differently to what you would expect occasionally, and you may suffer seriously if you have not provided against such a contingency. It was a maxim with Belisarius, that he who despised his enemy, and had too much confidence in himself in war, was very liable to be beaten. Isocrates said, it was imprudent to trust more to the faults of the enemy than to the wisdom of our own actions.

Profit by the absence of a skilful General.

If the opposing General should have no faults, never let an opportunity slip of striking a blow when he may happen to be absent.

Hannibal tried to come to an engagement with the Romans while he knew that their best General, P. C. Scipio, could not be present, in consequence of the wound received at the Ticino; as he thought he had greater chances against the other Consul, Tiberius Sempronius, in which he judged right, as he succeeded in defeating him in the battle of the Trebbia.

Whether a good commander or good troops most important.

The ancients disputed whether a troop of lambs led by a lion, or a troop of lions led by a lamb, would gain the day.[12] If we cannot settle this argument, we know, at all events, that the valour of the soldier does not suffice without the conduct of the chief; and the dread inspired by an able General on the enemy's side has led to many enterprises to get possession of the persons of distinguished commanders.

The Pasha Mezeth Seraskier of Amurath the Second, appointed a troop of janissaries specially to seek out John Huniade and kill him; this came to his ears, and he gave his horse and all the emblems of his rank to Simon Kemenie. The corps commanded by Simon was attacked with incredible fury, and he was killed, but this stratagem gave the victory to John Huniade.

Blucher was made prisoner at the time of the last siege of Dantzic, by a plot which the French General Serrurier laid to capture him. Serrurier having learnt that Blucher and his Staff were established in a farm-house at Neuhausen, ordered 300 horsemen to conceal themselves at a point he fixed upon, while he himself went as Commandant of French Artillery, with only eight troopers to Preuss Holland, a town at three

[12] The following reflections follow Napier's description of the confused state of the French Army after Wellington had crossed the Ebro, and turned their line of defence in the campaign of 1813:—

"But such an art is war! So fearful is the consequence of error, so terrible the responsibility of the General. Strongly and wisely did Napoleon speak, when he told Joseph that he must give himself up entirely to the business, labouring day and night, thinking of nothing else. Here was a noble army, driven like *sheep* before prowling wolves, yet, in every action, the inferior Generals had been prompt and skilful; the soldiers brave, ready, and daring, firm and obedient in the most trying circumstances of battle. The troops were excellent, the country strong, and favourable for defence; but that soul of armies, the mind of a great commander, was wanting."

leagues from Blucher's head-quarters, and, on his arrival, made a requisition for forage for 6,000 horse to be furnished in twenty-four hours. The magistrates sent instant notice to Blucher, which was precisely the object Serrurier desired. Blucher, on hearing of the requisition, immediately sent all his available men to seize those who had made it, and protect the magistrates in resisting the order. Serrurier, then leaving word that he was going to Brinheim, started with his small escort, but, turning off the road, joined the 300 horse he had previously placed in readiness, and with that force made an easy capture of Blucher, who had sent away all his escort to put a stop to the requisition.

Capture of General Prescott, 9th July, 1777.

In the War of Independence in America, a daring enterprise was planned by Colonel Barton, of the national troops, for the capture of General Prescott, commanding the British forces in Rhode Island. The occurrence is further remarkable, as showing the way in which negroes were made use of in those days.

Exact information as to the locality in which the General had his head-quarters having been obtained from a deserter, the party under Colonel Barton, consisting of forty chosen men, set out in boats in the middle of the night with their oars muffled, having to row a considerable distance, and to pass under several forts occupied by the British, as well as through a squadron of men-of-war. Having reached General Prescott's quarters and secured the sentinel at the door by surprise (in the words of the story as related in the American journals), "the *negro with his head*, at the second stroke, forced a passage into the house and then into the landlord's apartment;" the landlord on pain of death, having been com-

American battering ram.

pelled to point out the General's chamber; it was instantly opened by the *negro's head*, and the colonel, calling on the General by name, told him he was his prisoner.

The General, who was an old man, asked leave to dress himself, but was told to put on his breeches and slippers, and the rest of his clothes should be carried with him. In getting back to their boats, they had to pass through a field of barley, and the stalks very much annoying the General's naked legs as he was hurried through the field, he exclaimed, "Gentlemen, do you mean to kill me?" One of them replied, "No, we do not intend to kill you, but to exchange you for General Lee, and after that we do not care how soon the devil has you."

General Lee, one of the best of the National officers, had been taken prisoner a short time before.

Seizure of Kaffir chief, Sandilla, 1847-48.

In the Kaffir war, 1847-48, it was well known that there could be no security for the colony, while the chief Sandilla was at large; every effort was therefore made to effect his capture. He secreted himself in one of the deep valleys of the Amatolas, near a stream called, by the Kaffirs, Wolf River. The nature of the ground secured him from the approach of cavalry, but was just the place for the Rifle Brigade. Sir George Berkeley's plan of patrolling the country, and falling back on camps well stored with provisions, in the very neighbourhood of Sandilla, soon worried the rebel chief from his haunts. Abandoned by many of his people, his crops destroyed, his dwelling burnt, his cattle scattered among those he could not trust, and deprived of Macomo's support, he found himself constantly exposed to the fire of our troops, and, at one time, it is said, he dared not venture

to slake his thirst at the stream for four-and-twenty hours. Completely worn out and broken down by hunger, he was at length compelled to surrender with a retinue of eighty of his people.

Prince Eugene had a narrow escape at the siege of Belgrade, in 1717. Being engaged in a reconnaissance, accompanied by his staff, he was attacked by 1,200 Turkish horse, who had been concealed in ambush. One of the Turkish officers, knowing Eugene, fought his way close up to the Prince, and was in the act of shooting him with a pistol, when he himself fell pierced by several balls.

A General must not forget the characteristics of the troops opposed to him.

In forming plans for campaigns, the General must not confine his attention to the country which is to be the theatre of war, and the proportions of the different arms of the service which will be required to correspond to the nature of the country. The peculiar characteristics of the troops to be employed on both sides, and their method or system of making war, have also to be taken into consideration.

Some people show great warlike qualities out of their own country, but not at home; others exhibit valour to the highest degree in defence of their own country, but want courage and resolution when they leave their own shores.

It was the opinion of Hannibal that the Romans were much more formidable abroad than in their own territory; and he advised the King of Syria to invade Italy, instead of waiting to be attacked in his own dominions.

An Army should be weeded of all doubtful characters.

An Army in the field is better without men of doubtful courage or bad character, who cannot be depended upon. In the Scriptures (Deut. chap. xx.) we find the *fearful and fainthearted* exempted from service; an ex-

emption of such a disgraceful nature that one would have thought it would never have been claimed; but such is the effect of example that, in Gideon's expedition, 10,000 only remained out of 32,000, the other 22,000 having availed themselves of the terms of the proclamation, that whosoever was fearful and afraid might return. (Judges, chap. vii. verse 3.)

Cyrus followed this plan, and Cortez despatched all his malcontents to Cuba; Monk made himself master of the Army by banishing from its ranks every man disposed to act in virtue of a political idea, and by reducing it to a purely military spirit and interest. On the standard which he raised was inscribed the two principles:—"The Government cannot stand without the entire subjection of the military to the civil power; the Commonwealth must be administered by the Parliament."

But as many men would take this means of getting out of the service, it would not answer simply to discharge men as bad subjects. If they are really vicious, they should be punished as well as turned out of the Army. If they are not to be depended upon for courage, they should be placed where they can be made use of without incurring any risk. The Emperor Leon urges the necessity of proving the valour of soldiers before employing them on any expedition.

It is related of Magaclidas that, being closely invested on a wooded mountain, he selected the worst of his troops and made them fly across the forest. The enemy, as he expected, pursued the fugitives, and he was thus enabled to escape with his best troops.

Peculiarities of the French in warfare.

The victories of the French have been owing to their attacks; their defeats to attacks made on them: impe-

tuosity and inconstancy are the national characteristics. When the Grand Vizier, with 25,000 men, arrived at Belbeis, in 1801, General Belliard, who commanded the French, resolved to defeat him before he should be joined by the Anglo-Turkish Army under Hutchinson, and for this purpose detached 5,000 men, with a proper proportion of artillery. The English officers, Majors Holloway and Hope, attached to the Vizier's head-quarters, persuaded him to anticipate the attack of the French by making one. The result was that the French were attacked on their march in a wood, routed, and driven back to Cairo.

Peculiarities of the Austrians.

The apprehension of the Austrians about being outflanked or turned, is notorious. It has been described by one author as a national disorder or weakness. They fancy themselves outflanked or enveloped at the very moment when they might surround those who have the temerity to outrun them. This excessive apprehension disconcerts their plans, and drives them to retrograde movements at a time when, to beat the enemy, they have only to advance upon him.

Cæsar adapted his mode of fighting to the spirit and discipline of his troops.

Cæsar's practice was to alter his mode of fighting, and adapt it to the troops under his command.

Philip of Macedon, observing that the Illyrians had all their best troops in front, whilst their flanks were weak, placed his best troops on the right, and taking the enemy in flank, completely routed them. Metellus acted in a similar way at the battle he gained over Herculeius in Spain.

In Napier's description of the dispositions for the battle of Talavera there is the following passage:—

Dispositions at Talavera adapted to the special

"Sir Arthur, taking Talavera, which was built close to the river, as his fixed point, placed the right of the

CHAP. VII.

qualities of the troops engaged.

Spaniards there, drawing them up in two lines, their left resting upon a mound, where a large field redoubt was constructed, and behind which a brigade of British light cavalry was posted. The front was covered by a convent, by ditches, mud-walls, breastworks, and felled trees. The Spanish cavalry was posted behind their infantry, and their rear was supported by a very large house in the wood, well placed, in case of defeat, to cover a retreat to the main roads leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa. In this position they would not be attacked seriously, nor their disposition be even seen; thus one-half of the line of battle was rendered nearly impregnable, yet held by the worst troops."

The chief circumstances on which the victory at Flodden hinged, were the feint made by the English, and the headlong impetuosity of the Scottish nobles, which hurried them out of the order of battle, and exposed them to be taken in flank and rear by the enemy.

Arrangements by Marlborough and Eugene for Malplaquet suited to peculiarities of troops.

The position of the French at Malplaquet was exceedingly strong, and it has been supposed that the well-known national characteristics of the French, already referred to, had some influence in deciding Marlborough and Eugene to make the attack, in anticipation that while the courage of their own troops would naturally be raised in the excitement of the attack, that of the French would become depressed from being confined and partly reduced to inaction within the entrenchments.

Although the extent to which a commander can exercise his own discretion in choosing the line of country which is to be the theatre of his operations must in all cases be limited by a variety of circumstances, in so far as he can make choice, he should select a district where

he can obtain supplies more readily than the enemy can. The richest province that the enemy has on his frontier is the most desirable for the scene of operations, as you have then the greatest means of enriching yourselves, while the damage done to the enemy is proportionably great; and if it should be desirable to retain any conquests after the war, it must be an advantage to be in temporary possession of the most valuable. If you have a superiority in cavalry, endeavour to carry the war into those districts where water and forage are plentiful; on the other hand, avoid such, if the enemy is superior in cavalry, but at the same time be cautious of entangling yourselves in defiles. If you cannot depend on all the people under your command, or the allies you are connected with, try to make such dispositions with regard to the theatre of war that the troops on whose fidelity you can depend will interpose between the enemy and those of whom you are distrustful, so that in case of need you may be able to overpower and disarm the disloyal. Otherwise, if your Army consist of different nationalities, it is better to place those of the same nation in the same camp, instead of mixing up different languages, habits, and customs.

The most desirable localities in which to make war.

Placing of troops.

The season of the year, and the climate of the region where the war is to be carried on, frequently check the General in his operations; but it is wonderful how much may be effected with seasoned soldiers in the most inclement season.

Season of the year.

The Swedes, under Gustavus Adolphus, attacked and took Konigsburg and Greyfenagen in the depth of winter, when the Germans could not keep the field. Guicciardini attributes the defeat of the French at the Garigliano to

the Great Captain's Army being composed of Spanish troops inured to hard labour and inclement weather, which the French and Swiss were unable to support.

Troops are made by experience.

It is, however, only necessary prudence not to calculate too much upon any superiority you may have over the enemy, either in this respect or in point of discipline, as very indifferent troops by long practice in war become formidable. The Macedonians at one time were looked down upon by the other people of Greece. This circumstance also points out to us the wisdom of striking hard and sharp at the commencement of a war to bring it as speedily as possible to a termination, before the enemy's troops have time to become disciplined and inured to war.

Bad troops may become good.

Peter the Great was a good prophet when he said his cousin Charles, by beating him, would teach him to make war.

P. Cor. Scipio, before the defeat of the Romans on the Trebbia, dissuaded his colleague, Tiberius Sempronius, from giving battle to Hannibal, because he said their armies were composed of new levies not inured to war; that by disciplining them during the winter they would be in a better condition to give battle in the spring.

Numerical strength of Armies.

The numerical strength of the Armies to be brought into the field should, to a certain degree, be proportioned to the numbers you must be prepared to contend with. It is desirable to have, if possible, a slight numerical superiority over your opponent; but able strategy and tactics will more than compensate for an inferiority in numbers; and, in the resources of his genius, the skilful General in command of the smaller army will find the means of being superior at the decisive point when the critical moment arrives.

Strength of the armies of Cæsar and Alexander.

The Armies of Cæsar and Alexander were rarely above 35,000 to 50,000 men; and there are few countries where larger armies can be supplied so as to act with efficiency, or where they can move with facility or find suitable battle-fields.

Large armies of Napoleon.

Napoleon certainly brought greater numbers into the field; but such a master in the art of handling troops rarely appears.

In the war at present just going on in America, if we are to believe the despatches published, immense Armies on both sides have been engaged, and yet no decisive action has been fought.

Section III.

Proportion of different arms.

The proportion of the different arms of the service which should compose an Army must always be determined in some degree by the nature of the country in which operations are carried on.

Any hitherto received notions on the subject seem liable to modification through the great advances which have been made, as well as those still in progress in the construction of artillery and manufacture of small arms; and the necessary data on which to found any principles adapted to these changes, will probably only be attained in actual warfare.

The use of cavalry against cavalry will probably be little affected by the changes above referred to, and cavalry must still continue to be a description of force well suited for surprises, for cutting off convoys, falling upon foraging parties, as well as the very important duty of follow-

ing up a victory, by pursuing the enemy before he has time to rally; but the prodigious range of modern artillery and small arms certainly places cavalry at a disadvantage in its relation to the other two arms of the service; for, although the cavalry share in the improvement which has been made in fire-arms, by their old carbines being replaced by rifled breech-loading carbines, the advantage they have thus gained bears no proportion to that conferred on artillery and infantry by their new equipment, the services performed by cavalry with fire-arms being, at all times, very trifling.

The notion of gaining superiority in war by precision of fire cannot be said to have originated with the recent introduction of the rifle as a weapon for general use.

As far back as the time of the Flibustrers and Buccaniers, great dependence was placed on an accurate aim. In the great battle between the celebrated Buccanier leader, Henry Morgan, and the Spaniards, near the city of Panama, A.D. 1670, Morgan, who gained the victory, had only 1,200 men opposed to 400 well-equipped cavalry and 2,000 Spanish infantry. Morgan's success was, in a great measure, obtained by 200 picked men, who covered the front of his line, and skirmished with the Spanish cavalry, profiting, at the same time, by some marshy ground which prevented the cavalry getting very near them.

With one knee on the ground, these Flibustrers are described by their historian, Oxemlin, as making every shot tell upon the enemy's ranks—one portion loading while the better shots fired, and brought down a man or horse at every discharge.

Out of the 400 cavalry not 50 escaped; and the

Spanish infantry, after delivering one volley, took flight.

Morgan's casualties were very slight, while those of the enemy amounted to 600 men left on the field.

The sack of the rich city of Panama was the result of this victory.

Many other instances of the judicious use of marksmen or tirailleurs might be quoted from various periods of history. Such, for example, as the battle of the Cowpens in the American War of Independence; the attack on New Orleans at a later period; the repulse of the Archduke Charles, in his attempt to pass the Aar, in 1799, when two companies of Zurich riflemen defeated every effort of the Austrian Pontoon Corps to throw a bridge across the river.

On that occasion, a sergeant of the riflemen particularly distinguished himself. Being a remarkable shot, his comrades, like Morgan's Flibustrers, loaded for him. The hero of that day afterwards rose to the rank of colonel.

Selection of a General.

The selection of a General to command an Army must often throw the Government of a country into a state of great perplexity. Various attempts have been made to portray the characteristics of an able General; and in some of these attempts the character has been successfully sketched out; but all the talents of the General combined in perfection will not avail unless they can be brought into exercise under a favourable conjunction of circumstances. Such a rare combination of qualifications may excite a feeling of jealousy against the person possessing them, which may prevent his being employed at all, or, if employed, may expose him to

open opposition, or the insidious and perhaps more destructive influence of secret machinations set on foot expressly to thwart his measures. In the present contest in America, the Federal Government are supposed to favour the employment of a General who is not a native-born American, and, therefore, ineligible for the office of President. Whether this insinuation be well founded or not, if the case is used hypothetically, it serves to illustrate the foregoing observation.

Men born with different gifts.

The General having been selected, no small discernment and tact are required in the choice of his subordinates. "All men are not alike," says Plato; "we are born different one from another; and nature gives to each a peculiar disposition or talent for some one thing more than for others." We have different gifts, says St. Paul (Romans, chapter xii., verse 6). Cardinal Richelieu is reported to have said, that "one of the greatest blessings that could be conferred on a State would be the employment of each citizen in a position suited to his capacity."

On the judgment of the General must in a great measure depend the employment of officers in positions suited to their abilities, or the placing the right men in the right places.

Cæsar employed Mark Anthony in civil government until he discovered that his talents fitted him more for the military profession.

Demosthenes was a great orator, but he was no soldier.

In 1705, at a council of war summoned by the French Marshal Villars, the subject of discussion was the evacuation of Hunningen, the place being ill prepared for defence. The majority of the council voted for

the abandonment; but M. de Perya offered to undertake the defence, and pledged his honour that he would save the garrison. Villars accordingly entrusted him with the command of the garrison.

After a gallant defence, which occasioned the enemy a loss of 1,000 men, two breaches having been opened, and terms of capitulation refused, M. de Perya succeeded in evacuating the place at night with the garrison, leaving only a rear-guard of 400 men to keep up the fire. He arrived in safety at Saverne at daybreak on the following morning; and a few hours after was joined by the rear-guard, leaving only 100 sick and wounded men behind, and losing only one officer and seven or eight men in the operation.

Importance attached to reputation for good or bad fortune.

So prone are we to be influenced by feelings of a superstitious nature, that even a reputation for good or bad fortune has frequently been held to be of importance. Cicero attributed the frequent employment of Marcellus, Scipio, and Marius in command of armies, to the belief entertained that they were fortunate Generals.

> "It is Success that colours all in life;
> Success makes Fools admired, makes Villains honest;
> All the proud Virtue of this vaunting world
> Fawns on Success and Power, howe'er acquired."—THOMSON.

Louis XIV., after one of his favourite Generals had sustained a defeat, went into the apartments of Madame de Bourgogne, and complaining of him, the Duchess, who was engaged in a game of cards at the time, said to his Majesty, "Prince, he is so unfortunate, I would not give him my hand to play."

This question involves another, which is tact in making a selection, without giving offence to those passed over or creating a feeling of jealousy.

It is not surprising that a high-spirited man in a noble profession should feel acutely his supersession by an officer of inferior rank, and yet such a measure must frequently be an imperative necessity. It is indispensable and unavoidable; for no Army can ever hold a high standing, managed on the system of succession by seniority, carried out in its integrity. There is, perhaps, no better argument in favour of the purchase-system in our service, than the assistance it may often afford in advancing a promising officer without exciting any feeling of jealousy.

Argument in favour of purchase system.

One method which has been employed to give a command to a junior officer without offending his senior, is to detach the latter first, but such a scheme cannot always be practicable.

An unwilling commander.

An unwilling commander, it is said, is half beaten before the battle begins,[13] therefore, an officer who is in favour of a measure is to be preferred for the execution of it, to one who disapproves of the plan, and one who volunteers to carry it out is to be preferred to either, supposing the qualifications of all three to be on a par in other respects.

When Soult raised the garrison and camp of Bayonne to 14,000 men after the Anglo-Portuguese Army entered France, he wished Reille to take the command, but as that General was reluctant to undertake the duty, Soult, not choosing to employ an unwilling commander, desired d'Erlon to take Reille's place.

The idiosyncrasy of individual officers and soldiers to be studied.

When it is desirable to hold up to officers or soldiers

[13] To commit the execution of a purpose to one who disapproves of the plan of it, is to employ but one-third of the man: his heart and his head are against you; you have commanded only his hands.

the advantages to be anticipated from success, the prospects thus held out should, as far as possible, be adapted to the characteristics of those about to be employed. The base soul serves for lucre, and the noble soul for honour and glory, but the desire of the one requires to be satisfied as well as that of the other.

Rewards should be promptly conferred.

When troops have gained a success, no time should be lost in thanking them publicly. If in the power of the commanding officer to distribute rewards, he should do so on the spot.

Cæsar was very liberal to his soldiers. When his lines before Durazzo were attacked by Pompey, the Centurion Sceva and his cohort were particularly distinguished by their valour. Cæsar, in addition to a very handsome donation in silver, caused the cohort to be moved from its place in the eighth line to the first line, and gave each man double pay and ration for life.

Mark Antony caused a common soldier who had distinguished himself to be seated next to him at supper.

Polybius says that Antiochus, before assaulting Seleucia, promised large rewards and crowns to the captains and soldiers who distinguished themselves.

At the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, A.D. 1707, 200 officers who headed the assault were promised a step of rank each by Count d'Aguilar and the Marquis de Bay.

The promise of crowns of gold to the men who should scale the walls of Carthage produced immense effect.

Measures to abolish plundering, and yet satisfy the soldier.

In Napier's History the author suggests that, instead of allowing troops to sack a place after its capture, they should be rewarded by a fixed rate of compensation.

"As rewards for extraordinary valour should keep

pace with chastisement for crimes committed under such temptation, it would be fitting that money, apportioned to the danger and importance of the service, should be insured to the successful troops, and always paid without delay. This might be taken as ransom from enemies, but if the inhabitants are friends or too poor, Government should furnish the amount."—Vol. v. p. 285.

An old writer, Foresto, says the Russians are better conducted the worse they are treated. If this be the case, the fact is quite exceptional. The hope of reward diffuses its influence much more widely than the fear of chastisement amongst people in general, who have any pretensions to civilization; for this reason, that all can aspire to distinction, but only a few stand in awe of punishment; those whose habits bring them most within the range of punishment relying on their skill or dexterity to evade it.

Worst soldiers most active in plundering.

When plundering is allowed, the worst soldiers frequently get the largest share, because the value of booty is partly a matter of chance; and also because the honourable soldier remains with his colours as long as there is a chance of his services being required, while the bad soldier at once disappears in quest of plunder.

Martzenado mentions a soldier in his company, at the sack of Exea de los Cavalleros, who was notoriously the greatest coward in the regiment, and got more booty than any other soldier on that occasion, because he left the ranks while his comrades marched on to take a battery which annoyed the besiegers.

Cyrus refused to allow plundering at Sardis, expressly

on the ground that the worst soldiers gained most when pillaging was sanctioned.

The Istrians, a feeble State, took up arms in a hopeless contest with the Romans, from a spirit of vengeance, because their country had been pillaged.

Strict discipline in an enemy's country.

When war assumes an offensive character, and the enemy's country is invaded, the maintenance of a very strict discipline is a measure of vital importance to the invading force.

Livy mentions the pains taken by the Romans to make the people of Plaisance and Cremona return to their habitations to cultivate the fields, in order that they might draw supplies from that country.

So stern was the discipline in the Army of Belisarius, that it is said his soldiers never touched the fruit on the trees they passed on their march. And there is an instance recorded of the Army of Scaurus leaving behind, in a camp they had occupied, a tree laden with fruit.

It was held as a maxim by the Duke of Wellington, that all soldiers are inclined to plunder, and can only be prevented by the constant attention and exertion of their officers.

In a letter from the Duke to Don Manuel Frere, in March, 1814, the Duke thus sums up the duties of officers and soldiers in invading a country:—"However France may be reduced, there is no doubt that the army which I am enabled to lead into the country is not sufficiently strong to make any progress, if the inhabitants should take part in the war against us. What has occurred in the last six years in the Peninsula should be an example to all military men on this point, and should induce them to take especial care to endeavour to

conciliate the country which is the seat of war, by preserving the most strict discipline among the troops, by mitigating, as much as possible, the evils which are inseparable from war, and by that demeanour in the officers in particular towards the inhabitants which shall show them that they, at least, do not encourage the evils which they suffer from the soldiers, and will afford the inhabitants some hope that the evil will be redressed, and will be of short duration."

Strong opinions of the Duke on this subject.

About the same period, the Duke, in writing to the Secretary of State, thus describes his feelings and difficulties:—

"I must tell your lordship, however, that our success and everything depends upon our moderation and justice, and upon the good conduct and discipline of our troops. Hitherto, these have behaved well; but I despair of the Spaniards. They are in so miserable a state, that it is hardly fair to expect that they will refrain from plundering a beautiful country into which they enter as conquerors, particularly adverting to the miseries which their own country has suffered from its invaders. If I could now bring forward 20,000 good Spaniards paid and fed, I should have Bayonne. If I could bring forward 40,000, I do not know where I should stop. Now I have both the 20,000 and the 40,000 at my command upon this frontier, but I cannot venture to bring forward any for want of means of paying and supporting them. Without pay and food, they must plunder, and if they plunder they will ruin us all."[14]

[14] M. Thiers gives the following description of Wellington's position at this time:—

(Soult) "Etabli derrière l'angle des deux rivières avec environ 40 mille hommes de vieilles troupes, il contenait son adversaire (Wellington), qui n'osait ni s'avancer sans l'Espagnoles de peur de n'être pas assez fort, ni pénétrer en France avec eux de peur qu'ils ne fissent

The conduct of Lord Wellington on entering France is a practical commentary on the instructions he has left for the benefit of future generals in command of armies of invasion.

It is recorded in Napier's History, that, towards the close of the year 1813, although expecting a battle, he caused nearly the whole of the Spanish troops attached to his Army, to withdraw into their own country, in consequence of the excesses they had committed, having previously executed all the marauders he could take in the act.

"These decisive measures" (adds General Napier), "marking the lofty character of the man, were not less politic than resolute: the French people immediately returned, and, finding the strictest discipline preserved and all things paid for, adopted an amicable intercourse with the invaders."

The successful issue of the Burmese war in 1826 is in a great measure to be ascribed to the close attention paid to the maxims of Wellington by Sir Archibald Campbell, and the troops under his command.

Success of Burmese war promoted by the discipline of the troops.

After the taking of Prome, the inhabitants, who had fled from their homes, were invited to return, by proclamations and assurances of protection, and promises of regular payment for supplies afforded to the Army. All the property which they had left behind was scrupulously taken care of. The result of these judicious measures was, that in a short time Prome was rebuilt,

insurger les paysans français en les pillant. Le Général Anglais attendait donc pour prendre l'offensive, premièrement, que les pluies, qui étaient très abondantes, cessassent; secondement, que son gouvernement lui envoyât de l'argent pour payer les Espagnoles, seul moyen de conserver parmi eux la discipline."—Vol. xvii. p. 398, Leipsic.

and the tide of population, which had been receding before the British Army, flowed back into the deserted provinces, and actually sought that protection and security under the British flag which they could not enjoy in the vicinity of their own armies.

The means of supplying the Army from the Rangoon stores were so inadequate, that it was only by thus conciliating the people, and obtaining their aid in bringing in supplies, that the British General was enabled to provide for the further prosecution of the war on the return of the cold season.

Alexander induces the fugitive inhabitants to return, by kind treatment.

After the capture of Persepolis, Alexander, pursuing his march, got amongst people so wild, that they fled into the mountains, which were covered with snow, killing such of their own people as could not keep up in the flight; but, by the kind treatment which some prisoners experienced at their hands, even those wild hordes gained confidence, and by degrees became sociable.

When the inhabitants of a country fly in this manner, the Army loses the advantage of the means of transport, as well as of supplies and other conveniences; and those who are driven from their homes are added to the number of our enemies. The French, defeated at Carcassone, were almost exterminated on their retreat by the natives of Thoulouse and Nîmes, in consequence of the licence to which they had previously given way in those parts.

An early instance of the lust of plunder and the consequences, is recorded in the seventh chapter of Joshua.

A General is under a disadvantage when he fights on ground which he has not been able to reconnoitre, either

personally or by the agency of others. The Duke de Nemours was advised, on this account, against giving battle at Cerignola, and a large ditch, which the great captain had widened, and the existence of which even was unknown, proved the destruction of the duke and his army.

Federal defeat at Fredericksburg.

In the present war in America, General Burnside is said to have been very imperfectly informed as to the Confederate defences at Fredericksburg when he attacked their position in December, 1862.

Monk's caution.

Monk's cautious progress through the Highlands has been thus described:—"Marching through unknown districts, with enemies in ambush on all sides, he penetrated into fastnesses hitherto considered inaccessible, and never allowed the foe to get the slightest advantage of him. He maintained spies in all quarters, whose communications were made to himself alone. Arriving at his encamping ground, he himself always chose the ground, posted the sentinels, and sent out foraging and exploring parties. His soldiers relied as much upon his vigilance as upon the walls of a citadel. He attended to all their wants, even sometimes prescribing for the sick."

Sang-froid required in reconnoitring.

The risks for which an officer must be prepared, and the *sang-froid* required on a reconnaissance, are well exemplified in a little adventure which befell the Earl of Crawfurd and Rothes on the 1st October, 1746, the morning preceding the battle of Roucoux.

The Earl having ridden out, with his aide-de-camp and a few volunteers, to reconnoitre the situation of the French Army, commanded by Marshal Saxe, they came suddenly upon one of the enemy's advanced posts. The sergeant who commanded turned out his picket and

presented arms, believing he saw a French General and his escort. The Earl, who first perceived them, without betraying the least mark of surprise or confusion, rode up to the sergeant, and, assuming the character of a French General, told him, in French, that there was no occasion for such ceremony. He then asked if they had perceived any of the enemy's parties, and being answered in the negative, "Very well," said he, "be upon your guard, and if you should be attacked, I shall take care that you are supported." So saying, he and his retinue retired before the sergeant could recover from the surprise occasioned by this unexpected visit.

In all probability, the sergeant soon found out his mistake, for Marshal Saxe, after the battle, in dismissing on parole the Prince of Tingeary, who was taken prisoner, sent by him a message to his old friend, the Earl of Crawfurd, wishing his lordship joy on the occasion of his becoming a French General; and adding, that he could not but feel displeased with the sergeant of the picket for not having procured him the pleasure of the Earl's company at dinner.

Operate on the communications of the enemy.

Whatever may be the nature of the operations we have in view, the enemy's communications must be rendered as difficult as possible, if they cannot be altogether intercepted, while we keep ourselves accurately informed of his position and movements.

In October, 1812, the French Generals Caffarelli and Clausel, with 44,000 troops, in fine condition, were anxious to succour Burgos, but they were forced to wait Souham's arrival and news from the King. Here Wellington's arrangements with the *partidas* interfered; they had no direct tidings from Valencia, because the cir-

cuitous lines of correspondence were so beset by the bands, that the most speedy and certain communication was through the War Minister at Paris, and he obtained his surest information from the English newspapers! For the latter, while deceiving the public with stories of victories never gained, battles never fought, enthusiasm and vigour which had no existence, did most assiduously enlighten the enemy as to the numbers, situation, movements, and reinforcements of the Allies.

Another instance of the importance of intercepting correspondence is mentioned by Napier, in the same campaign (October, 1812). Joseph, having 70,000 men, was able to hold Valencia while he advanced towards the Tagus, and he sent Souham urgent orders to act in concert without risking a battle. Hill, being thus menaced and reduced by Ballastero's defection to defend the Tagus when it was becoming fordable in all places, gave notice of the danger to Wellington. Joseph's letter was despatched on the 1st October, and six others followed in succession, day by day, yet the last carried by Colonel Lucotte, first reached Souham. The advantage of the allies' central position, and the value of the *partidas*, were here made manifest. Hill's letter, only despatched on the 17th, reached Wellington at the same moment that Joseph's reached Souham.

No means to be spared to get information.

The practice of blindfolding the bearer of a flag of truce seems only a measure of natural precaution, but it is said to have arisen from the fact of messages having been sent solely with a view to gain intelligence of the enemy's camp and position.

Prince Thomas reconnoitred Corbie by sending in an officer of the regiment of Piedmont, very badly

wounded, in a postchaise, with two Engineer officers disguised as the postilion and coachman.

Catinat disguised himself as a coal-merchant, to get into Luxemburg to examine the works.

Gustavus Adolphus likewise came over to Germany in disguise during the Thirty Years' War.

Some military writers advocate small parties for reconnoitring, because if the party encounters no obstacle, it will, of course, be quite sufficient for the duty; and if a large force is sent, and it should fall into an ambuscade, the consequences may be serious. It is impossible to frame rules on such a subject. Napoleon frequently sacrificed large numbers of men in examining the enemy's position.

When Moses sent the spies into the land of Canaan, he gave them instructions to look at the country and the people who inhabit it,—if it is a strong country or not, if the people are many or few.—(Numbers xiii. 19.)

The Consul Lucius Emilius Paulus did the same before commencing war with Perseus, King of Macedonia.

So did Alexander when he went to war with the Persians.

The march of science has given rise to a novel method of obtaining information in the present American War, by means of the telegraph wires—"tapping the wires," as the operation is termed. The celebrated General John Morgan, assisted by his active coadjutor Colonel Grenfell, and a telegraph operator, during a raid in Kentucky, deceived the Federals completely by this means, and at the same time obtained for themselves some valuable information, as well as a supply of stores, of which they stood much in need.

Information useful in war should be collected in peace.

During peace, it is the duty of the Government of a State to collect statistical information about every portion of the globe; it is particularly incumbent on a State such as England, with colonies and possessions in every quarter of the world, and exposed at any moment to war in the remotest regions of the earth.

An intercepted despatch from Napoleon to Marie Louise revealed to the allies, in 1813, the Emperor's intention of throwing himself on their communications, adopting for his base the girdle of fortresses in Lorraine and Alsatia. This precious document was the means of removing all the obstacles which had hitherto opposed that cordial combination of operations between Blucher and Schwartzenberg which was so desirable.

A still more remarkable instance of the incalculable value of discovering the enemy's intentions occurred in the Russian campaign. General Seslawin having ascertained the intention of the French to retreat, reported the information he had obtained to his superiors, by whom it was not credited. Piqued at his information being doubted, he dashed into the French bivouacks, and carried off an officer and some soldiers of the Guard, by whose means his statement was confirmed. He thus saved Doctoroff from destruction at Borowik; and the intelligence obtained by Seslawin in this way also decided the march of Kutusoff on Malo Jaroslawitz, a movement which had a most important effect on the fate of the French, as it prevented Napoleon from taking the road by Kalouga—a line of retreat which, although it would not entirely have spared him from disaster, would at least have saved him from Krasnoi and the Beresina.

The battle of Mudki affords an example of the

responsibility attaching to the intelligence department of an Army.

The Sikhs, 30,000 strong, with twenty-two guns, were concealed in the jungle within a few miles of Mudki, when, on the morning of the 18th December, the British Army arrived at that place, after a fatiguing march of twenty-one miles from Churruk.

On the approach of the British, a Sikh picket which had been posted on the look-out, retired, and informed Rajah Lal Singh that the time had arrived to make a spring, as they believed that the British Generals were followed by little more than an escort.

The British pickets had hardly been planted, scarcely one of the soldiers had breakfasted, and officers were at their ablutions, or snatching a little sleep upon the ground, when Major Broadfoot, who was sitting at luncheon with the Governor-General, received a scrap of paper. Looking at it, he rose, with the exclamation, "The enemy is on us!" He rode to the front, and passed the word along. Some mistrusted the information; and even, when he showed the clouds of dust raised by the advancing masses, his warning was not implicitly believed.

While the British troops were yet forming, he returned from his reconnaissance, galloped up to the Commander-in-Chief, and, saluting him, pointed to the rising cloud of dust ahead. "There," said he, "your Excellency, is the Sikh Army."

It was the political agent making over the frontier to the soldier. The cannon-shots that almost immediately began to lob in from the still unseen guns soon told their own tale.

Inconvenience suffered by the French for want of information in the campaign of Marengo.

In the campaign of Marengo, the want of accurate knowledge of the country caused the French Army much unnecessary trouble, and delayed their operations. Napoleon did not know of the existence of the Fort de Bard, or its means of defence. Had his advanced guard been provided with pieces of a proper calibre, the work might easily have been reduced. The crossing of the Alps might have been effected with greater expedition if the French had been aware that the little St. Bernard was practicable for artillery.

Requisitions, without regard to expense.

In preparing to undertake a campaign, or while it lasts, a General must not be deterred by motives of economy from making requisitions on his Government for ample supplies. Such a course will not be palatable to those in superior authority, but the faithful discharge of the duty entrusted to a General requires that he should disregard such considerations. The supplies of an Army ought always to be more than sufficient. The loss and waste in war are so great, that it is impossible to meet the wants of an Army by any precise calculations of days and rations per man. Convoys are cut off; magazines take fire, or are destroyed by the enemy; powder is blown up; provisions are damaged and spoilt; horses die from over-fatigue and exposure, or are captured, or killed in action. Soldiers must have nourishment; they may make extraordinary efforts, and subsist for a short time on very scanty fare, but want and exhaustion will kill in the end, if prolonged beyond a certain point.

While civilians, labourers, and others of the same class with the soldier are reposing in their beds, the soldier watching over their safety must often be without

shelter, and exposed to the risk of death at every instant. Such hardships are well known to be inseparable from his condition; but it is not less true that those who are charged with the responsibility of providing for his wants have a sacred trust confided to them, and it is their duty to see that he is subjected to no privations beyond those which are unavoidable.

Section IV.

Time required to make soldiers. They are not to be had ready made for money.

A General should make it a rule to be as sparing as possible of the lives of his soldiers. Men may be found for money, but it takes time to make soldiers.

At the installation of Lord Brougham as Lord Rector of Edinburgh University, in his address he introduced the following criticism on the contrast between the military characters of the Duke of Wellington and the Emperor Napoleon:—

"His illustrious friend, the Duke of Wellington, had a consummate acquaintance with whatever subject he was called upon to consider practically. Among others may be mentioned his regimental economy and discipline, which Napoleon did not so well know, because he cared not so much for the comforts of his men, nor was at all sparing of their lives (a powerful object at all times with the Duke); but he had a knowledge almost preternatural of the place where each corps or even company of his vast armies was to be found at any given time, because this was intimately connected with the use he might make of what he somewhat unfeelingly termed 'the raw material.'"

The value of soldiers' lives to be carefully considered.

The sacrifice of the lives of valuable soldiers which must attend even a battle gained, is a consideration which should make a General hesitate about engaging in a general action, if there is a reasonable expectation of weakening or destroying the enemy's power by other means.

As, for example, if there is a prospect of the enemy's being obliged to divide his forces to procure subsistence, or if he is losing many men by desertion or sickness.

Otho's Generals advised him against giving battle to Vitellius, because he had plenty of provisions, and there was no doubt that the army of Vitellius would very shortly be reduced by famine. Disregarding this advice, he was overthrown at Bebriacum.

Condé, on arriving in Germany, 1644, to take command of the French army, held a council of war, at which Turenne, well acquainted with the country, as also with the formidable position occupied by the Bavarians, expressed himself in favour of moving by Langendeutzling and the valley of Blotherthal into the valley St. Pierre, to cut off the enemy's supplies, which could only reach him from Villingen, on the other side of the Black Forest, two leagues from the source of the Danube, adding that it would be easy to starve them out, but it would be hazardous to attack veteran troops, commanded by the best General in Germany, in such a position as they then held. In this opinion D'Elact and Grammont concurred.

War almost a game of chance.

Even if we have advantages over the enemy in position as well as in the quality and number of our troops, there are so many contingencies in war, that a battle is still like a throw at some game of chance.

Hannibal was strongly impressed with this idea, and frequently said there was nothing in which success was so uncertain as in war.

Prosper Colonna, General of Charles V. in Italy, being pressed to give battle to the French army, refused, because he said he would expose his army certainly to a very heavy loss, while the advantage even of a victory would be trifling.

If a General is so situated that he cannot repair his losses as readily as the enemy can, that circumstance forms an argument against fighting.

A General who is not acquainted with the exact strength of the enemy's forces should endeavour to obtain accurate information on that point before fighting. Montecuculi fought the battle of Visiloch upon wrong information as to the number of the Swedes.

Beware of being drawn into a combat against your interest.

When a General has determined not to give battle, he should be careful to guard against being tempted to swerve from his determination by the devices of the enemy, or by any other pressure which may be brought to bear upon him.

The Duke d'Alba, being accused of manœuvring too much, and of letting slip favourable opportunities of fighting, replied to the charge by saying, "The object with a good general is not to be always fighting, but to conquer: when he has conquered, he has fought well."

Catherine II. of Russia, ignorant of war, and dissatisfied with her Marshal Romanzow because he did not bring the Turks to battle, asked him why he did not fight. His answer was, that the enemy had three times his numbers. "The Romans" (said Catherine) "never

asked the numbers of their enemies, but where they were, that they might fight them."

A General must have the moral courage to turn a deaf ear to such taunts; the very circumstance of appearing to avoid an engagement is quite sufficient to let loose the tongues of detractors, who are always ready to assail any man invested with power, let his courage, prudence, and ability be ever so great.

Moral courage required in a general.

Marshal Berwick, in 1706, retreating, with 7,000 men, from the frontier of Portugal to the confines of Arragon, pursued by 25,000, encountered a storm of obloquy. As soon as he was reinforced, he advanced to Iruesta, where he found himself in presence of the enemy, and had to sustain a fresh storm of censure for not engaging them. Disregarding all that was said of him, he waited until he found a favourable opportunity at Almanza, when the taunts of his enemies recoiled on their own heads.

Quintus Fabius was said to conquer by refusing to fight.

The battle of Mohacz was brought on by the Duke of Lorraine dividing his army, in order to tempt the Turks to attack him, taking care that the detached corps did not go beyond a distance which permitted of the whole being rapidly concentrated when necessary.

In the war of 1653, Turenne, like Fabius, with an inferior number of troops, always encamped on high ground, or places difficult of access, keeping near his enemy, but always choosing his lines of march, so as not to be compelled to fight. Condé, like another Hannibal, made use of stratagems without end to draw Turenne into an engagement. Sometimes approaching the French

he gave an alarm, and suddenly retreated, in hopes of tempting his adversary to pursue, and surprise him in the eagerness of pursuit. This manœuvring lasted six weeks.

In 1752, the French in the East Indies, under M. de Kerjean, less wary than their countrymen under the great Turenne, were defeated near Bahoor, by allowing themselves to be tempted into an action where prudence dictated to them to avoid one.

General Lawrence, the English General, had positive orders not to follow the French into their own territory; therefore, being desirous of bringing them to an action, he adopted the ancient and oft-tried stratagem of feigning a retreat. This induced General Dupleix to order his nephew, M. de Kerjean, to pursue them to Bahoor, and risk a battle. The English General, on being informed he was pursued, laid his plans to turn on the enemy and surprise him in the night, in which he was completely successful.

Burmese war.

When the Burmese General, Maha Nemiow, advanced on Prome, in the war of 1826, his march was made with extreme caution: at every mile he stockaded himself, evidently with the intention of pushing his approaches so near that a simultaneous and overwhelming rush might be made from all sides on the British force. Sir Alexander Campbell, to inspire him with confidence, and induce him to hasten his attack, kept the British troops within their lines throwing up batteries and entrenchments, as if apprehensive of his approach; but all this failed to lead the Burmese veteran into any act of indiscretion; and Sir Alexander, whose Army was suffering severely from repeated attacks on his convoys,

was compelled to seek an opportunity of becoming the assailant.

Wellington taunted with not assisting the brave garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo.

In 1810, when the French were besieging Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington's firmness and generalship were put to a severe test. The Governor of the place was firm and honourable, and Romana came from Badajoz to propose a combined movement for carrying off the brave and distressed garrison. To let the place fall (it was said) without an effort, would be a grievous thing and a dishonour. The Spaniards and Portuguese alike demanded that an attempt should be made to raise the siege; the first as a proof of good faith; the last, to keep the war longer from their country. The English troops also were eager for the enterprise, and policy seemed to call for it, lest the world should deem the promise to defend Portugal a hollow boast. Nevertheless, Wellington absolutely refused to venture even a brigade, and thus proved himself a truly great commander, and of a stedfast mind. It was not a single campaign, but a terrible war he had undertaken. If he lost 5,000 men, his Government would abandon the contest; if he lost 15,000, he must abandon it himself. Although Wellington had at that time 56,000 men under his orders, the utmost force he could have brought into the field to give battle, or have made available to carry off the garrison by surprise, was 20,000, while Massena, one of the best of the French Generals, with 60,000 veterans under his command, was eagerly watching to see him make the attempt. Open battle only a madman would have attempted, while, if even a momentary success attended the surprise, the 5,000 undisciplined men brought off from the fortress would have ill supplied

the 10,000 or 12,000 good troops lost in saving that garrison. Massena, desiring the attempt should be made, held back his troops, appeared careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English General, saying he was afraid; that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared to carry him off; that he was insensible to military honour, and would suffer the place to fall without a shot to redeem his plighted word! All this subtlety failed; Lord Wellington abided his time. "If thou art a great captain, Marius, come down and fight. If thou art a great captain, Silo, make me come down and fight."

Feeling of discontent amongst troops sometimes unfavourable to assuming offensive.

When feelings of discontent or dejection are prevalent amongst troops, the moment cannot in general be considered favourable for encountering the enemy. At the same time, occasions arise when, by good management, a General may turn such feelings to good account. The sight of the enemy sometimes has the effect of dispelling all dissensions or feelings of discontent in a camp; and if superstitious feelings create dejection, they also sometimes act as powerfully in giving an impulsive energy to the courage of the soldier.

Marius, apprehending that the novel and fierce aspect and cries of the Teutons and Ambrons might have the effect of discouraging his men, avoided a combat with them until his army had become accustomed to the sight of those new enemies. He then gave battle, and was victorious.

Upon certain days, the Romans, as well as some other nations, were forbidden to fight, unless when compelled to do so either to resist an attack, or repel an invasion.

Pompey selected Sunday to attack the Jews, knowing their objection to fight on that day.

The troops of Brutus and Cassius, fighting against Antony and Augustus, lost courage entirely, because the Lictor put the garland on the head of Cassius the wrong way, and because a flock of vultures settled on the camp.

Dejection spreads fast.

When the Emperor Jovian arrived at the place where the legions of Crassus had been defeated, the associations connected with the spot produced such a feeling of dejection amongst his men that he was obliged to move off as speedily as possible.

Superstition of troops.

In October, 1812, the Fort of Chinchilla was besieged by Soult, and from its situation and strength, a vigorous defence was expected; but after a few hours' attack it fell; for a thunder-storm suddenly arising in a clear sky, and discharging itself upon the post, killed the Governor and many other persons; whereupon the garrison surrendered, overcome, it is said, by a fit of superstitious dread.

Sforza, Duke of Milan, got possession of Genoa by fomenting discord within the walls.

External dangers heal internal commotions.

On the other hand, it is stated in Livy that the appearance of the Veii and Samnites before the walls of Rome, put an end to the strife respecting the agrarian laws, and the animosity which had been engendered on the subject of those laws was for a time forgotten in the general enthusiasm to defend the Eternal City.

The Americans in the present war have been accused of desiring a European war, in the hope that it would have the effect of reconciling all parties, put an end to the civil war, and lead to the restoration of the Union.

Napoleon made use of the superstitious feelings of his men when he rode along the ranks before the battle of Friedland, and said, "This is the anniversary of Marengo."

In the Burmese war, 1826, in addition to many Chobwas and petty princes, the native levies were accompanied by three young and very handsome women of high rank, who were supposed to be gifted with preternatural powers, and to be able to turn aside and render harmless the British balls. These Amazons, dressed in war costume, were specially attached to a corps 8,000 strong, and rode amongst the ranks encouraging the men.

A peal of thunder being heard before Cyrus engaged Crœsus, "We follow thus Jupiter omnipotent," said Cyrus, and advanced to the attack.

However avaricious a General may be of the blood of his men, it may sometimes be good policy to fight, in order to establish amongst the troops a feeling of confidence in their commander; that feeling which is the fundamental basis of an army, and which can only exist when soldiers and officers have a mutual knowledge of each other, founded on experience in war.

The Sultans were in the habit of seeking to establish their reputation in this way, on ascending the throne.

Montluc thinks a captain should establish his reputation.

"You captains (my comrades)," says Montluc, "who shall do me the honour to read my life, take notice that the thing in the world which you ought most to desire is to meet with a fair occasion wherein to manifest your courage in the first sally of your arms; for if in the beginning you shall prove successful, *you do, amongst others*, two things: first, you cause yourself to be praised

and esteemed of the great ones by whose report you shall be recommended to the knowledge of the King himself; and, in the next place, when the soldier shall see a captain who has behaved himself well, and performed any notable thing at his first trial, all the valiant men will strive to be under his command, believing that so auspicious a beginning cannot fail of a prosperous issue, and that under such a man they shall never fail to be employed; for nothing can more spite a man of courage than to be left at home to burn his shins by the fire, whilst other men are employed abroad in honourable action. So that by this means you shall get more honour and proceed to greater reputation; and, on the contrary, if you chance to be baffled in the beginning, whether through your cowardice or want of conduct, all the good men will avoid you, and you will have none to lead but the lees and canaille of the army, with whom (though you were the hero of the world) there will be no good to be done, nor other than an ill-repute to be acquired."—*Commentaries of Montluc.*

Lochiel was especially renowned for his physical prowess; his clansmen looked big with pride when they related how he had himself broken hostile ranks, and hewn down tall warriors.

Death of Claverhouse.

On the morning of the battle of Killiecrankie, Lochiel, feeling that a life on which so much depended should not be uselessly sacrificed, adjured Dundee not to run into any unnecessary danger. "Your lordship's business," he said, "is to overlook everything, and to issue your commands; our business is to execute those commands, bravely and promptly." Dundee answered, with calm magnanimity, that there was much weight in what his

friend, Sir Ewan, had urged, but that no General could effect anything great without possessing the confidence of his men. "I must establish my character for courage; your people expect to see their leaders in the thickest of the battle, and to-day they shall see me there. I promise you, on my honour, that in future fights I will take more care of myself."—*Macaulay.*

This policy requires to be used with great circumspection: the importance of a first success is undoubtedly great; but so, in proportion, are the disastrous consequences of a reverse at starting.

After a General's character is established, troops may rally under a reverse; but when a General is not known, a panic is likely to follow a check, particularly if the troops are raw and undisciplined.

In the contest now raging in America, the Confederate troops are said to judge of their commanders by their personal conduct under fire, having very little respect for any commander who does not, like Longstreet, lead them into the thickest of the fight.

It may sometimes be desirable to create a belief in the superiority of our own army in point of valour and numbers.

Cæsar and Pompey both adopted this maxim to gain adherents in the country. Pompey drew up his army at Munda in presence of Cæsar in a position where he could not be attacked, and where he had no intention of fighting; and he was subsequently defeated, because he was induced to leave that advantageous position.

One object which made Hannibal earnestly desire a battle before he fought at Cannæ was the hope that, by a victory, he might gain over some of the wavering

allies, who only adhered to the side of the Romans from fear.

When he arrived first in Italy, he gave battle to the Consul Sempronius, on the Trebbia, while the Gauls were yet with him, well knowing the fickleness of such allies; and he is believed to have placed them where they were exposed to the brunt of the action.

The battle of Bicoque, in 1522, is said to have been fought because M. de Lautrech was afraid the Swiss would soon leave him.

Reasons for hastening a battle.

In like manner, should the enemy expect reinforcements, it may be advisable to bring on a battle before their force is increased.

The battle of Pavia was hastened on because there was no money to pay the Spanish troops.

The Tuscans were attacked by the Roman Army, under Spurius Servilius and Aulus Virginius, because the Romans were starving.

Memnon advised Darius, if he could not stop the progress of Alexander by devastating the country before him, to attack him before he made himself formidable by conquests.

The hour of the day at which to commence a battle.

The hour at which to commence a battle being a point of some importance, when a commander has the option of choosing his time, he should deliberate on the circumstances in which he and his opponent are placed respectively, and determine accordingly.

If superior numbers are on our side, and we feel confident of victory (says Marmont), we should attack at daybreak, so as to have abundance of time to profit by the victory we anticipate.

The same rule applies if all our corps are well in hand, while the enemy's army is not concentrated.

But when the forces on both sides are nearly equal, and the victory uncertain, it is advisable to defer the attack until noon; the consequences to be apprehended from a reverse are not then so serious; and a General, before all things, should think of the preservation of his army. The destruction of the enemy is only a secondary consideration.

If, acting upon this maxim, the battle remains undecided, we have the whole night to organize a fresh attack or make other combinations. The troops can renew their strength by rest and refreshment, while the enemy is in an uncertainty as to your intentions, and is thus kept on the alert, and cannot obtain the same refreshing repose.

The Numidians under Jugurtha and Bocchus, noted for more cunning than strength in war, attacked Marius in the night, because (said they) if we are beaten, the darkness will befriend us in our flight; and if we beat the Romans, it will not prevent our pursuing a vanquished enemy through a country of which he has no knowledge, and with which we are perfectly acquainted.

Scipio learning that Hasdrubal had kept his men drawn up from daybreak without any refreshment, deferred the combat until mid-day, when, as the Carthaginians, exhausted with fatigue, were about to take a meal, he fell upon them.

Before the battle of Hohenlinden, Moreau ordered Serruzier to engage the enemy in the forest between Haag and Hohenlinden, to take advantage of localities

suited to arrest his progress, and thus delay him, so that he should not be able to debouch from the forest before daybreak at the soonest. These orders were strictly obeyed, and thus the way was prepared for that great feat of arms which contributed to place Moreau amongst the greatest captains of the age.

Importance of a few hours in war.

The history of the campaign of 1797 furnishes a striking instance of the importance attaching to a few precious hours in war.

After the defeat of the Archduke on the Tagliamento, although the position of Napoleon Buonaparte was brilliant in appearance, he was not without cause for anxiety. He had to choose between retracing his steps, or marching on Vienna; he adopted the latter alternative, at the same time, he saw the prudence of extricating himself from his embarrassment by political means, if satisfactory terms could be entered into, and accordingly he made overtures of peace to Prince Charles.

From the Archduke's answer, it was evident that the time for negotiation had not arrived, and the French Army was put in motion for Freisach.

The march had hardly commenced when an aide-de-camp from the Archduke presented himself before Buonaparte, the bearer of a proposal for a suspension of arms for four hours. General Buonaparte was not the man to be thus duped; he saw at once from the short time demanded, that it was only a ruse to answer some other purpose, and he pressed forward his movement on Freisach. The object of the Archduke in attempting to obtain this short armistice was to give time for General Sporck to join him, the near approach of

that General with his division from the Tyrol having been notified.

T. Didius, in order to defer battle until he was reinforced by some legions on their way to join him, issued orders to his army to prepare for battle. Secret orders were at the same time given to be careless in guarding the prisoners; some of them of course escaped, and straightway informed their comrades that a battle was imminent. The enemy thus led to expect an immediate attack, kept their forces concentrated, and the legions expected by Didius joined him in safety.

Means to deter the enemy from making an attack.

When it is desirable to deter the enemy from making an attack, the object has been effected by leading him to suppose that reinforcements have been received. To do this, a corps must be detached secretly to return in the guise of a reinforcement.

Schemes to ensure the safe arrival of reinforcements are something of the nature of stratagems to secure convoys, and may be planned in an endless variety of ways according to the genius and ingenuity of the General.

The following is rather a singular plan by which Napoleon attempted to reinforce his army in the field in Spain when he had exhausted his resources in France and he was reduced to the necessity of withdrawing some of his veteran troops from Spain to meet the exigencies of his affairs in other parts of the continent.

Fifteen or twenty thousand French troops composed at that time the garrisons of Barcelona, Tortosa, Peniscola and Murviedro.

To obtain the services of these men in the field,

Napoleon tempted the Spanish Government by offering to withdraw the garrisons from these places.

Wellington at once saw through the scheme, and immediately urged the War Minister at Madrid, not to allow of any capitulation, except on the basis of the garrisons of the places named being considered prisoners of war.

Napoleon's scheme for reinforcing his army thwarted by Wellington.

The scheme (he added) is likewise attended with another, viz., to hold Figueras and Rosas, and probably a corps of troops within the Spanish frontier. The Spanish troops now in Catalonia, therefore, would be unable to co-operate with this army in any offensive operation against the enemy.

In recommending the line of conduct which was advisable, the Duke added he was not insensible that he was recommending a continuance of sacrifices, particularly of the meritorious city of Barcelona; but he reminds the Spanish Government that the interests of their nation are bound up with those of the Allies, and encourages them with the hope that their sufferings are approaching an end.

The junction of Allies prevented by a stratagem.

The junction of the French under the Prince of Salerno, near Naples, with Rustan, was prevented by a forged letter, intimating to the latter that it was impossible for the French to join, and he might therefore return to Constantinople, which he did three days before the French arrived.

The forgery was executed by Cæsar Mormili, who had got some blank signatures of the French king.

Tact in acting with Allies.

When allied troops are acting together, great tact is required to preserve unanimity as to operations. Each is sure to have some individual interest, and each is

generally biassed in favour of those plans from which he is likely to derive most benefit.

Eugene was observed one day to be musing very seriously, and on being asked the cause, he replied that he was thinking if Alexander had been obliged to consult the Dutch Deputies before he put his plans in execution, he would not have made half as many conquests.

When allies lose a battle, each is ready to attribute the failure to the other; when they gain a battle, each is ready to claim the merit.

The offer of advice in war is sometimes attended with a similar result.

Scene between Vendôme and the Duke of Burgundy. Battle of Oudenarde.

Before the battle of Oudenarde, Vendôme said to the Duke of Burgundy, who had been ill-advised to march to Ghent, "When you perceive in Prince Eugene a desire to avoid an engagement, he knows how to force you into one."[15]

The allies were at that time preparing to cross the Scheldt; and Vendôme, seeing a battle inevitable, wished to persuade the Duke to make the attack. The scene has been thus described:—"It is still time," said Vendôme to the Duke of Burgundy, "to discontinue your march and attack." The latter hesitated, lost time, would have turned back, sent twenty squadrons to dispute the passage, recalled them, and said, "Let us march to Ghent." "It is too late," said Vendôme; "you cannot now. In half-an-hour, perhaps, you will have the enemy upon you." "Why did you then stop me?" rejoined the Duke. "To begin the attack immediately. Cadogan is

[15] In the Memoirs by the Prince de Ligne, ascribed to Prince Eugene.

already master of the village of Hurne. Let us form, at least, in the best manner we can."

And, again, in the same account, Vendome is described as giving orders to charge the left. "What are you doing?" said the Duke of Burgundy. "I forbid it. There is an impassable ravine and morass." Imagine the indignation of Vendome at hearing this, when he had passed over the ground a minute before.

In offensive as well as defensive war, marches may be classed as a branch of the art second to none in importance. Marching is the method by which the great object in war, *superiority at the decisive point at the decisive moment*, is to be attained. There is scarcely any operation which can be carried on without frequent marches. The flank or rear of a camp may be gained, and an immediate march becomes necessary. A general who has gained a march on his enemy retains that advantage until some great obstacle, for example, a river, or an inaccessible mountain, or a fortress, delays him long enough for the enemy either to recover that lost march, or to make himself master again of the strategic line, by means of a circuitous march.

Gaining a march gaining an advantage.

A frontier cannot be defended, unless troops can be readily moved from one position to another. An order of battle cannot be formed without a march, and what is the use of victory when gained if the conqueror is contented with the possession of the battle field?[16]

Victory useless, unless followed up.

Bauner, the Swedish General, said that, to deserve a triumph, you should have destroyed your enemy. Cæsar rallied Pompey on not having followed up his victory.

[16] Example, present campaign in America,—bloody battles, and no results.

Hannibal often reproached himself for not having marched upon Rome after Cannes, as he was advised by Maherbel.

When Richard defeated Henry VI., at Northampton, he marched straight to London. If Charles I. had taken Rupert's advice, and marched to London after Edgehill, his affairs might have taken a different turn.

If a defeated enemy finds that his loss is confined to a few thousand men, and that he is allowed to retreat unmolested, he will surely re-appear and renew the attack from some other quarter.

In 1796, after the battle of Neresheim, Moreau did not follow up his success as vigorously as he should have done, unless prevented by cogent reasons. The Archduke Charles, profiting by the delay, made a rapid march, and united his forces with those of Wartensleben, an object which he had long desired, and looked upon as the only means of restoring the power of Austria in Germany. Thus reinforced, he fell upon Jourdain, defeated him, and then turned with the same mass upon Moreau.

Marches in general partake of the nature of stratagems.

Marches, whether executed completely out of sight of the enemy, or partially or wholly in view of the enemy, or in order to mask the march of another body, may, and generally do, partake more or less of the character of stratagems.

The mention of this branch of the art of war will remind all lovers of military history of the memorable achievement of that great soldier, the Duke of Marlborough, in his march to the Danube.

The affairs of the Empire in the winter of 1704 were in such a critical state, that Marlborough resolved

to gain the Danube with the Army under his command, there to make an effort to restore the sinking fortunes of the Emperor.

Marlborough's march to the Danube.

One great difficulty which presented itself was that of preventing a premature disclosure of his intentions, for everything depended on their being kept secret until ripe for execution.

In order to maintain this secrecy, he was compelled to refrain from communicating the movement even to his allies the States General; for their timidity was such, that it was not likely their consent would be given, and it was very evident that nothing could be long kept secret which came on for discussion before such an assembly.

Having drawn together his forces from their winter quarters in the Netherlands, and assembled them in a camp at Maestricht, he set out from there on the 10th May, as if with the intention of carrying the war into France by the Moselle, and on the fourteenth day reached Coblentz.

Part of his march after that was performed in two columns, one on each side of the Rhine, while on the waters of the noble stream itself, and parallel with the heads of the columns, a fleet of transports accompanied the troops, carrying artillery and stores, and the sick. It was not until this military procession reached Philipsburg that Marlborough threw off the mask. Here he crossed the river on a bridge, the stores and guns were disembarked, and the Army wheeled off to its left, and, quitting the Rhine, made an expeditious march through Franconia, and formed a junction with the forces under the Prince of Baden and Prince Eugene.

The allies having driven the enemy from the im-

portant post of Donawert, the siege of Ingoldstadt was allotted to the Prince of Baden, while Marlborough and Eugene undertook to watch the Elector of Bavaria. In the course of a very short time all Europe resounded with the news of the glorious victory gained at Blenheim.

The march of the French corps under King Joseph, Marshals Victor and Jourdain, and General Sebastiani, previous to the battle of Talavera, was a combined movement, with a view to attack the allies while they were separated in four unconnected bodies, three of which were enclosed as in a net, by the Alberoche and the Tagus.

"Had Napoleon been there," Napier says, "his stroke would have been swift and deadly. Joseph was slow."

Talavera. Fortunately, Sir Arthur penetrated the enemy's design in time, and selected the position of Talavera as suited to receive the shock of battle ; but it was only after the most earnest solicitations that he succeeded in inducing the Spanish General Cuesta to avoid the ruin impending over his head, by uniting the Spanish *Corps d'Armée* under his orders with the British in the position selected at Talavera.

Busaco. After Massena had been repulsed in his attack on the heights of Busaco, 29th September, 1810, finding Sir Arthur's position impregnable, and seeing it could not be turned by the Mondego, because the allies might pass that river on a shorter line, the French Marshal held a Council of War, at which it was proposed to return to Spain. At that moment, by means of a peasant, a road was discovered leading from Mortagao over the Caramula ridge to Boyalva; and the Marshal resolved to turn Wellington's left. To mask the move-

ment, skirmishing was renewed so vigorously that a general battle was expected; but an ostentatious display of men, disappearance of baggage, and casting up of earth on the hill covering the road to Mortagao, indicated some other design; and Sir Arthur was not long in seeing into the enemy's intention, and his own Army was immediately put in movement to retire across the Mondego.

March of the French after the battle.

This flank march, made by Massena with a view of surprising the left of the allies, has been condemned by Napier as a violation of the soundest principles of war.

He threw himself, with his whole Army in disorder, into a narrow defile, within ten miles of an enemy in position. While enclosed in that narrow gorge, he was not in a condition to fight, while Wellington, within four hours' march of either end of the defile, might have presented 12,000 or 14,000 troops at Sardos to head the French in the defile, and assailed their rear with his other divisions. Massena, at the same time, abandoned his line of communication, without having established another.

The maxim that, as a general rule, battles are to be avoided, is particularly applicable to defensive war, as marches and other circumstances frequently alter and diminish the resources of the enemy more surely than the most signal victory.

Defensive war.

In defensive war, the talent of the General is shown in compelling the enemy to attack at a point where every preparation has been made to oppose the most formidable resistance. The choice of a good position, with the flanks well supported, the rear open and at the same time protected, the front well covered with obstacles rendering the

attack difficult, brave and well-disciplined troops, energy and determination on the part of the commander, are amongst the prominent conditions of success in defensive battles.

Offensive battles.

Offensive battles depend more on skill in strategical and tactical combinations, intelligence and quickness on the part of the troops in manœuvring, with a spirit of excitement prevailing in the ranks, an ardent thirst for the attack.

Marmont's description of the Duke of Wellington's system.

Wellington's system in the Peninsula is thus described by Marmont:—"The English General, either owing to his natural character, or from his skill in apprehending the position in which he was placed, perceived, at a glance, the method it was advisable for him to pursue, and never swerved from the system thus adopted.

"For a long time he worked incessantly on the misery and destitution of the French Army—a powerful auxiliary, which the force of circumstances placed in his hands.

"His own Army better provided, able to concentrate every day, had always the power of moving, and always stood in a menacing attitude. Military and political calculations alone governed his movements; whilst the French Army, a prey to penury and want of every description, exhausted with duty, was daily losing its strength and resources." [17]

Thus, when Massena, at the head of a superior force,

[17] When Severus entered Caledonia, he had endless fatigues to sustain, forests to cut down, mountains to level, morasses to dry up, and bridges to build. He had no battle to fight, and saw no enemies in a body; instead of appearing, they exposed their flocks of sheep and oxen, with the design to surprise the Roman soldiers who should straggle from the main body for the sake of plunder. He lost 50,000 men without subduing the country.

threatened to invade Portugal, Wellington posted himself behind two strong places; and, covered by the Coa as well, waited till the French Army had exhausted some of their resources. When these places capitulated, and he apprehended being attacked himself, he took up a position at Busaco; and, after the repulse of the French in that battle when they manœuvred to turn his flank, he disappeared, and retired within the strong lines at Torres Vedras.

"The English General there waited patiently until want and misery had almost disorganized and destroyed the French Army. Pursuing his system to the extreme, he even left the enemy undisturbed within cannon shot, although he knew him not to be in a condition to fight, being weakened by the absence of 15,000 or 20,000 men, who had gone in quest of provisions without their arms. Reduced one-half, the French Army returned into Spain, after having abandoned its artillery and stores for want of horses to drag them, and with half the cavalry dismounted. In fact, having suffered immense losses, although no fighting had taken place except the battle of Busaco and two trifling engagements on the retreat.

"This was always Wellington's system; and, later, at Waterloo, when opposed to Napoleon, he still gave battle in a defensive position.

"Defensive battles may be looked upon as *professional* battles. Offensive battles, well prepared and delivered, are the emanations of genius."

Accuracy of the French Marshal questionable.

The battles of Salamanca, Vittoria, and the battles on the Nive and Nivelle, as well as at Orthes and Toulouse, surely afford ample grounds to contest the accuracy of the French Marshal's assertion that

Wellington always pursued the same system. At the same time, whether Marmont is correct or not, his observations develop a theory deserving of attention by those who have to conduct a war against superior forces.

That Wellington may have repeated the same arrangement or combination in his campaigns, and found it answer to do so, no one will dispute; but, at the same time, his was a genius which was anything but barren of resources.

Napier on Wellington's plans for the campaign of 1813.

The following are stated by the English historian of the war to have been Wellington's views at the opening of the campaign of 1813:—"His plan being to operate on the enemy's great line of communication with France through the northern provinces of Spain, he so disposed his troops, spread such reports, and made such false movements, as to mask his real design. For the gathering of partidas at Arzobispo, the demonstrations in Estremadura and La Mancha, the positions of Hill at Coria and the Pass of Bejar, and the magazines formed there, were all of his ordering, and indicated a move by the Tagus or by Avila. The greater magazines at Celerico, Visen, Penamacor, Almeida, and Rodrigo, in no manner belied this; but half the Army, widely cantoned in Portugal, apparently for health, was really on the true line of operations, which was to run through the Tras-os-Montes.

"The whole Army would have crossed the Douro on the Portuguese frontier, if the necessity of keeping his right so far advanced in Spain during the winter had not barred that project; for a concentration on his left would have exposed the country on his right to incursions, and would at the same time have disclosed his real design. The modified plan was therefore adopted, of operating

with his left, ascending the right of the Douro to Esla, crossing that river to unite with the Gallicians, while the rest of the Army advancing from the Agueda, should force the passage of the Tormes. By this combination, which he hoped to effect so suddenly that the king should not have time to concentrate in opposition, the front of the allies would be changed to the right, the Douro and Carrion turned, and the enemy thrown in confusion over the Pisuerga. Then moving forward in mass, the English General could fight or turn any position taken by the king, gaining at each step more force by the junction of the Spanish irregulars, until he reached the insurgents of Biscay, gaining also new communications with the fleet, and consequently new depôts at every port opened."

The problem was to be solved by hiding the project and gaining time for the Tras-os-Montes march; and to do this, minor combinations and resources for keeping the French Armies scattered and employed, were to be freely used. In that view the bridge equipage was secretly prepared in Abrantes, and the bullock-carts to draw it came from Spain by Lamego. The improved navigation of the Duero seemed more conducive to subsist a movement by the right, and yet furnished large boats by which to pass the left over the river. The widespread cantonments permitted changes of quarters under pretence of sickness, and thus the troops were gradually closed upon the Duero without suspicion. Hill and the Spaniards in Estremadura and Andalusia always menaced the valley of the Tagus, and contributed to draw attention from the true point; but more than any other thing the vigorous excitement of and sustenance

Bridge equipage secretly prepared at Abrantes.

of the northern insurrection, occupied the enemy, scattered his forces, and rendered the success of the project nearly certain.

Employment furnished for Suchet.

Neither did Wellington fail to give ample employment to Suchet's forces; for his wings were spread for a long flight, even to the Pyrenees, and he had no desire to find that Marshal's army joined with the other French forces on the Ebro. The lynx eyes of Napoleon had scanned this point of war also, and both the king and Clausel had received orders to establish the shortest and most certain line of correspondence possible with Suchet, because the Emperor's plan contemplated the arrival of that Marshal's troops in the north; but Wellington found another task for them.

Soult's counter-attack after the passage of the Nive.

After the passage of the Nive in December, 1813, the wings of Wellington's Army were separated by that river, and Soult resolved to fall upon one of them with his whole force united. His plans were ably conceived, and he augured so well of his chances, that he desired the Minister of War to expect good news for the next day. The situation of the allies was better than he had been led to believe, as they had two more divisions than he was aware of at the point fixed for his counterstroke; still, their situation was such as to give him some right to anticipate success, for on no point was there any expectation of this formidable counter-attack. Wellington was on the right of the Nive, preparing to assault the heights where he had seen the French the evening before. Hope's troops, except some Portuguese, had retired to their cantonments; the first division was at St. Jean de Luz and Ciboure, more than six miles from the outposts; the fifth division was between these

places, at Bidart, and all exceedingly fatigued. The light division had orders to retire to Arbonne, four miles to the rear, and part of the second brigade had already marched; but fortunately Kempt, somewhat suspicious of the enemy's movements, kept the first brigade in front until he could see what was going on; he thus saved the position.

Prudence of Kempt.

If Soult, according to his original plan, had fallen with the bulk of his forces on Bussussary and Arcangues, it would have been impossible for the light division, scattered as it was over an extent of difficult ground, to have stopped him for half an hour; and if Foy and Villatte had been able to assail the flank of Hope's division by the ridge coming from Bussussary, the battle would have been won by the French. But, for some reasons unknown, Soult altered his first design. The attack was not made with that vigour and impetuosity which was necessary to success; the small force of the English at first engaged stood firm against the shock of the first attack, and while the French were hesitating, time was given for the English supports to arrive.

Desperate battle of St. Pierre.

Soult, repulsed in this attempt on the left wing of the Anglo-Portuguese Army, assaulted the right, commanded by Hill, two days after, on the 13th December; a day which will ever be memorable in the annals of the British Army as the anniversary of St. Pierre, one of the most desperate battles in the whole Peninsular War. Wellington, so early as the 10th, apprehending that Soult would finally fall upon Hill, had ordered him to be reinforced with the 6th division, which had been done; but in the night of the 12th the rain swelled the Nive, and carried away the allies' bridge

of communication, so that on the morning of the 13th Hill was completely cut off from the rest of the Army; thirty-five thousand Frenchmen approaching him in front, while another division under Paris, with the cavalry of Pierre Soult, menaced his rear. To meet these he had only 14,000 men in his front and 14 guns. To oppose Paris' division there were only 4,000 Spaniards with Vivian's cavalry, but on this occasion Soult's plans had been previously divulged, and Hill was prepared for an attack, having observed the French columns passing the Nive by the boat-bridge above Bayonne at sunset on the previous evening.

Attack of the Imperialist position at Friburg, 1644.

In the year 1644, when Condé,[18] contrary to the advice of his Generals, determined to attack the strong position of Freyburg, in which the Imperialist General, Merci, had entrenched himself, Turenne, who was well acquainted with the country, showed the Prince a defile (see page 269) by which a part of the Army might attack the left flank of the Imperial Army, whilst the remainder attacked the front and right of the position. Turenne was entrusted with the attack by the defile, Condé reserving to himself the assault of the enemy's position in front. Turenne's column having to make a considerable détour, Condé's attack was fixed to take place three hours before sunset, while Turenne set out on his march by daylight.

Turenne's flank attack.

Merci had foreseen the possibility of Turenne's flank attack, and had barred the approach to his camp on that side by an entrenchment, strengthened by abattis, and the woods on each side were lined with infantry. After prodigies of valour on both sides, Merci was obliged to yield

[18] Duke D'Enghien.



A. March of the Duke d'Enghien from Brisach.
B. March of Turenne by the ravine to attack the entrenchment.
C. Position of the Duke d'Enghien, to give time to Turenne to enter the Blotherthal Valley.
D. Retreat of the Bavarians by the Valley of St. Pierre.

his position; but he took up another a league in rear, almost as strong, where he again defied his opponent.

Condé then altered his plan, and seeing he could not drive the enemy from his position, determined to blockade him and starve him out. Merci, perceiving the design, abandoned his camp, and succeeded in making his escape, after a sharp encounter between his rear-guard and the advance of Condé's Army, losing in the affair great part of his baggage.

Halidown Hill decided by a flank attack.

A flank attack decided the battle of Halidown Hill, in 1333.

Douglas, at the head of the chivalry of Scotland, arrived at Bothville on the 19th July, in that year, in order to raise the siege of Berwick, and finding the English posted on the hill in four lines, flanked by their famous archers, the Scottish men-at-arms dismounted, and ascended the hill on foot, with great impetuosity. Laden with armour, they were soon out of breath by running up the hill; they were terribly galled by the archers, and thrown into disorder by great stones rolled down the hill upon them. Edward, seeing the decisive moment arrived, ordered a flank attack, while with a chosen body of men-at-arms and archers on horseback, he led a charge in front himself. The lacquies, who had been left in charge of the horse of the Scots, fled with them from the field at the very moment the men-at-arms might have made some defence on horseback. Twenty thousand Scots fell in the battle and pursuit, amongst them nearly all the nobility of the kingdom.

Old stratagem of an assumed timidity.

One of the oldest stratagems in war is, perhaps, that of assuming an appearance of feebleness, irresolution, or

want of courage. While thus appearing to retrograde, if measures are skilfully disguised, progress is in reality made; and often as the stratagem has been used, it still seems to be generally successful.

Some explanation of this is afforded in the natural tendency which a show of timidity on the one side has to create confidence in the opposite party; while at the same time the confidence so created is apt to degenerate into rashness, and a neglect of the common precautions necessary for security.

It was thus that Cassius, in the Parthian war, having ranged his cavalry in a front line, with the infantry in a second line concealed behind them, by then retreating with his cavalry, drew the Parthians into the snare which he had prepared for them with his infantry.

How often has baggage been placed in the way to lure the enemy, with a view to falling upon him while in disorder, engaged in plundering.

At a battle between the Poles, under Constantine Ostrowski, and the Muscovites, near the Castle of Orstea, the Poles led the enemy into a snare by feigning to retreat, which brought their pursuers under the fire of a formidable concealed battery.

The Austrians attempted the same stratagem in 1809, on the banks of the Piave, but not with like success. They occupied a strong position, in which they could have defended the passage of the river for some time; but desiring to have the advantage of fighting the French with their backs to the river, and, further, of alluring them to advance until they came under the fire of their batteries, they allowed them to cross the river without molestation. The French, however,

were too wary to be caught in the trap thus laid for them.

On the 13th August, 1793, 35,000 Royalists, under d'Elbée, Royraud, and Charette, marched to attack the army of General Tuncq, mustering 9,000. As the Republican General could present a sufficiently extended front, and he wished to conceal his weakness in numbers, he drew up his Army in two lines, and placed one of his divisions where it was concealed by the inequalities of the ground. Two battalions were then ordered to advance to within half musket-shot of the enemy. These battalions were soon compelled to retire, which they did in good order, and still keeping up their fire. The Royalists pursuing with impetuosity, fell into the snare prepared for them; the division hitherto concealed, at a signal from the drum rising suddenly as if out of the ground, delivered a well-sustained fire by files, which threw the Royalists into complete confusion.

Judicious disposition of Artillery at Wattignies.

The victory at Wattignies was in a great measure attributable to the judicious disposition of Jourdain's artillery, which was drawn up on some heights, so as to enable him to reply to that of the enemy, whilst some field-pieces, masked by the infantry, also played into the ranks of the enemy, the infantry skilfully wheeling back portions of their line to allow the light batteries to fire.

Montrose, at Aberdeen, being much inferior in numbers, placed all his best troops in one wing, and refused the other, until the enemy, advancing on the retiring wing, was assailed by the other.

Battery bearing on the flank of the Austrians at Friedland.

Seruzier proposed a movement at Friedland which had great influence on the fate of the day. Having dis-

covered a ravine practicable for artillery, from which a raking fire could be poured in upon the flank of the Austrians if their line advanced, it was arranged that the main body of the French by retiring should tempt the Austrians to advance as soon as Seruzier, having filed eight batteries of artillery round by the ravine, was ready to attack them in flank. The terrific discharge poured in by these batteries on the advancing Austrians was decisive.

At Auerstadt he executed a similar movement.

Section V.

Passage of rivers.

In ancient, as well as in modern times, there is, perhaps, no operation in war which has called forth the genius for stratagems more frequently than the passage of rivers.

One of the first maxims laid down by Jomini for the passage of a river is to deceive the enemy as to the intended point of crossing, to distract his attention, and, if possible, induce him to divide his forces, by great preparations and a great bustle, and, if necessary, false attacks at every point but the real one.

When the course of the river will permit, he recommends that a point should be selected where there is a bend in the stream, affording a good cross-fire on the point of landing, on the opposite side, so as to prevent the enemy from falling on the troops as they land. An island near the enemy's shore may be made of great assistance, such, for instance, as the Island of Lobau, the possession of which was so important to Napoleon in 1809, when he fought the battles of Essling and Wagram. A small tributary falling into the main stream, where boats

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may be collected to form a bridge, may also be very useful.[19]

If possible, the construction of the bridge should be protected by passing over a corps in boats, to form a lodgement on the opposite side. This was done recently at the passage of the Rappahannock, previous to the first battle of Fredericksburg (Burnside). Very considerable loss was sustained by the Federals in attempting to build bridges on that occasion previous to dislodging the enemy on the other side.

An army acting on the defensive must adopt measures to frustrate those operations which, according to the general rules for the attack, the enemy is likely to undertake. Where there are rivers, the fords must be watched, and all boats removed from those parts of the river which cannot be protected, and, generally, every obstruction which the nature of the locality may suggest must be prepared, in anticipation of the attempt to force a passage.

Maurice and Spinola.

By such means Maurice of Nassau prevented Spinola from crossing the Yssel and the Waal.

Cæsar.

Cæsar, meditating the passage of the Allier, in presence of Vercingentorix, marched for some days along the bank while the enemy followed the opposite bank, until they reached a wooded district, where they encamped. On the morrow, Cæsar continued his march; Vercingentorix did the same, seeing that all the Roman legions started as on former days; but Cæsar had left in ambush three cohorts from each legion, with orders to throw a bridge over the river, and raise a *tête du pont*, as

[19] At the recent siege of Vicksburg, both parties seem to have contended stoutly for the command of the Yazoo river, which falls into the Mississippi near there. On the whole, that stream appears to have been rather prejudicial to the defence of Vicksburg.

soon as the army of Vercingentorix should be at a sufficient distance. The detached cohorts, having completed the bridges as ordered, Cæsar countermarched, and passed over his whole army.

Gustavus Adolphus passed the Lic by opening on the Imperialists with seventy pieces of cannon at one point, while a detachment crossed and threw up an intrenchment at another point. Gustavus Adolphus crosses the Lic.

Coligny having thrown a bridge over the Garonne, in order to attack Castelgeloux and some other places, Montluc destroyed the bridge, by loading a wooden mill with stones and letting it float down the stream until it struck the bridge.

Alexander passed the Hydaspes by feigning the intention of forcing a passage at a different point from that at which he really intended to pass. Alexander.

He crossed the Indus in a similar manner; on that occasion an island in the river favoured his plans.

Xenophon also adopted the same stratagem.

During the combat on the Carrion, in the Peninsula War, October, 1812, the French General, Maucune, having dispersed a Portuguese regiment, between San Indro and Muriel, came upon the latter village with a strong corps, just as a mine was fired to destroy the bridge. The explosion checked the French for a moment; but suddenly a horseman, darting out at full speed, rode down, under a flight of bullets, calling out that he was a deserter; he reached the edge of the chasm, violently checked his foaming horse, held up his hands, and, exclaiming that he was a lost man, with hurried accents asked if there was no ford. The good-natured soldiers pointed to one, and the gallant fellow

looked earnestly for a few moments, as if to fix the exact spot; then wheeling his horse, kissed his hand in derision, and, bending down over his saddle-bow, dashed back to his own comrades, amidst showers of shot, and shouts of laughter on both sides. The next moment Maucune, protected by a concentrated fire of guns, passed the river at the ford thus discovered.

Moreau

Moreau, to mask his intention of crossing the Rhine at Kehl, transported his head-quarters to Landau, as if he intended to carry the war into the Palatinate; and he caused the Austrian positions on the left bank to be attacked with sufficient impetuosity to create a belief that the attacks were seriously made. The boats required for the passage were collected as if for the transport of provisions, and a report was circulated that his leading division was ordered to join the Army of Italy.

When Buonaparte signed the convention with the Sardinians in 1796, he reserved to himself the right of passing the Po at *Valence*,—rather an ingenious stratagem to impose upon Beaulieu, and persuade him that he would be attacked in front by Lonelli.[20] While the Austrians were waiting for the expected attempt to force a passage at Valence, the French Army, rapidly manœuvring by its right, descended the river, and, crossing at Plaisance, turned Beaulieu's left, leaving him only time to retire behind the Adda.

Buonaparte passes the Po at Plaisance.

This success had the effect of bringing the Duke of Parma to conclude an armistice, by which the French obtained a quantity of supplies and a pecuniary subsidy, of which they stood much in want.

[20] To assist this scheme, Buonaparte also kept his divisions dispersed, but in such a way that they could be easily united.

Wellington's passage of the Adour.

The passage of the Adour, termed by Napier one of the prodigies of war, is an excellent example of the higher order of stratagems, one which, for extensive and daring combination, will bear comparison with any operation which the genius of a General has ever conceived.

At the commencement of the year 1814, the object which engaged Wellington's chief attention was, to drive Soult's army from Bayonne, and blockade or besiege that place.[21]

How and where to cross the Adour, with a view to the investment, was a point which required deep consideration. It was a great river, with a strong current, and well guarded by troops and gunboats above Bayonne: still greater was it below the town; there the ebb-tides run seven miles an hour; there also there were gunboats and a sloop-of-war, and merchant vessels which could be armed to interrupt the passage. There was reason to apprehend that the very preparations necessary to bridge the stream, either above or below, could not be made without disclosing the design to the French; nevertheless, Wellington resolved to pass, the means adopted being proportionate to the greatness of the design.

To throw the bridge above Bayonne would involve the carriage of materials over bad roads and a difficult country; and when finished, his convoys, in passing from his magazine to the army, would not be safe, as they would have to lend their flank to Bayonne, and cross several rivers liable to floods.

A village below Bayonne promised many advantages, but the rapidity and breadth of the river at that point precluded the use of common pontoons; and the bar at

[21] NAPIER.

the mouth of the river, six miles from the town, seemed to be an obstacle to the entrance of vessels fit for a bridge from the sea, and a strong defensive force would inevitably bar the construction if they could.

At the same time, these very *difficulties*, in some degree, seemed to *favour the project*, as the very magnitude of them was such that it seemed likely they would be regarded by Soult as insuperable; and that, if his left was attacked, he would abandon the care of the Lower Adour to defend the rivers beyond the Nive, and thus the Lower Adour would be laid open for the enterprise.

To meet the natural obstacles Wellington collected forty large sailing-boats of from fifteen to twenty tons, as if for commissariat purposes. He secretly loaded them with planks and other materials for the bridge, designing that they should be joined by some gunboats and run up the Adour to a fixed point, on which he would previously direct the troops and artillery, meaning, with hawsers and pontoons, to form rafts, and pass a force to destroy a small battery near the mouth of the river, and cover the operation.

While the English General was secretly arranging this great offensive operation, Soult was diligently increasing his defensive means; and, to strengthen his left, which he believed to be menaced, he withdrew his outposts from Anglet, in front of Bayonne, enabling Wellington closely to examine the Lower Adour, and prepare with more certainty for the passage.

In the second week in February, the weather admitted of an advance, and the first operations were to turn the rivers beyond the Nive at their sources with Hill's corps, while Beresford held the French centre in check lower

down. This, it was hoped, would draw Soult's attention from the Adour below Bayonne, where the passage was to be made; but Wellington, uncertain if he could force the tributary streams with his right, designed, in that case, if his bridge was happily thrown, to operate on that line, and turn the French army by the right of the Adour: a fine conception, by which he could seize Dax and the Port de Landes, and cut off Soult from Bordeaux.

Wellington's operations during the 15th, 16th, and following days, left Soult completely at a loss to discover his adversary's object; and the Marshal's conjectures embraced every project but the true one. In his uncertainty he decided to hold the Gaves as long as he could; but, when they were forced to abandon the defensive, concentrate his whole force at Orthes, and fall suddenly upon the first of the allies' converging columns that approached him.

On the 15th February, the height of Anglet had been occupied by the Guards and Germans. Small parties were cautiously pushed towards the river through the pine forest, called the wood of Bayonne.

The total force under Hope, composed of two British and two Spanish divisions, three brigades of Anglo-Portuguese infantry, and Vandeleur's light cavalry, amounted to 28,000, with twenty pieces of artillery.

In the night of the 22nd, the first division, six 18-pounders and the rocket-battery, were cautiously filed from the causeway near Anglet towards the Adour; but, owing to the heavy state of the roads, it was not until daybreak they reached some sand-downs extending behind the pine forest to the river. The French pickets were driven into the camp at Beyris, the pontoon train

and artillery were brought down to the Adour opposite the village of Boucaut, and the 18-pounders placed in battery on the bank. The light troops closed to the edge of the marsh which covered the right of the French camp, and the enemy's attention was attracted by false attacks at Arcangue and Urdains, which were prolonged beyond the Nive by the fifth division.

It was intended that the arrival of the gunboats and chasse-marées at the mouth of the Adour, should have been simultaneous with that of the troops, but the wind continued contrary, none were to be seen, and Hope, whose firmness no untoward event could ever shake, resolved to attempt the passage with the army alone.[22]

The enemy's flotilla opened fire about nine o'clock on the morning of the 23rd, but Hope's artillery and rockets replied so sharply, that three gunboats were soon sunk, and the rest took refuge higher up the river. Sixty men of the Guards, in the meantime, were rowed over in one of the pontoons in face of a picket, which retired without firing a shot.

A hawser was then stretched across, and a raft formed with the remainder of the pontoons, to work during slack tide, by which means the force on the right bank was increased to 600 men, supported by part of the rocket troop, the whole under Colonel Stopford.

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[22] "*St. Swer, March* 1, 1814.

". . . The movements of the right of the Army, which I detailed to your lordship in my last despatch, were intended to divert the enemy's attention from the preparations at St. Jean de Luz and Passages for the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, and to induce the enemy to move his force to his left, in which objects they succeeded completely; but upon my return to St. Jean de Luz, on the 19th, I found the weather so unfavourable at sea, and so uncertain, that I determined to push forward my operations on the right, notwithstanding that I had still the Gave d'Oleron, the Gave de Pau, and the Adour to pass."

Two battalions, under General Maucomble, were detached from Bayonne, to ascertain Hope's movements. Colonel Stopford's force on the right bank, aided by the artillery on the opposite bank, was well posted to repel this reconnaissance, and after a brief contest, the French, staggered by a well-directed discharge of rockets, retired hastily into the place.

During the night, the pontoons used as row-boats were substituted for rafts, and, carrying 15 men at each turn, the whole of General Howard's division, 6,000 men, with some cavalry, were on the right bank by the 24th.

On the same day, the flotilla made its appearance under a press of sail with a strong breeze, making for the mouth of the river. The men-of-war boats in the most gallant style led the way over the bar; the native crews of the remaining boats, kept in obedience by officers of engineers, with armed sappers, were constrained to follow, and the flotilla effected the passage with the loss of six of their number.

The boats were immediately moored, the sappers worked incessantly night and day, and by noon of the 26th, a bridge was passable about two miles and a half below the town of Bayonne, which, for the remainder of the war, served as the regular communication with the army from St. Jean de Luz and Spain, by the road of Dax, thus avoiding all the difficult and exhausted country along the foot of the Pyrenees. The same evening, after a sharp affair, the garrison was forced to withdraw into their defences, and Bayonne was blockaded on both sides of the Adour.

Some idea of the difficulties attending the establishment of this bridge, and the ingenuity and forethought

requisite in its construction, may be formed from a short description of its various parts.

Description of the bridge at Bayonne.

Twenty-six chasse-marées, moored head and stern, at distances of 40 feet reckoning from centre to centre, were first bound together with ropes; two thick cables were then carried loosely across the decks, and the ends being cast over the walls on each bank, were strained and fastened in various ways to the sands. They were sufficiently slack to meet the spring tides, which rose fourteen feet, and planks were laid upon them without any supporting beams. The boom, moored with anchors above and below, was a double line of masts connected with chains and cables, so as to form a series of squares; hence, if a vessel broke through the outside, the shock would turn her round in the square, and she would become entangled with the floating wrecks through which she had broken. Gunboats, with aiding batteries on the banks, with furnaces for heating shot, were stationed to protect the boom, and row-boats were furnished with grappling irons to tow off fire-vessels.

Had the General in command at Bayonne kept strong guards with a field-battery on the right bank of the Adour, the British troops could not have been passed over, nor could any vessels have crossed the bar; and, in all probability, this stupendous work would never have been achieved. It is, therefore, perhaps, allowable to say, that the genius shown by Wellington in the design of this undertaking is eclipsed by the skill and ingenuity which he displayed in keeping the whole thing a profound secret from the enemy.

Passage of the Beresina.

As a military operation, the passage of the Adour is far more interesting than the celebrated passage of the

Beresina. That event has been classed by Jomini amongst the miraculous; and it certainly does seem extraordinary that, hemmed in as the remains of the Grand Army was at that moment, any portion of it should have succeeded in crossing the river. The point at which the passage was effected was the accidental discovery of an intelligent cavalry officer; to Napoleon must be granted the merit of having decided to attempt the passage at that particular point; to the intelligence, and fortitude, and almost superhuman energy of the old engineer, Eblee, and his chosen band of pontonniers, the French Army were deeply indebted or the construction of the bridge.

Bridge at Vienna.

The Austrians, in evacuating Vienna, partially destroyed their bridge; but whilst the French were engaged in constructing a bridge on the right bank, the Austrians might easily have returned and repaired theirs, and turned the flank of the French. It was, therefore, necessary to destroy the Austrian bridge entirely. To spare the effusion of blood which that would have cost, Napoleon adopted the ingenious stratagem of making preparations as if he intended to repair the bridge, which being seen by the Austrians, they destroyed the bridge themselves.

Passing of defiles.

The passage of a defile is an operation which has some affinity to the crossing of a river.

If an enemy is engaged in a mountainous country through which there is only one defile practicable for the march of an Army, the maxim is that the possession of it is more likely to be gained by art than force.

In such an enterprise, too much caution cannot be used; the neighing of a horse, the light of a pipe, the glittering of the sun on the soldiers' arms, the dust made by the march of troops, the sound of their voices in

talking, or of their arms as they move, may betray the design, and render its execution impossible.

Hannibal enters the gorges of the Alps.

When Hannibal had marched for ten days along the Rhone, he found himself in a position of great danger and difficulty; for as long as the army had remained in the plain, the chiefs had abstained from molesting him; but on his entering the passes, the Allobroges assembled, and seized upon the defile through which he must necessarily pass. If they had concealed their plans, they must have utterly destroyed the Carthaginian army; but as their intentions became evident prematurely, this plot, though it caused considerable loss to the Carthaginians, proved no less destructive to themselves. Hannibal halted, and encamped at the foot of the heights, while he sent forward some of the Gauls, who served him as guides, with instructions to discover the designs and plans of the enemy. From these spies Hannibal learnt that during the day the barbarians kept a careful guard at their post, but that when night came they retired to a neighbouring town.

Upon this information, Hannibal's plans were immediately formed. Leading out his men, he brought them in sight of the enemy at the entrance of the defile, where he encamped. At night, after watch-fires had been lit, Hannibal himself, with a small chosen band lightly equipped, penetrated through the defile, and took possession of those points which the enemy held in the day, but deserted at night.

General Lee, by holding the passes, covers the march of his army into Maryland.

The movement made by General Lee, after the battle of Chancellorville, into Maryland and Pennsylvania, turning the right of Hooker's Army, affords an illustration of the importance of defiles in war.

The Blue Mountains, running from Harper's Ferry in a south-westerly direction to the southern limit of the State of Virginia, are intersected by several gaps (as they are termed in America), through which alone it is possible for an army to penetrate into the Shenandoah Valley from the eastern slope of the mountain ridge.

The three principal gaps are Snicker's, Ashby's, and Chester's. The moment Hooker discovered Lee's intention of moving round his right, he sent off his cavalry to secure the gaps, and attack Lee engaged in his flank march; but it was too late: General Fitzhugh Lee was already in possession of Snicker's; Chester's was occupied by General A. P. Hill; and Stuart, with his redoubtable horsemen considerably in advance of Ashby's Gap, at a little place called Aldie, waited for the Federals under Pleasanton, in hopes, by feigning a retreat, to draw them into the gap, which is of such natural strength that the Confederates would no doubt have given a good account of their opponents if they had succeeded in drawing them into the trap prepared for them.

With these passes in his possession, the Confederate General was able to move his whole army unmolested along the valley, which is screened by the mountain ranges already described as stretching across the State of Virginia.

Maxim of Sertorius.

Sertorius frequently resorted to bribery to secure the passage of a defile, and when this method was commented upon, he said he did not buy the passage, he only bought the time that would be consumed in taking it by other means.

Such a method of clearing a defile can seldom be

practicable; when it is so, it has, at all events, the recommendation of saving many valuable lives.

Take the road which can be passed at the smallest cost.

On the same grounds, when there is a choice of roads, both equally suited for the object contemplated, it is advisable to select one which is not likely to be defended by the enemy.

When the French commenced their march into Lombardy in 1515, they were apprised that the Swiss were prepared to oppose their progress at all the usual passes. Francis I., then acting on the advice of General Trevulci, sent detachments to each of the great routes, to distract the attention of the Swiss, while he effected a passage with the main body of the army over a mountain pass discovered to him by a peasant.

Cæsar Borgia, the Duke of Valentinois, intending to pass through Tuscany, and apprehending the mountain passes would be closed against him, sent to demand a passage from the Florentines, and then passed, without waiting for their answer.

Broussin, a French Chef de Brigade, quitted Beneventum, January, 1799, to encounter the Neapolitan insurgent army. The latter being posted in a defile which could not be forced, Broussin placed a battalion of his force in ambuscade in a ditch concealed by a thicket; he then posted some cavalry behind a farmhouse, and despatched the rest of his troops to assault the defile and retire, so as to draw the enemy after them. This scheme completely succeeded; the ambuscade, rising suddenly, poured in a volley, which threw the insurgents into complete disorder, and a charge of cavalry completed their overthrow.

Sale's march to Jellalabad.

Towards the close of Sale's march to Jellallabad, the

tribes were seen clustering on the steep hills on either side, and soon poured themselves down on the rearguard, vainly striving to sweep off that portion of the force.

Dennie particularly distinguished himself on that occasion by the skill with which he drew the enemy into his toils and the vigour of his onslaught. Placing his cavalry in ambush, he brought up his infantry to the attack, and ordered them to advance firing. Adopting then the stratagem which has so often been repeated and yet seems seldom to fail, he wheeled about as though panic-stricken, and fled. The enemy, after a brief pause of wonder, believed they had accomplished a great victory, and, sending up a wild shout, plunged forward in pursuit, as they believed, of the flying Feringhees. They were soon in the clear, open space to which Dennie had designed to lure them. The cavalry, at whom they had laughed while on the hills, now dashed in upon them, and such was the slaughter which ensued, that the right arms of the British horsemen are said to have been wearied with the blows they struck on that day.

Importance of fortifying defiles in anticipation of an invasion.

If defiles form part of the defences of a country, they should be fortified, in anticipation of invasion. Through the neglect of this precaution, 10,000 men may enter where 40,000 could not force a passage, had some simple defences been constructed.

It was by the timely raising of the citadel of Modrisa on an elevated position of natural strength that Scanderberg defied the power of the Turks.

When the Jews prepared to defend Jerusalem against Holofernes, the High Priest Eliachim sent letters throughout the country adjoining the route by

which Holofernes was expected, directing the passes and the summits of the mountains to be occupied.

If the enemy, by such means, is only obliged to make a détour, something is gained, as he must consume time and provisions, as well as probably lose men.

In 1708, when the Duke of Orleans was on the way to lay siege to Tortosa, the enemy broke up an important pass known by the name *Del Asse*, and, although no troops were left to defend it, the Army of the Two Crowns was detained half a day in removing the impediments to their progress, and lost a number of animals in the work. All places are not, of course, equally favourable; but in a very short time damage may be done to a mountain road the repair of which will require several hours' work.

The Athenians and Lacedemonians, by occupying Mount Olympus, obliged Xerxes to go round by Macedonia.

Retreats.

A well-conducted retreat reflects great credit on the military genius of the General who commands.

Depression of spirits produced by.

One of the most serious difficulties to be contended with on such occasions is the depression of spirits produced amongst the men by the idea of retiring. When the soldier sees the enemy in front of him he sees only one danger, but when there is an enemy in rear pursuing him the danger is often exaggerated in his imagination. At such a time, the power of the personal character of the General is tested; and the fortitude of the men will be sustained in proportion to the confidence with which they are inspired by the genius and ability of their leader.

The foresight of the General should enable him to

discover in time when a retreat will be necessary; and the movement should not be deferred until a close pursuit becomes inevitable. When pressed closely by the enemy in retreating, time may still be gained by a judicious choice of positions, to be abandoned at a suitable moment, thus obliging the enemy to make dispositions which retard his progress. A well-appointed artillery should be with the rearguard when this plan is adopted.

The retreat of Marmont before the Prussians is an example. Marmont operated with 6,000 men on the left bank of the Aube. Blucher, with 45,000 men, passed the river at Planchy, and marched against the French. Marmont took up a position on the heights of Vindè, in rear of Sezanne. Everything evinced a determination on the part of the French to give battle. Blucher made his dispositions accordingly to carry the position, bringing up thirty pieces of artillery in battery. At a favourable opportunity, the French moved off in good order. The Prussians pursued; but, during the whole day, were kept at a distance, and frequently obliged to halt to assemble their forces. The French reached Ferte Gauchier, exchanging cannon-shots the whole of the way, but with trifling loss, and then took up a position at Morin.

In 1706, the King of Spain's troops were completely deceived as to the retreat of the allies under the Marquis de las Minas from near Guadalaxera.

The news of the retreat was brought to the camp of the King by some deserters, who reported that the allies had retreated in the direction of Alcala. The King's troops immediately set out in pursuit; but the allies, who had commenced their retreat at night, as if in the direction of Alcala, had done so expressly to

mislead the enemy, and had afterwards changed the direction of their columns.

Means of deceiving the enemy as to line of retreat.

In order to deceive the enemy as to the line of retreat, prisoners have sometimes been afforded facilities to escape after having been first deceived as to the line of retreat by a conversation purposely carried on within their hearing. A good deal of management is required in letting the prisoners escape just at the right moment.

A confidential soldier may be despatched as a deserter at the same time, to confirm the story of the prisoners who have escaped. In order further to carry out this scheme, traces of the track of an army should be placed upon the wrong road.

Had proper precautions been observed by the Consuls Titus Veturius Catonus and Spurius Posthumus, they might have escaped the Caudine Forks, for they were drawn into that snare by soldiers disguised as shepherds, specially employed by the Samnite General, Caius Portius. These men approached the Roman army so as to be taken prisoners, and then gave the information that the Samnites had invested Luceria, a place allied to Rome. The Romans marched to succour Luceria, on the road to which place there was a defile difficult of access and egress. The outlet to the defile had been previously blocked by the Samnites, and as soon as the Romans had fairly entered the defile, they also closed the entrance.

Stratagems used by the ancients.

The ancients frequently aided themselves in retreating by collecting large quantities of wood and setting fire to it in the rear of their line of march, so as to impede pursuit.

After the battle of Vittoria, Joseph's army was so

hotly pursued on its flight to Pampeluna, that the rear-guard, unable to destroy the bridges on the road, set fire to the villages behind them to delay their pursuers.

After the defeat at Marienthal, Turenne held his ground behind a defile until night; then, aided by the darkness, and the intricacy and gloom of a wood, he made good his retreat, the Imperialists dreading an ambuscade.

In 1743, Marshal Saxe evacuated the Castle of Wiex in presence of the Austrians, by keeping up a vigorous fire of artillery, in order to conceal his movements from the enemy encamped on the other side of the river.

Marshal Luxemburg effected his retreat unmolested by the Imperialists, by taking up a formidable position, and fortifying it as if with the intention of remaining there.

Much may be done by light troops in covering a retreat, by cutting down trees, breaking up roads, &c., as already observed.

Pompey at Brundusium, intending to leave Italy and change the seat of war, before embarking, caused the roads to be broken up to impede Cæsar's march; across some he cut ditches and placed a row of palisades, or blocked them up with gabions. The approaches to the harbour he closed with a boom. Having made these preparations, the walls of the place were manned by a few archers who made a show of holding the town, while the main body embarked. The archers got safe away afterwards by paths with which they were familiar.

The heroic Ney, in charge of the rear-guard on the retreat from Moscow, is a model for those entrusted with a similar duty.

CHAP. VII.

Ney in command of rear-guard in Russia.

Napoleon, perplexed with difficulties, after issuing various orders, exclaimed, "Ney's position makes me uneasy; what is to become of him?" And certainly the position of that dauntless warrior was one of a singularly trying description at that moment, requiring all the *sang froid*, valour, and perseverance even of his intrepid nature.

"All the Cossacks in the world will not hinder me from executing my orders, or make me budge an inch until they are fulfilled!" were his words. 6,000 infantry, 300 cavalry, and 12 pieces of artillery composed his whole force. He was surrounded by the light troops of the enemy, harassing him in every movement. His march was in close, compact order, always ready to receive an attack. In a dense fog, the advanced guard of the French came upon Milloradowitz' corps. Ney, clearing the ravine which separated him from the enemy, overthrew their first line, broke through their second, and would have routed the whole corps, but for the murderous effect of their artillery. The Russians, however, were so staggered by the impetuosity of his attack, that they feared to follow him when he retired. Ney then lighted his bivouac-fires, the Russians did the same; after a few hours' repose, the French Marshal moved off in the middle of the night, determined to put the Borysthenes between his small corps and a foe he could not hope to conquer. But on gaining the banks of the river, new perils awaited him. The plains swarmed with Cossacks, charging from all quarters, and pouring in grape from their light artillery. By hastening the march, a wood was gained, which obliged the enemy to make a détour, and enabled the French light infantry

to do some execution amongst them. When the French were on the point of reaching Orsza, and congratulating themselves on having got rid of their pursuers, bivouac-fires were suddenly descried, but whether indicative of friendly aid at hand, or fresh enemies to contend with, was a mystery. Ney despatched a reconnoitring party; they were received with a volley. Furious at seeing new dangers thus spring out of the earth, he was preparing to open a passage with his sword, when the whole was discovered to be a ruse of Platow's,—"a camp formed in the desert," in the hope of alarming the French, and inducing them to surrender.



Retreating through a defile is attended with great risk if there is time for the enemy to attack the rear-guard after the advance and centre are enclosed in the pass. It is advisable, therefore, to include the head of a pass, on such occasions, within two or three lines of entrenchments, one within the other, so that as the troops diminish, they may have a smaller line to defend.

Retreating through a defile.

The battle of Senef, in 1674, was an attack made by Condé on the rear-guard of the Spanish Army after the main body had got well enclosed in a defile.

Montluc mentions that the Spanish Army, under Don Alvaro de Cenda, having to pass a defile in retreating before Marshal Brissac, the cavalry were sent into the defile first, and the infantry received the shock of the French attack, because, if the cavalry had been overthrown, they would have caused great confusion amongst the infantry in the defile.

If there are several defiles leading in the same direction, it may, perhaps, be advisable to make use of all of them.

Unless, in a case of great necessity, a defile should not be entered when there is not sufficient daylight remaining to get through before dark.

When a retreat through a defile is anticipated, the defile itself should be taken possession of as soon as possible; and, as spies have a favourable opportunity of ascertaining the numbers of an Army at such a moment by seeing the battalions in column and counting them, persons in the garb of peasants, or having a suspicious appearance, in the vicinity of a defile, should be made prisoners.

Cæsar, harassed by Pompey, on his retreat after the battle at Durazzo, halted at his old camp at Asparagium, and, having unloaded his baggage, sent out his cavalry as if to forage, but brought them in again by another gate. Pompey, believing Cæsar's cavalry had really gone to forage, sent his out also. Cæsar then decamped in the night. A similar stratagem is recorded in the campaigns of Marshal Schomberg, after his famous retreat from Waren.

Cæsar retreating before 200,000 Helvetians, kept a day's march ahead of them; on reaching the Rhone, they had considerable difficulty in crossing, owing to the rapidity of the stream, and only succeeded in passing over 30,000 men on the first day. Cæsar surprised this body in the night while they were thus separated from the main body, and completely routed them.

Banner, the Swedish Marshal, with 14,000 men, pursued by 40,000 imperialists under Gallas, saw no hope but in deceiving the enemy as to the line of his retreat. He sent his wife and those of his officers, and his baggage by Poland into Lower Pomerania; at the same time, knowing the Elector of Brandenburg to be an ally of the imperialists, he bribed a Prussian officer to procure a guide to conduct his Army by the woods along the Notez. This fact being conveyed to the knowledge of Gallas by the Prussian officer, as it was intended it should be, the imperialists were thereby induced to march into Poland; the scheme having so far succeeded, Banner after dark made a countermarch, determined to force the corps of Count Bouchain, which guarded the passage of the Oder, before Gallas could cross Lake Custrin. Bouchain having followed Gallas, Marshal Banner was agreeably disappointed, on reaching the Oder, to find his passage unopposed. The chagrin of the imperialists was proportionately great on finding they had been thus duped.

Keeping camp fires burning to conceal a movement, like feigning a retreat, is an old stratagem, used in the time of Mithridates, and probably before, but still not worn out.

In 1835, in consequence of the successes of Abdel Algeria.

Kader, General Trezel, commanding at Oran, was despatched with 2,500 men and five or six guns on the road towards Maskara, and advanced as far as the banks of the Sig. During his march he was attacked by skirmishers, and suffered so much, that although the enemy had been repulsed on every occasion, he felt unable to proceed any further. In order to save appearance on his retreat, he determined to return to Arzen instead of Oran, and, fearing that arrangements might have been made by Abdel Kader to attack him on the direct route, he skirted the hills which form the boundary of the valley of the Sig on the west, intending to come out into the open country which surrounds the Gulf of Arzin by a defile below the junction of the Sig and the Habia, where the united streams take the name of the Makta (ford). The Emir devised his intention, and at once despatched a body of cavalry, each carrying a foot soldier behind him to occupy the pass. The head of the French column arrived there about the middle of the day, the soldiers terribly exhausted with the heat. On their left were hills, and on their right a marsh, formed by the Makta, and the passage between was so narrow that the carriages which contained the ammunition and the wounded could only pass singly. In this conjuncture, the Emir launched his troops upon the column, and struck a panic into the whole force. Only one carriage containing wounded was saved; the ammunition carts were all lost. General Trezel, with the greatest difficulty, succeeded in bringing the survivors into Arzew at eight o'clock at night, after marching sixteen hours, during fourteen of which they were constantly engaged with the enemy. No less than 500 men

were left on the line of march. Abdel Kader carried off a howitzer on this occasion, the first he ever possessed.

After the victory gained by Massena over Generals Korsakow and Holza at Zurich, in 1799, Suwarrow thus addressed his officers: "You will be answerable with your lives for another pace that you retreat. I am going to repair the faults you have committed. I will show no mercy; so stand firm as a wall."

At Austerlitz, 2nd December, 1805, when the Russians, cannonaded by the French artillery, were making a painful retreat over the frozen lake, but still with unbroken ranks, Napoleon, seeing the cannon-balls glide along the ice, came up at a gallop, and said to the commandant of artillery, "You are wasting time; those masses must be swallowed up. Fire on the ice, and break it." Seruzier immediately pointed eight of his howitzers, so that the almost perpendicular fall of the heavy projectiles broke through the ice. Several other batteries then followed his example, and, in a short time, 15,000 Russians and Austrians were buried in the waters of the lake.

Russian campaign of 1812. Retreat of Barclay de Tolly.

The retreat conducted by Barclay de Tolly, in the Russian campaign of 1812, has been much admired.[23] Napoleon, on arriving at Witepsk on 27th July, thought he had at last an immediate prospect of the battle he had so long desired. The Russian Army lay encamped before him, and at that moment no doubt it was Barclay's

[23] Such was the outcry raised against the cautious system pursued by Barclay de Tolly at the commencement of this campaign, that he was removed from the supreme command.

He then, without hesitation, nobly accepted a subordinate command. He is now generally acknowledged to have been one of the greatest amongst the many great Generals who were his contemporaries.

intention to fight, in order to give Bragathion time to join him. Napoleon announced to his staff a battle for the morning; his parting words to Murat were, "To-morrow, at five o'clock—the sun of Austerlitz." During the night, intelligence from Bragathion arrived which relieved Barclay from any necessity for either fighting or remaining in the position he then occupied, and his retreat was instantly commenced, and the position evacuated before morning. At daylight, Murat sent word to the Emperor he was about to pursue the Russians, who had already disappeared. Napoleon would not believe but the Russian Army was still in front. At length he mounted his horse. Every step he took destroyed his illusion, and he soon found himself in the midst of the camp Barclay had just deserted.

Everything about it exhibited the science of war: its advantageous site; the symmetry of all its parts; the exact and exclusive nicety in the use to which each of them had been destined; the order and neatness which thence resulted; in fine, nothing left behind; not one weapon nor a single valuable; no trace; nothing, in short, in this sudden and nocturnal march which could demonstrate beyond the bounds of the camp the route which the Russians had taken. "There appeared more order" (says Segur) "in their defeat than in our victory." A Russian soldier, who was surprised asleep under a bush, was the solitary result of that day which was expected to be so decisive.

War in the Caucasus.

In the war in the Caucasus, Woronzoff received orders from the Emperor to take Dargo at any price. Schamyl, finding himself unable to defend that fortress, and also regarding it as of no strategic value, allowed it

to be taken; but when the Russians commenced their retreat, he attacked them with such impetuosity in the forest of Itchkeri, that the whole force would have been annihilated, had not Woronzoff, by means of some Circassian spies, sent an intimation of his situation to General Freitag, with orders to hasten to his assistance.

Rallying fugitives.

When a retreat degenerates into a rapid and disorderly flight, some officers of experience should be immediately despatched to suitable points, in order to collect and rally the fugitives at those points, and a general rallying-point should at the same time be determined upon and made known.

While officers retain control over their men, a retreat upon several lines is to be avoided, particularly in an enemy's country, as each separate column is a separate mark for the enemy's assaults, and affords him additional means of impeding the retreat by such measures as cutting bridges, breaking up roads, destroying fords, &c.

Taking security for contributions.

When obliged suddenly to evacuate a country which has been laid under contribution, but before there has been time to collect the amount fixed, some of the principal inhabitants may be seized and held as hostages until the amount has been paid up.

Surprises—maxims relating to.

Before attempting a surprise, a very exact knowledge of the ground and everything connected with the enemy's position should be obtained.

Small parties should scour the country in all directions, to prevent intelligence from being communicated.

When troops have arrived in a place or camp fatigued after a long march, the moment is favourable for a surprise, unless their discipline is very good.

In the war in Spain, 1708, the regiment Louvigni

were surprised immediately after taking up their quarters at Bennavarre.

From not having properly examined the place on entering, a body of the enemy had remained unobserved in an old castle in the suburb, from which, at an appointed time, they issued forth and attacked the town with loud shouts. The Louvigni regiment tried to take possession of the old castle, but, being repulsed, they had no choice but to surrender.

Weather has an effect.

Bad weather also favours a surprise; the winter season also affords the advantage of long nights.

Surprises generally succeed best when undertaken by troops from a distance, provided the distance is not so great as to render it necessary for the troops to bivouac by the way, as the traces of a bivouac might betray the enterprise.

The enemy's alarm-posts, as well as the points in his position about which he is most anxions, may sometimes be discovered by giving a false alarm.

Maxims.

For the purpose of a surprise, the troops, as well as all implements and other accessories required, should be brought from different points, and not all assembled until the last moment.

Much forethought is necessary to see that nothing which can be required is omitted in the preparations; in fact, good preparations almost constitute the soul of a surprise. One very important requisite is generally a good supply of guides. The allies failed in surprising Tortosa in 1708, through an unfortunate shot, which killed the guide, who was to have led them to a point on the possession of which the success of the enterprise depended.

If the preparations for a surprise are made in a walled town, the design may be kept secret by closing the gates, so that no one can convey intelligence to the enemy's outposts.

Napoleon closed the gates of Verona before the battle of Arcola, to prevent any one leaving the town to give information of his movements.

On an expedition to effect a surprise, each man should be made to understand his particular duty, as far as the same can be defined; as, for example, one man should be told off to reply to the enemy's fire, while another attempts the escalade.

Difficulty of keeping a surprise secret.

There is great difficulty in preventing a scheme for a surprise from being divulged; and if before the attempt is made the enemy should be found to have strengthened the point intended to be surprised, the enterprise should be abandoned, as the probability is that information of it has reached the enemy.

Measures when prematurely discovered.

If the attack has commenced it may be persevered in, if there is a reserve sufficiently strong to meet the enemy's reinforcements; if not, steps should be taken to retire, doing at the same time any damage which is possible, such as spiking guns or throwing down works. Another course is certainly sometimes open when any strong point has been gained—which is, to hold that point and defy the enemy; upon the prudence of such a course the commander on the spot must be the judge.

The importance of not allowing men to change duties is not generally known; and those who wish for that indulgence probably often look upon the rule as unnecessarily stringent which debars them from what

appears to be merely a trifling accommodation; but, viewed in the proper light, there is no regulation which should be more rigidly enforced; for, in actual warfare, a soldier, holding traitorous correspondence with the enemy, may be foiled in his plans, by not being able to get placed upon sentinel, or other duty, at the critical moment; a difficulty which could generally be surmounted if the practice of the service permitted a change of duties.

In the year 1757, while the Allied Army was waiting an attack from the Prussians, in a strong position near Eisenach, a plan was formed for the capture of Seydlitz and a corps of 1,200 men under his orders, stationed at Gotha: 8,000 men were despatched for this purpose, and, after a night-march, succeeded in coming upon Seydlitz by surprise about eight in the morning. The old Hussar, however, effected his escape, with a loss of only twenty men.

A thick fog rising soon afterwards, the idea occurred to Seydlitz that it might assist him in recovering his quarters. For this purpose he divided his force into twenty small detachments, causing some of his men to dismount and represent infantry. Having made his arrangements, he attacked the town with his Hussars. Taken, in their turn, by surprise, and seeing troops in all directions, but without being able to ascertain their numbers on account of the fog, the French became alarmed at the prospect of being surrounded, and beat such a hasty retreat that in two hours there was not a Frenchman in the place.

Seydlitz followed in pursuit, took forty prisoners, killed nearly as many more, captured a quantity of baggage, and very nearly took two of their Generals.

Surprise of Aroyo del Molino, by Hill.

The surprise of Aroyo del Molino by Hill, in October, 1811, was a very brilliant affair.

Information having been received that Gerard's corps was marching on Torre Mocha, General Hill determined to try to intercept him and bring him to an action. Having moved for this purpose with the corps under his command to Almesca, the British troops were there placed so as not to be seen, and no fires allowed.

Everything which could be ascertained respecting the enemy tended to assure Hill that they had no suspicion of his proximity, and also that their outposts were rather negligent. He, therefore, decided to attack them before they could march in the morning.

The town of Aroyo del Molino is situated at the foot of one extremity of a mountain range, running from it to the rear in the form of a crescent, almost everywhere inaccessible, the two points being about two miles asunder, the Truxello road running round that to the eastward. The ground over which the troops had to manœuvre being a plain, Hill's object was to place a body of troops so as to render the retreat of the enemy impossible by any of the roads leading out of the town.

The British moved from their bivouack at two o'clock in the morning, in one column, direct upon Aroyo del Molino, until within half a mile of the town, where, under cover of a low bridge, the column closed, and divided into three. A violent storm of rain and thick mist came on at daybreak, screened by which the left column, consisting of the 71st, 92nd, and part of 60th, with the 50th, and guns in reserve, marched direct upon the town. The right column, consisting of the 28th, 34th, some Portuguese, and part of 60th, with the 39th, in reserve,

broke off to the right, so as to turn the enemy's left, and, having gained about a cannon-shot to that flank, it moved in a circular direction upon the farthest point of the crescent above described. The cavalry under Sir W. Erskine was posted so as to act wherever required. The advance of the British columns was unperceived, until they approached very near to the enemy, who was engaged in filing out of the town, the rear of his column, with some of his baggage and part of his cavalry, being still in the town. The 71st and 92nd charged into the town with cheers, and drove the enemy everywhere out of it at the point of the bayonet. The French formed squares outside the town; but, being unable to resist the impetuosity of the attack, they were compelled to retreat. The right column of the British had, however, by this time attained the point to which it was directed, and nothing was left for the French but to surrender, or disperse and ascend the mountain. They preferred the latter, and attempted to scale the cliffs in rear of the town, which might have been deemed inaccessible. In this attempt they were so hotly pursued that very few escaped.

Considerably more than 600 of the French fell on this occasion, and 1,500 prisoners, amongst whom Generals Brune and the Duke d'Arenberg, together with the whole of the enemy's artillery, were captured.

Surprise of Denain.

One of the greatest exploits in the career of Marshal Villars was the surprise of the allies in their entrenched camp at Denain, in 1712.

By means of these lines, the allies, at that time engaged in the siege of Landrecy, kept up their communication with Marchiennes, the depôt from which they

drew the munitions of war and supplies requisite to carry on the siege.

To raise the siege, Villars determined to assail the allies in these lines.

In his own account of the preparatory measures for this enterprise, the Marshal says: "The great point was so far to deceive Prince Eugene that he should think the attack intended on his lines of circumvallation, and move the bulk of his forces to Landrecy, whilst we should move the mass of ours to Denain. To effect this, it was necessary to mislead our own troops as well as the Prince and his Army, revealing the secret even to our own generals only at the moment of execution.

"All was done as I arranged with the few to whom it was absolutely necessary I should communicate my plans. Our Hussars were extended along the road to Bouchain, and on the banks of the Salle, in order that no deserter should pass from either side, and also in such a way that my attention might seem to be directed on Landrecy. Count Corigny was ordered to prepare bridges to pass the Sambre, also to collect, with all possible expedition, a quantity of fascines, in the vicinity of the lines of circumvallation, so that they might be at hand when required."

So completely was the French Army deceived as to their commander's intention, that the Lieutenant-Generals the Marquis of Albergotti and Bouzoles came to the Marshal on the 23rd, to remonstrate with him on the wildness of the scheme he had in view, representing it as one which did not hold out the smallest hope of success. "Go and rest yourself for a few hours, M. d'Albergotti," said Villars; "to-morrow morning, at

three o'clock, you will see if the enemy's intrenchments are as good as you think them."

Having completed all these measures to induce Prince Eugene to direct his attention and to draw his troops towards the extreme left of his over-extensive position, and every means having been adopted to intercept all information as to the blow really contemplated, Marshal Villars ordered a corps of thirty battalions, accompanied by artillery and pontoons, to march on the evening of the 23rd July, for the purpose of forming bridges over the Scheldt at Nerville, between Bonchain and Denain. This corps arrived at its destination early on the morning of the 24th, and having been followed during the night by the rest of the French Army, the passage of the Scheldt was effected at Nerville without opposition. The greater part of the garrison of Valenciennes had also moved against the position of Denain at the same time; and the Earl of Albemarle being thus unexpectedly attacked on both sides by an overwhelming superiority of numbers, the whole of his corps, including its commander, was either taken or destroyed before any effectual assistance could be afforded to it by the rest of the allied Army; and Prince Eugene had the further mortification of witnessing in person this disaster from the heights on the opposite side of the Scheldt which overlook the scene of the action, without being able to afford any assistance.

The first consequence of this successful stroke was the reduction of the fortified posts which had been established by the Allies to protect their line of navigation. The important post of Marchiennes, with its depôts and a considerable garrison, thus fell into the hands of the

French; and Prince Eugene was obliged to abandon the siege of Landrecy, for want of the means of carrying it on, or of subsisting his Army.

In the *Memoirs*, generally, although not justly, ascribed to Eugene, the disaster is attributed to the conduct of the Dutch. Eugene is there represented as saying, "Had they (the Dutch) maintained themselves half an hour in the post at Denain, I had been there. So I had calculated, supposing matters at the worst, had I even been deceived by the manœuvre of Villars. I found only 800 men, and three or four Generals, drowned in the Scheldt; and all those who had been surprised in the entrenchments, killed, without making any defence. Albemarle, and all the Princes and Generals in the Dutch service, were taken prisoners in attempting to rally the troops."

Surprise of a whole army more frequent in ancient than in modern times.

The surprise of a whole Army—an event of no rare occurrence in ancient times—became more difficult after the introduction of fire-arms into general use; and the practice of bivouacking, instead of encamping, has added to the difficulty, as the precise position of a bivouack cannot be so readily discovered as that of an Army under canvas.

During daylight a surprise ought to be impossible; and it would be so if every officer and soldier attended punctually to his duty.

One of the most remarkable instances of the surprise of a large force in modern times, occurred in the Russian war of 1812.

During the time Napoleon was at Moscow, the advanced guard, 30,000 strong, under Murat and Poniatowski, was posted in the neighbourhood of Winkowo.

Their outpost duties were discharged in a careless, negligent manner, which did not escape the notice of the Russians; but as it was apprehended that a premature attack might cause Napoleon to retire before the winter was sufficiently advanced to render his retreat impracticable, the Russian General refrained from any attempt on this corps until it became evident that the French were making preparations to retreat.

As soon as such a movement become apparent, General Benningsen was placed in command of a force specially designed to surprise and capture that portion of the French Army commanded by Murat.

The force under Benningsen's command was divided into five columns of attack: the first, under Count Orloff Demidoff, was destined to turn the left of the enemy and cut off his retreat. The second column was directed against the left, with orders to support Count Orloff. The third was to maintain the communication between the fourth and fifth, destined for the attack of the enemy in front, so as to prevent his reinforcing his left, which was looked upon as the decisive point.

Notwithstanding some delay in the attack beyond the appointed hour, the surprise of the French was complete. They defended themselves with great resolution until the appearance of Orloff's column in rear of their left, when a general panic ensued.

It has been said that a little more vigour thrown into the attack would have produced greater results, and that if Orloff's corps had been properly supported, Murat and his whole force must have been destroyed or made prisoners.

Thirty pieces of artillery and 1,500 prisoners were

the trophies of the Russians, together with some baggage, which bore testimony of the distressed condition to which the French were reduced, roasted cats and horse-flesh being in preparation for the table of the King of Naples.

Murat attempted to justify himself for his negligence on the ground that he was at the time confiding in an implied armistice; but no such convention whatever had any existence, and the verdict which Jomini has given is that the King of Naples allowed himself to be surprised by unpardonable negligence.

Warfare in Algeria.

The occupation of Algiers having brought the French into collision with the Kabyles, and other tribes extremely expert in surprises, the experience thus gained has probably been in a great measure the means by which those excellent troops, the French Zouaves, have been trained.

Hungry and weary, the soldier in Algerian warfare is described as arriving at the end of a toilsome day's march, only to pass a night of incessant watchfulness. Denied the use of fire, lest it should betray the position of the bivouack, in floods of rain and storms of wind, every one must be on the alert within reach of his arms; those who are on sentry crouching in the bushes like wild beasts, marking and following with their eyes the slightest movement, and in breathless silence listening for the faintest sound; the lives of all depending on their vigilance.

Arab mode of attack.

The favourite mode of attack practised by those indigenous tribes is to scale places to all appearance inaccessible, or to penetrate stealthily through thickets which seem to be impassable, and then suddenly to pour

a volley into the bivouack. The usual mode of meeting these attacks is with the bayonet. On some occasions the Zouaves, adopting their enemies' own device, have succeeded in taking their assailants suddenly in rear, by escalading rocks and swinging themselves from projection to projection, by means of bushes growing out of fissures in the cliffs.

Such a measure has generally been successful in putting these native tribes to flight.

While this constant watchfulness and energy are required, it is at the same time a point of honour among the soldiers that their comrades at rest in the bivouack are not to be disturbed unnecessarily by any false alarms.

Many instances of the presence of mind, cool and determined courage, which this sort of warfare begets, may be found related in the various narratives of Algerian warfare which have been published; the following is from the campaign of General St. Arnaud (afterwards the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in the Crimea):—

"A Kabyle column was perceived by a French sentinel in the night stealing along a wooded slope towards his post. The sentry crept back and made his report to the sergeant; the latter, having by personal observation verified the sentinel's report, and judging his own party too weak to encounter the approaching force, gave immediate orders to abandon the bivouack and retire. After proceeding a very short distance, the sergeant halted his party in a good defensive position. The Kabyles, finding the bivouack abandoned, established themselves there for the night. As soon as all was quiet, the sergeant and his party rushed out suddenly from their place of con-

cealment, which was only at about fifty paces distant, and very soon regained possession of their old resting-place."

A parallel to this is to be found in the war of 1704, when General Mayerfeld (Swede), hearing that his camp was to be attacked in the night by General Schulenberg, drew out his army, leaving all their tents standing; and when the attack was made on the camp, he and his corps were ready to fall upon the Saxons.

In the year 1843, a body of French cavalry, under the Duc d'Aumale, succeeded in surprising the camp of Abd el Kader. The Emir himself made his escape, but several thousands of his followers were made prisoners, and a valuable booty also fell into the hands of the captors.

Assuming uniform of enemy.

Surprises have frequently been effected by troops in disguise, their nationality being concealed by their personating the dress and appearance of allies or reinforcements.

In 1602, the knights of Malta, being apprised that the Turkish fleet was to stop in the port of Mahomette, a small place in Barbary, they sent 2,000 picked men, disguised in the Moslem costume, who, arriving about the time the Turks were expected, were received with acclamations. As soon as they landed, they fell upon the Mussulmen, sword in hand, and sacked the town.

During the siege of Narva, a communication from the Swedish General, Horne, to General Schleppenbach, pressing for succour, having fallen into the hands of the Czar Peter, the Czar detached a force from his camp, habited in the Swedish uniform, with directions to fire volleys, by way of signals, at a certain distance from the citadel, precisely as proposed in General Horne's

letter. Horne, not doubting that the expected reinforcement was approaching, answered the signal as agreed, by two pieces of cannon; the false Swedes then advanced, and acted a mock engagement with their Russian comrades engaged in the siege. General Horne, imagining that his supposed countrymen were likely to be defeated, detached Colonel Morat with 150 horse, and Colonel Loode with 800 infantry, to their assistance. The cavalry being in front, were cut to pieces, but their fate revealed the plot, and the infantry made good their retreat into the city.

The fort of Schenk was surprised by French partisans in a similar manner in 1702. Two corps made their appearance in the vicinity of the fort at the same time from different quarters, and went through a sham fight. One party, representing the Dutch, feigned to take flight, and taking refuge under the walls of the place, were admitted in the belief that they were friends.

In the wars of Darius it is recorded that the Sacæ (probably the ancestors of the modern Afghans) having divided their army into three bodies, Darius attacked one of these divisions, and, having routed and destroyed it, dressed up his own men to personate the men who had been slain, and in that disguise was allowed to approach so near to the second division of the Sacæ before the deception was discovered, that he was easily enabled to destroy it also. Two-thirds of the enemy being thus disposed of, the remaining division was easily vanquished.

Adopting language of enemy.

Previous to the adoption of uniforms, it must have been very difficult sometimes to distinguish friends from foes. Thus, at the siege of Pavia by Lautrec, in 1523,

a corps, sent to succour the place, passed through the French Army, speaking Italian, and through the lines of the Italian troops in the French service, speaking Italian.

In 1708, the Imperialists surprised a Spanish corps near Baells, by approaching the post of a regiment, and in reply to the challenge, giving the name of one of the auxiliary regiments in the Spanish service.

In 1676, Villars, in a similar manner, surprised the grand guard of the Army of the Prince of Orange, encamped at the Abbey of Waure. He himself led the first platoon, and on being challenged, answered, "Vive l'Espagne!" adding that it was a detachment of Dutch troops returning from the war; he then advanced, and without much difficulty made the guard prisoners.

Making use of enemy's drummer to surprise.

In the war in the Caucasus, the Circassians, having taken a Russian drummer prisoner, made use of his assistance to inflict a very heavy blow on the corps to which he belonged, by obliging him to beat the Reveillé, in aid of a plan which they had laid for surprising his comrades.

While the French Army was in the Island of Lobau, a plan was laid by Seruzier to cross the small arm of the Danube, and surprise an Austrian corps of 3,000 infantry with 22 guns posted on the opposite side, under the command of General Krasner, who felt himself so secure in his position, that he was known to be in the habit of going to bed every night.

Seruzier surprises the Austrians on the banks of the Danube.

Seruzier communicated his scheme to Napoleon, who appointed a time to hear all the details, and reconnoitre the ground.

At the time appointed, the Emperor, according to Seruzier's account, habited in the dress of a soldier of

artillery, and accompanied by Seruzier in like costume, the one with an axe, and the other with a hatchet, proceeded to a wood on the bank of the river, where the soldiers were in the habit of procuring fire-wood. Seruzier showed the Emperor a long raft, which he had prepared and concealed near the place where he proposed to cross the river, and explained the whole of his plan. The Emperor conceived there would be some difficulty in assembling a force unseen by the enemy at the point for crossing; but all that had been provided for by Seruzier, who removed the Emperor's doubts by informing him that he did not require any artillerymen, beyond those under his own command, and that as for infantry, they would go down and cut wood as they had been in the habit of doing in the forest, which was on the left of the raft. With each detachment, he would send a certain number of men with arms concealed under their cloaks; the men thus armed, would be desired to lie down in silence in the wood, and await the night. The enemy would then see the wood-cutters returning as usual in the evening, and no suspicion was likely to be excited respecting the men with arms who were to remain behind.

The Emperor, having approved of the enterprise, 2,000 picked men were told off for its execution; these being assembled at midnight, and the raft fixed, Seruzier with his adjutant passed over first to reconnoitre; he then returned to superintend the crossing of his men. Just as they were moving off, in the words of his own account, "The chef de bataillon Baillon, under whose orders 200 men without arms had been placed, who were destined for a special service, came up to me with

an embarrassed air, and asked what he was to do with 200 men without arms. 'You will employ them,' said I, 'in upsetting the stands of arms piled in front of the enemy's lines, and breaking the arms themselves across the stocks, making of them what the French call *jambons*. You will also be supported by 500 men of reserve, who will be placed under your orders.'

"Three battalions of 500 men each were then formed, and a reserve of the same number, and we passed silently over the river, without being discovered. When near the enemy's camp, I drew up my three battalions, placing myself in the centre with the 200 men without arms, and the reserve immediately behind me. At the given signal, the three battalions rushed into the camp with fixed bayonets. I repaired myself with the reserve to secure the artillery. My orders were given in as loud a tone as possible, and my men were instructed to break the silence hitherto observed, by making as much noise as possible.

"On all sides the Austrians heard words of command: 'Garde à vos bataillons! Apprêtez armes!' &c. Although only two in the morning, the day began to dawn. The poor devils, surprised and thrown into consternation, issued from their quarters, some nearly naked, others half dressed, those who retained a little self-possession ran to the spot where their arms were piled, but it was only to find the stands upset and the muskets broken. 'Surrender at discretion, or no quarter will be given,' we said, but it was almost unnecessary, as they saw the moment for resistance was past.

"I repaired to the General's quarters, and found him dressing himself. 'You are my prisoner,' he said,

in an imperious tone, which made me laugh. 'Excuse me, Monsieur Krasner, you are still asleep, but to waken you thoroughly, I beg to inform you that it is you who are my prisoner. Give me up your sword.' The General obeyed without saying a word. The weather was abominable; we secured in all 3,000 prisoners."

One object in war and various means, yet an identity in the means used.

Whatever may be the cause of a war or pretext on which it may be declared, when once it has commenced, the point to be decided is simply the physical superiority of man over man. On the other hand, the means by which war may be conducted are infinite, calling for the exercise of the intellectual as well as physical powers. Still there is a certain identity in the character of the events and incidents which mark the progress of all wars, whatever may be the relative strength of the Armies engaged; and it is, therefore, not surprising to find a similarity between the events recorded by the periodical press during the struggle for independence in North America, and the narratives which are now daily appearing in letters from the correspondents of the newspapers.

Old American war of independence.

In *Gaines' Mercury*, April 14th, 1777, there is an article headed "Surprise of the Americans at Roundbrook."

"The day before yesterday, Generals Lord Cornwallis, Grant, and Mathews, with the first battalion Grenadiers, one battalion Light Infantry, a detachment of the Guards, the Light Horse, two battalions Hussars, and the Yagers commanded by Colonel Donop, marched from New Brunswick in New Jersey, between eight and nine at night, in order to surprise a large body of the rebels stationed at Roundbrook, seven miles' distance

from that city, commanded by a General Lincoln. The expedition was conducted with so much secrecy, that scarce any of the inhabitants knew of the departure of the troops till Sunday morning. They avoided the roads, and got close to the rebel intrenchments before day, heard the sentinel cry 'All's well,' and were ordered to lie on their arms till the rebels should fire the morning gun. The order being given for the attack, these troops rushed on with their usual intrepidity, and put the rebels to flight, killed upwards of a hundred, took 73 prisoners, 3 brass cannon, and a quantity of arms and ammunition."

Siege of Arras raised by an attack on Condé's lines.

The siege of Arras was raised by Turenne in 1654, by an attack on Condé's lines, which bears a very close resemblance to the surprise of the lines of Denain, by Villars, in 1708.

The lines occupied by the Spaniards were reported to be of such strength that an attempt to force them was opposed by all the superior officers except Turenne. Marshal Hocquincourt proposed to make such an attempt as might suffice to save the honour of the French arms. La Ferte, who had a personal animosity against Turenne, spread the most discouraging reports as to the hazard of making any attempt.

Turenne's arguments were that a mere attempt would be a sacrifice of valuable lives, without saving the reputation of the Army; that by making a serious attack with several battalions, some opening would most surely be found where the men repulsed in other quarters would be able to penetrate; that in a night attack, no part of the enemy's force would be able to move from its own post, or render any assistance, except to those in

their own immediate vicinity, until daylight enabled them to judge of their situation. He took every opportunity of conversing with the officers on the principles on which such an attack should be conducted, the strict discipline to be observed in a night attack to prevent the men from straggling and losing their way in the dark, and such other points as seemed particularly worthy of attention in this particular case.

A positive order was at length issued from the Court to make the attack, and it was decided the principal assault should be directed against that part of the camp of Don Ferdinand de Salis, commanding the Italians, which was next to the quarters of the Generalissimo Fuensaldagna, as being the weakest point and the furthest from Condé's post. Three false attacks were at the same time organized against other portions of the lines. Turenne, Hocquincourt, and La Ferte held the chief commands on the part of the French, and were to act in concert; but that portion of the force under Hocquincourt does not appear to have arrived at its post at the time appointed.

The columns set out at sunset, provided with all the proper implements, each trooper carrying two fascines in front of him, and the musketeers carefully concealing their matches. In the early part of the night the moon shone brightly; but the sky became suddenly clouded, and the wind blew violently, so that when they got within 200 yards of the lines they were discovered by the blazing of their matches, causing an illumination, which was heightened by the darkness of the night. Turenne's infantry soon passed the ditches, and established themselves solidly, clearing the way for the

cavalry. The Italian troops and Lorrainers, pressed on all sides, abandoned their intrenchments, and spread disorder and confusion in every direction; the Austrian Archduke and the Commander-in-Chief followed the fugitives; and when the day broke, Condé alone thought of arresting the progress of the French, and covering the retreat. Having collected some squadrons of cavalry, he succeeded in driving back part of the corps of Marshal La Ferte, who had imprudently descended from a good position on some elevated ground. Turenne, seeing the importance of the position abandoned by La Ferte, quickly occupied it with some of his own men; and Condé, immediately suspecting that Turenne was at hand, did not think it prudent to pursue La Ferte, or attack the high ground just occupied by Turenne, on which the Marshal had at once planted some cannon.

Turenne, on his part, seeing that the troops of La Ferte were prudently not pursued, suspected that the General who refrained from doing so could be no other than Condé; so soon did these two great men discover each other in their mutual actions.

The Allies lost nearly 3,000 men in this surprise, killed and taken prisoners, 63 pieces of cannon, 2,000 waggons, and 9,000 horses, and all their baggage and military train.

Strict discipline required to ensure the success of any enterprise intended to take the enemy by surprise.

It is impossible to calculate on the success of the best-laid plan for a surprise, unless the strictest discipline is maintained and the most punctual attention paid to the orders given, let those orders be what they may. In 1795, General Romana concerted a plan with General Don Ildefonso Airas for the relief of Rosas; and the former had arrived, as agreed, close to the posts he was

to surprise, without being discovered, when one of the Spaniards, replying to the challenge of a French sentinel by discharging his musket, the alarm was given, and it became necessary to abandon the enterprise.

Surprises seldom assisted by any accidental circumstances.

Surprises are much more frequently brought to a miscarriage than assisted by accidents; but there was a remarkable exception to this during the war in Vendée, in 1794, when a surprise was greatly aided by a singular event which occurred quite accidentally.

The Royalists, having been much harassed by moveable columns sent from the camp at Chichi, formed a plan to surprise the camp, although it was in a strong position, and armed with artillery.

The Royalists divided their forces into two divisions, under Renou and Guichard; but they did not calculate well the time required, and, consequently, did not arrive at the foot of the hill on which the camp was situated until daybreak. One of the Vendean chiefs then refused to hazard an attack with his division; the other made the attempt, with a column of 2,400 men, and was repulsed. A large detachment from the camp, which had been sent out on a foraging expedition, happened to be on its return to the camp while these events were going on, and became entangled between the column retiring from the camp after its repulse, and the other column which had remained in reserve and had not advanced to the attack.

The Republican detachment thus entrapped between two fires was destroyed, as the garrison was in ignorance of the cause of the firing, and, therefore, did nothing to assist them.

Section VI.

Stratagems much used in sieges.

Sieges are generally fruitful in expedients to surprise the enemy. By such means, the approaches are in some cases advanced. In other cases, by one dexterous stroke the whole affair is brought to a sudden conclusion; and it sometimes happens that before the siege can be even commenced, a stratagem must be resorted to in order to form the investment of the place.

Stratagems to invest places.

The operations of Marshal Saxe in 1745, when ordered by Louis XIV. to lay siege to Tournay, belong to the latter category. The Marshal assembled his Army near Maubeuge, then decamped, dividing the force into several corps, to each of which he assigned a different route. The main body marched by Malplaquet, captured a detachment sent by the Governor of Mons to reinforce St. Guillain, and then advanced towards Quevrin; but whilst, with a view to conceal the real plan, the Count d'Estrees was detached to threaten Mons, the Marshal suddenly turned his Army upon Tournay, and the investment was completed by the corps under the Duke d'Harcourt.

1596. The Cardinal Archduke Albert, preparing to lay siege to Calais, assembled his troops and formed his magazines at Valenciennes, giving out his intention to be the relief of Fère, threatened by Henry IV. of France. He then made a rapid march to Calais unexpectedly, and as the place was badly provisioned, took it in twenty days.

1643. Turenne sat down before Alessandria as if with the intention of forming the siege, but, in reality, in the hope that the enemy would weaken some other place to

reinforce Alessandria, and thus afford him an opportunity of gaining an advantage at the point thus weakened. To favour this scheme, the investment of Alessandria was very negligently observed, in order that the enemy's troops might pass into that place. The Spaniards fell into the snare thus laid for them, and withdrew troops from Trino; they had no sooner done so, than Trino was assaulted by Turenne.

Montmorency, in 1554, designing to besiege Marienburg, in the Netherlands, advanced towards Avesnes, thus inducing the enemy to strengthen that place. He then suddenly turned upon Marienburg, and took it in consequence of its being insufficiently garrisoned.

Washington fixed upon Christmas night for the surprise of Trenton, 1776, trusting that, after the feasting and carousing of the day, the slumbers of the Hessians might be sound, and their discipline more than usually relaxed. In communicating his intention to the Adjutant-General by letter, he says:—"For heaven's sake keep this to yourself, as the discovery of it may prove fatal to us, our numbers being, I am sorry to say, less than I had any conception of; but necessity—dire necessity—will, nay must, justify my attack." Washington felt that success might brighten his prospects; no failure could make them darker. Their progress on the night of the attack was very much impeded by the ice on the Delaware, and by storms of snow and hail, so that, instead of arriving, as he expected, at Trenton at four o'clock in the morning, it was eight before the little bands into which his force had been divided to facilitate their advance, were all united in the vicinity of the place. Late as was the hour, they were in sufficient time to

accomplish their design, and the greater part of the garrison were made prisoners. Shortly after this, Lord Cornwallis having called in his scattered posts with a view to attacking Washington, the latter did not feel himself a match for the force thus concentrated in his front; but conceiving that the bulk of the enemy's force was really in his front, he promptly seized the opportunity of surprising Brunswick in Cornwallis's rear, in the hope of getting possession of the military chest, obtaining stores, and releasing Lee, an enterprise which he conceived he might accomplish by breaking through the feeble force which must be left to guard the rear of Cornwallis's Army.

To avert attention, he kept fires burning in his camp as usual, and by a night march reached Princeton at daylight. Three British regiments had passed the night there, and were preparing to march when Washington arrived. Falling on these troops by surprise, and with great impetuosity, they were speedily overpowered and driven back along the Brunswick road; but by this time Washington's troops were overcome with fatigue, and Cornwallis, seeing no enemy in his front at daylight, and hearing a cannonading in his rear, had commenced to move for the protection of his magazines and stores at Brunswick and Princeton. Washington then deemed it prudent to retire over Stoneybrook, destroying the bridge after him, to check pursuit.

Neuberg surprised by Feuquieres.

Neuberg was surprised by Marshal Feuquieres, in 1688, in consequence of the garrison relying too confidently on the impregnability of the place on one side by reason of the natural strength of the ground on which it was situated at that point. Feuquieres, having ascer-

him, by surprising Cremona on one side by Commerci, and on the other by Vandencourt. The latter missed his way during the night; one of my detachments entered by a sewer. I got possession of one of the gates and some of the streets. This couplet of the French describes the rest:—

"Par une faveur de Bellone,
Et par un bonheur sans égal,
Nous avons retrouvé Cremone,
Et perdu notre Général."

"Villeroy, taken by our soldiers, who had thrown him under his horse, and not easily recognized without his hat, his wig, and his sword, said to one of his captors, 'I am the Marshal; save me; I will give you a regiment of cavalry, and a pension of 2,000 crowns.'

"The streets ran with blood. To save these small battles, I sent word to Villeroy by Commerci to stop them, and let the French surrender. He had the spirit to reply,—'They must not obey a prisoner;' and seeing the body of Crenan brought in, who had been killed, he said, 'I envy his fate.'

"I admired the bravery of the French, awakened out of their sleep, and half naked, resisting us everywhere with ferocity; and the intelligence of their officers. Mine were very deficient. I had the glory of having surprised, and not having kept; but, in fact, when we do not succeed, it is the same as if we had not undertaken." [24]

This exploit, which has gained such notoriety, was contrived by Eugene, in concert with a priest and some of the inhabitants of Cremona. An old aqueduct, or

[24] This statement is to be found in the *Memoir of the Life of Prince Eugene*, pretended to have been written by the Prince himself, but which was in reality the production of the Marshal Prince de Ligne. The work has had a very extensive circulation through Europe, and has often been quoted as an authentic autobiography.

drain, led out of the town beyond the ramparts; its terminus in the town was under the priest's house, and Eugene, by a large bribe and the promise of a bishopric, induced the priest to permit his troops to enter the town by this passage. He may be said to have gained possession of the place, as well as taken the Marshal prisoner; but through the spirit and energy of some of the French officers their men were rallied, and Eugene was obliged in the end to retreat.

Equally famous, in more modern times, is the daring attempt on the strong fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom, by Sir Thomas Graham, 8th March, 1814.

Bergen-op-Zoom.

Bolder in character than the attempt on Cremona, the temporary success gained by the brave men who mounted the ramparts on that eventful night, showed that the attack was also the result of a skilfully-matured plan, not the fruit of a rash conception; and in reading over the best accounts of the affair, one is almost at a loss to understand how it miscarried. The capture of Cremona was expected to follow the entrance of the troops into the town by a stratagem at a point where there was no reason to anticipate any immediate opposition—a plot which can be readily understood without the aid of a plan; but it is almost impossible to comprehend the details of the attack on Bergen-op-Zoom without being assisted by some rough sketch of the place.

The force appointed for the attack was distributed into four columns, each of which was destined to advance upon the place from a different quarter. No. 4 (see page 329), the right column, was to enter by the bed of the river Zoom where it passes out of the town on the side of the Scheldt; it was then to proceed along the ramparts to

its right, to facilitate the entrance of the left column, No. 1, which was to turn the outworks on the left of the Antwerp road by their right, and afterwards assault the bastion in rear of them. The second column was to attack the bastion on the left of the gate, through which passes the road to Breda; the third column was to make a false attack upon the works which cover the road from Steenberg.[25]

The right column effected its entrance as intended, and its advanced guard of 300 men was pushed along the rampart even as far as the bastion on the right of the road to Breda; but the main body of this column having, by some accident, divided itself, a part, consisting of 200 men, moved to the left of the Zoom, and was soon

[25] "A little before daybreak, an aide-de-camp came with orders; and sergeants of companies being called, the brigade was ordered to get ready in full marching order, when we were sent by companies to the church, for the purpose of depositing our blankets and knapsacks. We began now to expect that something of note would follow, and we were not deceived; for after having left bag and baggage, we marched in the direction of Bergen-op-Zoom, and halted about half way between that town and our old cantonments at Rosendahl till after dark, when we again paraded, and put on our great coats over our accoutrements. Something dark and mysterious was, in all appearance, going on, as we were ordered not to speak, except in whispers; and truly the orders were strictly attended to. The march had more the appearance of a funeral than anything else. Fancy to yourself a fine, clear night, the country around covered with snow, a column of men marching at a very slow pace, great coats and cap-cases on, arms secured; nothing heard but the bark of dogs at the farmhouses adjacent to the road. This barking of the dogs was generally looked upon by the old soldiers as the prelude to some sanguinary combat; meanwhile we approached till within a mile and a half of the outworks, when we turned to the left into a field, where we halted, and were ordered to pull off our great-coats, which were left in heaps under the charge of some drummers.

"Volunteers, together with the men for duty, were called upon to place scaling-ladders. Orders were likewise issued not to take any notice of the French picket, even if it should fire upon us, but simply to follow the guides. When we passed the picket, some cannon and blue-lights went off to warn the garrison. Nothing daunted, we moved on at a quick pace in the midst of the enemy's shot, got into the ditch, which was frozen, and at length got on the ladders, and mounted the ramparts. After all had gotten up, we formed right in front, near the Antwerp gate."—*Narrative of a Soldier.*



No. 1. General Cooke. The left column attacked between Antwerp and Waterport gate.

No. 2. Attacked to the right of new gate.

No. 3. False attack.

No. 4. Right column, Skerrett and Gore, at the entrance of the harbour, which could be forded at low water.

to elapse before the arrival of daylight to disclose the relative position of the combatants. The British troops had but a very imperfect knowledge of the locality in which they were engaged, while a brave and determined foe within the place, stronger in numbers than the assaulting force, and with a thorough knowledge of every part of the works, remained to be subdued.

A continual fire was kept up against the troops who had entered the place; and, ere long, some of the guides, together with most of the superior officers, were killed. All attempts to reach the Great Square or Place proved abortive, the streets and avenues leading to it being swept by the enemy's cannon.

Part of the fourth, or right column, which had gained possession of the Arsenal, was driven out of that post: the enemy there gained command over the position which had been taken up by the remainder of that column on the bastion near the Waterport gate, obliged them to abandon that bastion, and retire to the frozen marsh between the Waterport gate and the detached fort on the Scheldt. They were there reinforced by 600 men, detached from the first, or left column; but the position was found untenable: part of the column escaped across the ramparts, on the Antwerp side; the remainder were obliged to capitulate.

After the overthrow and dispersion of the column near the Waterport gate, the enemy was enabled to concentrate a greater force on the remaining columns. At daybreak the guns of the fortress were turned, and opened fire on the troops exposed on the unprotected ramparts; and although the 69th and 55th twice gained possession of the bastion adjoining their position at the

point of the bayonet, it became evident that to prolong the contest was only a useless sacrifice of life. General Cooke therefore determined to endeavour to withdraw the remainder of the force. In this he partially succeeded, one part of those now left covering the retreat of the other; those who could not be withdrawn had no alternative but to surrender.

The following observations on the failure of this attack, by Sir Carmichael Smith, are deserving attention:—

"The errors we committed, and to which our failure must be attributed, appear to be as follow:—

"1st. The unaccountable mistake made by part of the column No. 4 in turning to their left instead of their right, as also their having left 600 men in a perfectly useless situation at the Waterport Gate.

"2nd. The detaching a party from the column No. 1 to patrol to the right must be considered as an error. It was said of the Army of Lucullus, by the Armenian monarch, 'As an Army too few; as ambassadors, too numerous.'

"If information of what the enemy was about was required the party was too numerous. If meant to overcome the resistance which had already checked the advanced guard of the column 4, and to facilitate the entrance of the column 2, it was too few. It would rather appear that the column 1 ought to have sent for the 600 men of the column 4 left at the Waterport gate; and, with the whole united, to have pushed on to the right to facilitate the third attack.

"3rd. The last mistake which we committed, and which will probably be conceived to be the fatal one, and decisive as to the fate of the attack, was detaching to

assist the party left at the Waterport gate. It would have been better that this battalion should have been brought up to join the whole of the troops who were at this time concentrated on the ramparts near where the column No. 1 had originally entered. By thus detaching, we were beat in detail; and, after the loss of these two battalions, which diminished our force by 1,200 men, our conduct necessarily became that of defendants instead of assailants."

Maxims

In all surprises of fortified places the aim should be, in the first instance, to get possession of one of the gates as soon as possible, by which troops can be poured into the town with ease. It is also a maxim to have strong supports ready at hand to follow up the first success.

In a recent military work, it is observed that, at the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, 600 men laid down their arms merely because they had no officer with them who knew enough of fortification to conduct their retreat by the covered way. Had such an officer been with them they might all have safely escaped.

This observation is probably well founded. At the same time, if more attention had been paid to the two maxims above recited, there would have been no occasion for a retreat.

Napoleon's comments on Bergen-op-Zoom.

Napoleon, in commenting on this attack, is said to have paid a compliment to the General under whose orders it was undertaken, as well as to the troops engaged: the Emperor is also said to have stated as a fact that the attempt was attended with greater difficulties than Graham was aware of, as the garrison was not surprised, the Governor having had intimation of the meditated attack.

Double set of orders. The fictitious ones to be published; the real ones to be kept secret until the last moment.

In preparing for an expedition such as that against Bergen-op-Zoom, when troops are in quarters, or separate cantonments, it has been recommended to send two letters of instructions to each of the Commanding Officers, one with the real plans to be kept secret, and informing him that the other contains only fictitious orders to be made public. At the usual hour for giving orders, or at a suitable time for the purpose, the fictitious orders should be issued. Then, if the enemy has communication with any one in the camp, he is likely to be misled, and may, perhaps, take some step favourable to your real designs. The genuine orders should not be divulged until they can no longer be concealed without detriment to the service.

The Prince of Orange, in 1692, in order to surprise Steenkirk, gave out an order for a foraging expedition on the following morning, and then, at ten at night, marched off for Steenkirk.

Means of deceiving spies and deserters.

By changing the road occasionally on the march, if possible, spies and deserters may be deceived. All peasants who may appear in sight should also be arrested and detained.

B.C. 251.

Aratus, about to surprise Sicyon, sent forward four soldiers with a guide disguised as travellers, to seize a gardener who lived near the road and kept some dogs. The man was secured, but the dogs escaped. By a lucky accident, however, their barking created no alarm.

Measures after a place has been entered by surprise.

After troops have succeeded in getting into a place by surprise, they should spread to both flanks, so as to afford room for those following. An effort should be made to get possession of the main guard, and the Governor should, if possible, be secured, in order to

torch. Houses which cannot be set on fire may be blown up or bombarded.

When a seaport is taken on the land side.

If a seaport is taken possession of from the land side, none of the vessels in the harbour should be permitted to leave the port. By this precaution, before the event is known, vessels may enter the port as usual, in ignorance of what has taken place, and some valuable prizes may be made.

Ulm was taken in 1702, by the Elector of Bavaria, by means of some officers introduced into the place disguised as peasants. At a preconcerted signal, one of the gates was seized by these pretended peasants, and 600 men, who were waiting in ambush, were then admitted.

In 1701, Eugene, in concert with some monks, laid a plan to seize Mantua. The monks were supplied with arms, and were to have overpowered the guard at one of the gates and admitted the Imperialists, but the plot was discovered.

In 1581, Claude Barlaimont and General Schenck, in the Spanish service, obtained possession of the castle of Breda, through M. de Fresin, then a prisoner in the place, who corrupted a sentinel, made the guard drunk, and then opened the gates.

Although, as a general rule, when the plan for a surprise has been matured it should be promptly executed, a contrary course is sometimes to be recommended; as, for instance, when it is to be supposed the enemy has some suspicion that a blow is meditated; in such a case, by delaying the execution of the scheme, the enemy may be thrown off his guard.

When Hannibal had prepared his measures to sur-

prise Tarentum, he rested a considerable time at three days' journey from the place. This delay gave confidence to the Roman Consul Caius Livius, the Governor, and he was engaged in a drunken revel when Hannibal arrived.

The Marquis de Bay, Captain-General of Estremadura, marched, in 1706, to surprise Alcantara, but discovering by the way that the Portuguese had got notice of his intention, he divided his force, and made each portion retreat by a different route, as if he had abandoned the enterprise; but the commanders of columns had orders when and where to concentrate for another attempt, and, a very short time after, the surprise was effected with complete success.

Gustavus Vasa, by distributing his forces, and then rapidly concentrating them, surprised the Governor of Delicarlia in his castle.

Demetrius, with a view to take Sicyon, retired to Cenchreæ, and passed some time in revelry and debauch, by which the Sicyons were thrown completely off their guard, and fell an easy prey. B.C. 304.

Capture of Fecamp, by Bois Rosé.

The recapture of Fecamp, a port and citadel in the province of Caux, by Bois Rosé, during the wars of the League (1593), although an operation circumscribed within narrow limits, is an example of the marvellous results which ingenuity and boldness combined can effect, and offers great encouragement to any one entrusted with a difficult enterprise.

At the time of the exploit about to be related, the citadel had been recently surrendered to Admiral Biron, by the League; and Bois Rosé, the hero of the adventure, was greatly assisted by his perfect knowledge of

locality, having been some time in command of the garrison, while the place was held by the League. But even with that knowledge, he could never have succeeded had he not secured the assistance of two men within the walls of the place.[27]

The face of the fort next the sea stands on a precipice 600 feet high, the base of which, in ordinary tides, is immersed in water 18 feet deep. During a few days in the year, at particular seasons, the tide is extremely low; and on those days, for some hours, a small space of sand is left bare at the foot of the precipice.

Well aware of this peculiar circumstance, and, also, of the impossibility of gaining access at any other point, Bois Rosé determined to escalade the place during one of these very low tides.

For this purpose a cable, equal, in length, to the height of the rock, was converted into a rude ladder, by sticks passed through it at proper intervals. Having selected fifty resolute men, suitably armed for such an expedition, he then conveyed them in two boats to the bottom of the rock at low water, on a very dark night. One of his partisans in the place, according to arrangement, was always on the look-out, and, at the preconcerted signal, for which the confederates had now been waiting six months, they hauled up the rope, and made it fast to an embrasure. Two sergeants, esteemed men of great resolution, mounted first, and the rest of the fifty men followed in succession, Bois Rosé himself bringing up the rear. Before they got half-way up, to return was impossible, as the tide had

[27] Two other cases of surprise have been compared with that of Fecamp—viz, that of Dumbarton, in 1571, and the capture of the Numidian fortress in the Jugurthine war, by the soldiers of Marius.

risen six feet, and carried away their boats: their position, therefore, suspended as they were between the heavens and the ocean depths, was well calculated to unnerve the stoutest heart. Suddenly, a message was passed down to Bois Rosé that the leading sergeant declared his inability to mount another foot. In this emergency, as the only alternative, Bois Rosé mounted up over the bodies of all the party until he reached the leader: having failed to infuse new life into his fainting spirit, he drew a dagger, and gave him the choice of advancing or of being instantly killed and thrown into the sea. After incredible difficulty, the whole party reached the summit of the rock, a little before daylight, and, being admitted into the castle by their partisans, the guard and sentinels were at once despatched, and every one of the garrison who offered the slightest resistance, was, in like manner, put to the sword.

Breda taken by Prince Maurice.

In 1590, Prince Maurice of Orange took Breda by introducing a boat-load of turf, under which sixty picked men were concealed. The men thus concealed made themselves masters of the castle, and afterwards took the city by capitulation. On that occasion one of the men employed, in consequence of the extreme cold, was seized with a fit of coughing while concealed in the boat; and it is related of him that, fearing the noise would betray his comrades, he said, "*Fellow soldiers, kill me, lest we be all killed.*" A memorable speech, as Grotius observes.

Origin of word "Camisade."

The word Camisade, meaning an assault or surprise by night, had its origin in the surprise of a French post near Rebéc, by the Marquis de Pescaire; the Marquis's

men, on that occasion, having worn white shirts over their clothes to distinguish them.

The surprise of a place may frequently depend on the ability of troops to make forced marches, performing in two days what may be supposed impossible to effect under four days. In modern warfare, as long as one or other party can command the railway communications of a country, they may baffle all the calculations of their opponents.

In minor operations, to secure expedition, a body of cavalry has sometimes been employed, each trooper carrying an infantry-man behind him.

General Schultz, in September, 1684, surprised the rebel force under Tekeley, near Zebin, in this way; and in more recent times a remarkable instance is afforded, in the surprise of Emaum Ghur, in the desert, by Sir Charles Napier, in January, 1843.

Sir Charles Napier in Scinde. Emaum Ghur.

The force employed on that occasion consisted of 200 Irregular Cavalry and 350 men of the 22nd Regiment, mounted on camels. Ali Morad and a native guide were compelled to conduct the party, and a string of camels carried the requisite supplies, provisions, and water. Beeloch horsemen swarmed in the vicinity of his line of march; but Sir Charles succeeded in taking the place, and then blew it up.

The Duke of Wellington thus expressed himself on the subject of this achievement:—"Sir Charles Napier's march upon Emaum Ghur is one of the most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of, in my life. He moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces; he had his guns transported under circumstances

of extreme difficulty, and in a manner the most extraordinary; and he cut off a retreat of the enemy, which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their positions."

In 1704, the French garrison of Brisach required the assistance of a corps of pioneers, and were in daily expectation of their arrival. Eugene, hearing of the circumstance, endeavoured to surprise the place by sending in an Austrian corps equipped as French pioneers. The scheme miscarried in consequence of the officer in charge very indiscreetly firing a pistol at an overseer of the works who had insulted him. The following is the account in the work entitled *Memoirs of the Prince Eugene*:—

Surprise of Brisach fails, because an officer cannot endure a caning.

"I narrowly escaped taking the two Brisachs, the one because the Governor of Friburg missed the way, and the other from the false delicacy of the Lieutenant-Colonel, whom I had directed to enter as a courier with the others, and who being unable to endure *a caning* from an overseer of the works of the place, ordered him to be fired upon. This was indeed insisting very unseasonably on a point of honour, on one of the few occasions on which a man might without disgrace receive a thrashing. Had we succeeded, he would rather have been envied than reproached for it."

Schemes to guard against surprise on outpost.

In order to guard against being surprised, it is recommended that advanced guards or outposts should light fires in one spot and post themselves at another; then if the enemy should approach, he will be seen by the light of the fire. Of course, this scheme can be of little use unless the most perfect silence is observed. If the guard have no fire, they may be posted at a

different point from that which they occupy in the daytime. By varying the strength of the outposts, the enemy intending to surprise a small post may perhaps fall into the hands of one much stronger than they expected. An outpost should be placed where there are as few ways of approach for the enemy as possible, and as many avenues as possible by which the picquet can retreat. When first an outpost is occupied, the men should remain under arms or in the saddle until the environs are well reconnoitred.

When a deserter reported, change the watchword.

When a soldier deserts, the watchword should be immediately changed. Whenever the sound of approaching steps, as of the relief or new guard, is heard, the guard should fall in, and some men should be sent to reconnoitre, for almost all surprises of guards have been effected by the enemy coming in the guise of a friendly force.

Triple sentinels.

On very dangerous posts, three men should be planted—one to stand, while the other two beat right and left.

Whilst the British Army occupied its position along the Spanish bank of the Bidassoa, a vast number of desertions took place. As this was an event which had but rarely occurred before, many opinions were hazarded as to its cause. "For my own part" (says Mr. Gleig), "I attributed it entirely to the operation of superstitious terror on the minds of the men.[28]

"It is generally the custom, in planting sentinels in the immediate presence of an enemy, to station them in pairs. Such, however, was the nature of the ground

[28] Subaltern.

covered by our pickets in the Pyrenees, that in many places there was hardly room for a couple of sentinels to occupy a single post. Almost every foot of this rugged country had been the scene of action, in which those who were killed, falling among the rocks and cliffs, were left in many instances unburied; and, unfortunately, it frequently happened to be necessary to plant a single sentinel just at a spot where one of these mangled corpses had fallen.

"More than once I have been remonstrated with for desiring as brave a fellow as any in the corps to keep guard near his fallen comrade. 'I don't care for living men,' said the soldier, 'but for God's sake, sir, don't keep me beside *him*.'

"That both soldiers and sailors are superstitious, every one knows; nor can it be pleasant for the strongest minded among them to spend two or three hours of a stormy night beside a mangled and half-devoured carcase. My own opinion therefore was, that many of our sentries became so overpowered by superstition that they could not keep their ground, and knowing the punishment for returning to the picket house, they went over to the enemy rather than endure the misery of a diseased imagination."

Dogs trained to aid in defence.

The Rhodians had in the Castle of St. Peter, in Caria, fifty dogs so well trained that they knew Christians from Turks, and would give the alarm at night by barking.

M. A. Gaudin relates that, in his time, there were dogs trained in the same way in Dalmatia.

Maxim.

It is a good maxim to adopt any number of seemingly trifling precautions rather than to neglect one

necessary one. On this principle, it is advisable to strengthen a camp as much as possible, particularly if it is likely to be occupied for any length of time. Josephus says it was very difficult to surprise the Romans, owing to their fortifying their camps. If there are no natural objects to assist in strengthening a camp, the flanks may be strengthened by baggage, sacks of forage or flour, chevaux-de-frise, abattis, wagons, spare gun-carriages, or such things.

Villages or detached buildings which it is expedient to occupy, will be more easily defended if they are included within the lines than if occupied as detached posts. The risk of the garrisons being cut off will also thus be avoided.

Lucius Emilius said a fortified camp was to an army like a harbour to a fleet.

Use to be made of country people.

The country people may often be made useful in throwing up works, but they must be carefully superintended by sappers and officers and non-commissioned officers who understand military works. In the present war in America this course appears to have been resorted to by both sides; and where extensive works have to be constructed, and labour of this kind is available, it is almost equal to a reinforcement, as it liberates a great many combatants for other duties.

Maxims.

Advanced posts should always be pushed out as far as circumstances permit, so as to get the earliest intelligence possible of the enemy's movements.

When an Army is composed of troops from different countries, a spirit of emulation may be created by praising the work of the men of one nation in presence of those of another; when the troops are all of one nation, a

spirit of rivalry is created by holding up one regiment as an example to another.

The different posts assigned in case of alarm must be most clearly understood by the different corps; otherwise one corps, in its eagerness to support another, may denude the very post by which the enemy designs to penetrate.

An instance of this occurred at the siege of Lerida, where the Marquis de la Trousse, by going to the assistance of Count Harcourt, who was hard pressed, left an opening by which 1,500 infantry, 800 cavalry, and a convoy were introduced into the town. 1646.

If some faces of a fortification are naturally very strong, a very few men may suffice for their protection, a strong reserve being always in hand to send to any menaced point; but there are very few fortifications which have any of their sides so perfectly impregnable that they may be left undefended by any portion of the garrison.[29]

Guides: their fidelity of the utmost consequence.

Everything may depend upon the fidelity of guides in secret expeditions; the greatest caution should, therefore, be observed in their selection. Those who have already proved themselves faithful, or whose families and friends are security for their fidelity, are to be preferred, if competent in other respects. As an Army advances into a country, it becomes necessary to replace the old guides by others who are familiar with the new country upon which the Army is entering. All this work, which devolves on the staff, requires great tact and intelligence. Men, who have something to lose, are more to be depended upon than outlaws, who are compromised to

[29] *See* Neuberg, page 323; Ravenna, page 357; and Alost, page 357.

such an extent that they have no mercy to expect if they fall into the enemy's hands.

Every Army ought to have a special corps of guides: men who have been smugglers, partisans, poachers, huntsmen, are the class of people best adapted for a corps of this description.

The officers of such a corps should make themselves well acquainted with the peculiarities and individual characteristics of each man, as personal motives and feelings always constitute a medium through which the affairs of life are viewed, with a force and colour not their own; and it is, therefore, essential to know the idiosyncrasy of an individual to judge how far he is likely to be biassed in his views and representations of what he sees and hears.

M. de Sembrano, Admiral of the Maltese galleys, said that, when he had to go out of port, he knew the weather was not so bad as represented by the pilots, who had their homes at Malta; and that, when he had to return with provisions from the ports of Sicily, he knew the weather was worse than was represented by these same men who wanted to return to their families.

Precautions to be taken with guides.

In order to avoid the risk of a guide taking flight, he ought to be under the charge of a non-commissioned officer and two soldiers. In consequence of the disappearance of a guide, Asdrubal could not find the ford of the river Metaurus, and was discomfited by the Consul, Claudius Nero.

In 1541, the Germans, having intelligence with one Bornamise, marched to surprise Breda, and their confederate opened the gate to them; but, becoming afterwards nervous, he made his escape, and concealed

himself, and they, not knowing which way to go in the dark, were obliged to retreat, in doing which they sustained considerable loss.

Hannibal was on the brink of destruction in the Alps through the treachery of his guides.

Water supply during a siege.

A supply of water being indispensable to sustain a siege, the efforts of the garrison of a besieged place are naturally directed to preserving the source of their water-supply, while the aim of the besiegers will always be to cut off that supply.

A sufficiency of water to sustain life being equally indispensable to the besiegers, their operations must be suspended if they are totally deprived of access to this necessary of life.

Difficult as it must obviously be to raise a siege by such means, the scheme is one which might in some cases deserve attention. An attempt at such a measure is recorded in the Scriptures.

"And when Hezekiah saw that Sennacherib was come, and that he was purposed to fight against Jerusalem,—He took counsel with his princes and his mighty men to stop the waters of the fountains which were without the city: and they did help him.—So there was gathered much people together, who stopped all the fountains, and the brook that ran through the midst of the land, saying, Why should the kings of Assyria come, and find much water?"—2 Chron. xxxii., 2–4.

In 1510, the want of water put an end to the siege of Zerbi, and brought ruin on the besiegers. (See page 387.)

The four requisites to sustain a siege.

In addition to a supply of water, three other conditions are indispensable for the defence of any place: they are—provisions, men, and munitions of war; if any one of

these requisities should fail, however abundant the supply of all the others, they cannot avail—the place must fall.

Cæsar postponed every other operation to undertake the siege of Durazzo, because that was Pompey's grand depôt.

1712. The burning of the magazines at Arras caused a serious scarcity of forage for the French cavalry.

Louis XIV. made peace with Savoy before he signed the peace of Ryswick, in order to avoid the enormous cost of transport of provisions, which he must have incurred, unless he risked a battle.

The Duke of Wellington, in a letter to Earl Bathurst, 19th August, 1813, represents strongly the disadvantage to his Army of the want of a proper naval force on the coast, to impede the coasting trade called the cabotage between the Garonne and Bayonne, and St. Jean de Luz. By the stoppage of this trade, the Duke points out, the enemy would be obliged to use the land transport of the country in collecting his magazines on the Adour, by which the collection of store magazines would be much impeded, if their collection to any extent could be at all effected, and the distress occasioned by the war and its consequent unpopularity in France would be considerably increased.

Villars took the magazines of the allies at St. Amand and other places in 1712, and they could do nothing more that campaign.

One great difficulty in provisioning a place for a siege or blockade is to find spacious dry magazines which are at the same time bomb-proof.

In anticipation of a siege the stores should, if possible, be divided, so that in the event of any accident they may not be all destroyed.

State of magazines.

The state of the magazines should be a secret to the garrison; to this end, it may be a useful precaution not to allow the men who attend in one store to have access to another.

In order to keep down the consumption of stores, the number of unprofitable consumers should be kept as low as possible; all people who are likely to encourage discontent by grumbling and complaining of the hardships of a siege should by all means be removed.

Alexander, before attacking Leucas, in Leucadia, which was well provisioned, took all the places adjacent to it, giving the inhabitants permission to retire into Leucas, in order that the provisions in that place might the sooner be consumed.

At the famous siege of Derry, General De Rosen, on finding that the town was in extreme distress for want of provisions, adopted the expedient of increasing the distress, by forcing as many people as possible to take refuge within the walls. All Protestants from thirty miles round were driven under the walls in hopes that their friends would admit them into the place rather than leave them in such a perilous situation. 1689.

This stratagem was not altogether new in the annals of Irish warfare.

In the list of Sir Wm. Coles' exploits, it is recorded that in 1641 he starved and famished 5,457 of the Irish within a few months.

At the siege of Limerick in 1650, the garrison being straitened for provisions, all useless people were sent out of the town. Ireton, the Commonwealth General, ordered some of the people who were thus turned out to be executed, and the rest to be whipped back into the city.

Rosen's order at the siege of Derry had little effect; the garrison would not admit their unhappy friends who were placed under the walls, and even fired upon them, and Rosen was obliged to withdraw them. King James himself was greatly alarmed when he heard the circumstance, fearing it would furnish the enemy with grounds to accuse him of a breach of faith, which might prejudice his interests in Great Britain.

When the English carried the war into France and approached Bayonne in 1813-14, placards were posted up at the corners of the streets, announcing that all persons not having a year's supply of provisions must be ready to quit the place.

When a place is about to be besieged, all the wood in the vicinity which might be serviceable to the enemy should be destroyed.

Assistance afforded by an army in the field to a beleaguered city.

By encamping an Army in a strong position near the place, the besiegers' convoys may be cut off, and his operations greatly impeded. This, which is a very old device, has often also the effect of deterring the besiegers from assaulting the place, under the apprehension of being unable to hold it.

A.D. 1620.

The siege of Bois le Duc, by Maurice of Nassau, was interrupted and finally abandoned, owing to the judicious choice of a position by the Count de Berghe, commanding the Austrian Army.

The protracted defence of Sebastopol may be ascribed entirely to the advantage which the garrison possessed in having free communication with an Army in the field.

B.C. 108.

Metellus, at the siege of Zama, after attempting the assault twice, was invested by Jugurtha, and obliged to abandon the siege, and meet Jugurtha's Army in the field.

Such a diversion is, at all events, likely to procure good terms for the besieged.

Breaking through an investment.

When the besiegers have made a complete investment, an effort should be made to open up a line of communication with the garrison, by getting possession of some buildings or a position which may be fortified.

Entrenched camps.

On the subject of entrenched camps, Sir Howard Douglas has left on record his opinion that the principle of entrenched camps has been carried to excess in making them places of refuge for large Armies, whether formed on insulated points or under fortresses; that it would be more advantageous for an Army to keep the field, falling back if necessary, or forming itself into a corps of observation, for the purpose of covering a fortress.

Suchet and lines of circumvallation.

Suchet, in Spain, usually guarded his lines of siege by lines of circumvallation—a protection which had been long disused. The question has been raised as to whether the formation of such lines at Badajoz might not have been the means of saving the battle of Albuera.

When Landrecy was retaken from the allies in 1794, Mariscol, the engineer entrusted with the direction of the siege, departing from the ordinary routine, opened the trenches in the night at 150 toises from the covered way, instead of the ordinary distance of 300. Thus the tremendous fire kept up by the besieged was rendered useless, as it was directed on a line at the ordinary distance, and passed over the heads of the men actually at work on the parallel.

The same engineer, at the siege of Quesnoy, in the same year, commenced by opening parallels opposite to a

different part of the works from that at which the real attack was to be made.

Dejean, at the attack on Nieuport, and Poitevin, at the siege of Venloo, adopted the same scheme.

In 1792, Mayence, which was in a condition to have set at defiance 15,000 or 20,000 men unprovided with the means of undertaking a siege, or of passing the Rhine to invest the place, was surrendered to the French General without a blow, through the weakness of the Governor and the intrigues of a faction inside the place, headed by one Eckmayer, a professor of mathematics, exercising the functions of engineer. Custine, having arrived before the place, paraded his force to the greatest advantage, to strike consternation into the garrison, and then sent a summons by the hands of a Colonel Houchard, selected expressly for the office of herald from his colossal stature and warlike appearance, as well as his proficiency in a certain style of military eloquence.

Houchard acquitted himself on his mission so well that the garrison laid down their arms, agreeing not to serve for a year, although they had a bridge to pass over into Cassel, without the least fear of opposition, and had only to draw up another bridge to stop all pursuit. 800 Austrians alone refused to join in this ignominious capitulation, and passed over and joined Prince Esterhazy.

Mode of communicating with the garrison.

The very ancient device of communicating with a beleaguered garrison by shooting arrows into the place, bearing written placards or notices attached to them, was resuscitated by General Stanhope, and put in practice at the siege of St. Philip's, Minorca.

1708.

By that means, he intimated to the garrison that they

would be all sent to the mines if they did not surrender before the batteries were completed.

Insubordination within the walls.

In 1794 Figueras fell, in a great measure owing to the insubordination and dissension which prevailed within the walls. The French General, Perignon, being well informed of the prevailing discontent, skilfully took advantage of the circumstance, by summoning the garrison, requiring at the same time an immediate reply, as his men were eager to be led to the assault.

Gibraltar.

In the war of the Spanish succession, 1704, our fine fleet, under Sir George Rooke, not having been able to effect any service of importance, the Admiral, dreading that an accusation of inactivity would be preferred against him, held a council of war near Tetuan, on the 17th July in that year, at which, after deliberation, it was resolved to make a sudden and vigorous attack on Gibraltar. Thus it was that England became possessed of that important fortress.

The Courts of France and Madrid, chagrined at the loss of such a valuable possession, immediately ordered the Marquis de Villadorias, an officer of distinction, to attempt to recover the place by a siege, and, on the 11th October, the Marquis accordingly opened the trenches. On the 31st of the same month, 500 volunteers made an oath never to return till they had taken the place. This forlorn party, conducted by a goatherd to the south side of the rock, lodged themselves, unperceived, the first night in St. Michael's Cave. The next night they scaled Charles the Fifth's Wall, surprised and put to death the guard at Middle Hill, and afterwards, by means of ropes and ladders, assisted a party of several hundred men sent to their support to mount up to the same place.

According to the plan which had been agreed upon, a second support should have been sent to follow up this first success; but owing to dissensions in the camp of the allies, the further support which should have been sent was withheld, and these brave men were left to their fate, and, being discovered by the garrison, they were speedily dispersed or taken prisoners.

Subsequently, a breach having been made in the Round Tower, at the extremity of the King's lines, and another in the entrenchment on the hill, the besiegers determined on another assault. The detachment for the upper breach mounted the rock in the middle of the night, and concealed themselves in the clefts of the rocks until daylight; then, advancing and throwing grenades, they drove away the guard left for the protection of that point, while 300 men stormed the Round Tower. This success, however, was merely temporary; the garrison, once roused, speedily regained possession of their works.

1708. At the siege of Lisle, Eugene gave frequent alarms for several successive nights at a half-moon, intending to attack the work afterwards in the daytime, feeling quite confident that the garrison, wearied out by night duty, would take rest in the day.

1647. The Duke de Guise gave frequent false alarms to fatigue the Spanish garrison in Naples, and throw them off their guard. In ancient history, a great many instances of this stratagem are to be found.

Coni. At the siege of Coni, in 1799, the Austrians commenced by turning the course of the streams, to stop the mills in the town.

When Count Maurice of Nassau besieged Nieuport,

he would have been placed in a very embarrassing position if the Archduke Albert, instead of giving battle, had simply closed the only narrow road of communication between Nieuport and Ostend. The only escape for Count Maurice would have been by embarking his troops, and that he could only have effected with considerable loss. Nieuport. 1600.

When the Romans besieged Capua, Hannibal threatened Rome, hoping thereby that the force engaged in the siege of Capua would be recalled for the defence of Rome; but the Romans considered their capital sufficiently defended without the assistance of that force. Capua.

When Maurice of Nassau besieged Gertruydenberg, the Governor of the Low Countries, Count Mansfeldt, was urged to try to relieve the place by laying siege to Breda; but he rejected that advice, seeing that before he could reasonably hope to take such a place as Breda, Gertruydenberg must fall, and that then Maurice would have a force available for the relief of Breda. Gertruydenberg. 1593.

In order to attack Dessau, in 1813, the French were obliged, in the face of the enemy, to re-establish the bridge which had been burnt by the Swedes. This they did by laying planks between the uprights which were still standing, under the protection of a cross-fire, of platoons stationed on the banks of the river, at their end of the bridge. Dessau.

When a superior force is assailed by an inferior, the latter very often has the advantage of making an attack which is unexpected, for the stronger does not generally expect to be attacked by the weaker. Bold measures have also sometimes the advantage on other grounds. An attack sometimes succeeds through its boldness.

Bacon says, there is in human nature, generally, more of the fool than the wise; and, therefore, those faculties

by which the foolish part of men's minds is taken are most potent. Thus the effect of boldness is wonderful; it doth fascinate and bind, hand and foot, those that are either shallow in judgment, or weak in courage—which are the greatest part; yea and prevaileth with wise men at weak times.

Yet boldness is the child of ignorance and baseness far inferior to other parts.

Boldness is even blind, for it seeth not dangers and inconveniences; therefore, it is ill in counsel, good in execution: so that the right use of bold persons is that they never command in chief, but be seconds, and under the direction of others; for, in counsel, it is good to see dangers, and, in execution, not to see them, except they be very great.

The alliance concluded between Cromwell and Louis XIV., in 1657, raised the presumption that the allies, in prosecuting the war with Spain, would aim at getting possession of some of the fortified places on the seaboard. So certain did the Court of Spain feel that this would be the policy of their enemies, that Cambray, a place usually well garrisoned, was almost denuded of troops, in order to strengthen the places on the coast.

Turenne and La Ferte, on hearing of the defenceless condition of Cambray, laid siege to the place without delay.

Cambray. Condé, who was at that time at Bussiere, on the Sambre, repaired to Cambray the moment he received
1657. intelligence that the siege had commenced. Finding the French works in a very incomplete state, he dashed through two lines of French cavalry with a strong reinforcement of his best troops, and presented himself before

the gates of the place, much to the astonishment of the Governor, Count Palazzi.

This accession to the garrison placed the fortress in such a respectable state for defence that Turenne abandoned the siege.

Ravenna was surprised by Aspar, General of Theodosius II., on the side next to the marshes, where the place was weakly defended, because the garrison firmly believed that the works could not be approached on that side. Ravenna. A.D. 425.

In like manner Alost was taken by the Netherlands troops, in 1582, by an attack on the strongest side, because the garrison, in the hurry and excitement occasioned by the alarm of a sudden attack, rushed to the defence of the weakest points, neglecting altogether that side which they believed to be impregnable. Alost.

King Herod, in order to get at some bands of robbers who had secreted themselves in caves in a precipitous cliff, inaccessible by ordinary means, either from the foot or the top of the rock, constructed some large boxes, which were let down from the top of the rock filled with soldiers.

In the wars in which the French have been engaged in Algiers, the native tribes have on several occasions taken refuge in inaccessible caves of this description. Some of the measures taken to dislodge or destroy them, such as suffocation by smoke, have been censured as repugnant to the laws of war. Algerian warfare.

The citadel of Barcelona, called Fort Montjuich, is by far the strongest point in the works of the place, and its reduction had always been regarded as an operation to follow, not to precede, the capture of the city, Bold attack by Peterborough on Fort Montjuich, 1705.

until the bold mind of Peterborough conceived the idea of reversing the usual order of events.

Having ascertained by a personal reconnaissance that the garrison relied with too much confidence on the extraordinary strength of their position, Peterborough framed his plans accordingly, taking care not to give the slightest hint of his intentions, even to his most intimate friends; while, the more fully to mislead every one as to his intentions, he called councils of war, at which the siege of Barcelona was represented as a hopeless undertaking, and its abandonment discussed and finally agreed upon.

The fiery nature of Peterborough was for a time put under a degree of restraint to which it could scarcely submit. The murmurs and open expressions of dissatisfaction, as well as insinuations of treachery, to which his conduct gave rise, were, however, patiently endured.

So well were his measures taken, that on the night fixed for the assault the garrison were engaged in a public rejoicing to celebrate the raising of the siege, while in the camp of the besiegers active preparations were in progress to reimbark the troops—one man only knew the great stake which was about to be lost or won.

On the afternoon of Sunday, the 13th September, a detachment of 1,200 men assembled, it was generally supposed, for the purpose of covering the embarkation. Scaling ladders had already been privately prepared. About six in the evening, 400 men, as an advanced guard, moved along the Serria road, as if *en route* to Tarragona, the remainder of the detachment following as a support. Peterborough then communicated his intention to the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, and the

column of march changed direction, and moved on Fort Montjuich.

The General's intention now developed itself, and the troops expected to be led immediately to the assault; but the night was dark, and Peterborough had no intention of hazarding an attack before daylight; he therefore called his officers together and explained to them his plans, which were to get possession of the outworks by a *coup de main*, in the expectation that the body of the place would not then hold out. In this view he proposed to entice the garrison to meet him on the outworks by an open assault in the light of day.

The orders were that the columns should push on, disregarding the enemy's fire, leap into the ditch, drive the garrison before them, and, if possible, enter the works along with them. The troops were divided into two columns of attack and a reserve. The garrison turned out promptly at the first alarm, but, after a sharp struggle, the bastion was gained, and an entrenchment thrown up. Succours arriving from the city, the fight was renewed, and the Marquis de Risbourg in turn attempted to deceive the assailants by a stratagem, which nearly proved fatal to Peterborough's plans.

Ordering his men to shout "Charles the Third," he desired them at the same time to open the gate, as if they meant to surrender or fraternize with the assaulting column. The Prince of Hesse, deceived by these demonstrations, advanced at the head of his column as far as the ditch, where they were received with a murderous discharge in front and flank; the Prince, while striving to rally his men, was killed; this was the crisis of the day, and for a moment the fortune of Peterborough

seemed to tremble in the balance, for a reinforcement of 3,000 men was just then hurrying from the city to oppose the assaulting columns.

Fortunately this reinforcement, misled by a report that the whole allied force was upon them, retreated back into the city. Peterborough then rallied his men, and finally secured himself in the position which he had gained in the citadel, ready to carry on operations against the city.

During the same war, San Matteo, garrisoned by a British force under Colonel Jones, was threatened by
1705. the Condé de las Torras, an experienced veteran. Peterborough had at the moment only three weak regiments of British infantry and 200 dragoons available for the succour of San Matteo, a force by no means adequate to the difficulties to be apprehended on the march, both from the enemy's forces and the hostility of the inhabitants.

"Let me try," said he, "whether I cannot, by diligence and surprise, effect that which by downright force is impracticable."

Having broken up his small force into several detachments, and secured efficient guides, he marched from Tortosa, appointing a rendezvous for the whole at Traguera, two leagues from San Matteo.

His march was conducted in perfect secrecy, by detaching small parties of dragoons and Miquelets in advance, to occupy the passes on the route, and allow no one to precede the troops on their march. By this latter precaution no intelligence of their march could be carried to the front.

Not content with thus cutting off all true intelligence

from the enemy, an ingenious device was adopted to impose upon the Condé de las Torras. Two peasants were bribed to carry despatches to Colonel Jones by different routes. To secure the fidelity of these men, their families were taken as hostages, and care was taken at the same time not to let them know anything through which by any amount of treachery they could do any harm. One of these men by a skilful contrivance was arrested on the road; on being examined and threatened with instant death if he did not disclose all he knew, he revealed the route taken by his companion, who was thus also secured. The identity of the communications of which these men were the bearers, and the skilful way in which it had been managed that they should fall into the hands of the enemy, completely duped the Condé de las Torras. The purport of the despatches being that Peterborough was on his way with a large force to the relief of San Matteo, the head of the Earl's small column no sooner appeared in sight than the Spaniards struck their tents, spiked their guns, and abandoned their works in a style which much more resembled a disorderly flight than the retreat of a disciplined body of troops.

Alicante besieged by Asfeld.

In 1708, 12,000 men, under Asfeld, appeared before Alicante, the last place which the English retained in Valencia. Having taken the town, they blockaded the castle, which was situated on an inaccessible rock, but having no direct communication with the sea, could not easily receive assistance from without.

Asfeld, having constructed an enormous mine in the rock, under the castle, capable of containing fifteen hundred barrels of gunpowder, intimated to the Governor

that any officers appointed by him might see the mine, in order to satisfy him of its existence. This offer was accepted, but the officers employed could only see the mouth of the cave, and suspected some stratagem, and reported accordingly; and the Governor, partly influenced by their opinions, and partly relying on the great natural strength of the rock, refused to capitulate.

The explosion of the mine is described as resembling some awful convulsion of the elements; the Governor and most of the principal officers were buried in the chasm which was opened, or blown into the air, but the defences of the place were so little injured that the garrison remained firm.

Owing to the boisterous state of the weather, several attempts which General Stanhope made to effect the relief of the place proved unsuccessful. He was enabled, however, to obtain honourable terms of capitulation for the garrison.

The gallant defenders of the place, reduced to 600 men, had scarcely any provisions or water remaining at the time they surrendered.

Chevalier Bayard.

The Chevalier Bayard with the spirit of a valiant warrior combined a subtle genius. Being besieged in Maizieres, in Champagne, in 1520, on one side of the river by the Lord Francesco, with 15,000 men, and on the other by the Count of Nassau, with more than 20,000, the "good knight" devised the following plan to induce the Lord Francesco, whose camp did him most mischief, to repass the water.

He caused a letter to be written to Master Robert de la Marche, who was then at Sedan, inviting him to bring over to the King's party the Lord Francesco, who

was not, he understood, indisposed to it, but he urged him to do it that very day, telling him, as a great secret, that 12,000 Swiss, and 800 men-at-arms, had arrived within three leagues, and were to attack the Lord Francesco's camp at daybreak next morning, whilst he himself made a sally from the town, and that he would be very clever if he escaped being cut to pieces with his whole army.

The letter was despatched by a person who had scarcely got two bow-shots from the town when he was seized, as the good knight had anticipated, and carried before the Lord Francesco, who had no sooner read the letter than he concluded that the Count de Nassau, between whom and himself there was some jealousy, had posted him on the other side of the river on purpose to expose him to destruction.

The result was a violent altercation between these two commanders, which almost brought their armies into collision, and the next day they *trussed their points*, and raised the siege.

Attack on lines of Turin by Eugene.

St. Simon gives the following account of the effect of Prince Eugene's inroad upon the lines at Turin :— 1706.

"La Feuillade was charged with the conduct of the siege of Turin. M. le Duc d'Orleans, under the tutelage of Marsin, commanded the covering army. M. le Duc d'Orleans proposed to dispute the passage of the Tanaro, a confluent of the Po, or compel the enemy to accept battle ; but this was overruled by Marsin, and the Army was led to Turin to assist the besiegers.

"When the Duc d'Orleans, soon after arriving there, learnt that the enemy was approaching to succour Turin, he suggested that they should be opposed as they

attempted the passage of the Dora; but in this he was again overruled by a council of war.

"Finding himself thus opposed, he wished to quit the Army, but was persuaded to remain.

"On the 6th or 7th of September, he rose from his bed alarmed with the intelligence that Prince Eugene was about to attack the Castle of Piannezza, in order to cross the Dora, and attack the besiegers. He hastened to Marsin, and suggested that troops should be sent to dispute the passage of the brook that the enemy had yet to cross; but Marsin would listen to none of his arguments. He maintained that it would be unsafe to quit the lines, that the news was false, and Prince Eugene could not possibly arrive so suddenly.

"When the enemy appeared in sight, it was no longer time to make arrangements—Marsin, more dead than alive, was incapable of giving any directions. Towards the middle of the day, Marsin was incapacitated from doing anything further by a severe wound. La Feuillade ran about like a madman, tearing his hair and incapable of giving any orders."

Value of a place not always in proportion to strength of fortification.

The best fortified and strongest places are not always the most valuable or important in war. The strategic position of a place, the plan of the campaign, and a variety of circumstances, some of them, perhaps, of an accidental nature, determine the value of a fortress or fortified town.

Reasons for taking places.

Sometimes, in a military view, it may be desirable to take a place merely to dismantle it; sometimes for the purpose of holding it. In other cases, various considerations, partly or wholly political or military, may combine to make a siege advisable.

Charles V. took Terouenne to dismantle it, because the French found it serviceable to their designs upon Luxemburg.

Louis VII. demolished the fortresses of the county of Champagne for similar reasons.

Condé and Turenne advised Louis XIV. to dismantle the greater portion of the places he had taken from the Dutch, in order not to weaken his Army by numerous garrisons. Had this advice been adopted, the consequences would have been very serious to the Dutch.

Sometimes the capture or demolition of a place is necessary for the glory or reputation, or to preserve the prestige, of a monarch or an empire.

Such was the second taking of Caubul in our own times, although the place was not entirely destroyed.

Samaria was destroyed by Hiram, King of Jerusalem; Samos, by Othane, General of Darius Hystaspes.

Relief of Taunton.

After Cromwell had remodelled his Army, he wished to move upon Oxford, where the King's Army lay entrenched, urging in support of his plan that, the principal force of the Cavaliers, in fact, the flower of the King's Army, with the bulk of the artillery, being there in position, a victory over that force would put an end to the war, as the few places in the hands of the Cavaliers might be easily reduced, after the destruction of the only Army they had in the field. On the other side, it was urged that the issue of a battle was uncertain, even if it were possible to compel the King to fight a battle in the open field; that Taunton was the key of the four western counties; that its fall, after so glorious a defence, would produce a great moral effect in the country; and that, moreover, its heroic garrison had a right to expect the

1645.

first relief that could be despatched to those parts. These were the sentiments which generally prevailed in the Army; and the order to march to the relief of Taunton was received with a burst of enthusiasm which seemed to make the men disregard all fatigue; and they hardly took any repose until they found themselves in Dorsetshire, while the Cavaliers were in ignorance of their even having left London.

If the possession of a place facilitates the enemy's communication with those districts from which he obtains supplies, either in men, money, food, clothing, arms, or horses, the sooner it is wrested from him the better.

During the war in the East, it was deemed advisable to deprive the Russians of Kertch, in the Crimea, and some of the ports on the coast of Asia Minor.

If a place borders on the territory of a neutral, who is wavering and inclined to join the enemy, the occupation of it may keep him in check, and prevent him from declaring against those who have taken possession of it.

A place may be of little value to ourselves, and yet of great value to the enemy. Such a reason would be a valid one for occupying it to the exclusion of the enemy.

Philip II. of Macedon, at war with the Athenians, and distrusting the Thebans, seized upon Elathee, on account of its situation on the frontier of the two republics.

Louis VIII. took Rochelle, because, while it remained in the hands of the English, it was to them a convenient port to disembark troops for their incursions into France.

When a prince has shut himself up in a fortress, the

advantage to be expected from getting possession of his person may fully justify the siege of the place.

Sometimes a blockade more expedient than a siege.

Sometimes it is more expedient to reduce a place by blockade, than to go through the process of a siege. By blockade, the fortifications will be spared, as well as the expenditure in men and munitions of war.

Maxim.

A maxim to be always remembered is that, if a citadel or town can be successfully assailed on the weak side, then the strong side is in a manner useless.

Character of governor of a fortress.

The character and reputation of the governor of a fortress must be specially considered, both by those who employ him, and by those who have to contend against him.

If he is not a man in sound health and of active habits, who can see everything for himself, then, however great his bravery, he must trust to the reports of others as to the condition of affairs; and in that manner he is liable to be deceived. These and all other circumstances which in any way disqualify an officer for the responsible duty of maintaining a defence, are, of course, to be regarded as favourable to the attack.

Soldiers improve under an able governor.

Marmont says, an indifferent garrison will become good under a good commandant. Such a man will awaken in the breasts of the soldiers a feeling of patriotism and honour.

The glory of a victory on the field of battle he considers great, but the determined defence of a place he looks upon as more meritorious. He then adds that the preservation of a citadel or town is often in war a matter of such importance, he thinks every governor who loses the place confided to him should, like a naval commander who loses his ship, be called upon to account

for the loss before a court-martial, and suffer punishment, or receive an honourable recompense, according to the verdict pronounced.

Sorties highly conducive to the defence.

In the defence of a place, the Marshal is a strenuous advocate for frequent sorties, to obstruct the progress of the approaches, and damage and destroy generally the implements and works of the besieger. He cautions all governors to guard specially against surprises; for he says, the more improbable the occurrence of an event the greater is the effect which such an event produces when it does happen. A brave garrison may defend a breach, and the enemy may, for a long time, be unable to overcome the resistance offered; but if, at the moment that all attention is directed to the defence of an opening in the works, a cry is raised that the enemy has entered by escalade at another point, then people are astonished and bewildered: the defence of the breach is abandoned, and the place is taken.

Marmont says he always had a great ambition to be entrusted with the defence of some important place, and that, if such a duty had ever fallen to his lot, he would have had the history of the defence of Grave, in 1675, printed and circulated amongst the garrison, conceiving the defence made by M. Chamilly to be without a parallel as a military achievement.

1675. Siege of Grave.

The allies were bent upon taking Grave from the French, because the Dutch hostages for the contributions were prisoners within its walls, and would, of course, be released on the fall of the place. In order to save the place, the French General, Count d'Estrades, who commanded in Maestricht, employed M. de Melin (Colonel) to remove these prisoners from Grave. This

officer found means to get through the besiegers' lines, and enter the place with some money, of which the Governor Chamilly stood much in want. He then took charge of the hostages, and again eluding the vigilance of the besiegers, he passed through their lines, and lodged his prisoners safely in Maestricht.

Almeida.

General Brennier, left to his fate in Almeida, saw nothing for his troops but starvation, or to surrender prisoners of war. To escape such an alternative, he determined to try to evacuate the place without being perceived. Preparatory to the attempt, the troops were employed for several nights in the destruction of the ordnance by firing one piece into another.

1811.

By these repeated discharges the allies became so familiarized with the sound of firing, that, when General Brennier, on the night fixed for the evacuation, immediately before marching out of the place blew up the mines, the noise attracted very little attention amongst the pickets of the allied Army; and he was enabled to commence his march unmolested about two in the morning. He had not, however, proceeded far before Pack's brigade followed in hot pursuit.

By casting loose horses and mules, and throwing away knapsacks, a few of the retreating garrison succeeded in making their escape; but by far the greater number were either killed or taken prisoners.

Siege of Breda, 1625.

The siege of Breda, in 1625, conducted by the famous Spinola, under the most discouraging combination of circumstances, furnishes also an example of a model governor.

Spinola and Justin.

The garrison was composed of English, French, and Dutch troops, amounting in all to 7,000 infantry, and

some squadrons of horse. The English were commanded by Colonel Morgan, an officer who had gained great distinction in the wars of that period; the French were under Colonel de Hauterive; and the Dutch under Colonel Lohre; the whole subject to the supreme direction of Justin de Nassau, the Governor.

The besiegers' approaches continuing to advance, notwithstanding the terrific fire which was kept up by the garrison, Justin determined to try to accomplish by water that which he had not been able to effect by fire. To this end he caused the course of the river Merck to be turned, and thus obtained an accumulation of water, which, on the opening of the sluices, swept away horses, men, and houses, throughout the surrounding country, swamping the enemy in his lines. This inundation was greatly aided by an unusually rainy season, causing a pestilence, which swept off numbers of the Spaniards, and reduced the force of the besiegers to 12,000 men.

Spinola, although prostrate from sickness, continued to animate the troops in the trenches by his spirit; giving directions for the repair of the damages which his works had sustained, and for the vigorous prosecution of the works remaining to be completed.

Justin rivalled his adversary in the faithful discharge of the trust confided to him, establishing regulations to stay the epidemic which had made its appearance within the walls, repairing the breaches, and watching over the careful distribution and expenditure of the daily diminishing stores of food and ammunition, so as to prolong the defence as much as possible.

At length Spinola was reinforced, and the garrison were so completely cut off from all communication beyond

the walls, that they did not even know of the death of Prince Maurice, to whom they were daily looking for succour. Neither, of course, had they heard of the failure of an attempt made by his successor, Prince Henry, to raise the siege.

Prince Henry, after the miscarriage of his attempt to relieve the place, sent a despatch to the Governor, permitting him to surrender on the best terms he could obtain. This communication fell into the hands of Spinola, who forwarded it to Justin by a trumpet, offering him, at the same time, honourable terms of capitulation; but that trusty soldier, doubting the authenticity of the despatch, replied to Spinola, in courteous terms, that a permission to surrender was not an order, and that he conceived he should better discharge his duty to his Prince, and show his respect for the Spanish General, by defending the place to the last extremity.

At this time, the prospect which presented itself to the Governor was of the most gloomy and discouraging nature; but, by the bold and unruffled countenance which he maintained, he both kept up the courage of the garrison, and concealed from them the straits to which they were actually reduced. By frequent sallies on the besiegers' lines at the weakest points, he retarded the progress of the siege to the utmost of his power; and, in reply to a second message from Spinola, urging him, for the sake of his brave garrison, not to drive him to extremities, he gave the Spanish General to understand that he was quite under a mistake as to the real condition of Breda if he supposed the place incapable of holding out for many months to come.

At length, a despatch from Prince Henry was received by Justin, apprising him of the death of Prince Maurice, and of Prince Henry's inability, from various circumstances, to afford any assistance in the defence or relief of Breda, and, therefore, conferring full power on the Governor, after consultation with his officers, to act entirely according to his own descretion in surrendering the place.

Hitherto, the Governor, in daily expectation of some assistance, had kept the exhausted state of the magazines a profound secret, not only from the enemy, but also from all within the place, except one or two confidential officers. The intelligence just received rendered further concealment impossible; but the bold Morgan, as well as the Commander of the French troops, would listen to no mention of the word surrender. They said the honour of their troops and of their respective countries was concerned, and that they required a positive order from the Prince of Orange to surrender the place. The heroism of this declaration cannot be fully realized without reading the details of the sufferings from fatigue, famine, and disease which these men were at that time enduring.

Justin, having found means of again communicating with the Prince, received the required authority, accompanied with an intimation that capital punishment would be inflicted on any one who refused to obey. The Prince, at the same time, desired the Governor, before acting on the order, to acquaint him by a certain number of fires lighted up in the city how many days he could still hold out.

The critical state to which the garrison was reduced

was made known to Spinola, by a copy of this despatch which fell into his hands: and when he saw eleven fires lighted up in the city, the measure of their expiring strength was at once revealed to him. He thereupon called a council of war, and desired their opinion as to whether he should wait eleven days and then compel the garrison to surrender at discretion, or should offer on the spot conditions worthy of such a brave defence. The council, with the exception of Count de Berg, were in favour of eleven days' delay.

The noble disposition of Spinola prompted him to the more generous course; and he at once despatched Count de Berg to negotiate for the surrender of the town and garrison on honourable terms, which were accepted without hesitation.

Spinola drew up his army to see the garrison march out, and saluted them with the greatest respect. To the Governor and the Colonels Morgan, Hauterive, and Lohre, he paid particular compliments, and, at the same time, displayed the feelings of his own great character in the care and attention which he caused to be paid to the sick and wounded.

Defence of Taunton by Blake.

During the siege of Taunton by the Royal forces, in 1645, while Blake, who commanded the garrison, was in expectation of reinforcements which had been despatched to his assistance, the "cavalier general" Berkeley attempted to induce him to make a premature sally, hoping that, if he succeeded in tempting Blake to do so, he might have an opportunity of carrying the place by a sudden assault before the arrival of the reinforcements which he had heard were expected.

Berkeley's stratagem was the old one of a feigned

attack, as if by an enemy's force on his own camp; but Blake, who watched the proceedings of the Royalists from the church tower, perceived the stratagem intended to lure him from his strong position, and remained firm within his ramparts.

Sir John, seeing the failure of his plan, recalled his squadrons, formed them in deep columns, and rushed towards the ruins which separated the real combatants. Vast quantities of hand grenades were thrown into the houses, and two long and handsome streets were that day burnt to ashes. Never had the cavaliers fought more gallantly. Pike in hand they cleared the outworks, passed the gate, and stormed the barricades in East Street; but the besieged fell back only to concentrate their strength and recruit their stock of ammunition. Resisting with passive courage, until the enemy began to show signs of weakness, Blake then gave the word for the reserves drawn up in the Bull-ring to advance at a pike charge, while the musqueteers, stationed in and behind the houses in East Street, opened up a sharper fire; after a tremendous struggle, the garrison succeeded in clearing the streets, and the cavaliers were driven back to their entrenchments.

The same afternoon, ten successive discharges of artillery, the preconcerted signal of approaching relief for the garrison, resounded in the Blagden Hills; and Blake made his dispositions that night to co-operate on the following day with Welden, who commanded the relieving force, in an attack on the camp of the cavaliers. In anticipation of such an event, the Royalists evacuated their camp during the night. This news having been brought to Blake by his scouts at daylight, he imme-

diately sounded the trumpet for a sortie, and the Royal forces would, no doubt, have suffered severely in their retreat, had they not taken the precaution to make the roads impassable for cavalry, by felling trees and throwing them across for barricades.

Blake, to whom so much honour is due for the successful defence of Taunton, had had only a short experience in war at that period. Born in 1598, he lived the life of a country gentleman, until the breaking out of the civil war. Adopting, then, the cause of the commonwealth, he commenced his great career at the age of forty-three, by raising a troop of horsemen. Previous to his appointment as Governor of Taunton, he had assisted in the defence of Bristol, in 1643, and greatly distinguished himself by the bravery he displayed on that service; but, in the defence of Taunton, he had more scope for the exercise both of his military and administrative ability.

The town of Taunton was not even walled, and possessed no natural advantages of site favourable to a defence. The attacking force was well provided with artillery, and consisted of well-trained troops, brave, vigilant, and numerous. It was, therefore, no ordinary achievement to sustain a state of blockade and siege under such circumstances for several months, repelling, during that time, many fierce and vigorous assaults.

Advantages of the defence to the Parliamentary cause.

The advantage to the Parliamentary cause from the protracted defence of Taunton was very great, as the King's operations were, to a certain extent, paralyzed by the delay, while Cromwell gained time to remodel and discipline his forces.

Defence of Lyme.

The genius of Blake was called into requisition at a

later period in the defence of Lyme: and although that place was surrounded by a ditch and strengthened by a few outworks, all the resources of his fertile genius, and the energy of his indomitable character, were required by the exigencies of his situation.

At one time, receiving information that a surprise was to be attempted, he formed a plan for a counter-surprise. Thus, when the assailants came to the works, they found them abandoned, and were induced to lay aside the caution with which they had approached the place, and plunge recklessly into the close and intricate alleys, where Blake's men lay in ambush, ready to cut them off. 400 of the besiegers were thus entrapped, and fell in heaps under the murderous fire poured upon them from the doors, windows, and parapets of the adjacent houses.

The siege was brought to a close through a clever stratagem, concerted by Blake and the Admiral (Earl of Warwick). 300 men having been secretly landed from the fleet to reinforce the garrison, a squadron then moved off to another part of the coast, as if with the intention of landing a force to operate on the flanks and rear of the besiegers. Prince Maurice was induced to despatch all his cavalry, supported by some infantry, to oppose the threatened landing. Thus, while the garrison had, in reality, been reinforced, and the besieging force weakened to the extent of the force they had detached, the besiegers, under the impression that part of the garrison had been embarked in the fleet to try a landing at a distance, conceived that a favourable opportunity now presented itself for a renewed assault. This final effort had no better success than those which had

preceded it, every house being in itself a little fortress; and Prince Maurice then thought fit to abandon the siege, knowing that Essex was moving westward with the force under his command.

Dunster Castle.

The talents of Blake were not confined to defensive war. Dunster Castle, previously held to be impregnable, fell before his skill and the valour of his men. Having constructed a mine in the wall, the explosion created a breach sufficiently large to admit an assaulting party, and the impetuosity shown by the Roundheads on that occasion is described as irresistible.

Free Company at Dantzic.

The Free Company (Compagnie Franche) formed in Dantzic during the great siege, and commanded by Chambure, a staff officer, distinguished themselves greatly by their exploits. Boussac, a small village above Dantzic, in the possession of the Russians, was recovered 1813. by a night attack made by this Company. Having landed at the village from their boats, unperceived, they killed the outposts and dispersed the battalions trying to form. The story of their return to Dantzic afterwards through hosts of the enemy borders on the marvellous, as their boats were carried away by the wind and current.

The redoubt of Frival, after it fell into the hands of the Russians, was recovered by this Company, although Rapp looked upon the attempt as an act of madness. Creeping along the ground on their bellies, they reached the palisades, escaladed them, answering the challenges in Russian, and at last succeeded in forcing open the gates.

Surprises seldom succeed when garrison is vigilant.

When a town is besieged, the governor and garrison should always remember that surprises have seldom

succeeded except when favoured by neglect of military duty, or a feeling of too great security on the part of those who are surprised. The enemy should always be supposed to have a design upon every point, and no precaution, even the most minute, should be overlooked.

Louisburg. When the expedition under Admiral Boscawen and General Amherst attacked Louisburg, 1758, the enemy had spent years in preparation for such an event. Breast-works had been thrown up at every part of the coast where a landing seemed at all within the scope of possibility. Heavy guns and swivels swept the approaches to the shore in all directions. Trees had been felled, and laid close together in a line between the works and the water's edge, forming an abattis which could only be reached under a murderous fire from the batteries.

The boats' crews pulled steadily to the shore under a shower of red-hot balls, grape, and other projectiles, but only to be driven back. Had the enemy only allowed them to land, they could not have advanced, and it is probable they would have had no alternative but to lay down their arms; but, repulsed in the attempt to land, they became exasperated, and determined to gain a footing somewhere.

Some rocks which had been left unprotected, in the belief that they were inaccessible, having been discovered by Lieutenant Hopkins, he succeeded in scrambling over them, followed by some light infantry; he and his companions then pointed out their track to Brigadier Wolf, and that brave officer speedily seized the golden opportunity thus put in his way. On approaching the spot indicated, and finding that, owing to the surf, the landing from the boats was tedious, Wolf jumped into the

General Wolf.

surf, Brigadier Laurence and the troops followed his example, and, after some difficulty and considerable loss from the enemy's fire, a firm footing was established on the shore at that point.

As no order could be preserved in landing under such circumstances on this rugged shore, the first step was to marshal the troops who had effected a landing. As soon as this was done they attacked the nearest battery in flank, having, in a manner, turned the enemy's position by landing at this unexpected point.

It frequently happens that when works have been looked upon as impregnable, and such an idea as retreat has never been taken into consideration, the sudden discovery that the defences so much relied upon are not invulnerable creates a panic; and such was the case in this instance—a very few days decided the fate of Louisburg.

Sweidtnitz surprised through over-confidence of King of Prussia.

The fortress of Sweidtnitz was surprised in 1761, owing to the King of Prussia feeling over-confident in the security of the place. His idea was that, having his camp at no great distance, the enemy could not form the siege without his receiving notice in time to march to the relief. In this feeling of confidence he withdrew 4,000 men from the garrison. But he had a sagacious adversary to contend with in Marshal Laudohn. That skilful General had been long watching in vain for a joint in Frederick's armour; and the moment he heard of the defenceless state in which Sweidtnitz had been left, he conceived the design of capturing it; and the plan was no sooner conceived, than he proceeded to put it in execution.

Covered by a dense fog, a select body of troops suc-

than a good traverse, which entirely stops up the gallery of the countermine towards the side from which the enemy may come. If they attempt to oppose this operation, the men carrying the loaded shells should throw them, and retire quickly with their comrades, to prevent being hurt by the explosion; for the smoke they make in bursting, together with the splinters, must unavoidably compel the enemy to quit the gallery for some time. As soon as the gallery has been thus cleared of the enemy, the whole party must immediately return, and work as hard as possible on the traverse, in order to stop up the gallery. If the besieged still persist in interrupting the work, the shells fitted with fuses only must be thrown, which will oblige the enemy to retire quickly; then, as the assailants know the shells to be empty, they can continue to finish the traverse. Loopholes or openings may be made, in order to fire upon the enemy, in case he should appear again in that part of the gallery opposite the traverse.

A miner, says Vauban, ought to listen frequently to discover whether there are any at work under him. He ought to sound with his auger towards the place he hears the noise come from; but the enemy often makes a noise on one side, while they are at work at the other side.

When a miner draws too near there are various ways of stifling him and destroying him. In searching for one another, the long borers, with which miners are provided, are sometimes used to pierce the interval between them. A pistol-shot fired through the hole thus made the instant the borer is withdrawn often proves fatal to the miner on the other side.

The great danger to a miner is when the enemy is working under him. Miners have a way of ascertaining this by a drum, with something on it, to which a tremulous motion is given if there is any shaking of the ground underneath.

Siege of Bhurtpoor.

The siege of Bhurtpoor, in 1826, affords a good instance of the vast consequences which depend on the skill or inefficiency of miners and engineer officers.

Engineers should have had a better knowledge of the works.

The scarp, or outer wall, seemed entirely of mud, beaten down in courses of about three feet deep, in the manner usually adopted throughout Hindostan, where stones are not procurable. This coating of mud was twelve or fourteen feet thick, behind which there was a solid wall. The engineers had an old native drawing of the fortification in which *various courses of stone-work*, with which the outer wall was riveted, were distinctly marked; but although they had this drawing, they never asked themselves what had become of the *stone-scarp*. They went through the mud-covering in mining, and reached the wall, and then deliberated whether there was any necessity for going further. They decided that they had mined sufficiently. They then loaded, tempered, and fired, and, in consequence, rather increased the strength of the bastion than facilitated its capture; for a perpendicular stone wall of about ten feet high now presented itself to any storming party that could have been ordered to attack it. Had they pierced the wall, they would have made a capital breach.

When a place is assaulted by day.

When an assault is to take place by day, any appearance of unusual bustle must be carefully avoided, and measures must be adopted to conceal the assembling of the troops. It is a question whether the assault should

be preceded by a greater fire than usual from the batteries.

No measures of detail are too insignificant to receive attention. At the siege of Barcelona, the Spaniards got as far as the Bastion St. Pierre three times, and three times they were driven back, and the artillery opened on them again. This could not have happened, if they had not neglected to provide themselves with such trifling articles as a few spikes. Had they done so when they found that they could not hold the bastion, they could at least have spiked the guns.

No measures of detail too insignificant to receive attention.

1714.

When a place is assaulted at several different points, the columns of attack have sometimes been directed each to notify the commencement of its attack by shouting.

The importance of keeping the enemy in ignorance of the real state of the garrison has been recognized in sieges from time immemorial.

When Hannibal was encamped under the walls of Rome, the Romans made a display of a feeling of security, by sending reinforcements to their Army in Spain. And, with the same view, on the death of a rich proprietor, his lands were sold at a higher price than they had been valued at before the war.

Vespasian blockaded Jotapa, feeling confident of reducing the place by the scarcity of water. The Governor caused some clothes to be dipped and hung out to dry, as if they had water enough for washing. Vespasian then changed the blockade into a siege, and lost great part of his best troops.

Deceiving enemy as to state of place.

In 1691, when Prats de Molo (Forcia de Pratis), a small town situated in the mountains of Roussilon, with a castle called Fort la Garde, was besieged by the Viceroy,

the Governor, Chevalier Landoste, sent two priests to the Viceroy, under pretext of asking protection for two churches situated outside the walls, but in reality to create intimidation by their reports.

Being questioned on the state of the place and the garrison, they represented all the streets as barricaded up to the ramparts, the strength of the garrison they estimated at 1,000 men, all animated with the most resolute spirit, determined to die at their posts; and they stated that the idea of capitulating or evacuating had never been mentioned, the male inhabitants had all been armed, and the women and children sent away.

The gossip of these priests had considerable effect afterwards in inducing the Viceroy to raise the siege on hearing of the approach of a French detachment.

In the Peninsular war, De Grammont, of the 10th Hussars, was sent into Pampeluna, on the 21st October, 1813, to caution the Governor against blowing up or injuring the works, in consequence of a rumour that he meditated some such measure.

This officer was well received, and offered wine and a fresh loaf, and on his return he reported that the men whom he saw looked plump and jolly. It is probable that this was all prearranged to impose upon the Allies.

The Romans, besieged by the Gauls and almost starved, threw bread over the walls, to make the Gauls believe they had plenty. The Athenians did the same when besieged by the Lacedemonians.

The remnants of Varus's legions, blockaded by the Germans, took some of their prisoners into their magazines, in order to show that they could not be reduced by want.

Ambuscades minor class of surprises.

Surprises may be divided into two great classes—those in which the enemy is unexpectedly attacked in his position, and those in which he is drawn into a snare which has been prepared for him. To the latter class belong ambuscades, a mode of warfare which, although still occasionally practised, can only be carried on to a limited extent with modern armies.

In the campaign of 1815 (hundred days), Excelman placed one of his lieutenants, Piré, with a body of Chasseurs and some infantry, in ambush, at a place called Rocquencourt, behind Versailles, on the St. Germains road, whilst he himself, taking the road by Plessis-Piquet, fell upon a brigade of Prussian cavalry about a league and a half from Versailles, and drove them back upon Rocquencourt, when Piré and his Chasseurs issuing forth, completed their discomfiture, very few of them escaping from the field.

In order to prepare an ambuscade, the character of the enemy's General must be studied, and measures framed to suit. As, for instance, if he is a man of an arrogant, impetuous temper, it is probable that he will be most easily led to the commission of a rash act by appearing to despise him and treat him with contempt.

The Prince of Orange is reported to have said that rash and violent men were easily drawn into ambuscades, and Polybius makes a similar observation.

Post for an ambuscade.

In posting an ambuscade, a position on the flank of the enemy's line of march is to be preferred to one directly in his front, as the light troops on the flank do not in general beat the ground so thoroughly as the advanced guard. Country houses, with court-yards and sunk stories, are very convenient places for troops on

this service. A village, if the inhabitants are friendly, is also to be preferred to woods or ravines, as an enemy generally regards the latter with more suspicion on a march. In very hot weather the vicinity of a well or stream of water is a good place. At the attack on Zerbi, in 1510, 4,000 Spaniards, in searching for water, fell into an ambuscade prepared by the Moors, and were all slain on the spot.

Attack on Zerbi by Ferdinand of Spain.

The Spaniards formed an ambuscade near Mora, on the Ebro, in the war of 1710, but they neglected to prohibit the men from falling asleep; and in consequence a loose horse in the night occasioned an alarm in the bivouack. A sudden cry to arms was raised, and some of the men commenced firing on each other, mistaking their comrades for enemies, while others took to flight, and thus an end was put to the enterprise.

Such is the similarity in the military schemes of all ages that the feints used, or said to have been used, by General Eyre to entrap his enemy in the Kaffir war, may be compared with those practised by Agesilaus against Tissaphernes, and by other generals in many instances during the long series of years between the expedition of the Spartan King to Asia, B.C. 396, and the war in the Amatolas, 1851–52.

During the recent mutiny in India, a detachment[30] marching to the relief of Arrah was nearly annihilated by an ambush which the mutinous Sepoys planted in a tope, or wood, through which the relieving party had to pass in the night. 1857.

In the war in 1704, when the Huguenots, under

[30] Part of 10th and 37th Regiments and a few Sikhs, in all 400 men, commanded by Captain Dunbar. Their loss was 135 killed and 60 wounded.

their chief, Ravenal, retired to the wood of Bemzet, Villars detached two battalions with orders to leave the road open to them to retire by Castagnolles; he posted, at the same time, near that road a body of troops, horse and foot, in ambush, by which force the whole of the Huguenots were exterminated.

The disgrace which is considered to attach to a General who allows himself to be surprised, ought to be a powerful incentive to watchfulness and circumspection.

When proper precautions are used, it ought to be impossible to surprise an army by day, and very difficult to do so by night.

Against being deceived, no specific can be offered; but an attentive study of the various means by which commanders have been surprised and deceived, is an exercise which will both sharpen the faculties, and draw attention to those points from which stratagems or surprises are most likely to be attempted.

The capture of Turenne's baggage by M. de Luxemburg, noticed in Feuquiere's Memoirs, is an example of the injury which may be inflicted by a cleverly devised ambuscade.

Turenne, on that occasion, wishing to succour Arras as speedily as possible, made a rapid march with his men, leaving his baggage to follow, under charge of General Seron. That officer having conducted it safely to within sight of Turenne's camp, rode on in advance to announce his success. M. de Luxemburg, who was concealed in the vicinity with a corps of cavalry, then sallied out, turned the head of the baggage column in the direction of St. Pol, and carried off the whole of it without Turenne or Seron knowing anything of the matter.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONVOYS.

"Il est contraire aux usages de la guerre de faire entrer ses parcs et sa grosse artillerie dans un défilé dont on n'a pas l'extrémité opposée."—NAPOLEON.

Stratagems frequently necessary to bring up supplies to an Army.

As long as an army has preserved its line of communication with its depôts, the march of convoys can be conducted with security by the simple rules laid down for such service; but as troops must be supplied, whether the communications be open, or cut off, or made very difficult, as in the case of beleaguered fortresses or moveable columns, so much used by the French in Algeria, artifice must frequently be employed, in order to divert the attention of the enemy from the line of march of a convoy, so that it may be passed through the interposing barriers.

Thiebault, in order to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, spread a report that a corps of 12,000 men, with twelve pieces of artillery and 1,000 cavalry from the Army of Portugal, 1811. was about to take up a position at Frade, and that they were to be provisioned daily from Salamanca. He then, ostensibly in furtherance of this movement, collected large supplies of provisions and baggage animals at Salamanca, and succeeded eventually in his real object —the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Great caution requisite with convoys of ammunition.

In the wars of Condé we have an instance of the great caution which is required in the march of a convoy; 120 troopers, each carrying a sack of powder behind him, and eighty loaded baggage animals, conducted by peasants, being on the march, a lieutenant in command seeing a drunken trooper with a pipe in his mouth, knocked the pipe out of the man's mouth; the man drew a pistol, and fired at the officer; the shot ignited one of the powder bags, and the flame communicating, the greater part of the ammunition was lost, and many of the troopers disabled.

When the French Army was encamped at Orne, in the campaign of 1746, Marshal Saxe, to cover the approach of a convoy, caused the Marquis d'Armentières to make a demonstration on the side of Ramillies, the day preceding that fixed for the arrival of the convoy, while he sent another corps to amuse the enemy on the side of the Abbey of Ramé. These two detachments drew the attention of the enemy entirely from the other line of road, by which the convoy was approaching, enabling it to accomplish its march without molestation.

1748. In 1748, the same General, before commencing the siege of Maestricht, deemed it necessary to revictual Bergen-op-Zoom, which was rather a hazardous operation, owing to the chain of posts occupied by the allies. To accomplish his object, he posted a strong corps of cavalry under the Count d'Estrees, in such a position near Breda that the allies could not attack the convoy without placing themselves between the escort and the corps of cavalry near Breda, which they declined to do, and thus the convoy reached its destination safely.

Inflated skins have sometimes been used as a means

of floating powder and other supplies into a beleaguered place. Where such means can be used, gutta percha bags might be made very serviceable.

Labour lost by the French in attempting to intercept the supplies destined for Eugene's Army when he was besieging Lisle, 1708.

When Lisle was besieged by Eugene, in 1708, the French generals were indefatigable in their exertions to prevent any supplies reaching the Prince's camp. With this object in view, they threw up lines of great strength, seventy miles in length, to secure the passes of the Scheldt. The States then ordered all that was necessary for the Army, as well as for the siege, to be sent to Ostend; and, if the French had commenced by intercepting that line of communication, the siege might have been raised.

Levenhaupt's convoy for Charles XII., 1708.

At the time Marshal Levenhaupt attempted to reach Charles XII. with a convoy, in 1708, the numerous victories of the Swedes over the Russians had inspired the former with such a contempt for the latter, that the Swedish escort, on seeing the Russian force sent to attack them, at once advanced to meet them, and 1,500 Russians were left on the field that day. The Czar hastened to the rear-guard of Calmucs and Cossacks, and charged them to fire on every man that ran away, even upon himself, he said, if he should be so cowardly as to turn his back. Levenhaupt, anxious to join his royal master, preferred continuing his route to renewing the combat on the following day; but the Czar would not allow him to proceed unmolested; and, upon five successive days, he harassed the Swedes incessantly, and Levenhaupt only succeeded at last in joining Charles with a small remnant of the escort of the convoy, and without any of the stores he was attempting to convey. In these desperate conflicts the Czar lost no less than 20,000

men. The Swedes displayed great valour and discipline in sustaining themselves against the overwhelming odds by which they were assailed, and ultimately reaching their King without being broken.

During the siege of Olmutz, 1758, Daun received positive orders to adopt some measures for the relief of the place. Two ways presented themselves of complying with these instructions. The one was by opening communication with the place, and the other by cutting off a great convoy which the King of Prussia was expecting, and the arrival of which was essential to the prosecution of the siege. The first course must have brought on a general action, which Daun was desirous of avoiding. He, therefore, made up his mind to attempt the capture of the convoy. The clouds of skirmishers attached to the Austrian Army enabled him to make his preparations undiscovered, whilst, at the same time, he deceived the King into a belief that he intended to risk a battle. The destruction of this convoy, which was effected by Laudohn, one of Daun's lieutenants, obliged Frederick to raise the siege of Olmutz, and to evacuate Moravia.

Siege of Corbie. Montluc volunteers to revictual the place.

When the Spaniards marched to the siege of Corbie, in 1508, it was of the utmost consequence to victual the place; but the distance to be traversed from the position occupied by the French at "Marches" seemed to render such an enterprise impracticable, at the slow rate at which troops moved in those days. Montluc, in his eccentric style, volunteered his services: "Que le Roi me laisse faire. Je creverai ou je le secourerai." Montluc could not be spared for the service; and it was entrusted to one of his officers, Captain Brucil, who acquitted

himself very well, marching chiefly by night, avoiding the villages, and concealing himself by day.

Colonel Simcoe in the American war, 1781.

In the American war, 1781, Colonel Simcoe pursued a convoy under charge of Baron Steuben, a German officer in the American service, but the Baron escaped over James River before Simcoe could reach the bank, and he had no means of crossing the river. Simcoe, thus baffled in his scheme of falling on the convoy, then conceived the idea of deceiving the Baron, and leading him to believe that a much larger force was at hand. This he effected by displaying his force on the heights, in such a manner that the Baron, believing he saw only the advanced guard of the whole army, decamped, leaving great part of his stores behind, which Simcoe secured as soon as he obtained the means of crossing the river.

Convoys should, by all means, be seized, and raids made into an enemy's country when a good opportunity offers.

The mere reputation of superiority in war is so important, and the moral effect of cutting off convoys and creating depredations in an enemy's country is so great, that no opportunity should be lost of attempting such expeditions when there is a reasonable prospect of their being brought to a successful issue.

The Empecinado.

One of the earliest adventures of the celebrated Don Juan Martin Diez, generally known by the name of the Empecinado, was the capture of a convoy in which was a carriage conveying a female relation or friend of the French Marshal Moncey.

The coach was escorted by twelve soldiers, in the centre of two columns of 6,000 men, each about a mile asunder. The Empecinado, with eight of his people, was concealed close to the town of Caravias. He allowed the leading column to pass them, boldly rushed upon the

convoy, put to death the whole of the escort, seized and carried off the carriage. When the alarm was given, Martin and his prize were in safety in the mountains. He was only able to save the lives of the lady and of one of her servants. To the lady herself he was very polite; and as she was with child, he sent her to his own house, that she might receive care and attention. The convoy turned out an important capture, consisting of money and jewels of great value, and a quantity of useful military effects, such as sword-blades.

On the 9th March, 1810, 300 French cavalry and infantry were detached from Guadalaxara to Siguenza, to raise contributions. Martin followed this column; but it was reinforced by 250 dragoons and 500 infantry, and he was obliged to give up the pursuit. He determined, however, to attack these people on their return; and he did so on the 16th, when they were on the march, in *high spirits*, having plundered the whole country. His loss in the encounter was very severe; but he captured the whole convoy, although his force was numerically far inferior to the French.

Some months afterwards the force under Martin's orders was considerably increased, and he was enabled to undertake enterprises on a more extensive scale. Having heard of the march of 600 infantry through the Cantarillas of Fuentes, conveying cloth and other things from Brihuega, he so disposed his troops as to keep in check the garrisons of Brihuega, Toreija, Guadalaxara—three places only five leagues asunder. A strong column was pushed out of the latter place to the relief of the convoy; but before this column reached the scene of action, Martin, after a severe contest, had secured the whole of

the stores, the greater part of the escort having fallen or remaining prisoners in his hands.

Towards the end of August, 1809, when the French fire had opened three breaches in the walls of Gerona, and the bombardment had reduced the greater part of the place to ashes, Blake marched from Tarragona, with orders to raise the siege. But frequent defeat had by this time made that General more cautious, without making him more skilful, and he confined himself to an attempt to throw supplies into the town; forgetting that a relieving army should not protract but raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia.

Two thousand beasts of burden loaded with flour, with an escort of 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, were entrusted to Garcia Conde, who undertook to conduct them to Gerona by the flat ground between the Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to the line of the French attack. Garcia Conde.

To facilitate this attempt a general attack was organized on all the French posts in every quarter, except that on which the convoy had to pass. A thick fog and heavy rain further favoured the enterprise by permitting Garcia Conde to move down the mountains unperceived until he reached the plain in rear of the French division commanded by Millosewitz. This division had no outposts, and its nearest supports were at a distance of six miles, and separated by rugged heights. The Spaniards, getting close up to the main body, with one home charge put it to flight. The fugitives, in their panic, at first went towards the town, and being fired upon, turned the heights of Palan, and would have gone into Blake's camp, had they not been met by General St. Cyr, who

was returning from a reconnaissance of the enemy's position. Rallying and reinforcing the panic-stricken division, he sent them back to Soult, and made Verdier follow Garcia Conde with the reserve; but it was too late, the latter had entered the place.

Garcia Conde.

This effort to relieve Gerona was much more creditable to Garcia Conde, who commanded the convoy, than to the General-in-chief, Blake, who, with the means at his disposal, had it in his power to have succoured the place much more effectually.

The reinforcement of men brought in by Garcia was insufficient to raise the siege by sallies, while it was sufficiently numerous to make a serious inroad on the limited supply of provisions which they had introduced. The intrepid Governor Alvarez, therefore, permitted Conde's troops to go back or remain, as they pleased; exacting from those who remained an oath not to surrender, and renewing, at the same time, his edict against speaking of capitulation.

During the siege of Lisle, 1708, General Webb rendered a very important service by bringing a large convoy into the camp of the Allies.

For the purpose of intercepting this convoy, the French despatched Count de la Motte, with a corps of 22,000 men, being more than double the strength of the escort. A desperate action took place, which ended in the repulse of the French and their flight, leaving 6,000 men on the field.

Had it not been for the skill and gallantry of General Webb on this occasion, the siege of Lisle must have been raised.

CHAPTER IX.

ON COMMAND.

"Would to God the Mareschal would have left the animosity he had against me at *Thoulouse* to have come and clawed away *Montgomery*; he had acquired honour, and the country a singular advantage by it, whereas his peevishness ruined all."—MONTLUC.

A well-defined command one of the conditions of success in war.

AMONGST the conditions of success in war enumerated by Jomini, he includes a command well "defined," yet how often do we find this neglected.

The ambition of an officer is frequently gratified by the offer of a command, and he accepts it without pausing to see that there is a clear understanding as to the extent of his powers.

The Government of a country when compelled to resort to war, may, perhaps, be so fortunate as to possess a General of established reputation, such, for instance, as the Duke of Wellington, to whom they can with confidence entrust unlimited power; a man of acknowledged superiority, on whom they are thankful to be able to rely, and to whom they would never think of dictating the course he is to adopt; but when such a valuable member of the community is not forthcoming at the critical time, Governments, haunted with apprehensions for the fate of their armies, frequently hope to avert disaster, and prosecute the war with success, either by

preserving in their own hands a controlling power, or by complicating the individual responsibility of their several commanders, making one General act as a check on another.

The experience of the past is not favourable to the policy of adopting either of these systems.

Kinglake in his Crimea, vol. ii. p. 156, thus adverts to the extent to which Lord Raglan was influenced by the Ministry in undertaking the invasion of the Crimea.

A general urges on an enterprise, of which in his heart he disapproves.

"Again and again it has happened, that mighty armaments, including the forces of several states and people of diverse races, have been gathered and drawn into scenes of conflict by the will of one man; but in general, when such things have been done, the compelling mind has been brought to its resolve by the cogency of satisfied reason or by force of selfish desire. What was new in this enterprise was that he who inexorably forced it on, did not of himself desire it, nor deem it to be wise, nor even in a high degree prudent; and the power which had strength to bend the whole armada to the purpose of the invasion was not ambition inflamed, nor reason convinced, but the mere loyalty of a British officer refusing to stint the obedience which he owed to the Minister of his Queen."

Interference of political authority with armies in the field.

The correspondence between Generals Nott and Pollock, and the Governor-General in India during the second Caubul campaign, affords a singular picture of the perplexity in which Generals may be placed by the interference of political authority.

The letters of Lord Ellenborough and his secretaries left it doubtful whether it was the intention of the Governor-General that the Generals should advance upon

Caubul, or fall back at once on Peshawur and Quettah; and every fresh letter seemed only to render the obscurity more obscure; in effect, his lordship was perpetually telling them that when he suggested to them to go forward, it was their business to come back; that they were to hold fast when he ordered to let go, and let go when he ordered to hold fast. It is probable that he had no very clear perception himself at this time of the course which he proposed to pursue.

Nott and Pollock.

In the personal opinion of Lord Ellenborough, our position in India at that time was not such as to justify the withdrawal of the large force under Nott and Pollock from our own provinces; but the public voice in India was loud in demanding retribution for the disasters at Caubul, and the abandonment of the women and children, who were prisoners in the hands of the Affghans, could not fail to create a great sensation in England. His lordship therefore found he had no alternative but to yield to the pressure from without, and push the armies of Pollock and Nott further into the heart of the Affghan dominions.

In this dilemma, his own opinion as to the impolicy of the advance of these armies remaining unshaken, he betook himself to a strange expedient in order to preserve a show of consistency, and at the same time to protect himself against the measureless indignation of the communities both of England and India.

Discarding the official mediation of the Commander-in-Chief in India, he despatched two letters to General Pollock, and two to General Nott. In these letters he set forth that his opinion had undergone no change since he had declared the withdrawal of the British armies to the provinces to be the primal object of Government;

but he suggested that perhaps General Nott might feel disposed to retire from Candahar to the provinces of India by the route of Ghuznee, Caubul, and Jellalabad, (this proposition may be compared to the case of a man wishing to retire from Reigate to London, and taking Dover and Canterbury in his way), and that perhaps General Pollock might feel disposed to assist the retreat of the Candahar force by moving forward on Caubul.

All the responsibility thrown on the Generals.

These letters were so worded, either by accident or design, as to cast upon the Generals all the onus of failure, and to confer upon the Governor-General, or at least to divide with him, all the honour of success.

The Armies were in fine condition, and fully equipped for movement, and the Generals were not men to shrink from their share of responsibility, but the distance and the difficulty of communication between Candahar and Jellalabad were great; neither General could feel sure how the other would act on the Governor-General's despatches, and to make a successful advance upon Caubul, it was necessary that they should act in perfect concert, and combine their movements so as to reach the capital at the same time. Two months were consumed in correspondence between the Generals before Pollock could assure himself of his brother General's intention to move upon Caubul.

Colonel Stanhope's description of the disputes between the naval and military commanders of the expedition to Cadiz, 1702.

When the allied expedition, under the Duke of Ormond and Admiral Sir George Rooke, arrived off Cadiz, 23rd August, 1702, officers and soldiers were impatient to engage, and every hour was of consequence, that the Spaniards might add no further to their preparations for defence; yet, in spite of these

considerations, three days were lost by the chiefs in debates upon the best place for landing, and ascertaining localities of which a map would have previously informed them, and in discussing questions which might have been determined on the voyage. These wranglings are thus described by Colonel James Stanhope, who, later in the war, commanded the forces in Spain:—"We are not only divided sea against land, but land against land, and sea against sea. Now, if it be true that a house divided cannot stand, I am afraid it is still more true that an army and fleet divided against itself, and each against the other, can make no conquests."

Difficulties experienced by Napoleon through the rivalry of his Marshals, and the ill-defined nature of their commands.

Even the despotic power of the first Napoleon was shackled—almost paralyzed—by this very evil of an ill-defined command in his war with Spain in 1809. His calculations as to a successful issue in that war were, no doubt, based on totally erroneous notions as to the character, energy, and patriotism of the people he had to contend with; but independently of the difficulties he had to surmount, he had created others for himself in the organization of his own Army.[1] The Marshals, accustomed to obey himself only, would have felt themselves humiliated at being placed under the orders of his brother Joseph, if they had not imagined that Joseph's ostensible command was a mere matter of convenience, and that they were at perfect liberty to dispute his orders, and only to execute them as far as they themselves approved. They were confirmed in this belief by the instructions which they had received to continue to com-

[1] Contrary to his own recorded maxim, which is—"Rien n'est plus important à la guerre que l'unité dans le commandement."

municate direct with the Prince of Neufchâtel, as well as by the tenor of the Emperor's conversations with them, and his conduct towards his brother.

In fact, Napoleon seemed rather to like to repeat to those around him that Joseph was no General, and that he knew nothing of war. On coming into Spain, instead of keeping him near his person, and seeking to give him that degree of consideration and respect in the eyes of the troops whose chief he was destined to become, he kept him following the army. The effect of that line of conduct would not have been effaced, if he had invested him with the most absolute authority; for in an army obedience and devotion are proportioned to the confidence which subordinates place in their commanders. What decision or energy could the King display in his command, when he knew that his subordinates considered themselves superior to him in military talents? Joseph was loaded with an immense responsibility towards the Emperor: the Marshals had no responsibility, whilst they had it in their power to frustrate all the King's designs, by downright disobedience, or a tardy, unwilling obedience.

False position of Jourdan as chief of the staff.

Jourdan, as chief of the staff with Joseph, was also in a false position. The other Marshals had received titles and fortunes from the Emperor; they, therefore, naturally considered themselves superior to Jourdan, and the influence which, as the organ of the King, he should have had, was thus weakened.

The Minister of War, in June, 1809, wrote to Jourdan, expressing the Emperor's disapproval of the inactivity of the Army of Spain. Jourdan, in reply, after acknowledging the letter, proceeds to say:—

"Your Excellency knows that my functions are confined to transmitting the King's orders, and reporting all events to your Excellency. I believe I have fulfilled my duties with care and exactness. If I had supposed it was the Emperor's intention to invest me with more extensive functions, I should have begged to be excused; first, because the supreme direction of affairs in Spain is much beyond my ability; and, secondly, because it is necessary to success in war, *that a chief should have under his orders officers of inferior rank who will obey him; not comrades, who think their merits superior to his.*"

The memorandum sent by the Duke of Wellington to Lord Mahon, which has been referred to in the chapter on Moral Ascendency, page 16, bears very strongly on the present subject also. There is nothing that the Duke more insists upon in that explanation of his views, than the value of the *unity of command* which belonged to Napoleon's presence.

Every sovereign (says the Duke) in command of an army enjoys advantages against him who exercises only a delegated power, and who acts under orders and responsibilities. But Napoleon enjoyed more advantages of this description than any other sovereign that ever appeared. His presence, as stated by me more than once, was likely, not only to give the French Army all the advantages which I have detailed, but to put an end to all the jealousies of the French Marshals, and their counteraction of each other, whether founded upon bad principles and passions, or their fair difference of opinion. The French Army thus had *unity of action.*

A General should be very accessible; all applications or despatches addressed to him should be opened and

A General should be always accessible.

disposed of as fast as possible; he may thus unexpectedly gain information of importance; he will also show his desire to promote the comfort and welfare of his men, and to administer justice strictly and impartially—points on which it is very desirable that the men should think favourably of their commander.

A General can have few confidants, perhaps the fewer the better, but at the same time he is not precluded from hearing and considering the opinions of others; this he may do by consulting his officers singly, a course to be preferred in general to the council of war.

When Boscawen arrived at Halifax in 1758, and sailed for Louisburg, the impediments to landing and the danger to the shipping were represented as so great, that the Admiral consulted his captains singly, the most of whom were opposed to the enterprise, and urged that a council of war should be called. When it came to the turn of Captain Ferguson to be consulted, for whose services on the expedition Boscawen had specially applied, that experienced old sailor represented to the Admiral that for his own honour, and the glory of the country, he should not abandon the enterprise without being fully satisfied upon actual trial that the landing was impracticable; he further advised him not to leave the question to the uncertain resolutions of a council of war, which had been so fatal at Minorca, at Rochfort, and even at Halifax, to the disgrace of all concerned and the extreme loss of the nation.

The opinion of one experienced officer generally more valuable than the collective wisdom of a council of war.

Upon this remonstrance of one brave officer in private conversation, this great expedition took a turn for the interests of Great Britain.

On the other hand, in the Caubul campaign, we

have an instance of the pertinacity of one man defeating the only measure which it is now asserted could have saved Elphinstone's army; we allude to the proposal to concentrate the whole army in the Balla Hissar, which was resolutely opposed by Shelton.

Relative rank of civil and military functionaries not, in all cases, defined.

The relative degree of authority vested in civil and military functionaries is so vaguely defined in some instances, that a clear exposition on the subject of precedence would be very advantageous to the public service.

In the year 1838, a misunderstanding took place in the West Indies, amongst the colonial officials in high position, which, although not attended with any serious results, may serve to exemplify the importance of framing some rules to obviate the risk of a similar misunderstanding, when more important interests are at stake.

The British dependencies in the West Indies are divided into two classes, designated respectively Crown and ceded colonies.

Those of the latter class have a species of legislature or council, and when the government of such a dependency becomes vacant, either through the demise or absence of the Governor, it is customary for the senior member of the council to act "ad interim" until a new appointment is made, or until the return of the Governor. When the government of a Crown colony becomes vacant, the senior military officer, not being the commander-in-chief, usually assumes the government. St. Lucia and Demerara are both Crown colonies, and becoming vacant one after the other in 1837, in conformity with ordinary custom, Colonel Bunbury, commanding 67th Regiment,

Colonel Bunbury becomes

Governor of St Lucia and then of Demerara.

from his rank became first acting Governor of St. Lucia, and subsequently of Demerara on its becoming vacant, British Guiana ranking as a superior government, and being most advantageous in point of rank and salary.

During the time Colonel Bunbury administered the affairs of St. Lucia, he became embroiled with some of the local authorities. Their dissensions became the subject of mutual representations to the Colonial Office, and it is believed that the Governor's administration of affairs was not altogether approved of by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and that despatches were transmitted from Downing Street to Government House at Barbadoes, of such a tenour as to leave no doubt that the removal of Colonel Bunbury to the temporary government of Demerara would not be acquiesced in by the Minister for the Colonial Department.

Order from home not to employ Colonel Bunbury as Colonial Governor.

The Captain-General and Governor of the Windward and Leeward Islands, Sir Evan McGregor, then consulted with the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces as to the withdrawal of Colonel Bunbury from Demerara, and a despatch was immediately transmitted to him, offering him leave of absence (which on a former occasion he had applied for), and directing him to hand over the government of the colony to Colonel Everard, C.B., who proceeded to Demerara for the purpose of assuming the office to which he was thus designated.

Colonel Bunbury sworn in as Governor of British Guiana, declines to give up his position.

Colonel Bunbury declined the leave of absence, and notwithstanding repeated orders directing him to hand over the government to Colonel Everard, he remained in the colony, and continued himself in the administration of its affairs as Governor.

Whether Colonel Bunbury justified this resistance of

the orders transmitted to him from Barbadoes, on the plea that, having been sworn in as acting governor, his civil "status" exempted him from that obedience to his military superiors which might otherwise have been exacted from him, or whether he justified himself on any other grounds,—his conduct on this occasion did not interfere with his further employment in an official capacity, as he served subsequently for several years as major-general in command of the troops in Jamaica.

CHAPTER X.

MUTINIES.

"The malcontent is neither well full nor fasting, and though he abound with complaints, yet nothing dislikes him but the present; for what he condemns while it was, once passed, he magnifies and strives to recall it out of the jaws of time. What he hath he seeth not, his eyes are so taken up with what he wants; and what he sees, he careth not for, because he cares so much for that which is not."—BISHOP HALL.

CHAP. X.

Legitimate resistance to established authority not easily defined.

THE speculative line of demarcation (in the words of Mr. Burke) where obedience ought to end and resistance must begin, is faint, obscure, and not easily definable. It is not a single act, or a single event, which determines it.

In civil life one part of the art of statesmanship is to prevent this line of demarcation from being passed; and in like manner the duty of an officer is to uphold the established discipline of the service and repress any attempt to infringe its rules; but here the parallel between the position of the statesman and the military officer may be said to end.

Systematic opposition to existing civil authority, legal and constitutional.

A systematic opposition to the executive authority in civil affairs may be organized in a country which enjoys a constitutional government. The avowed object of such opposition may be the overthrow of those in the enjoyment of power, and the seizure of such power itself, with a view to change and remodel the institutions of the country. All this may be done perfectly within the pale

of the law. No such licence can be permitted in an Army. One of the first principles of military obedience is that combination for any purpose whatever, except under the orders or with the sanction of the acknowledged chief of the army, is unlawful.

The discussion of the conduct and measures of superiors is equally repugnant to the spirit of military discipline, and any hesitation to obey a lawful command can only be met with stern and immediate retribution.

Distinctive character of martial law.

The distinctive character of martial law is ably described by Sir Matthew Hale, when he says:—"It is a law built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions; in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law. The necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it continuance."

Military officers, in the practical exercise of their duties, are not much concerned with speculations on the philosophy of martial law. Their duties commence with the administration of that law in such a manner as to give the soldier no just cause of complaint, and to prevent a spirit of insubordination and mutiny from springing up; such a spirit, however, will sometimes arise, even without any very good grounds; a few reflections, therefore, on its origin and character may not be unprofitable.

Idleness a fertile source of discontent.

One fertile source of discontent in an army is idleness. A portion only of the time of a soldier is necessarily employed in the routine of his duties in camp or quarters, in keeping up his exercises, and attending to his appointments and accoutrements.

It fortunately happens sometimes that the soldier when off duty finds employment for himself in pur-

suits which are of a harmless nature, or in manly and invigorating exercises. When such is the case, he should be encouraged to devote his time to the pursuits of his choice; but if he does not find employment of this description for himself, his Commander should, by all means, seek to provide it for him, and train him to a taste for it.

Alexander's Generals.

"Eumenes, a noble captain and soldier of Alexander the Great, to take that sluggishness from his souldiers that grew by idleness, did acquaint them with travel and pain to keep them in breath, sometimes marching forward faire and softly, and then retiring with great haste upon the sudden, much like to the Parthians in theyr fighting, taking upon them to flee for feare from the enemies, to draw the enemies after them, and then to return upon the sudden againe to fight with their enemies."

Fabius Maximus.

Fabius Maximus would never suffer his soldiers to be either slothful or idle; but before they should take any ease, he would still remove his whole camp from place to place to keep his soldiers in exercise of service, and to avoid sluggishness and idleness, which idleness was the first beginning of Hannibal's ruin in Italy.

"He thought fit to reclaime the faults of an evil and ignorant souldier by lenitie and gentlenesse, and wished no captaine to use his souldiers more sharply than the husbandman used his fig-trees, olive-trees, and wild pomegranates, which, by pruning and good handling of them, do alter their hard and wilde nature. At the same time, his laws against insubordination were so severe that he would cut off the right hand of any mutinous or seditious souldier within the camp."

"Ausidius Cassius, being consull and general in the

field, would cut off both the hands and feete of those souldiers that so offended, saying that they should have no hands to fight with the enemies, nor feet to go to the enemie."

The Gauls used to put a mark upon the soldier's girdle, and, if the soldier, through idleness, would not keep himself within that mark, he should be straightly kept in prison with thin diet, until the mark of his girdle would serve him.

Barbarous laws of the Gauls to keep the men on the alert.

The old Gauls had another law, that he which came last to the muster should be slain in the presence of the multitude; for that he seemed unwilling to come and to be with the first to answer for himself and his country.

This practice, in a modified form, prevailed in the German service as late as the last century, the corporal of the guard carrying a cane with which he belaboured the last man who fell into the ranks when the guard was ordered to turn out.

Difference of the grounds on which soldiers and officers become discontented.

It is alleged that, as officers serve for honour and their men for interest, the former become discontented at an unfair distribution of promotion, honour, and rewards; the latter, on account of long arrears of pay and bad and insufficient rations.

Causes of mutinies in India.

"Those who have watched events, or have studied Indian military history," says Sir H. Lawrence, "can distinctly trace almost all past murmurs and mutinies —we might indeed say *every one*—to some error or omission, trivial or great, of our own. Pay has been the great stumbling-block.

"The other chief cause of mutiny is religion—fanaticism. Hitherto, it has been restricted to Mahommedans. Hindoos are content to be let alone. The faithful not

only desire to proselytize, but go out of their way to annoy their neighbours with their ceremonies."

The British soldier generally receives his pay and supplies with great regularity; and there are, happily, few instances on record of his having shown a mutinous spirit. One case, which occurred in the year 1715, and created some alarm in London at the time, may be quoted, as it illustrates the observations just made on the jealousy of the soldier as to what he considers his rights.

The Guards, particularly the First Regiment, of which the Duke of Marlborough was colonel, were very much dissatisfied with the clothing issued to them in that year. They said it was so coarse, it was not fit to wear on the King's birthday; and they threw some of their shirts into the King's and Duke's gardens in the Park; and other specimens they exposed in the streets, crying, "These are Hanover shirts." The Duke of Marlborough made them a speech, but without much effect; and orders were then given from the Court to burn the shirts.

It is generally believed that the men had some cause for dissatisfaction on that occasion, and that they had been previously imposed upon in the quality of the clothing issued to them when they were abroad during the war.

When every just ground of complaint has been removed or redressed,[1] and there is still discontent amongst troops, it is then evident that the restraints of authority

[1] "The surest way to prevent seditions (if the times do bear it) is to take away the matter of them; for if the fuel be prepared, it is hard to tell whence the spark shall come that shall set it on fire."—BACON.

are irksome, and that there is a desire to throw them off; in such cases the spirit of disaffection is generally confined to characters of the worst description, always excepting mutinies springing from religious prejudices, such as the (great) mutiny in India.

Symptoms of a discontented spirit (legal insolence).

Where men are seen to pay with reluctance the customary marks of respect; when little knots assemble in earnest conversation; when defamatory stories are circulated, and sneering or libellous remarks made on the characters of officers;—such symptoms indicate a disposition to mutiny. To show a man you think him your enemy is enough to make him so, is an old maxim; therefore no suspicions should be betrayed until all is ready for a blow. A confidential man expressing himself dissatisfied with his commanders, may find out the ring-leaders amongst his comrades; or the agency of women may be made serviceable, as men open their minds to women with whom they are upon intimate terms.

Ringleaders should at once be removed.

Some pretext must be used to remove those who are the leaders in plotting to such a distance as will put it out of their power to do mischief.

Cortez, in order to get rid of some of his men who were opposed to his plans of conquering Mexico, put them in a vessel under Francis Montexo, ostensibly to reconnoitre the coasts which John Grijalva had discovered. 1518.

If men are about to revolt without any sufficient cause, a conciliatory tone is not likely to meet with any success; nothing but a strong hand is likely to avail in such a case; and as men who engage in a revolt are sure to be much at a loss as to what to do without the guidance of those master spirits who have set the spirit

of disaffection in movement, the ringleaders should, if possible, be seized without delay, and the effect will probably be greater if they are punished on the spot.

Familiar as we are with loyal demonstrations on "Royal Oak Day," and aware as every one is that a special service for the 29th May has a place in the Book of Common Prayer, it is singular that, at no very distant period, an oak leaf in a soldier's hat should have excited apprehensions of a military revolt. The circumstance is somewhat analogous to the temporary prohibition of the Highland dress; and the degree of terror which the sight of an oak leaf created may be judged of from the fact that, in 1717, two soldiers were flogged almost to death, in Hyde Park, and turned out of the service, for wearing oak boughs in their hats on the 29th May.

Some hold the opinion that the instigator of a revolt is not entitled to the benefit of that law which forbids us to compass the assassination of an enemy, and that once declared a traitor and a reward offered for his head, it is lawful for any one to put him to death.

Disarming men suspected of disaffection.

When a revolt is anticipated, no time should be lost in disarming the disaffected. This may be done by first separating them from their arms, under some pretext, and then causing some corps which can be depended on to seize the arms of the disaffected. All efforts should be directed to anticipate the mutineers to get the initiative, as it is termed in strategy.

After Cortez left Mexico, the natives formed a plan to allure the Spanish troops to a fête, in order to effect a general massacre. Peter d'Alvarado, who had been left in command by Cortez, having no fortress or place of

security to which he could retreat, fell upon the Indians before they were prepared or had armed themselves.

Lucius Pinarius, Roman prefect in Sicily and governor of Enna, on learning of an intended revolt, convoked the people to an assembly, giving orders to his men to fall upon them at a signal which it was concerted he should make with his robe.

Traitors should be taken by surprise.

"Either we must surprise them," he said, "or they will surprise us."

In anticipation of a revolt, all depôts of arms and magazines should be put in a state of defence, so that they may be held by a few trusty men, and any guns which are likely to fall into the hands of the mutineers should be well spiked.

When hardships must be endured, a General should persuade his men that their privations are unavoidable, and he should use liberality with all that is his own. In this spirit, the Marquis de Pescara and his officers, before the battle of Pavia, distributed the proceeds of the sale of their plate amongst the men.

Germanicus, in like manner, appeased one of the mutinies of the legions in Germany, by distributing his own money and that of his officers.

When through tyranny and incompetency a Commander has become unpopular, he should certainly be removed. It may even sometimes be good policy to remove a Commander on account of unpopularity, although there may be no very good grounds for the prejudice against him; but such a measure should not be adopted without a very close scrutiny into the state of the troops, for the show of dislike to a Commander may be a mere pretext, covering a determination, on the

part of violent and refractory men, to mutiny at any cost, in which case no measure of conciliation can eradicate the evil.

Charles I., on the scaffold, regretted that he had sacrificed Lord Strafford to popular excitement.

In mutinies, measures for their suppression should sometimes be governed by the class of troops to be dealt with.

Young troops and old troops to be differently dealt with.

Young troops are more easily intimidated than veterans; the latter know their strength and how to use it, and they are more easily worked upon by a point of honour than overcome by force.

Germanicus.

The dreadful mutiny of the Roman legions at Bonn, recorded in Tacitus, was appeased by a speech from Germanicus, in which he asked them by what name he should address men who had been guilty of such outrages. "Shall I call you soldiers?" he said; "soldiers!—who have dared to besiege the son of your Emperor—who have made him a prisoner in his own entrenchments? Can I call you citizens? Citizens!—who have trampled under your feet the authority of the Senate—who have violated the most awful sanctions, even those which hostile States have ever held in respect, the rights of ambassadors, and the law of nations? Will you, ye men of the 20th, his fellow warriors in the field, his companions in so many victories, will you thus requite him for all the favours so graciously bestowed on you? From every other quarter of the empire Tiberius has received nothing but joyful tidings, and must I wound his ear with the news of your revolt? Must he hear from me that neither the soldiers raised by myself nor the veterans who fought under him, are willing to own his authority? Must

I inform him that here the centurions are murdered; that in the camp the tribunes are driven from their post; that here the ambassadors of Rome are detained as prisoners; that the entrenchments are a scene of slaughter; and that here a Roman General leads a precarious life, at the mercy of men inflamed with epidemic madness?"

He then adverts to the massacre of the legions of Varus, in a skilful manner calculated to withdraw their minds from present subjects of discontent, and to excite in them a burning desire to revenge that massacre.

The legions stung with remorse at being distrusted by Germanicus return to their allegiance.

The legions on hearing that Germanicus, in consequence of the tumult, was about to send his wife and son for security to Treves, stung with shame at being thus distrusted, entreated him not to let her depart.

Order and tranquillity were soon after restored in this camp, but at Vetera, about six miles distant, insubordination still prevailed. Germanicus sent despatches to the officer in command, Cæcina, informing him that he was about to advance at the head of a powerful army, resolved, if justice was not previously executed, to put the whole body to the sword.

This intelligence was communicated by Cæcina to those on whom he could rely. The officers thus instructed concerted measures, with the well affected amongst the soldiers, and, at a signal given, they rushed into the tents of their comrades, sword in hand.

Dreadful scene of carnage at Vetera.

The scene of uproar and confusion which ensued surpasses any scene of horror recorded in history. Many men of worth and honour perished in the fray, for no attempt was made by any of the tribunes or officers to restore order, or to stem the vengeance and fury of the soldiers.

The troops of Don Sancho, ex-King of Castile, having risen in mutiny, that Prince, who was of a cruel disposition and much feared by his soldiers, seized a lance, and speared two of the ringleaders on the spot. This display of vigour, with an energetic harangue, had the effect of restoring order; but it is not an example to be followed by any Commander who does not feel himself powerful enough to quell the mutiny, as he runs the risk of displaying his weakness, and diminishing any feeling of respect for his authority which may still remain.

Idle threats which cannot be enforced, to be avoided.

When a mutiny takes place, it is good policy in the General to appear to be persuaded that the crime is to be attributed to a few ringleaders.

When the mass of the men can be persuaded to become the executioners of those who instigated the mutiny, the bad feeling is more effectually quenched than if the execution takes place by order of superior authority; and the same animosity towards their superiors will not rankle in the bosoms of the malcontents who escape punishment.

Cæsar addressing mutinous troops.

Cæsar appeased a mutiny by giving the men their discharge, saying, at the same time, "Others shall share with me the glory of the African expedition."

On another occasion, Cæsar, advancing into the midst of the men, said, "Comrades, what do you require?" "To be discharged," was the reply. "Well," said Cæsar, "citizens, you shall be immediately." The men, hurt at being addressed as citizens, said they preferred to be called comrades. "To be comrades," rejoined Cæsar, "we must make war together."

Cæsar repressed the disorders in the Ninth and Tenth Legions which he had brought over from Sicily to Africa by cashiering certain officers.

"C. Avienus, because you have excited the Roman soldiers against the Republic in Italy; because you have ransomed the municipal towns, and have never been of any real service either to the State or to me; lastly, because you have used the transports for the conveyance of your own horses and people instead of my troops, so that the Republic fails in troops when they are wanted: for these reasons I break you with disgrace, and order you instantly to leave Africa.

"A. Fronteius, tribune, I break you as a mover of sedition and a bad citizen.

"You, T. Salienus, M. Trio, and C. Clausenas, have been raised to command by my favour, not through your own merit, and since your promotion you have shown neither courage in war nor love of what is good in peace, and have been more active in exciting the troops against their Commander than discharging your duty with honour and submission; I look upon you as unworthy of any employment in my army; I break you, and order you to leave Africa immediately."

The appearance of a common enemy appeases dissensions.

An alarm of the approach of an enemy is well known to have the effect of allaying or suppressing the spirit of mutiny.

B.C. 410.

At the audience given to the deputies from Athens by the army in revolt at Samos, Alcibiades, who had been recalled from exile by the soldiers and appointed their General, recommended all parties to concur in a vigorous resistance to the common enemy; for, he added, in conclusion, "if the State could once be secured

from its public foes, a reconciliation amongst its members might easily be hoped for; but should either party be destroyed, either this at Samos or theirs at Athens, none would soon be left to be reconciled."

Policy of Cortez.

Cortez, yielding to the cry of the mutineers, made arrangements to evacuate Cuba, while his confidential men, duly instructed, exclaimed so loudly against the abandonment of such a beautiful country, that the mutineers changed their views, and clamoured to remain.

Scipio.

When part of the Roman Army in Spain mutinied, demanding their arrears of pay, Scipio desired them to

B.C. 191.

march to New Carthage to receive it; and that they might do so with confidence, he sent away the troops he had in New Carthage, under pretext of an expedition to chastise Indibilis and Mandonius, two chiefs who had allied themselves with the Carthaginians. The mutineers having been enticed into New Carthage by this stratagem, the leaders were seized and punished, and the mutiny completely suppressed.

Superior officers who encourage disaffection to be immediately removed.

When sedition or mutiny is countenanced or promoted by a superior officer, the first step is, if possible, to separate him from his most strenuous supporters, such as regiments which have been long under his command, and are known to be attached to him. Any measures taken for this purpose must be so well disguised as to appear to be connected with some other object.

When Turenne was ordered to march his army from Germany into Flanders, some of his cavalry showed symptoms of a mutinous spirit, in which they were partially supported by their commander, M. Rosen; for, although Rosen did not wish them to break out into open

mutiny, he thought it politic to encourage a display of reluctance to march into Flanders, in the hope that the corps might thus obtain arrears of pay, and be left in their winter-quarters in Germany.

On the order being given to march, these troops refused to move. Turenne, not doubting at that time the loyalty of M. Rosen, sent him and M. Traci to exhort the mutineers to return to their duty.

When Traci had executed his orders, he came back to the head-quarter camp; but Rosen remained with the revolted troops, ordered his baggage to be sent to him, and collected boats near Strasburg to pass the Rhine, which convinced Turenne that he was acting in concert with the men. Turenne and Rosen. 1647.

Turenne, therefore, marched without delay at the head of a force on which he could rely, composed of 3,000 infantry and four regiments of cavalry, and reached the Rhine just as the mutineers were about to cross.

It would have been easy for the Marshal, with the force at his command, to have charged these mutineers at that moment, and inflicted signal punishment on them in the confusion that prevailed; but as they sent a deputation to say that, if permitted to cross the Rhine, they would obey any orders he might afterwards think proper to give, he allowed them to cross; and troops being required for Flanders, he despatched the cavalry he had brought with him to that quarter, and attended only by a small escort of fifteen persons, he himself repaired by the bridge at Strasburg to Rosen's head-quarters, fully intending to take the first opportunity of making him a prisoner. No such opportunity occurred for several days; during which time he never lost sight of Rosen,

and was obliged to move about with those mutinous troops.

Part of the officers acknowledged his authority, but the troopers would not obey their officers, and elected others from their own ranks. During this time, however, Rosen was losing popularity every day; and Turenne was gradually acquiring an influence, by holding conferences with the men, addressing them frequently, and exhorting them to return to their duty.

Rosen seized.

At length the time arrived to strike a blow; the refractory mass having reached Etlingen, within eight leagues of Philipsburg, the moment appeared favourable to effect the arrest of Rosen. Turenne, therefore, ordered 100 musketeers, from the garrison of Philipsburg, to attend him at daybreak. With one-half of these men he took possession of the gate of the town; the other fifty he despatched with orders to seize the person of Rosen, and convey him as a prisoner to Philipsburg.

Turenne, having assembled the officers and informed them of the arrest of Rosen, the whole of them, as well as the non-commissioned officers, without exception, then tendered their support to the Marshal, and two regiments also gave in their submission and returned to their duty. The rest, headed by the officers they had elected, marched to Franconia. Turenne, with such force as he could muster, pursued them, and in the valley of the Tauber a rude encounter took place.

Precautions as regards sentries when disaffection is abroad.

When sedition amongst a body of troops is only partial, it may be kept in check by double sentries, one who can be trusted being always on the same post with one who is suspected.

After Verona fell into the hands of the Imperialists in

1510, some of the inhabitants being suspected of a conspiracy to bring back the Venetians, the Imperialist General, in order to discover the citizens who were disaffected to the Emperor, caused some of his men to run through the streets at night in a tumultuous manner, calling out, "long live St. Marc." Those houses where any signs of satisfaction were exhibited, were marked and given up to plunder on the following day.

Bernadotte 1796.

On the occasion of a mutiny, on account of arrears of pay, in a regiment forming part of Bernadotte's corps, detached from the Army of the Sambre and the Meuse to reinforce the Army of Italy in 1796, after the corps had crossed the Alps and reached Milan, Bernadotte on being apprised of the circumstance, appeared in person, and gave them the order to march. Awed by their General, they at first obeyed, then hesitated; Bernadotte drew his sword, and, dashing at the leading company, seized a grenadier, and said, "March, or I will kill you," then turning to the regiment, he addressed them in these words:—"Misguided men, do you think I should have brought you thus far to witness your dishonour? You will now either obey me or murder me. Do you seek the life of your General, to whom you are indebted for your own lives? Have you forgotten that without me you would either have been dead men, or you would now be employed in draining the marshes in Hungary? Give up the leaders of this mutiny, or I will cause you to be decimated." The culprits were thereupon brought out of the ranks and made prisoners. Bernadotte gave the word of command to march, and it was at once obeyed.

Buonaparte

Buonaparte, in 1801, dissolved a regiment of artillery

which had revolted and forced a passage into the citadel of Turin.

"Soldiers," he said, "your conduct has resounded through Europe, our enemies rejoice at witnessing your insubordination and crime. Profound grief in the hearts of your fellow-citizens has preceded the cry for vengeance. You have done good service, you are covered with honourable wounds received in upholding the glory of the republic. She has triumphed over her enemies, she holds the first rank among the powers of Europe. But what is the value of such grandeur, if her children, lost to all discipline, suffer themselves to be led by the unbridled passions of a handful of miscreants? You have entered the fortress in a disorderly, tumultuous manner, violating the countersign, without respect to the flag of the French people, which floats on its walls. You killed the brave officer whose duty it was to defend the place. You are all guilty. The officers who could not restrain you from such violence are unworthy to command. This standard, the sight of which should have brought you to your duty, but which you have abandoned, will henceforth be suspended in the temple of Mars, covered with crape. You are dissolved."

Massena at Genoa.

In 1800, the task imposed on Massena was one which combined a singular amount of responsibility.

He had to defend a place of great extent against the attack of superior forces by sea and land. He had within the walls to cope with famine, and a populace exasperated with hunger, and also to urge on to fresh exertions troops already almost exhausted by privations and fatigue.

Firmness and a rigorous sense of justice enabled him to discharge the duty confided to him.

Some of his famished men pillaged Castelletto and Besagno, an example which might have led to fearful results, had not severe retribution been immediately inflicted on the guilty. "It is my duty (said Massena) to punish and to protect, and believe me, soldiers, I shall fulfil my part. I shall protect the citizens, I shall cause these persons and their property to be respected, and I shall punish the guilty. Soldiers, whose career is made up of bravery, privations, and honour, (and you are I believe the majority,) I do not address you; I only point to a few offenders who seek to dishonour our Army, and serve the purposes of the enemy."

Recent instance of mutiny in a regiment in the Federal Army.

In the great contest now raging in America, several instances of mutiny amongst the Federal troops have been reported in the public journals, but not any of a very serious nature, considering the singular composition of the armies now on foot.

On the disbandment of some of the regiments enrolled to serve for two years, whose term of service expired in the spring of the year 1863, *one company* in the 1st New York Volunteers refused to do duty a fortnight before the period fixed for the discharge of their regiment, on the ground that they had been mustered into the service two weeks prior to the rest of the regiment.

This case was referred to the War Department, and the Adjutant-General, in a memorandum, decided that the term of service of regiments reckons from their *completion as* regiments, that is, *the date of muster in of the last company.*

This rule was probably extemporized by the Adjutant-General's department for the occasion. Had such a regulation been in existence before, the officer command-

ing the regiment could of course have acted on it, and punished the offenders without reference to Washington.

This decision was far from satisfying the mutineers, and the disaffection spread even to the other companies, who had not actually completed the two years.

Orders of General Burney.

General Burney thereupon ordered the 40th New York Volunteers under arms, and arrested the ring-leaders, stripped the men of their arms and regimental colours, and confined them to their quarters.

Order of General Sickles.

General Sickles commanding, confirmed these steps, and further ordered that the regiment should be placed on bread and water, and that on the following day the regiment should parade in two reliefs for fatigue duty on the corduroy road in the camp. He notified to them, at the same time, that when the men had returned to duty their complaints would be examined.

The order concluded:—

"If on to-morrow at noon the men of this regiment shall be found yet mutinous, then, besides the loss of all pay now due and to become due, and the bounty of 100 dollars, to which each man would otherwise have been entitled, with an honourable discharge, three men from each company will be selected for trial before a drum-head court, and turned over to the Provost Marshal for the immediate execution of the sentence imposed; all the other mutineers will be numbered and drafted into other regiments of this corps, and required to serve out the full period of their enlistments; the officers will be mustered out, or dismissed, or *reduced to the ranks*, according to circumstances. And the first regiment New York Volunteers, thus disbanded in disgrace, will

cease to exist as a military organization in the service of the United States."

The bread-water sentence was carried out, but the working on the corduroy roads was commuted. The men evincing their desire to return to duty, and expressing regret for what they had done, their arms, &c., were accordingly returned.

General Malet and the Philadelphians.

In a work on Secret Societies in France, an endeavour is made to connect the conspiracy for which General Malet and several French officers were executed during the absence of Napoleon in Russia, with the proceedings of a very remarkable military association formed several years before for the overthrow of the Napoleon Government.

The conspirators belonging to the fraternity are stated to have been known by the name of Philadelphians; and it is asserted that Moreau, Pichegru, and several other distinguished officers, were members of the society.

General Malet, at the time he made the attempt which cost him his life, was under the surveillance of the police—in fact, in a species of custody. His plans he kept a profound secret. To make his preparations, he had to employ the assistance of two young men, who afterwards appeared in the character of aides-de-camp, but up to the last moment they were in ignorance of his plans.

When brought before the military commission for trial, the president asked him who his accomplices were; his answer was, "Si j'avais réussi, j'aurai pour complices la France, l'Europe, et vous-même."

CHAPTER XI.

SPIES.

"What moves thee, say, when sleep has closed the sight,
To roam the silent fields in dead of night?
Cam'st thou the secrets of our camp to find,
By Hector prompted, or thy daring mind?"—POPE'S *Iliad.*

CHAP. XI.

A General should conceal the fact that he has good intelligence of the movements of his enemy.

WHEN a General is so indiscreet as to show that he has good information, curiosity is immediately excited to find out the sources from which his intelligence is obtained, and his plans may thus be frustrated; it is therefore imprudent in a General to make known that he is regularly informed of the enemy's movements.

When the Roman Governor of Jerusalem was informed of the plot to assassinate Paul, he enjoined his informants to keep the matter secret.

The best spies.

Those spies who can move about with the greatest security amongst the enemy's people are the natives of the frontier, or people who have relations in the enemy's country, as they can always give some good excuse if they are arrested; they are also likely to be acquainted with paths and by-ways which are little frequented or known. Neutrals may also be found serviceable.

When a message is of great importance, it is better, *if* possible, to send it verbally; then, if the messenger *falls* into the enemy's hands, nothing is divulged. There

are two risks with letters—that of their being lost, and that of their falling into the hands of the enemy. In either of these cases, if the bearer of the despatch does not know the contents his embassy is to no purpose.

The bearer of a despatch from Dion to Denis, in the Sicilian war, sat down to rest on the journey, and placing a little bag which contained provisions and his despatches under his head, fell asleep. A wolf, attracted by the smell of the provisions, carried off the bag; the despatch, therefore, never reached Denis, and its loss was attended with very serious consequences.

Xenophanes, sent by Philip of Macedon to Hannibal, to conclude an alliance with him against the Romans, fell into the hands of a Roman army, commanded by Valerius Lævinus. Being questioned as to who he was and where he came from, he, with great presence of mind, replied, that he was sent by Philip to make an alliance with Rome. He thus got out of their hands, and fulfilled his embassy to Hannibal. Returning by sea, his vessel was captured by a Roman galley; but he would on that occasion have extricated himself with equal dexterity, had not the suspicions of the Romans been excited by the strange appearance of some Carthaginian deputies sent with him by Hannibal to obtain Philip's ratification of the treaty.

Spies and couriers must be strictly enjoined not to communicate intelligence they have gained or are charged with to any one except the General who employs them.

Necessary training for persons employed as spies.

An endeavour should be made to sharpen their powers of observation by instructing them how to estimate the numbers of men by the space they occupy; also, in a general way, how to judge of topographical

reported to Marshal Luxemburg, the Marshal, relying on the information he had received, observed it was of no consequence, and remained under this delusion until an attack was made on both his wings, when, discovering he had been deceived, he made the best dispositions which circumstances permitted to save his army. Fortunately, Luxemburg's genius was just suited for such a conjuncture.

One John Castillon, employed by the secretary Saya in the time of Phillip II., was for nine years in correspondence with the Prince of Orange, and furnished him with all the ciphers and counter-ciphers used in the Government despatches.

Duke of Guise trusted no secretary.

Montluc says the famous Duke de Guise trusted no secretary, but wrote all important papers with his own hand.

The book which Augustus kept on the most important affairs of the empire was all in his own handwriting.

Modes of transmitting despatches secretly.

One way of carrying despatches is to tear them up in slips, and make buttons of them, numbering the bits; also to put the letter into a rifle, rammed hard down, so that the charge cannot be drawn; then if the bearer is in danger, he can fire his rifle; if he arrives at his destination, the despatches can be obtained by removing the breech of the rifle. Another way is to take two sheets of paper, and cut holes at intervals in one of them; place it on the other, and write the letters of the words you wish to transmit upon the whole sheet through the holes that have been cut in the other; then remove the cut sheet, and fill up the spaces between the letters in the other one, so as to make some kind of a letter out of

Writing in cipher.

it either on business of a commercial or private nature, signed by a merchant or other person, whose signature may agree with the contents. The person to whom it is sent, by applying a sheet with corresponding holes, will decipher what is intended. This scheme is only applicable to short communications. It would be tedious to enumerate the various devices which are known to have been adopted for correspondence in cipher. Some are so well known that they can no longer be practised; and very little ingenuity is required to lay down a system of correspondence in cipher which, for a time at least, will serve to baffle those who have not the key.

Some devices so well known that they can no longer be practised.

When the Spaniards were besieging Arras, a messenger sent with a communication through the enemy's lines, put it in lead and swallowed it, in case of being taken prisoner. When he arrived at his destination, he could not produce the despatch, although they endeavoured to assist him with some active medicine. "Il faut éventrer le coquin," said M. de la Ferte. The fellow heard this at the door, and it had such an effect that the little packet in lead was very soon forthcoming.

The spies who are employed should, if practicable, be people who are unknown to each other, and means should be adopted to prevent their holding any communication with each other, so that the correctness of their information can be tested by comparison. Another way of testing the fidelity of a spy is to question him on matters which must be known to him, and respecting which you are yourself accurately informed.

Description of persons to be employed as spies.

However little worthy of credit you may consider a spy, his communications should not be disregarded until they are thoroughly sifted.

The information of a spy should be thoroughly sifted.

relates that at Mora de Ebro his landlord was in the habit of listening at the keyhole of the door, and, after being detected, he was upon another occasion found listening behind a door to hear the orders given to the sergeants.

Character of a man should be inquired into minutely before he is employed as a spy.

Ascertain as much as possible of the previous history and present standing and circumstances of a man before employing him as a spy, and consider well whether there are any grounds which should deter you from placing reliance upon him.

Count Starenburg, Governor of Vienna, under the Emperor Leopold Ignatius, wishing to send advice to the
1683. Duke of Lorraine of the state of the place, selected the servant of a renegade Turk for the service. The Turk told Starenburg not to depend on the man, as he had already received 300 Hungarian pieces for services rendered, which had made him independent in his station in life; and also that he had his family in Turkey, and that he would be very careful of himself, and run no risks of losing what he possessed. The Turk's predictions were verified; the man, instead of putting the letter into the hands of the Duke of Lorraine, carried it to the Grand Vizier.

The guides to Crassus' army were employed by the Parthians.

The Parthians employed the men who acted as guides to the army of Crassus.

The Polish General Firley, when invested by Tartar rebels and Cossacks at Zbaras, was so closely hemmed in that he had no means of making known his situation to John Casimir, the King, and was in danger of being
1649. reduced to starvation. A Polish nobleman, Skrzetuoski, in this extremity left the place, and presented himself in the camp of the rebels under the pretext of joining them. Having made his observations of their camp, he

then escaped and carried intelligence to the King of the state of General Firley and his army.

Spies should give security, and never be seen anywhere near the General's tent.

A spy who serves you, and is also in the employment of the enemy, is called a double spy. He must be allowed sometimes to communicate correct intelligence to the enemy, or he would lose credit with them. On no account should he be seen anywhere near the General's tent, and some of his family or friends should be held as hostages for his fidelity. If he should be found out to be unfaithful, he may be made the means of deceiving the enemy by persuading him that you intend to do quite the reverse of that which you have in view.

Baring, aide-de-camp to Sir Charles Alten.

In the Peninsular war, Baring, aide-de-camp to General Sir Charles Alten, is supposed to have sometimes obtained information of the enemy personally. He and another German officer were denounced as spies in the general orders of the French army, their persons accurately described, and rewards offered for their apprehension.

In 1744, after the declaration of war by France against England, the Marshal Duke de Belle-Isle, on his road to Berlin, as minister, passed through a small portion of territory belonging to the King of Hanover. The bailiff of the district, having discovered him at the post-house, made him prisoner, together with his retinue. From the correspondence which ensued relative to this transaction, it appeared, amongst other curious matters, that the number of his retinue raised a suspicion that some of his attendants were scientific officers in disguise, appointed to reconnoitre the practicability of that route for an army, as the Marshal might have avoided the road if he had wished, and thus insured his safety from

arrest. After the arrest, an officer of his suite had permission to go to Hanover, and there made acquaintance with a French doctor, who undertook to convey some letters from the Marshal to Berlin and Frankfort. To avoid suspicion, the officer pretended to exchange snuff-boxes with the doctor, having concealed the letters in his own. The Hanoverian officer who had charge of the French officer, suspecting the scheme, laid hold of the two snuff-boxes, the doctor was arrested, and the letters sent to London.

La Fayette, in 1781, employs Charley Morgan as a spy.

La Fayette, when in command of a portion of the Republican Army opposed to Cornwallis, in Virginia, in the autumn of 1781, commissioned a Jersey soldier, Charles Morgan, generally known by the name of Charley, to obtain intelligence of the Earl's movements. This man (according to an American journal of that period), in order to execute his mission, deserted, and joined the Royal Army, assigning as a reason, that, although satisfied so long as he was under the command of Washington, he did not like being put under Frenchmen. After some days had elapsed, Lord Cornwallis, in earnest conversation with some of the officers of his staff, seeing Charley not far off, on duty, called him up, and asked him how long it would take the Marquis to cross James River? Charley, after pausing for a moment, replied, "Three hours." His Lordship exclaimed, "Why, it will take three days." "No, my lord," said Charley, "the Marquis has so many boats, and each boat will carry so many men; if your lordship will take the trouble to calculate, you will find he can cross in three hours." Lord Cornwallis turned to the officers who accompanied him, and said, in the hearing

of Charley, "The scheme will not do." Charley concluded the moment had now arrived for him to return to the Marquis.

Taking the earliest opportunity of plying his comrades with grog until they were well warmed, he then opened his masked battery, complaining of the wants in the British camp, extolling the good cheer in the American camp, and expressing his inclination to return. He thus succeeded in engaging some of his new comrades to desert with him, and was invested with full powers to arrange for the execution of their plan. Under the guidance of Charley, the whole, amounting to a party of seven, succeeded in making their escape; and on reaching La Fayette's quarters, Charley, of course, lost no time in relating the conversation he had overheard.

Kaffir wars: One of the chiefs generally remains friendly to the English, with a view to the interests of the native party.

In a notice of the Kaffir war, we have the following account of the artifices of that people:—

It is an old by-play in Kaffir war for at least one influential chief to *sit still*, and enact the trick of the *friendly dodge*.

Our pseudo ally shuffles off the stolen cattle and other plunder out of sight, gives the most useful information to his fighting friends in the bush, negotiates in their favour for peace when they have robbed the colony of all they can obtain; in short, the *friendly Kaffir chief* ever enacts to perfection *the traitor and the spy*. Such was Jan T'zatzoe and Hintza in 1834; such was Kreili and Macomo and Mapassa in 1846.

Peninsular war:—Colquhoun Grant and his companion Leon, a Spaniard of the peasant class.

The adventures of the celebrated Colquhoun Grant, employed by the Duke of Wellington on many missions of importance, border on the marvellous. In Napier's History some stories of this skilful officer are introduced

with great effect. He was generally accompanied by Leon, a faithful Spanish peasant; and amongst the class to which Leon belonged Grant seems to have had many devoted adherents, who were ready to assist and protect him on all occasions, which, in some degree, accounts for the success with which he pursued the business to which he had devoted himself. He scorned to assume any disguise, and sometimes spent several days in the midst of the French camp in his uniform, even when notices were posted up intimating to the army that he was within their lines.

Grant's boldness.

When despatched by Wellington, in 1812, to ascertain the intentions of the French with respect to Rodrigo, he had occasion to ford the Tormes, near Huerta, a village occupied by a French regiment, while on the opposite side of the river the ford was watched by cavalry videttes, who patrolled constantly backward and forward for the space of 300 yards, meeting always at the ford. "When day broke," says Napier, "the French assembled at the alarm posts; and at that moment Grant was secretly brought opposite the ford, he and his horse being hidden by the gable of a house from the infantry, while the peasants, standing on loose stones and spreading their large cloaks, concealed him from the cavalry. There he calmly waited until the videttes were separated the full extent of their beat, when he dashed through the ford between them, and, receiving their fire without damage, reached a wood, where the pursuit was baffled. Leon, in his native dress, passed uninterrupted, and soon joined him." Having ascertained that means to storm Rodrigo were prepared, and that it was talked of, he placed himself in a wood to test the intentions of

By a sudden rush, he fords the Tormes before the videttes on the bank can reach him.

Marmont; and, as the French passed by in march, he was enabled, from the position he had chosen, to count every battalion and gun; and finding all moved towards Rodrigo, he then entered Tamames, where he discovered they had left the greater part of their scaling ladders behind—a circumstance which made it evident they had no real intention of storming Rodrigo. This it was which allayed Wellington's fears for that fortress.

He counts the numbers of the French Army while on the march.

At last Grant fell into the hands of the French, a prisoner, on which occasion his faithful Leon lost his life. The uniform which Grant wore saved him from execution; but, for a time, his usefulness to the Great Duke was suspended; not so his adventures, for the means by which he succeeded in escaping, reaching England, and returning to the Peninsula in four months, to resume his position on the Tormes, watching Marmont's army, are, if possible, more remarkable than his exploits in the heart of the French army.

Grant taken prisoner; Leon killed.

Grant escapes, repairs to England, and rejoins Wellington in four months.

In another part of Napier's work, the system of intelligence established by the Duke in the Peninsula, 1811, is thus described:—

System of intelligence established by the Duke of Wellington in Spain, 1811.

"His Spanish spies were numerous within the French lines, and a British officer constantly visited their armies in disguise. Sobral, a Spanish Councillor of State, living at Victor's head-quarters, gave intelligence from that side; and Fuentes, a guitar player of celebrity, repeatedly made his way to Madrid; Mr. Stuart, under cover of vessels licensed to fetch corn from France, kept *chasse-marées* constantly plying along the coast, by which he not only acquired direct information, but facilitated the transmission of intelligence from the land spies: amongst those the most remarkable was a cobbler, living

in a little hut at the end of the bridge of Irun, where, always plying his trade, he continued for years without being suspected, to count every French soldier passing in or out of Spain by that bridge, and transmitted their number by the *chasse-marées* to Lisbon. With the exception of Sobral, a double traitor, all the persons thus employed were meritorious. The greatest number, and the cleverest also, were Spanish gentlemen, alcaldes, and poor men, who disdained rewards, disregarded danger, and are to be lauded alike for their boldness, their talent, and their virtue."

Siege of Mons. Treatment of female spies by the Spaniards in 1570, as related by Strada.

Strada relates that in 1570, after Don Federico, in obedience to the order of his father the Duke of Alva, had formed the siege of Mons, the Spaniards found in their quarters certain *women* of Mons, that came under colour of selling herbs, to discover the strength and resolutions of their army. "All which, by Federico's order, had their petticoats cut off above their knee—a military punishment wherewith the Spanish *use* to shame that sex; not unlike the old custom of the Ammonites; and being first carried through the camp, and '*laught*' at, they were, with this disgrace, sent back to Mons."

Akbar Khan made the medium of communication between Nott and Pollock when they were concerting their march on Caubul.

When Nott and Pollock were in correspondence as to the advance of their several armies upon Caubul, one letter was sent by Captain Troup to Akbar Khan, with a request that he would forward it to Nott. A few harmless lines were written in ink, and much important matter in rice water, to be brought out by the application of iodine. The employment of Akbar Khan himself as the medium of communication between the two Generals who were contemplating his destruction, is not one of the least amusing incidents of the war.

In 1814, there was in the French service in Spain a Spaniard, of Flemish descent, called Van Halen, a handsome person, and with a natural disposition for desperate treasons. He was at first attached to Joseph's Court, and, after that monarch's retreat from Spain, was placed by the Duke of Feltre on Suchet's staff; but the French party was now a failing one, and Van Halen only sought by some notable treachery to make his peace with his country. Through the medium of a young widow, who followed him without suffering their connection to appear, he informed Eroles of his object, and transmitted returns of Suchet's force and other matters of interest. At last, having secretly opened Suchet's portfolio, he copied the key of his cipher, and transmitted that also, with an intimation that he would soon pass over and endeavour to perform some other service at the same time also. Shortly after, he endeavoured to deliver a regiment of Cuirassiers into the hands of the Spaniards, but, by some accident, the scheme miscarried.

1814. Van Halen.

Van Halen copies Suchet's cipher and private signals.

He then forged Suchet's signature, and sent letters to the Governors of Tortosa, Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, directing the evacuation of those places; the Governor of Tortosa had suspicions as to the genuineness of the letter, and did not comply; but the others did, and two Generals, 2,600 men, four guns, and a rich military chest, thus fell into the hands of the Spaniards.

In order to guard against such treachery as that of Van Halen, Suchet used to place a very small piece of light-coloured hair in the ciphered paper; the latter was then enclosed in a quill, sealed and wrapped in lead; when received, the small parcel was carefully opened on a sheet of white paper, and if the hair was discovered,

the communication was good; if not, the treachery was apparent; because the hair would escape the vigilance of uninitiated persons, and be lost by any intermediate examination; but Van Halen knew this secret also.

"Our friend came to Aveiro yesterday; and I saw him last night at a fire on the road between Fornos and Martide."

Such is the description given by Wellington of his interview with a spy near Coimbra on the 7th May, 1809. The *friend* alluded to is probably Captain Argenton of the French Cavalry, with whom the Duke was in secret communication at the date of the despatch.

Great dissension prevailed in the French army at that time. By one party, a scheme was proposed for the elevation of Soult to the throne of Portugal. By another party that Marshal seems to have been thoroughly detested.

Argenton (an officer who had gained distinction, but a man of a restless disposition) being of the party opposed to Soult, sought, by opening a communication with the British General, to get rid of Soult. It is also probable that he was urged on by his own exigencies, being of extravagant habits.

The prudence of Wellington in dealing with people of this class is characteristically described by himself in allusion to this interview with Argenton.

"He gave me" (says Wellington) "a good deal of information respecting the strength, the position, and the plans of the enemy, and of the detestation of Soult generally prevailing in the army, ... and I *sent him back without his having seen any of our troops or knowing that we had such numbers collected here.*"

CHAPTER XII.

MILITARY DUTIES IN AID OF CIVIL POWER.

"*Cade.*—Be brave, then, for your captain is brave, and vows reformation. There shall be in England seven halfpenny loaves sold for a penny; the three-hooped pot shall have ten hoops, and I will make it felony to drink small beer! All the realm shall be in common. . . . . There shall be no money; all shall eat and drink on my score; and I will apparel them all in one livery, that they may agree like brothers, and worship me their lord.

"*Dick.*—The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers.

"*Cade.*—Nay, that I mean to do."—SHAKSPEARE.

THE duty imposed upon the military when their services are required in aid of the civil power, is one which is pregnant with responsibility, and calculated to call forth no ordinary amount of tact and intelligence for its due execution.

The law on this subject appears to have been explained by the judges on several occasions previous to the great riots at Bristol in 1831; but when those riots occurred, the position of officers and soldiers in relation to the community at large in cases of riots, as well as their duties on such occasions, seem to have been imperfectly understood.

The trials which succeeded those riots led to an exposition of the law, particularly from the Lord Chief Justice, which tended to remove some of the obscurity previously hanging over the position of a military man,

when confronted by a riotous and illegal assembly of civilians. At the same time, it does still seem desirable that officers should be in possession of more precise instructions on this most important subject than those at present furnished for their guidance in the book of regulations for the Army.

The duty of soldier and civilian the same, in the eye of the law, when riots occur.

"The law," said the Chief Justice at Bristol, "acknowledges no distinction between the soldier and the private individual, in respect of the obligation imposed on every subject of the realm, to preserve the peace of the King."

From the principle here laid down, it is at once obvious that soldiers as well as officers should endeavour to obtain at least a general knowledge of the distinguishing features of the offence denominated a riot, as well as of the duties of loyal subjects when such occurrences do take place.

The offence itself is one of a compound character, and frequently difficult to distinguish from a riotous and unlawful assembly.

The following concise definition of its nature has been given by a modern commentator on the law :—

Definition of a riot by Wise, barrister-at-law.

"A riot is where three or more persons are assembled together without the authority of the law, and engaged in the actual execution of a joint design of a private (or local) nature, with violence, and to the terror of the people."

The term *private* here used signifies that the design in pursuance of which the violence is committed, does not amount to high treason. Fewer than three persons cannot be guilty of a riot, any more than one person can be guilty of a conspiracy.

As to the purpose for which the persons are assembled, it appears to be generally held that the legality of the purpose is immaterial, provided the other ingredients of the offence exist, the policy of the law being to prevent even legal acts from being done in a violent or tumultuous manner to the danger of the public peace.

There must, however, be a joint purpose, so that if at a fair, or market, or place of amusement, a sudden quarrel occurs, and a public disturbance to the terror of her Majesty's subjects takes place, this would be an affray, and not a riot, because there would be no joint purpose.

But if, after the quarrel, parties are formed, and a joint purpose of mutual assistance entertained, and put into execution, then the offence of riot will arise, for, although lawfully assembled at first, and not for any joint purpose, they are *assembled for a joint purpose* the moment that that purpose of violence is entertained. And, in like manner, if a certain number of persons join together and attend a fair or market for the express purpose of rioting, the offence will be complete, although the fair itself is a legal assembly.

Joint purpose essence of a riot.

When a riot ensues amongst persons who have been at first lawfully assembled, then only those who take actual part in it will be guilty.

But where the assembly is unlawful, all persons present appear to countenance *all* the illegal proceedings, and they are exposed to great hazard from the difficulty of showing that they were not partakers in the criminal intent. They are bound to know that the meeting is unlawful, and bound therefore to absent themselves, even if they do not actually endeavour to disperse the meeting.

Certain it is that those engaged in dispersing it cannot distinguish between the active and the unoffending part of the mob.

At the special commission at Bristol, the Chief Justice gave a salutary warning to spectators at riots in these words:—

Charge of Chief Justice, Bristol.

"Let me," said his lordship, "impress on the attention of all those who from idleness, curiosity, or mere thoughtlessness, suffer themselves to form part of a riotous and disorderly meeting, that they subject themselves unconsciously to the danger of punishment for crimes which they never contemplated; for, where many are collected together in the prosecution of an illegal object, it is often impossible to discriminate between the active and unoffending part of the mob. It requires evidence on the part of the accused, which they may not be able to produce, in order to defend themselves against the charge of participation in the guilt of others. The only safe course for the peaceable and well-disposed on all occasions of popular tumult, is thus to lend their ready aid to assist the magistrates in suppressing it, or at all events forthwith to separate themselves from the riotous."

With regard to the duties of officers and soldiers when riots take place, it may be observed, in the first place, that when rioting is to be apprehended in the vicinity of a camp or garrison, it is usual for the military authorities to confine the troops to their quarters, and hold them in readiness to act in a regular manner, if required; it can only, therefore, rarely happen that soldiers or officers, singly or collectively, become entangled in a riot. Such an occurrence is possible on the

sudden breaking out of a popular commotion, and any soldier accidentally passing, being precisely in the position of any other subject, is bound to assist a constable when called upon, and, in the event of his refusing to afford such assistance, he is indictable for a misdemeanor.

This is not a mere theoretical liability, as a case in point was tried before Mr. Baron Alderson, in which the defendant was found guilty.

Case of a person convicted for not assisting to quell a disturbance.

The plaintiff was a police constable, and the defendant was charged with refusing to aid and assist the plaintiff, when called upon for his assistance, to quell a riot which was going on, and which the plaintiff was bound by his duty to stop without waiting for a warrant. The judge, in his address to the jury, thus explained what was necessary to make the refusal an offence :—

"Firstly, you must be satisfied that the constable saw a breach of the peace. Secondly, you must be satisfied that there was a reasonable necessity for the constable Herbert calling upon some other persons for their assistance and support; and in this case there is no doubt that the constable could not by his own unaided exertions have put an end to the combat. Lastly, the prosecutor must prove that the defendant was duly called upon to render his assistance, and that, without any physical impossibility or lawful excuse, he refused to give it. Whether the aid of the defendant, if given, would have proved sufficient or useful, is not the question or criterion. Every man might make that excuse, and say that his individual aid would have done no good; but the defendant's refusal may have been, and perhaps was, the cause of that of many others. Every man is

bound to set a good example to others by doing his duty in preserving the public peace."

In order to justify a constable in arresting or calling upon others to assist him in arresting a person, as in the case just quoted, it is necessary that there be a breach of the peace *continuing*, or reasonable ground to believe that a breach of the peace which *has been committed, will be renewed.*

Persons so assisting a constable are as much under the protection of the common law as the constable.

The preceding remarks refer to riots at common law, although, at the same time, many of them are also applicable to the more aggravated form of riot.

Previous to the reign of George the First, at various times enactments were passed for the suppression of popular tumults of an aggravated nature; but the Act now known as the Riot Act was not introduced until the reign of George the First, and with little alteration, except the substitution of a milder punishment for death, it has continued in force as originally introduced up to the present time.

Distinction between riots at common law and felonious riots.

The distinction between riots at common law and felonies, or aggravated riots, was thus described by Mr. Justice Gaselee:—

"A riot is not the less a riot, nor an illegal meeting the less illegal, because the proclamation of the Riot Act has not been read; the effect of that proclamation being to make the parties guilty of a capital offence if they do not disperse within an hour; but if that proclamation be not read, the common law offence remains, and it is a misdemeanor; and all magistrates, constables, and even private individuals, are justified in dispersing the

offenders, and if they cannot otherwise succeed, they may use force.

By the Riot Act it is enacted, "That if any persons, to the number of twelve or more, being *unlawfully*, riotously, and tumultuously assembled together, to the disturbance of the public peace, and being required or commanded by any one or more justice or justices of the peace, or by the sheriff of the county, or his under-sheriff, or by the mayor, bailiff or bailiffs, or other head officer or justice of the peace of any county or town corporate where such assembly shall be, by proclamation to be made in the Queen's name to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations or to their lawful business, shall, to the number of twelve or more (notwithstanding such proclamation made), unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously remain or continue together by the space of one hour after such command or request made by proclamation, that thus such continuing together, to the number of twelve or more, after such command or request made by proclamation, shall be adjudged felony without benefit of clergy." Riot Act.

The punishment, which by the original Act was death, has been altered to transportation or imprisonment.

The formalities to be observed on making proclamation are expressly laid down in the second section of the Act, which is as follows:—

"And be it further enacted that the order and form of the proclamations that shall be made by the authority of the Act shall be as hereafter followeth; that is to say, the justice of the peace, or other person authorized by this Act to make the said proclamation, shall, among the said rioters, or as near to them as he can safely come,

with a loud voice command, or cause to be commanded, silence to be while proclamation is making, and after that shall openly and with loud voice make, or cause to be made, proclamation in these or words to the like effect:—

Riot Act.

"Our Sovereign Lady the Queen chargeth and commandeth all persons being assembled immediately to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations or to their lawful business, upon the pains contained in the Act made in the first year of King George, for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies.

"God save the Queen.

"And every such justice and justices of the peace, sheriff, under-sheriff, mayor, bailiff, and other head officer aforesaid, within the limits of their said jurisdictions, are hereby authorized, empowered, and required, on notice of any such unlawful, riotous, and tumultuous assembly, to resort to the place where such unlawful, riotous, and tumultuous assembly shall be, of persons to the number of twelve or more, and there to make or cause to be made proclamation in manner aforesaid."

When twelve or more persons, without committing any act of violence, continue assembled in such a manner as to excite terror and alarm in the neighbourhood, although their assembly is unlawful, and they are liable to be tried and punished, their dispersion should not be proceeded with until the proclamation in the Riot Act has been read, and one hour given them to disperse; but if the reading of the Riot Act is opposed, or any breach of the peace committed within that hour, immediate steps may then be taken for their dispersion, without waiting for the expiration of the hour.

Steps which may be taken when the reading of the Riot Act is opposed.

Military accused of exceeding their duty at the Manchester Riots.

One of the arguments strongly urged against the military on the occasion of the Manchester riots, as they are popularly called, was, that they did not give the people time to disperse; that not more than twenty minutes elapsed from the opening of the meeting until the troops charged and cut down those whose conduct was peaceable and orderly.

The meeting referred to, which took place on the 16th August, 1819, was attended by about 80,000 persons. The avowed object of the people assembled was to petition Parliament—an object in itself admitted to be perfectly legal; but the great number that assembled, and the military array in which they appeared, with banners inscribed with "Liberty or death!" created alarm, and were declared to constitute the unlawfulness of the meeting.

The principal cities in England expressed an opinion that the meeting was peaceable and orderly, and that the behaviour of the military was intemperate and illegal.

Reasons assigned for the opinion expressed in the principal cities.

It was urged that if the meeting was an illegal one, and the arrest of the ringleaders was necessary, no more violence should have been used than was necessary to effect that object; that, at the time the military charged upon the assembled multitude, the attitude and manner of the people was perfectly orderly and regular; and, as before observed, that due notice had not been given to enable them to disperse.

Justification of the decisive measures adopted founded on the state of the country at the time.

On the other hand, it is quite certain that a spirit of disaffection was rife at that time, requiring a strong hand for its suppression. By some of the leading organs of the multitude then assembled, decidedly

republican sentiments were disseminated, the killing of kings openly justified, the truths of Christianity impugned, and the institution of property decreed as an usurpation of the common rights of the people.

Parliament refuses to inquire into the transactions at Manchester.

All motions for Parliamentary inquiry into the transactions at Manchester were rejected by Ministers, in which they were strongly supported. Grand juries threw out bills preferred against individuals of the yeomanry force,[1] and the coroners' inquests on the bodies of the people killed did not inculpate the magistracy and military; while true bills were found against Hunt and nine others for a conspiracy to overturn the Government.

Grand juries throw out bills against Yeomanry, &c., engaged in quelling the disturbance.

Lord George Gordon's riots.

The riot to which the name of Lord George Gordon is attached with memorable notoriety, affords a very remarkable instance of the interference of the military without the presence of a magistrate, and some singular phases of the result of such interference.

The military interfere without the presence of a magistrate.

Lord George had made himself conspicuous in upholding what is called the Protestant cause, in opposition to those who were disposed to relieve the Roman Catholics of some of the political disabilities under which they laboured.

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[1] In an action against some members of the Yeomanry for injury inflicted by them on one "Redford," one ground of defence was, that being engaged in executing a warrant, they acted in self-defence. Upon this Mr. Justice Holroyd observed:—"There is strong evidence that in this particular part where the plaintiff was, there was a great degree of resistance (not, and it is worth remark, that the plaintiff was engaged in it), and if there were the cavalry and soldiers on one side, and the mob on the other, then the act of one man in the mob would be the act of all, if the mob were at the time acting illegally; and if *any one of them* began his attack upon the military before there was a prior attack by the military, then the military would be at liberty to proceed in their own defence against *all* those persons who were acting in concert with the individual by whom the military were at first opposed."

The language he used to the party of which he was the acknowledged leader was, that "His Majesty, by giving assent to the bill of relief, had broken his coronation oath, and brought himself to the same pass in which James the Second was after his abdication." He urged them to assemble in large numbers, for the purpose of accompanying him to the House of Commons with a petition; he would not carry up the petition, he said, unless he was met by at least 20,000 people.

Lord George and his associates are not supposed to have had a design to overthrow existing institutions and introduce the reign of anarchy; but it seems very evident that, by the display of numbers, they wished to overawe the Legislature by an undue influence; and although the assembled multitudes were exhorted by their leaders, in the usual form, to abstain from any tumultuous conduct, there can be little question as to the irregularity of their proceedings.

Proclamation of George III. authorizing the military to act without the presence of a magistrate.

His Majesty George the Third, upon this occasion, issued a proclamation empowering the military to act without waiting for the directions of the civil magistrate; and the troops did act, and killed and wounded several hundred persons. Lord Mansfield, in defending these measures in the House of Lords, thus expressed himself:—"When a felony is committing or committed, and no justice or constable present, men are undoubtedly to exert themselves; and if they cannot apprehend, they are justifiable in putting the perpetrators to death. The justification, however, depends on the circumstances of the case. The soldiers who assisted in the suppression of these riots and tumults, in contemplation of law, are to be considered mere private individuals acting accord-

Lord Mansfield defends the measure. He explains the law in its bearing on the case.

Soldiers who act in such cases to be regarded as *private individuals.*

ing to law, and upon any abuse of the legal power with which they were invested, are amenable to the laws of their country."

Bill of indemnity proposed and laid aside as unnecessary. Reasons for the same.

It appears at one time to have been the intention of the Ministry to move for a bill of indemnity, because having obtained the aid of the soldiery "might appear a measure that militated against the spirit of the Constitution. But the bill was not introduced, and the grounds upon which the Ministers changed their intention in this respect were thus stated by Lord North:—"Such a bill," he observed, "was only necessary when one individual was liable to be prosecuted for having done another an injury by an act which nevertheless had been of great public utility. If a Minister in an emergency exceeded the law, any citizen who thus sustained an injury might recover damages against the Minister in a court of justice. Then, indeed, the Minister might have recourse to Parliament, whose uniform practice was to grant indemnities with alacrity. But, in the present instance, who could pretend to have sustained an illegal injury. When threatened with a prosecution, it would not be too late to apply to Parliament. Moreover, the Commons could impeach him; if they did not, that was his indemnity."

Bill of indemnity not required until damages awarded against the Ministers in a court of justice.

The Commons could also impeach the Ministers; if they did not, then that was an indemnity to the latter.

Sheridan tries to introduce a bill prohibiting the military from interfering without a magistrate.

Sheridan made a motion at this time in the House of Commons, to the effect that no military force can justifiably disperse illegal assemblies without waiting for directions from the civil magistrate, unless outrages have broken forth into such acts of violence and treason that all civil authority is overborne, and the immediate subversion of all legal government directly threatened. This motion was opposed on the ground that it was

The motion rejected as an attempt to define the circumstances under

an attempt to define under what circumstances it would be proper and legal to recur to the military power, and that it was a vague definition, which soldiers could not be expected to understand, and which might easily imbue them with a fatal timidity.

which the military might interfere, and to impose instructions on the military of such a nature as might make them shrink from the performance of their duties through a feeling of timidity.

The riots at Bristol, in 1831, afford instruction of another kind. No endeavour was made on that occasion, as at Manchester, to criminate the military for acting with undue promptitude; nor were they threatened with legal proceedings, as in the case of the troops employed in suppressing the Gordon riots for acting without a magistrate. The indictment against the military at Bristol was comprehended in a series of charges against the commanding officer and the second in command, for not having zealously given effect to the orders issued by the magistrates, by which full authority was given to them to use any means in their power to restore order in the city of Bristol.

Bristol riots, 1831.

The conduct of the military at Bristol the very reverse of that of their fellow-soldiers during the Gordon and Manchester riots.

The riots now referred to commenced on Saturday the 29th October, 1831, continued throughout the whole of the next day (Sunday), and were only got under on Monday morning. The whole of the city was on the verge of destruction; the mansion-house, custom-house, excise office, and bishop's palace were plundered and set on fire; the prisons burst open with sledge-hammers, and their inmates, debtors and criminals, set at liberty amidst the exulting shouts of the populace. During the whole of the Sunday the mob were the unresisted masters of the city. Forty-two offices, dwelling-houses, and warehouses were completely destroyed, exclusive of public buildings. The loss of property was estimated at half a million sterling. The number of rioters killed, wounded,

or injured amounted to about 110. Of about fourteen or fifteen who lost their lives, only three died from wounds given by the military. The rest were mostly the victims of excessive drinking, which either brought on apoplexy, or prevented their escape from burning and falling ruins.

Detailed charges brought against the commanding officer for want of vigour.

The culpable supineness of the officer commanding the troops in Bristol can be best understood from the charges which were preferred against him before a court-martial assembled at Bristol for his trial.

These charges set forth—

First. "That on the evening of Saturday, after the riots had begun and the Riot Act had been repeatedly read, the Colonel did not act with any vigour or effect in obeying the directions of the magistrates to disperse the mob, but conducted himself in a feeble and temporizing manner calculated only to encourage the rioters.

Second. "That on the Sunday, the second day, when he had brought the military for the protection of the mansion-house, he sent back the 14th Light Dragoons to their quarters in the very heat of the riot, under the pretext that their presence only irritated the populace, and shortly afterwards sent them away five miles from the city, alleging that the men and horses were already too much exhausted to be useful, which was not the fact, and positively refusing to comply with the directions of the magistrates to call them back, as the riot was hourly becoming more destructive and alarming.

Third. "That when required to protect the jail, which the rioters were attacking after having already destroyed the Bridewell, he gave positive orders to the cornet whom he put in command of the detachment sent for that purpose,

on no account to use force, but only to go to the jail and come back; which the troops accordingly did, although, when they arrived at the jail, the mob had broken into it, and were in the very act of liberating the prisoners and setting fire to the Governor's house.

"That after the rioters had made their way into the court of the Bishop's palace, and had forced the main door of the palace itself, the Colonel, although he himself took post within the court with a detachment of military, remained wholly inactive, during the commission of various acts of outrage by the rioters under his own eyes, refusing or omitting to comply with the application of certain of the bishop's servants, as well as of certain constables and other persons there present, to afford them assistance, in order to check the outrages of the rioters, and to save the said palace and the property therein contained; and, on the contrary thereof, he the said Lieutenant-Colonel gave most peremptory orders to the said detachment not to use any violence to the rioters, or to that effect, and passively permitted certain of the rioters returning out of the said palace laden with its plunder, to escape; and, at the same time, released, or caused to be released, certain of the said rioters, who had been apprehended in or about the said palace in the act of committing outrages, or carrying off plunder, and whom the persons apprehending them had consigned or offered to consign to the custody of the said detachment. Fourth.

"That, on the Sunday evening, when the Mansion-house was in flames, although he was on the spot at the head of a detachment of troops, he not only made no attempt to arrest the progress of the fire or prevent further outrages; but, after looking on for a few minutes, Fifth.

actually marched away the troops, and ordered them to return to their quarters, leaving Queen Square utterly unprotected, the consequence of which was, that during the night two entire sides of it were burnt down.

Sixth. "That, although he received at midnight a letter from the Mayor requesting and authorizing him to take whatever steps and issue whatever orders he, as military commander of the troops, might think necessary to check the destruction which was going on, he paid no attention to it during four hours—went to bed in the meantime—and, when called out of it by a magistrate about four o'clock on Monday morning, manifested great reluctance to act, pretending that the troops would be of no use.

Seventh. "That, on various occasions during all the three days, instead of resisting and putting down the rioters, he temporized with and yielded to them frequently, shaking hands with them, addressing them familiarly, and even using to them language which reflected on the conduct of a portion of the troops under his command, and which was calculated to add to the irritation of the rioters, and, at the same time, to augment their confidence in their own strength and power."

The officer who was despatched to the jail by Colonel Brereton, in his evidence before the court-martial, stated: —"When I returned, Colonel B. asked what I had done at the jail. I said, I had done what he told me—nothing; that I had seen an immense mob at the jail, destroying it, and had done nothing to check them. He told me he had heard I had shot four men there. I replied I had done nothing of the sort; and he said I had acted perfectly right."

The proceedings of the court were abruptly brought

to a close by the suicide of the prisoner, Colonel Brereton, before he had entered on his defence. The case is therefore, incomplete, so far as regards that officer; but his conduct was considered to be so glaringly inconsistent with his duty as to form no justification for the officer next in command, having abstained from taking that active part in suppressing the tumult which the extreme nature of the case so evidently demanded; and as he had been also personally applied to by the magistrates to assist with the troop under his command in restoring order, charges were preferred against him also, and the trial followed that of Colonel Brereton.

Charges against Capt. Warrington.

The charges against Captain Warrington, commanding a troop of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, were to the effect:—

"That, when informed on the Sunday night that the mob was about to set fire to the Custom-house, he neither turned out with his troop for its protection, nor communicated to his commanding officer the information he had received.

"That on the Monday, although he received positive written instructions from the Mayor, to take the most effective and decisive steps in his power for quelling the riot, he neither acted on them nor transmitted them to his superior officer, but kept his troop inactive in its quarters till he was again applied to, an hour afterwards, by a magistrate in person, while the mob during the interval had fired and sacked several houses.

"That although it was his duty, as being the only commissioned officer with the troop, except a young cornet of sixteen months' service, to be constantly at his quarters, to direct its movements and take the com-

mand of any detachment which might be called upon to act, he on various occasions either had been absent, or had sent out detachments to act under the command of that young officer, he himself remaining at home."

He was found guilty of the first and second charges, and of the greater part of the third charge, and sentenced to be cashiered.

Gavazzi riots, Montreal, 1852.

In the year 1852, the well-known orator Gavazzi, while on a tour in Canada, announced an address in one of the churches of Montreal. From the power and influence of the Romish party in the city, and the excitement occasioned by the appearance of Gavazzi, a breach of the peace was apprehended, and many persons who attended the lecture were supposed to have provided themselves with arms for self-defence.

The military fire upon the people assembled in the street without any lawful word of command.

The Mayor of Montreal, from the information that was brought to him, deemed it necessary to call upon the officer commanding the 26th Regiment to furnish him with a military party to aid in the preservation of the peace; and in answer to his requisition, two companies, mustering in all 200 men, under the command of the major of the regiment (Lieut.-Colonel Hogarth), were placed at his disposal.

Position of the military at the time of the occurrence.

Colonel Hogarth, in concert, it is supposed, with the Mayor, thought it advisable to divide the force into two parties of 100 men each, and stationed them at some distance from each other in the streets abutting on the church in which Gavazzi was engaged with his lecture.

No rioting, at the time the people were fired upon, requiring such an extreme measure.

At the conclusion of the lecture, some rioting took place, and it has been said that firearms were discharged; but, if so, the discharge was harmless, and it has never been pretended that any breach of the peace was com-

mitted amounting to a disturbance which an ordinary police force could not suppress. Suddenly, however, without the slightest warning, a volley from one of the parties of military posted in the street was directed against the people leaving the church, which proved fatal to several innocent persons returning to their homes, and wounded a number of others.

Contradictory statements as to the cause of the volley being fired.

The civil and military authorities in command on the spot were as much astonished at this unlooked-for attack on the people as were the unfortunate persons against whom it was directed; the firing was with difficulty stopped (the men intending to keep it up), and the question immediately arose, "Who gave the order to the military to fire?" The Mayor denied that he had authorized the military to act, Colonel Hogarth had not given any orders, and the officer commanding the company that fired had not given the word of command; yet the men distinctly asserted that they only fired upon word of command clearly and unmistakably given.

The officers tried by the civil power for murder acquitted.

In consequence of this occurrence, some of the officers and men of the 26th Regiment were arraigned before the criminal court in Montreal, on a capital indictment. The trial excited great interest; and great apprehensions were entertained for the safety of the public peace while it was proceeding. Such measures, however, were adopted that no breach of the peace occurred, and the trial ended in the acquittal of the prisoners.

A soldier brought before court-martial for an irregularity in firing off his piece in the ranks without leave or order.

Another effort to penetrate the mystery surrounding the whole transaction was then made by assembling a court-martial, and preferring a charge against one of the men implicated for a breach of discipline in firing off

his musket in the ranks without orders; but the charge was so drawn up as to embrace a capital offence, and an application was made to the judges to interfere and demand the release of his prisoner.

Proceedings quashed in consequence of unskilfulness in the wording of the charge.

The arguments used by counsel in favour of the prisoner were to the effect that he was not arraigned before a court competent to try the matter specified in the charge against him.

Arguments on which the civil power demanded the release of the prisoner when before the court-martial.

That it would have been in the power of the prosecution to have suppressed certain words in the charge, "towards," &c., and the omission of these words would have prevented the civil court from interfering; but that military courts are not to notice anything which can be tried by the ordinary tribunals, and therefore the court-martial had no right to proceed; for if the court inquired into the charge as it stood, it would proceed to try an issue of life and death. That the fact of the discharge of the musket would form the main part of the matter inquired into; and "if the discharge of that musket enter as an ingredient into another offence of a capital nature, can it be said the man so acquitted or convicted is to be again brought to answer for the same act charged to have been done '*diverso intuitu*' before the court-martial?"

The military authorities, in consequence of the interposition of the civil power, abandoned proceedings against the prisoner.

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
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